The Late Great Walter Williams said the South had a right to secede.

Southerners appear to have been wanting independence for many decades prior to the Civil War, so you could hardly call them "rash".

Democrats had controlled the country for decades, and Southerners by and large controlled the Democratic Party. 3/4ths of the Whig presidents had also been born in the South. The country had fought a war that got vast territories from Mexico and the assumption was that slaveowners would get their share of those territories.

There were also plans to acquire Cuba and possibly other Spanish and Mexican territories. Those plans fell through, but cotton prices were high. The only problem was the anti-slavery agitation, which only really became widespread after the Kansas-Nebraska Act (1854).

Secessionist agitation flared up on occasion. There were some politicians and agitators who jumped in at every opening to clamor for disunion, but most Southerners, and even most slaveowners weren't longing for secession for decades.

Madison was not the authority which granted the Constitution it's powers, and what he believed is irrelevant when compared to what the people ratifying the document believed.

Clearly, what Madison and other Framers believed the Constitution meant was relevant to what the Constitution meant.

With three states making it quite clear they believed secession was legal, (and for that matter, see Madison's quotes up above) and the other states not objecting, it is quite reasonable to believe that secession was legal under the Constitution and that nothing in it contradicted the Declaration of Independence.

Hamilton and Jay explained to the New York ratifying convention that ratification meant adopting the Constitution "in toto." If the convention didn't want that, they were free not to ratify. One reason the other states didn't object was because most of their conventions had already ratified the constitution and gone home.

Other states that included reservations in their ratifications refered to the right of revolution or to the people reasserting the power they had delegated. They didn't advocate any specific procedure for that happening.

In fact, you have to reach a lot to suggest there is any evidence that secession was illegal. The bulk of the evidence is on the side of legal.

People weren't talking that much in the early days of the Constitution about whether unilateral state secession was legal. The theorizing -- pro and con -- came later.

Meaning they recognized it as a right which they chose not to exercise.

Your logic is faulty. Voting to reject a plan doesn't mean the plan is legal or feasible. Ridiculous and unconstitutional schemes are rejected every year by Congress. That doesn't mean those schemes were constitutional (Sometimes Congress approves ridiculous and unconstitutional schemes, which means they want them to be constitutional, but doesn't prove that they are).

Simon Cameron was very corrupt, but Lincoln's reaction tends to make you think he didn't see it as that big of a deal.

There was a war on. Everyone in the Cabinet had a constituency back home that Lincoln feared displeasing. As it was, Cameron didn't even last a year as Secretary of War before he was replaced by Stanton, who had been a Democrat.

One thing I've learned in the last few years is that presidents say all kinds of stupid things in private when they think they aren't being recorded (and sometimes in public when they ought to realize that they are being recorded). Using stray comments as evidence for serious and damning judgments can lead to false or inaccurate or unproven conclusions.

The same sort of responsibility that slaves would have for their work in making their masters wealthy.

That is why people wonder about you. Slaveowners were not the slaves of Washington or New York. Apart from being what some people would call obscene, that comparison is wildly inaccurate.

You've swallowed whole the slaveowner's argument that New York City was cheating them out of millions. In fact, a lot of cotton was shipped directly from Southern ports to Britain and to Europe. If Southerners objected to going through NYC, they could buy and crew ships, insure the ships and cargoes, and ensure timely delivery of cotton in good years and bad all by themselves and see how much that cut into slavery's profits.

The reason for going through NYC was so that ships wouldn't be empty coming over from Europe or Britain: the Southern market was that much smaller than the Northern. New York City also had experienced financial institutions that most slaveowners had no trouble dealing with at times when fear over the future of slavery wasn't a serious issue.

And Southerners, as I've said above, largely controlled DC before the Civil War -- or at least before the reaction to Kansas-Nebraska temporarily cost them control of the House. Southerners got their fair share out of government appropriations. Any stealing or corruption would have been as much Southern as Northern in origin.

As I mentioned earlier in the thread, the behavior of Lt Porter in commanding the Powhatan leads me to believe Lincoln was going to get his war in Pensacola if he didn't manage to get it in Charleston.

Within 8 days of taking office, orders of March 12, 1861 issued from the Lincoln administration to reinforce Fort Pickens. These orders to Army Captain Vogdes were delayed until after the Senate adjourned on March 28, 1861 and then delivered by USS Crusader on March 31, 1861. Capt. Vogdes delivered them to Navy Captain Adams on April 1, 1861. Capt. Adams refused to comply with the orders.

RECORDS OF REBELLION,

VOLUME 1, CHAPTER 4

OPERATIONS IN FLORIDA.
[CHAP. IV.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, March 12, 1861.

Captain VOGDES, U. S. Army,
On board U. S. sloop-of-war Brooklyn, lying off Port Pickens:

SIR: At the first favorable moment you will land with your company, re-enforce Fort Pickens, and hold the same till further orders. Report frequently, if opportunities present themselves, on the condition of the fort and the circumstances around you.

I write by command of Lieutenant-General Scott.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

To: Captain I. Vogdes,
First Artillery, U. S. Army
on board Ship of War Brooklyn
off Fort Pickens,
Pensacola, Fla.

Delivery of these orders was delayed until after the Senate adjourned on March 28, 1861. They were delivered via USS Crusader to Capt. Vogdes, off Pensacola, on March 31, 1861, and by Capt. Vogdes to Navy Capt. Adams on April 1, 1861. Capt. Adams refused to comply with the orders, see below.

THE SENATE ADJOURNED
March 28, 1861

https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/hlaw:@field(DOCID+@lit(sj05289))

This the end of the Senate Journal for March 28, 1861:

Mr. Powell, from the committee appointed to wait on the President of the United States and inform him that, unless he may have any further communication to make, the Senate is now ready to close the present session by an adjournment, reported that they had performed the duty assigned them, and that the President replied that he had no further communication to make.
Mr. Foster submitted the following resolution:
Resolved, That the Senate will adjourn without day at four o'clock this afternoon.
The Senate proceeded by unanimous consent to consider the said resolution; and, having been amended on the motion of Mr. Hale, it was agreed to as follows:
Resolved, That the Senate do now adjourn without day.
Whereupon
The President pro tempore declared the Senate adjourned without day.

Lincoln did not fail to obtain Congressional approval because Congress was not in session, he waited until Congress adjourned and only then did he get busy the following day.

March 29, 1861
To the Secretary of the Navy

I desire that an expedition, to move by sea be go ready to sail as early as the 6th of April next, the whole according to memorandum attached: and that you co-operate with the Secretary of War for that object.

Signed: Abraham Lincoln

The memorandum attached called for:

From the Navy, three ships of war, the Pocahontas, the Pawnee and the Harriet Lane; and 300 seamen, and one month's stores.

From the War Department, 200 men, ready to leave garrison; and one year's stores.

April 1, 1861 by General Scott
April 2, 1861 approved by Abraham Lincoln
To: Brevet Colonel Harvey Brown, U.S. Army

You have been designated to take command of an expedition to reinforce and hold Fort Pickens in the harbor of Pensacola. You will proceed to New York where steam transportation for four companies will be engaged; -- and putting on board such supplies as you can ship without delay proceed at once to your destination. The object and destination of this expedition will be communicated to no one to whom it is not already known. Signed: Winfield Scott
Signed approved: Abraham Lincoln

April 4, 1861
To: Lieut. Col. H.L. Scott, Aide de Camp

This will be handed to you by Captain G.V. Fox, an ex-officer of the Navy. He is charged by authority here, with the command of an expedition (under cover of certain ships of war) whose object is, to reinforce Fort Sumter.

To embark with Captain Fox, you will cause a detachment of recruits, say about 200, to be immediately organized at fort Columbus, with competent number of officers, arms, ammunition, and subsistence, with other necessaries needed for the augmented garrison at Fort Sumter.

Signed: Winfield Scott

April 1, 1861
To Captain H.A. Adams
Commanding Naval Forces off Pensacola

Herewith I send you a copy of an order received by me last night. You will see by it that I am directed to land my command at the earliest opportunity. I have therefore to request that you will place at my disposal such boats and other means as will enable me to carry into effect the enclosed order.

Signed: I. Vogdes, Capt. 1st Artly. Comdg.

Captain Adams REFUSED TO OBEY THE ORDER and reported to the Secretary of the Navy as follows:

The instructions from General Scott to Captain Vogdes are of old date (March 12) and may have been given without a full knowledge of the condition of affairs here.

It would be considered not only a declaration but an act of war; and would be resisted to the utmost.

Both sides are faithfully observing the agreement (armistice) entered into by the United States Government and Mr. Mallory and Colonel Chase, which binds us not to reinforce Fort Pickens unless it shall be attacked or threatened. It binds them not to attack it unless we should attempt to reinforce it.

The Secretary of the Navy issued a CLASSIFIED response to Capt. Adams:

April 6, 1861

Your dispatch of April 1st is received. The Department regrets that you did not comply with the request of Capt. Vogdes. You will immediately on the first favorable opportunity after receipt of this order, afford every facility to Capt. Vogdes to enable him to land the troops under his command, it being the wish and intention of the Navy Department to co-operate with the War Department, in that object.

Signed: Gideon Welles, Secty. of the Navy

April 11, 1861 (USS Supply, official ship's log)

"April 11th at 9 P.M. the Brooklyn got under way and stood in toward the harbor; and during the night landed troops and marines on board, to reinforce Fort Pickens."

- - - - -

April 1, 1861
To: Lt. D.D. Porter, USN

You will proceed to New York and with least possible delay assume command of any steamer available.

Proceed to Pensacola Harbor, and, at any cost or risk, prevent any expedition from the main land reaching Fort Pickens, or Santa Rosa.

You will exhibit this order to any Naval Officer at Pensacola, if you deem it necessary, after you have established yourself within the harbor.

This order, its object, and your destination will be communicated to no person whatever, until you reach the harbor of Pensacola.

Signed: Abraham Lincoln
Recommended signed: Wm. H. Seward

April 1, 1861
Telegram
To: Commandant, Brooklyn Navy Yard

Fit out Powhatan to go to sea at the earliest possible moment, under sealed orders. Orders by confidential messenger go forward tomorrow.

Signed: Abraham Lincoln

April 1, 1861
To: Commandant, Brooklyn Navy Yard

You will fit out the Powhatan without delay. Lieutenant Porter will relieve Captain Mercer in command of her. She is bound on secret service; and you will under no circumstances communicate to the Navy Department the fact that she is fitting out.

Signed: Abraham Lincoln

The Secretary of the Navy was unaware that President Lincoln had relieved Captain Mercer and was "borrowing" the Powhatan. It was a real secret mission. Lincoln/Seward did think too far ahead. The Powhatan soon found itself meandering aimlessly about. SecNav Welles indicated it was not his problem as the Powhatan was not on any Navy mission. Lincoln eventually patched things up.

April 1, 1861
Telegram
To: Commandant, Brooklyn Navy Yard

Fit out Powhatan to go to sea at earliest possible moment.

April 5, 1861
To: Captain Mercer, Commanding Officer, USS Powhatan

The U.S. Steamers, Powhatan, Pawnee, Pocahontas, and Harriet Lane, will compose a naval force under your command, to be sent to the vicinity of Charleston, S.C., for the purpose of aiding in carrying out the object of an expedition of which the war Department has charge. The expedition has been intrusted to Captain G.V. Fox.

You will leave New York with the Powhatan in time to be off Charleston bar, 10 miles distant from and due east of the light house on the morning of the 11th instant, there to await the arrival of the transports with troops and stores. The Pawnee and Pocahontas will be ordered to join you there, at the time mentioned, and also the Harriet Lane, etc.

Signed: Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy

April 6, 1861

Lt. Porter took the Powhatan and sailed.

Seward sent a telegram to Porter: "Give the Powhatan up to Captain Mercer."

A dispatch boat caught up with Powhatan and delivered Seward's message.

Lt. Porter responded to Seward: "I received my orders from the President, and shall proceed and execute them.

Before leaving, Lt. Porter instructed the Navy Yard officials, "Detain all letters for five days."

Storms and boiler problems delayed Powhatan, but she arrived disguised and flying English colors.

Porter filed this report:

I had disguised the ship, so that she deceived those who had known her, and was standing in (unnoticed), when the Wyandotte commenced making signals, which I did not answer, but stood on.

The steamer then put herself in my way and Captain Meigs, who was aboard, hailed me and I stopped.

In twenty minutes more I should have been inside (Pensacola harbor) or sunk.

Signed: D.D. Porter

DiogenesLamp: "Southerners appear to have been wanting independence for many decades prior to the Civil War, so you could hardly call them "rash"."

x: "Democrats had controlled the country for decades, and Southerners by and large controlled the Democratic Party.
3/4ths of the Whig presidents had also been born in the South. "

Here again, Democrat DiogenesLamp well knows the truth, but refuses to acknowledge it because the facts don't fit his narrative.
The truth is a small minority of Southerners, known in the North as "Fire Eaters", had agitated for secession since at least 1850.
The most famous Fire Eaters were Edmund Ruffin (VA), Robert Rhett (SC), Louis T. Wigfall (TX), William Lowndes Yancey (AL), JDB DeBow (SC), John Pettus (MS), David Yulee (FL) and Nathaniel Tucker (VA) among others.

Fire Eaters' agitation was mostly silenced by the 1850 Compromise, which gave slavers everything they wanted, most notably, California US senate seats and Federal responsibility for fugitive slaves.
However, the demise of the Old Whig Party (circa 1854) and its replacement by anti-slavery Republicans lead to renewed Fire Eater threats of secession in 1856, should Republican abolitionist John Fremont become President.

In 1856 Democrats united, Fremont lost, Democrats regained majorities in Congress and in 1857 Doughfaced Pres. Buchanan worked with SCOTUS Chief Justice, Crazy Roger Taney, to concoct his Dred Scott opinions, expanding slavery and limiting Northern states' rights to abolish it.
Democrats also passed the record low Tariff of 1857.

So, by this point, early 1857, Southerners in general were totally happy with Washington, DC, and secessionist Fire Eaters were totally silent.
In 1859 Republicans gained a narrow majority in the House of Representatives, and began working for higher tariffs, but still there was no more talk of secession until the presidential campaign of 1860 split the majority Democrats and made Republican Lincoln the favorite.
Then again, as in 1856, Fire Eaters threatened secession if anti-slavery Republicans won the presidency.
Nobody threated secession over the proposed new Morrill Tariff.

And this is the key point here, which DiogenesLamp well knows, but refuses to acknowledge because it doesn't fit his pro-Confederate narrative -- Southern Democrats in, say, 1858, just as Democrats today, were totally happy with the United States provided they were ruling over it.
But by late 1860, once Democrats faced potential loss of political powers, especially relating to slavery, then Fire Eaters again began threatening secession, and when they lost the election in 1860, they immediately acted on those threats.

All this happened while Southern Democrats were still mostly in charge in Washington, DC, of the Presidency, the Senate and the Supreme Court, not to mention the US Army, Navy and Washington bureaucracy.

Yes, in 1860, just as today, it was in situ Democrats, then mostly Southerners, who corruptly ruled in Washington, DC, and when faced with future loss of political power, immediately declared secession and war against the United States.

All this DiogenesLamp well knows but refuses to acknowledge because he believes it's irrelevant.
It's irrelevant to DL because he has convinced himself that reasons don't matter, nothing matters except that Southerners wanted to secede, and therefore the rest of the country should have stood by and let it happen, regardless of provocations such as seizures of US forts in places like Charleston Harbor.

Clearly, what Madison and other Framers believed the Constitution meant was relevant to what the Constitution meant.

This statement is overly broad. What people have claimed Madison meant is contradicted by other evidence such as the ratification statements of New York, Virginia and Rhode Island.

One reason the other states didn't object was because most of their conventions had already ratified the constitution and gone home.

And no other legal body in the other states could make a statement on the point? You know, like the governors or legislatures? They could not say "We Disagree!"?

You are glossing over the fact that in terms of a provocative statement, silence is assent.

Didn't need to. With the founding document proclaiming it a right, the procedure was just for the states to resume governing themselves.

Your logic is faulty. Voting to reject a plan doesn't mean the plan is legal or feasible.

The contrary is also true. Rejecting a plan does not establish it as illegal.

That is why people wonder about you. Slaveowners were not the slaves of Washington or New York.

I'm thinking that is in the eye of the beholder. Finding out that 60% of their income went to DC and New York would tend to make someone think they are a slave or a servant.

You've swallowed whole the slaveowner's argument that New York City was cheating them out of millions.

I never knew about this aspect of the situation until BroJoeK posted one of his links that revealed New York was running the cotton trade, and the book he linked showed that New York and DC were getting about 60% of the total revenue from all Southern trade with Europe.

This was some years ago, and i'm sure the link is still on free republic, but it might be hard to find because it was in an old discussion.

If Southerners objected to going through NYC, they could buy and crew ships,...

This topic has been covered in past discussions regarding why all the shipping was controlled by New York. One significant factor was government subsidies payed to these Northern shipping companies, such as for mail delivery, which made their packet trade more profitable than a competing company from the south, and subsidies to the fishing ships. There was a fellow that commented in a discussion some years back, telling us that his family was heavily involved in the shipping trade and in the cotton shipping trade at exactly this period in history, and he went into some detail as to how they dominated everything.

The reason for going through NYC was so that ships wouldn't be empty coming over from Europe or Britain: the Southern market was that much smaller than the Northern.

That too was an artificial result partially caused by government manipulation of the markets. What do you suppose would have happened if the Southerners had 60% more money to spend and weren't required to use Northern shipping and other industries?

If the North kept the South down economically, wouldn't they have a smaller market as a result? Plus the stuff they bought because of government protectionist laws made them do business with the North and Northeast at a higher cost than they would have paid if not for government laws compelling them.

A pattern emerges of the government favoring the well to do businessmen of the North and giving them all sorts of economic incentives to maximize their profits.

Southerners got their fair share out of government appropriations.

That is contrary to what Robert Rhett and other Southerners who did the math said at the time. I recall reading one fellow who put an actual number on the money being transferred from the South to the North on the basis of government laws.

I don't recall the name, but I do recall he put a lot of work into it to get a precise number.

Chief Justice Chase hatched the idea, and presented it to the defense ex parte, to present a motion to drop the prosecution on a 14th Amendment argument. The 14th imposed a penalty on those who had sworn an oath to support the Constitution and had then engaged in insurrection or rebellion. Any subsequent prosecution for the same acts would be double jeopardy. And that was legal reasoning of how the government got out of bringing the case to trial, while not losing face.

The following may be of interest in determining why the prosecution did not want to proceed. Evarts was the lead prosecution attorney and, following the withdrawal of John Clifford, the only one of substantial note. He brought on Richard H. Dana to add some much needed heavyweight lawyering. The correspondence of Dana to Evarts provides significant insight.

Richard H. Dana, Jr. and William M. Evarts to Henry Stansbery, February 26, 1868, draft letter by Dana, at request of Evarts, never sent to Stansbery.

Our minds have been moved from the first by doubts of the expdiency of trying [Davis] at all which have so ripened into convictions that we assume the reponsibility of offering to you unasked, our opinion upon th subject. … We cannot see any good reason why the government should make a question whether the late war was treason and submit it to the decision of a petit jury of the vicinage of Richmond… The legal issue was whether secession by a state was a constitutional right which made legal what would otherwse have been treason.… we feel also assured that the public interest in this trial has very much abated, if not ceased. And as to the direct result of a conviction, the sentence of death for Mr. Davis, we suppose we shall have your concurrence when we express our belief, that after this lapse of time and all that has occurred in the interval, the people of the United States will not desire to see it carrried into execution… In short, we feel it our duty to suggest to you the consideration in which we cannot but think you will concur, that the point of law which the government can desire to have mooted and ruled upon, is one already sufficiently settled, and that the only matter of fact to be submitted to the jury is one of those events of history to which no doubt can ever be attached. Under such circumstances we cannot but think that the dignity of our republic will be lowered and the adequacy of our political system to deal judicially with such cases brought into doubt, by making a question of the law and of these established facts, and putting the power of any one man on a petit jury, at Nisi Prius, to give a triumph to the chief traitor and his favorers, and a defeat to the government which will not be much the less humiliating because it will be absurd.

Richard H. Dana, Jr. to AG William M. Evarts to August 24, 1868.

Sir,
While preparing with yourself, before you assumed your present post, to perform the honorable duty the President had assigned to us, of conducting the trial of Jefferson Davis, you know how much my mind was moved, from the first, by doubts of the expediency of trying him at all. The reasons which prevented my presenting those doubts no longer exist, and they have so ripened into conviction that I feel it my duty to lay them before you in form, as you now hold a post of official responsibly for the proceeding.
After the most serious reflection, I cannot see any good reason why the Government should make a question whether the late civil war was treason, and whether Jefferson Davis took any part in it, and submit those questions to the decision of a petit jury of the vicinage of Richmond at "nisi prius".
As the Constitution in terms settles the fact that our republic is a state against which treason may be committed, the only constitutional question attending the late war was whether a levying of war against the United States which would otherwise be treason, is relieved of that character by the fact that it took the form of secession from the Union by state authority. In other words the legal issue was, whether secession by a State is a right, making an act legal and obligatory upon the nation which would otherwise have been treason.
This issue I suppose to have been settled by the action of every department of the Government, by the action of the people itself, and by those events which are definitive in the affairs of men.
The Supreme Court in the Prize Cases held, by happily a unanimous opinion, that acts of the States, whether secession ordinances, or in whatever form cast, could not be brought into the cases, as justifications for the war, and had no legal effect on the character of the war, or on the political status of territory or persons or property, and that the line of enemy's territory was a question of fact, depending upon the line of bayonets of an actual war. The rule in the Prize Cases has been steadily followed in the Supreme Court since, and in the Circuit Courts, without an intimation of a doubt. That the law making and executive departments have treated this secession and war as treason, is a matter of history, as well as is the action of the people in the highest sanction of war."

My main point is that there was no general agreement that states could secede whenever they wanted to. Therefore, politicians wishing to leave the Union and form their own country should have acted prudently and carefully and with due consideration for the rest of the country and the obligations and responsibilities they had incurred as part of the United States.

You argue that there was such a right to secede without consulting or arranging things with the federal government and achieving a settlement and approval. So you apparently think there has to be a settled answer one way or the other. I don't think states did have the right to secede whenever they wanted, but my main point is that any state that wanted to leave would face disagreement and opposition from those who thought otherwise. The result would be war if such a state persisted.

And no other legal body in the other states could make a statement on the point? You know, like the governors or legislatures? They could not say "We Disagree!"?

They didn't feel the need to come down one way or the other. They accepted the Constitution as it was and that was that. At that time, perhaps even more than now, what some state convention saw fit to slip into their ratification message probably didn't attract much attention.

The contrary is also true. Rejecting a plan does not establish it as illegal.

You said that the fact that the Hartford Convention considered secession and rejected it. I pointed out that rejecting it didn't mean that they thought it constitutional. I did not say that rejecting the idea meant that they thought it was unconstitutional. Again, that doesn't matter. That wasn't my argument.

I'm thinking that is in the eye of the beholder. Finding out that 60% of their income went to DC and New York would tend to make someone think they are a slave or a servant.

Where are you getting those statistics from? There are legitimate expenses involved in getting goods to market on another continent. Those expenses still exist whoever the shipper and insurer and the banks are, so cotton growers would still be complaining even if they used Southern shippers and insurers and banks -- as was the case sometimes.

One significant factor was government subsidies payed to these Northern shipping companies, such as for mail delivery, which made their packet trade more profitable than a competing company from the south, and subsidies to the fishing ships.

You are ignoring just how global trade was even back then. A firm like Fraser, Trenholm & Co. had offices in Charleston, New York, and Liverpool. Was it a New York or a British or a Southern firm? Answer: it was a Charleston firm that did what it could for the Confederacy during the war.

And "fishing subsidies" is a red herring. Here's from encyclopedia.com:

FISHING BOUNTIES in the United States were not at first true bounties. To aid domestic fisheries, from 1789 until 1807 the federal government levied duties on imported salt and paid allowances on fish and meat cured with foreign salt and then exported. This allowance, or bounty, primarily affected the cod fisheries, which used large quantities of imported salt. The bounty as revived in 1813 applied only to the fisheries. Beginning in 1828 the duty was lowered while the bounty remained unchanged. The bounty was continued in 1866 to support northeastern fisheries, considered training grounds for seamen.

This encouraged American cod fishermen, who were in New England, and it gave secessionists something to gripe about, but what effect could it realistically have on whether Southerners could charter their own ships and send their cargo directly to Britain and France?

There was a fellow that commented in a discussion some years back, telling us that his family was heavily involved in the shipping trade and in the cotton shipping trade at exactly this period in history, and he went into some detail as to how they dominated everything.

Maybe, but I've learned not to trust anonymous people on the Internet, especially on these Civil War threads.

60% more people would have made a real difference. As it was, cotton plantation owners were some of the richest people in the country. There weren't enough of them to make the South as large an importer of foreign goods as the North, so it was likely that ships would be coming from Europe half full, which was bad business.

Here is a "thought experiment" somebody did relating to shipping cotton directly from New Orleans to Manchester. Plenty of money had to be paid as costs along the way, so planters would always be discontented. Notice the information at the bottom of the page about the spoilage. Given the possibility of spoilage and the ups and downs of the market, cotton brokers (many of whom were Southerners) were in a very risky business and could lose their shirts.

A pattern emerges of the government favoring the well to do businessmen of the North and giving them all sorts of economic incentives to maximize their profits.

And Eastern fisherman and shippers complained about the wars the country fought to get more land for the cotton growers. Gripes are a part of life. Southern supporters of secession and the creation of a new country were always exploiting -- and creating -- gripes about mercenary Yankees. A bit of skepticism about such talk is helpful.

I recall reading one fellow who put an actual number on the money being transferred from the South to the North on the basis of government laws.

Again, not so different from today. Add up everything some other part of the country gets from the government and it looks damning if you don't bother to calculate what your own part of the country gets from Uncle Sam.

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