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Ok, I spent way too much time going over that (and a lot more) in the vid.

For one thing, it becomes very clear that “denazification” to Putin meant killing Zelenskyy.

Putin conceded that goal. I don’t think it meant all that much personally, to Zelenskyy, but such a concession would tend to indicate that Putin would also relent from taking out everyone moderate (Zelenskyy types) and right (Poroshenko / Tymoshenko types) in the Ukrainian political spectrum. In effect, Ukraine could retain significant political independence. (I doubt Russia would honor this for long, but, it would at least curtail the fighting for a time — and I keep in mind that overall Kyiv was still in a very desperate spot.)

Putin also conceded that Ukraine could remain “militarized”, but it is totally unclear what “militarized” would mean to Putin. At a March 2014 level? At a March 2022 level? Enough to strongly deter Russian aggression? I’ll get back to that.

Zelenskyy was willing to renounce the goal of joining NATO. I have severe doubts he’d politically survive that even pre-Bucha, but, again, I’ll get back to the NATO issue, because it ties in with the whole issue of Ukrainian militarization.too.

I think that once Bucha was uncovered, Zelenskyy was trapped. If he’d compromised his own people would have put his head on a pike, literally, and, more important, someone like Poroshenko would take over. Boris Johnson almost certainly told Zelenskyy that Bucha, and the fact Ukraine HAD taken back ground, was the opportunity where the West would commit to more substantial military aid. Many people in the West who were squishy on that aid were still cautious and ridiculously burdened by their own processes and bureaucracy, but, the shift was there to be taken advantage of, and it was... (Go back and look at the rhetoric, and the timing of more robust weapons support announcements.)

However, set that aside. Dollars to donuts, Johnson probably advised Zelenskyy of the total fantasy of Bennet’s idea that Ukraine could become an Israeli style independent fortress, strong enough to deter Russia. For one thing, Israel gets huge US support as well as considerable other public and private support. 15 million Jews abroad (12 million in the US), many pretty well off and / or influential, help leverage that. Bennet is quite disingenuous when he makes the case Israel is all alone.

Further, such a level of independence would require Ukrainian military strength relative to Russia at least close to Israeli strength relative to its enemies. There is just no way in hell, Russia could ever allow even remotely that, especially given how much Russia had hardened and unified Ukrainian opinion. Once capable of inflicting serious retaliatory harm to Russia, Ukraine could just wait for a good moment to re-approach NATO. (Much like Finland is now relatively safe in approaching NATO.)

Further yet, Bennet on the one hand speaks of Israel not depending on partners, yet he suggests Ukraine could sign security agreements with Russia and the US that would have to fall short of being treaties for Russia to agree with them (as if Russia even abides by treaties, anyway). And, as we’ve seen, even with the US, such agreements depend on fickle US politics. (Can you say, 2014 and “Obama”?)

But even if “Fortress Ukraine” can be obtained, if it “works”, that’s the worst case scenario for long term European and / or global security. I mean, I understand the Poles arming up and support it — but only until all of NATO becomes as a group relatively equally armed at a MODERATE level — not each country freaking armed to the teeth. Security? Crap, we may as well fire off all the nukes now.

Bennet speaks of familiarizing himself with the situation and players, and his capability to deal-make, but his study is most visibly a real rush job. It is both shallow and full of craters, and I really don’t see any sign Bennet understands the longer term dynamics and risks.