Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani announced that his administration will begin procedures to remove International Coalition forces from Iraq during a press conference on December 28, likely due to pressure from Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. These militias have used legal, military, and political pressure in recent weeks to expel US forces, as CTP-ISW previously assessed. This pressure, particularly the Iranian-backed attacks on US forces, creates an escalation cycle that triggers US self-defense strikes to protect US servicemembers. The Iranian-backed factions and militias then misrepresent these self-defense strikes as violations of Iraqi sovereignty, which generates domestic pressure on Sudani to remove US forces. This pressure appears to have succeeded at least partly in that Sudani repeated Iranian-backed militia talking points about the United States. Sudani said that that the self-defense strikes are violations of Iraqi sovereignty and were inconsistent with the advisory role of the International Coalition.[1] These claims ignore the fact that the US forces have a right to self-defense and that the Iranian use of client militias and proxies in Iraq to attack US forces in line with Tehran’s regional agenda is itself a violation of Iraqi sovereignty. US advisory forces are currently deployed in Iraq for counter-ISIS operations at the invitation of the Iraqi [2]government. Sudani did not provide a timeline for removing International Coalition forces or describe the mechanism by which they would be removed.[3]
An Iraqi decision to expel US forces will very likely create space for ISIS to rapidly resurge in Syria within 12 to 24 months and then threaten Iraq. The US military mission in these countries is to enable the enduring defeat of ISIS and through cooperation with local partners.[4] The US support to its counter-ISIS partners in both Iraq and Syria is instrumental to successfully defeating ISIS.[5] US forces and infrastructure in Iraq provide the logistical support that enables the presence of US forces in Syria. The expulsion of US forces from Iraq would necessitate a withdrawal from Syria, where ISIS is reconstituting itself in Syrian regime-held territory.[6] CTP-ISW continues to assess that the United States and its partner in Syria have successfully contained but not defeated ISIS and that the US withdrawal from Syria will very likely cause a rapid resurgence in Syria within 12 to 24 months.[7] A resurgent ISIS would then be able to threaten Iraq again. The Iraqi Security Forces still face significant deficiencies in logistics, intelligence, and fire support that inhibit their ability to defeat ISIS alone.[8]
full report: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-28-2023
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https://twitter.com/Felix_Nuno/status/1740082935569535115
Iran has increased its production rate of highly enriched uranium (HEU). The United States and the E3 (France, Germany, Italy) confirmed in a joint statement on December 28 that Iran has increased its enrichment rate of 60 percent purity uranium.[1] Iran has been stockpiling 60 percent HEU since April 2021.[2] Iran decreased its enrichment rate and HEU stockpile after it reached an informal nuclear agreement with the United States in August 2023.[3] Western media reported that the United States refroze Iranian financial assets released as part of the agreement in October.[4] Iran's current stockpile of 60 percent HEU stands at 128.3 kilograms as of October 28.[5]
This development is consistent with CTP-ISW’s long-standing assessment that Iran has developed a nuclear program that it intends to use to produce a nuclear arsenal.[6] The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines 25 kilograms of 20 percent or more enriched HEU as a “significant quantity” for “which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded.”[7] Iran has stockpiled at least five bombs worth of HEU, given Iran's current stockpile of 128.3 kilograms of 60 percent HEU. Iran previously planned to serially produce nuclear warheads for ballistic and cruise missiles as part of its pre-2003 nuclear weapons program[8] The stockpiling of HEU is one of the key steps Iran would have to pursue to develop an arsenal and has previously conducted work on the other key steps in weaponization and delivery vehicles.[9] The Iranian enrichment infrastructure is also designed for a speedy mass production of HEU and/or weapons-grade uranium for multiple nuclear weapons.[10]
Iran has no use for 60 percent HEU other than for use in a compact nuclear explosive or to further enrich it to 90 percent weapons-grade uranium. Sixty percent HEU can only be used for nuclear weapons and does not have an alternate civilian purpose. The required enriched uranium purity for energy purposes [in a ligtht water reactor, as Iran has (mý correction)] is between 3 to 5 percent, and medical research reactors use 20 percent HEU.[11] Iran is now capable of producing weapons-grade uranium at a much faster rate than it would be if it only had a stockpile of lower than 60 percent enriched uranium.
The US Treasury Department sanctioned a Turkish and Yemeni financial network that enabled the IRGC Quds Force to fund the Houthis.[77] The US sanctions targeted one Yemeni, one Turkish entity, two Yemeni entities, and one Turkish entity responsible for facilitating financial flows between the IRGC Quds Forces and the Houthi movement. The Treasury Department said that Iranian funding enables Houthi attacks against international shipping in the Red Sea. The sanctions targeted Turkey-based Al Aman Kargo Ithalat Ihracat Ve Nakliyat Limited Sirketi (Al Aman), which Treasury said served as ”a waypoint for money sent by” Iran to Houthi businesses in Yemen. The sanctions also targeted two Yemeni money exchanges tied to the Houthis and one Yemeni national, the president of the Yemeni Currency Exchangers Association in Houthi-controlled Sanaa, Yemen.[78]
full report: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-29-2023