Iran is adapting to US defenses by firing high-speed, maneuverable missiles at US bases in the region, which highlights the threat that the advancement of Iran's ballistic missile program poses to US national security interests.[1] US officials told the Wall Street Journal on July 18 that Iran is using missiles that “travel at extremely high speeds and can maneuver as they streak toward the earth.”[2] Iranian leaders have expressed interest since at least the Iranian strikes on Israel in April and October 2024 in employing maneuverable reentry vehicles in order to improve the relatively low accuracy of Iranian missiles.[3] All ballistic missiles have a circular error probable (CEP), which is the “radius of a circle, centered at the intended target, within which 50 percent of the missiles would be expected to impact.”[4] The stated and publicly known CEPs of Iranian medium-range ballistic missiles are between 20 and 500 meters.[5] A maneuverable reentry vehicle can be used to evade anti-ballistic missile systems or improve the accuracy of ballistic missiles by altering their trajectory during the terminal stage of flight.[6] Iranian leaders examined using maneuverable reentry vehicles and other technical improvements to missile accuracy after the 12-Day June 2025 War.[7] Such improvements could make individual projectiles harder to intercept and more destructive.[8] Iran still struggled with relatively poor missile accuracy in its strikes against Israeli military targets in March and April 2026, however, which likely pushed Iran to deploy cluster munitions at a greater scale in order to maximize damage.[9]
Iran previously claimed in May 2025 that it had developed a maneuverable reentry vehicle capability, and it is possible that Iran has deployed missiles with that capability in the current conflict. Iran introduced an upgraded version of the Haj Qassem missile with a maneuverable reentry vehicle in May 2025 known as “Qassem Basir.”[10] IRGC-affiliated media posted footage of Iranian forces launching Haj Qassem missiles at Jordan and other Gulf states on July 18.[11] It is unclear if Iranian forces fired the Qassem Basir variant, however.[12]
An Iranian missile attack on a base in Jordan killed two US service members on July 17.[13] A third service member is missing in action.[14] Unspecified US officials told Western media that the attack took place at Muwaffaq Salti Airbase in Azraq, Jordan.[15] It is not clear which missiles Iran used in the attack. Two US officials said that Iran struck the base earlier this week and the US service members suffered minor injuries.[16]
The People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia are likely supporting Iranian efforts to target US bases in the region. US officials told the Wall Street Journal on July 18 that they are concerned that the PRC and Russia are supporting recent Iranian targeting of US assets.[17] Both countries have supported Iranian targeting during the conflict thus far. Iran used an advanced reconnaissance satellite purchased from the PRC in 2024 to target US military assets and bases across the Middle East in spring 2026, according to the Financial Times in April 2026.[18] The Washington Post separately reported in March 2026 that Russia was providing Iran with the locations of US military assets, including warships and aircraft, to support Iranian attacks against US forces.[19] Russia is also reportedly sharing advanced drone tactics with Iran to support Iranian attacks against US forces and assets. [20] Iran likely continues to rely on its key partners to improve the accuracy and effectiveness of its attacks.
Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei and other senior Iranian officials, including members of the negotiating delegation, have publicly declared that the US–Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) is no longer in effect. Mojtaba published a statement on July 18 condemning alleged US “violations” of the US-Iran MoU and claiming that US “violations,” including airstrikes on Iran, prove that US President Donald Trump's signature of the MoU was “invalid.”[21] Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for International and Legal Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi told Iranian state media earlier on July 18 that Iran is “suspending” its commitments and implementation of the MoU.[22] It remains unclear if the Iranian regime has given up on diplomacy entirely, however. The Supreme Leader's military adviser, Major General Mohsen Rezaei, stated on X on July 17 that “both diplomacy and negotiations…are over,” but some regime elements continue to advocate for diplomacy to achieve Iranian objectives.[23] Iranian negotiating team head and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf argued on July 15 that Iran needs diplomacy with the United States to secure its national interests.[24] Regime outlet Nour News separately published an op-ed on July 18 in which it argued that diplomacy would secure Iran's interests through long-term commitments.[25]
Iran and the United States interpreted the MoU’s fifth clause about the Strait of Hormuz in fundamentally different ways, which contributed to the MoU’s collapse. The MoU stipulated that Iran had to make “its best efforts” to ensure the safe passage of traffic through the strait.[26] US President Donald Trump indicated that the MoU would enable traffic in the strait to return to pre-war conditions, inferring that the MoU would remove the Iranian threat to shipping and dispel Iranian control over the strait.[27] Iran interpreted the clause as affirming Iranian authority over the strait, however, and only allowed safe passage for vessels through Iran's traffic separation scheme. [28] Iran has repeatedly attacked vessels attempting to transit through the strait via the southern corridor along Oman's coast. Iran's Ambassador to Pakistan, Reza Amiri Moghadam, claimed on X on July 18 that the United States interpreted the MoU in a manner inconsistent with its original intent and used it to ”gain control” over parts of the Strait of Hormuz, almost certainly referring to the US-sponsored southern corridor.[29] Iranian Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei separately described US plans for a southern corridor in the Strait of Hormuz as a “strategic failure.”[30]
The fifth clause also required Iran to engage in talks with Oman and other Persian Gulf littoral states regarding the future management of the strait.[31] Iran consulted the Gulf states, but these states rejected Iran's management of the strait, including Iran's proposal to impose transit fees and other restrictions on vessels transiting the waterway.[32] ISW-CTP previously noted that the fifth clause assumed that the Gulf states would moderate Iran's stance on the strait and that Iran would reach an agreement with these states. The clause did not take into account that Iran could resort to using force to advance its objective of securing permanent control over the strait. Iran has adopted an increasingly hostile tone toward the Gulf states in recent weeks, and its current attacks on the Gulf states are likely, in part, meant to deter these states from continuing to oppose Iranian control of the strait (read more about Iran's attacks on the Gulf states below).[33]
Iran struck a Kuwaiti power and desalination plant on July 18, likely in response to an alleged US strike on an Iranian desalination plant near Jask, Hormozgan Province, on July 17. Iranian officials alleged that the United States struck “power facilities and desalination pumps” on a pier in Bonji village, north of Jask, on July 17.[34] Several Iranian media outlets circulated photos of a destroyed structure along the pier.[35] ISW-CTP cannot independently confirm the structure's purpose. A local official claimed that US strikes on the facility cut off water to several villages west of Jask.[36] Iranian regime officials have repeatedly warned in recent days that Iran would attack “regional infrastructure” in response to any US attacks on Iranian critical infrastructure.[37] The Iranian attack on the Kuwaiti power and desalination plant on July 18 marks the second attack that Iran has conducted on such a plant in Kuwait in the past 48 hours. Commercially available satellite imagery captured on July 18 showed smoke rising over the Shuaiba Power Plant.[38] Iran also struck an unspecified Kuwaiti oil facility on July 18.[39] The Kuwait Petroleum Corporation said that the facility suffered material damage.[40] Iran has not acknowledged the attacks on Kuwaiti critical infrastructure at the time of this writing and claimed that it targeted a radar and support center at two US bases in Kuwait.[41]
The United States has struck additional bridges and roads around Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff at 2:00 PM ET on July 17.[42] A senior US official speaking to the Wall Street Journal on July 17 said that the United States has targeted transportation infrastructure around Bandar Abbas in order to disrupt supply routes to the city.[43] Bandar Abbas is a port city that hosts the IRGC Navy First Naval District and numerous other naval facilities, and the city is also vital for moving military supplies, fuel, personnel, and commercial cargo between Iran's interior and its southern coast.[44] US strikes have targeted several bridges linking Bandar Abbas to nearby towns and Iranian provinces.[45] Geolocated footage posted by an OSINT account on July 18 shows damage from US strikes on July 16 to a tunnel that connects Bandar Abbas to a nearby county.[46] IRGC-affiliated media reported on July 18 that recent US strikes caused 116 telecom towers to go offline in Bandar Abbas and Hajjiabad, which is about 100 kilometers north of Bandar Abbas.[47] Israeli media claimed on July 18 that the telecom towers “support SIM cards used to control” Shahed drones and that the damage to the towers could limit the range of the drones that Iran uses to attack shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.[48] The United States previously struck on July 16 the Radio and Communications Regulatory Authority's office in Bandar Abbas, which is responsible for regulating telecommunications networks, licensing operators, and managing Iran's radio-frequency spectrum.[49] Iran has taken several steps to re-open its supply routes in Bandar Abbas and clear damage from US strikes. Iranian authorities announced on July 18 that they opened an alternative route to avoid a bridge that the United States attacked on July 17, for example.[50]
Iran launched a ballistic missile at a US base in Saudi Arabia, marking the first Iranian attack on Saudi territory in nearly three months.[51] Iran launched one ballistic missile at an unspecified base in al Kharj, near Riyadh.[52] Prince Sultan Airbase is located in al Kharj. Early warning sirens also went off in Yanbu on Saudi Arabia's Red Sea coast, although it is unclear whether an attempted attack took place there.[53] Saudi Arabia relies on Yanbu as a key oil export terminal to mitigate disruptions from the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.[54] The Iranian attack on Saudi Arabia comes amid heightened tensions between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis. Saudi Arabia recently struck Houthi-controlled Sanaa International Airport to prevent an Iranian Mahan Air flight from landing there, after which the Houthis responded by attacking an airport in southern Saudi Arabia.[55] It is possible that Iran conducted the attack on al Kharj on July 18 to deter Saudi Arabia from taking further action against the Houthis.
Iran appears to be less willing to target Saudi Arabia with the intensity that it is currently targeting other regional US allies, given that Iran only fired a single missile at al Kharj. Iran previously reduced its rate of attacks on Saudi Arabia in March following reports that Saudi Arabia was considering responding to the attacks.[56] Saudi Arabia, which has conducted covert strikes on Iran during the war, has favored reaching a diplomatic agreement with Iran and reportedly even briefly explored pursuing a mutual non-aggression pact with Iran.[57]
Iran also targeted US facilities in Bahrain and Jordan on July 17 and 18. The IRGC claimed that it targeted several US bases and a data center in Bahrain.[58] Bahrain said that it intercepted multiple Iranian attacks on July 18.[59] The Jordanian Defense Ministry intercepted four Iranian drones and 10 missiles on July 18.[60]
Iran continues to attempt to coerce vessels to transit through Iranian territorial waters in order to secure recognized control over the strait and impose transit fees on these vessels. An Iranian Environmental Protection Agency official announced on July 18 that the agency asked the government to charge fees for “environmental services” from ships transiting the strait, citing the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).[61] UNCLOS stipulates that coastal countries may not impose fees or hamper maritime traffic in international waterways but may charge fees within territorial waters.[62] Iran is forcing vessels to transit Iranian territorial waters by conducting drone and missile attacks on vessels using routes outside of Iranian territorial waters, including the southern route along the Omani coast.[63] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy announced on July 17 that it conducted combined drone and missile attacks on “four violating ships.”[64] ISW-CTP has not recorded any new Iranian attacks on civilian vessels since its last data cutoff at 2:00 PM ET on July 17, however. The IRGC Navy may have been referring to vessels it attacked prior to the data cutoff.[65] These vessels may have also not reported the incidents. Iranian officials continue to threaten attacks against vessels. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Commander's senior adviser Brigadier General Hossein Ashtari threatened “a crushing response to any move” from the United States and “any interference in the Strait of Hormuz” on July 17.[66]
The United States conducted a seventh consecutive night of strikes on Iran on July 17 in order to degrade Iranian military capabilities.[67] CENTCOM said that the United States targeted Iranian surveillance sites, military logistics infrastructure, underground weapons storage sites, and maritime capabilities.[68] Anti-regime media posted footage on July 18 of smoke rising from the 10th Artesh Air Force Tactical Airbase in Konarak, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[69] The United States repeatedly struck this base during the war in March and April.[70] Two OSINT accounts reported that the United States struck a missile launch site in Lar, Fars Province, on July 17.[71] The United States may have also struck the Yazd Missile Base, given that Iranian media and multiple OSINT accounts reported explosions in the area.[72] Iran frequently launches missiles from this base, and the US-Israeli combined force struck the site at least five times during the war.[73] OSINT accounts and anti-regime media also reported strikes in Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province, and posted footage of the aftermath of an explosion in Sepahan Shahr, Esfahan Province.[74] Three US officials told Reuters on July 16 that recent US strikes in Iran can be viewed as “shaping operations” but did not provide further details.[75] Supreme Leader Military Adviser Major General Mohsen Rezaei threatened on July 17 that Iran will begin “full-scale destruction” if the United States continues to attack Iran in the next two to three days.[76]
Unidentified actors launched drones at unspecified targets in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan, on July 17. The US-led international coalition intercepted five drones over Erbil on July 17, according to Kurdish media.[77] Unidentified actors launched eight booby-trapped drones in Erbil earlier on July 17, some of which may have been targeting the US Consulate in Erbil.[78] Unidentified actors also launched at least eight drones at the US Consulate in Erbil and a US base at Erbil International Airport on July 15.[79] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias launched numerous attacks against US positions in Iraqi Kurdistan during the war in March and April, but no group has claimed responsibility for these recent attacks at the time of this writing.[80]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-july-18-2026/
