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Iran Update Special Report, July 13, 2026

The US-Iran ceasefire has effectively ended with relatively more intense and consistent exchanges of fire in the Persian Gulf. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy announced on July 11 that it closed the strait, struck a Cyprus-flagged vessel, and then struck a second unspecified vessel on July 12.[1] The United States struck dozens of Iranian military targets on July 12 to degrade Iran's ability to threaten shipping.[2] The United States has conducted over 300 strikes in Iran since July 10.[3] Iran retaliated on July 12 with strikes against US military bases in Jordan, Bahrain, and Kuwait, likely in order to deter these countries from allowing US forces to use their territories to launch strikes against Iran.[4] Iran also claimed that it struck a US radar site in Oman on July 13, but neither the United States nor Oman commented on the strike.[5] The United States will resume its blockade of Iranian ports beginning on July 14 at 4:00 PM ET.[6]

The present fighting is relatively less widespread in geographic scope and smaller in terms of total strikes compared to March and April 2026, but the increase in strikes and reimposition of the blockade nonetheless mark the end of the ceasefire. Most US strikes have targeted military sites in southern Iran, though the United States has conducted some strikes on infrastructure deeper into Iran.[7] Three hundred US strikes over three days is also roughly a third as many strikes as the United States alone conducted during the peak of the US-Israel campaign in March and April 2026.[8] Iran has continued to expand the geographic scope of its attacks, however, by targeting most of the Gulf states.[9] It has so far declined to target Israel or commit to large-scale targeting of civilian infrastructure in the Gulf states, as Iran chose to do in March and April 2026.

The US naval blockade had a limited but notable effect on Iranian willingness to continue fighting in Spring 2026 and was critical to securing the memorandum of understanding (MoU). The New York Times reported on July 4 that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, reportedly fearful of the US blockade and the deteriorating economic situation in Iran, implored Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei to accept the June 18 MoU despite the supreme leader's concerns and desire to retain control over the Strait of Hormuz.[10] Mojtaba reportedly agreed to the MoU only on the conditions that Iran's negotiating team would not cross his “red lines” and that Pezeshkian would accept responsibility if the MoU were to fail.[11] Pezeshkian‘s effort to pressure Mojtaba indicates that the US naval blockade played a major role in pressuring the Iranians to accept the MoU.

Pezeshkian’s efforts to secure the MoU do not imply that other elements of the Iranian regime were seriously affected by the blockade, however. Other elements from the IRGC — the leaders of which are close with Mojtaba — were far less willing to accept the MoU. Mojtaba’s concerns about the control of the Strait of Hormuz under the MoU are likely emblematic of the position of the anti-negotiations camp. It is notable in the context of Mojtaba’s concerns about controlling the strait that as soon as the United States, Oman, and others made efforts to undermine Iranian control through the southern transit route in the strait, the IRGC began attacking shipping again. It remains far from clear when and if economic damage caused by the blockade will affect the willingness of the IRGC to continue the fight.

The recent MoU breakdown and the reimposition of the US naval blockade can cause negative political effects within Iran that are not immediately related to a breakdown in the regime's willingness to continue the fight. Many Iranians, including, presumably, many regime supporters, are suffering under an extremely devastating economic situation.[12] The present MoU had promised an end to the conflict on a relatively acceptable basis for the Iranian regime. The regime's decision to continue firing into the Strait of Hormuz ultimately reignited the war, and the regime will need to argue the case to its own people and among itself as to why continued conflict is necessary. This situation will likely revive the intra-regime debate over how to handle the strait, economy, and negotiations with the United States. The anti-negotiations camp will likely use the reimposition of the US blockade as evidence that negotiating with the United States was a mistake and that Iran should pursue its strategic objectives, including the preservation of its nuclear program, control of the strait, and survival of Hezbollah, even at the risk of a longer conflict with the United States and its ensuing economic costs. The effect of the new US blockade will likely manifest differently if the anti-negotiations camp can successfully argue that negotiations and the MoU were a failure.

This is a new phase in the war, and both sides have had time to internalize lessons and reconstitute after the initial round of conflict. Iran has continuously made efforts to reconstitute its ballistic missile and drone programs since the ceasefire on April 8.[13] The United States has presumably also had time to undertake reconstitution tasks and apply lessons learned. Both sides have also had significant economic and political reprieves. The Iranians were able to execute some oil exports, while the global economy reacted to the ceasefire and MoU. The price of oil dropped from $92 USD per barrel on June 1 (down from a high of $104 USD on May 18) to as low as $68 USD on July 2.[14] These military and political effects will probably change some features of the conflict relative to its previous iteration in March and April 2026.

An unspecified Lebanese official told international media on July 13 that the next round of US-brokered Israel-Lebanon negotiations will begin in Rome, Italy, on July 14.[15] The negotiations will likely focus on plans to implement the first two “pilot zones” in southern Lebanon. Lebanese media reported on July 13 that the Lebanese delegation's primary objective for the talks is to secure a timeframe to implement the pilot zones that are stipulated in the June 26 Trilateral Framework Agreement.[16] Lebanese President Joseph Aoun instructed the Lebanese negotiating delegation to demand that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) withdraw from the pilot zones as a precondition to further technical discussions.[17] The Lebanese government previously conditioned its participation in the Rome meetings on the IDF’s withdrawal from the pilot zones, according to Saudi media on July 11.[18] Hezbollah-aligned media reported on July 11 that Israeli officials proposed to the Lebanese government that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) deploy in pilot zones and begin disarming Hezbollah with Israeli and US oversight before authorizing any IDF withdrawals, which the Lebanese government rejected.[19]

US military representatives have continued to meet with LAF commanders in Lebanon to discuss plans to implement the pilot zones since July 11.[20] An unspecified US official told international media on July 11 that the LAF would begin backfilling IDF positions in the pilot zones “in a matter of days” and stated that Israel, Lebanon, and the United States are planning to establish future pilot zones.[21] Lebanese media reported on July 12 that the IDF will “attempt” to withdraw from one of the two initial pilot zones before negotiations begin in Rome to demonstrate Lebanese government progress in direct talks with Israel and combat Hezbollah's argument to Lebanese citizens that the negotiations are fruitless.[22] ISW-CTP has not observed any indicators that Israeli forces are currently withdrawing from the pilot zones, however.

The Lebanese government is attempting to balance the need to disarm Hezbollah with the significant latent threat Hezbollah poses to Lebanese stability amid unprecedented Hezbollah weakness. Hezbollah remains unprecedentedly weak despite its relative military success against Israel. The group still lacks experienced commanders and a charismatic leader, and increasing reliance upon Iranian guidance has made it appear significantly less Lebanese.[23] This weakness, however, disguises the serious latent threat that Hezbollah poses to Lebanon's stability. Unspecified sources close to Lebanese President Joseph Aoun told Lebanese media on July 13 that Aoun seeks to “contain” Hezbollah's influence in Lebanon, not forcibly disarm the group.[24] Aoun previously stated on July 10 that the Lebanese government must “cooperate with Hezbollah” in order to disarm the group.[25] Aoun’s hesitancy and caution reflect the latent threat Hezbollah poses. The risk of a clash with Hezbollah is relatively greater because the group feels threatened and its military wing is full of Iranian and other foreign cadres.[26] These cadres may be less restrained in their dealings with the Lebanese government given Lebanon is not their country.

Any disarmament plan that relies on cooperating with Hezbollah — and therefore its Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and Iraqi, Syrian, and other militia cadres — will almost certainly fail, because none of these actors will acquiesce to disarming Hezbollah.[27] Hezbollah leaders and Hezbollah-allied politicians have continued to assert that Hezbollah will remain armed in southern Lebanon and have threatened that attempts by the LAF to disarm the group would cause civil war.[28] Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri and unspecified Hezbollah officials told Hezbollah-aligned media on July 13 that LAF commanders are aware that it would be “extremely difficult” to disarm Hezbollah.[29]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, released a statement on July 12 outlining its views on several topics, including the Iraqi federal government's ongoing anti-corruption campaign and US-Iraq relations.[30] The coalition noted its support for the anti-corruption campaign, which has included over 50 arrests in recent weeks as part of the government's efforts to recover public funds.[31] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq may support the campaign because anti-corruption has broad public support in Iraq, and the campaign has not affected Iranian-backed Iraqi politicians and officials. Iraqi authorities have instead mainly arrested Sunnis and political allies of former Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani.[32] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq argued that the Iraqi federal government should prioritize an end to the US “occupation” and condemned Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi’s visit to Washington, DC, which begins on July 13.[33] US-led international coalition forces are expected to leave Iraqi Kurdistan in September 2026.[34] Coalition forces previously withdrew from federal Iraq in January 2026.[35]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq also argued in the July 12 statement that the Iraqi federal government should “liberate” the Iraqi economy from “American hegemony,” amid continued reports that Zaydi will focus on expanding US-Iraq economic relations during his visit to Washington.[36] The coalition's statement said that the United States imposes control over Iraqi resources and funds, almost certainly in reference to the US Treasury Department temporarily pausing shipments of Iraq's oil earnings to Iraq during the war due to Iranian-backed Iraqi militia activity.[37] The Iraqi Central Bank has managed an account at the New York Federal Reserve that has held the Iraqi federal government's oil export revenue in US dollars since 2003.[38] Zaydi wrote in a Washington Post op-ed on July 13 that he hopes US companies will invest in Iraq and that his visit to DC, during which he will meet with US President Donald Trump, will transform US-Iraq relations from “crisis management to opportunity creation.”[39] Iraqi federal government spokesperson Haider al Aboudi said on July 13 that the agenda for Zaydi’s visit includes developing economic relations in the US oil, gas, energy, technology, and infrastructure sectors.[40] Aboudi added that the United States and Iraq will sign an MoU related to the oil and gas sectors.[41] It is unclear if this MoU is related to the agreement Zaydi is reportedly expected to sign with the United States, in which the US government will support investment in Iraq in exchange for the Iraqi federal government taking steps to limit Iranian influence in Iraq, including by disarming the Iraqi militias.[42]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq reaffirmed its commitment to armed resistance against the United States and Israel on July 10, which further exemplifies the problems the Iraqi federal government faces in attempting to comply with US demands to disarm the militias.[43] The coalition includes Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, and Harakat Ansar Allah al Awfiya. The first three of these militias conducted the most attacks during the war and are the closest Iraqi militias groups to Iran.[44] Zaydi noted in his Washington Post op-ed that the Iraqi federal government is committed to restricting arms to the state and has made “significant progress” in disarming several unspecified armed groups.[45] The federal government has not yet clarified how it plans to disarm militias that refuse to disarm, however. Zaydi’s op-ed follows an Iraqi media report on July 9 that unidentified militias are handing “scrap” missiles and inoperable drones to the government but holding onto functional heavy weapons.[46] The Iraqi federal government also has historically lacked accurate information on the number and types of militia weapons to the covert nature of the militias, including those within the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[47]

The Houthis launched an unspecified number of ballistic missiles and drones on July 13 targeting Abha International Airport, Saudi Arabia, in response to likely Saudi strikes on Houthi-controlled Sanaa International Airport, Yemen.[48] The Saudi Defense Ministry spokesperson confirmed on July 13 that it intercepted Houthi ballistic missiles targeting Saudi Arabia's southern region.[49] The Houthi Political Bureau previously claimed on July 13 that Saudi Arabia struck Sanaa International Airport to prevent an IRGC-affiliated Mahan Air passenger jet from landing at the airport.[50] The aircraft was reportedly carrying a Houthi delegation returning from former Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s funeral in Tehran.[51] Some missile remnants found at the airport appeared to come from a Storm Shadow cruise missile, according to a munitions researcher.[52] Saudi Arabia uses the Storm Shadow.[53] This escalation comes after Mahan Air resumed direct flights between Tehran and Sanaa on July 3.[54] Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Sarea claimed on July 3 that Saudi aircraft attempted to prevent the Mahan Air flight from landing in Sanaa, but that Houthi air defenses forced the Saudi aircraft to withdraw.[55] Sarea also warned Saudi Arabia that the Houthis would retaliate against any future Saudi “airspace violations” with strikes on Saudi airports and other “vital interests on land and sea.”[56]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-july-13-2026/

Iran Update Special Report, July 14, 2026

Iran has attacked at least three commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz in the past 24 hours, which indicates that Iran retains the ability and willingness to attack commercial shipping despite recent US strikes on Iran. Iran struck at least three vessels, including two Emirati tankers, on July 13 that were attempting to transit through the strait via the southern route along Oman's coast.[1] The Iranian attacks killed one crew member and wounded eight others.[2] Iran has repeatedly used force to try to deter vessels from using the alternative traffic separation scheme along Oman's coast because traffic through this route undermines Iranian efforts to assert full control over traffic in the strait. US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced on July 13 that it conducted another wave of strikes against Iranian military targets that Iran used to threaten shipping in the strait.[3] US officials, including US President Donald Trump, have stated that the current US campaign to degrade Iran's ability to threaten shipping could last several weeks. It is therefore premature to assess the effects of this campaign. The threshold for Iran to be able to disrupt shipping in the strait remains low, however, given that even individual drone and missile attacks can deter vessels from passing through the strait. Maritime traffic through the strait is dependent on the risk calculations of ship captains and shipping companies, which are generally risk averse.

Iran responded to the US strikes by attacking US military bases across Kuwait, Bahrain, and Jordan on July 14.[4] Iran reportedly used a cluster munition warhead in an attack on Bahrain for the first time. ISW-CTP cannot verify this report, but if the report is accurate, Iran's use of a cluster munition warhead to attack Bahrain would represent a notable inflection in Iranian tactics given that Iran has previously only used cluster munition warheads in attacks against Israel.[5] Cluster munition warheads contain submunitions that disperse over a wide area and are intended to maximize damage.

The Iranian Parliament held its first open session since the start of the US-Israel-Iran War and discussed proposed legislation on Iranian management of the Strait of Hormuz.[6] Parliamentarians reviewed the “Strategic Action Plan for Ensuring the Security and Sustainable Development of the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf,” which Parliament first proposed in April, among other matters, at the July 13 session.[7] Parliament did not approve the bill or publish its text. The bill is likely intended to formalize Iran's control over the Strait of Hormuz and likely will not fundamentally alter the steps Iran is currently taking to secure its control over the strait. One hundred and eighty parliamentarians also signed a letter on July 14 calling for an oversight committee to ensure the government implements the bill.[8]

Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf notably did not preside over the session, and Deputy Parliament Speaker Hamidreza Haji Babaei led the session in his absence.[9] It is unclear why Ghalibaf did not lead the session, but his absence comes after several parliamentarians have criticized Ghalibaf in recent weeks for failing to convene Parliament.[10]

Iran may be deploying forces to the Iran-Iraq border due to concerns about Kurdish opposition groups conducting anti-regime activity amid heightened tensions between the United States and Iran. Anti-regime Kurdish groups based in Iraqi Kurdistan told Iraqi media on July 14 that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) deployed 3,000 “special forces” from the IRGC Aerospace Force and IRGC Ground Forces, as well as drones, artillery, and tanks, to the Iran-Iraq border in recent weeks.[11] The groups’ leaders claimed that the IRGC is deploying these forces to prepare for a possible confrontation against them.[12] No other sources have reported this large troop deployment at the time of this writing, however. Iran has periodically launched drone and missile attacks at these groups’ bases during the US-Israel-Iran War, including during the US-Iran ceasefire.[13] ISW-CTP has observed an uptick in these groups’ attacks on Iranian security forces and Iranian security operations in Kurdish-populated areas in recent weeks.[14] Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-run outlet Defa Press also reported in June that the regime is closely monitoring fighters in Kurdish-populated provinces and has replaced “purely defensive reactions” with an “active deterrence” doctrine against these fighters.[15] The Iranian regime has historically accused Kurdish opposition groups of cooperating with Israel and the United States to conduct operations against the regime and destabilize Iran.

Hezbollah appears to be conducting an information campaign to delay the Lebanese government's disarmament efforts by attempting to convince the Lebanese government that the group will cooperate with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and that the Lebanese government must prioritize securing a complete Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon before disarmament efforts can begin. Hezbollah is attempting to portray itself as a willing partner to the Lebanese government that also seeks to preserve internal Lebanese stability, which is a key Lebanese government objective.[16] Senior Hezbollah officials, including Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem, have repeatedly stated in recent weeks that Hezbollah seeks to maintain Lebanese national unity and supports the LAF’s deployment to southern Lebanon.[17] Unspecified sources told Lebanese media on July 13 that Hezbollah agreed to withdraw from southern Lebanon and “cooperate” with the LAF.[18] Hezbollah previously agreed to withdraw its forces north of the Litani River during the Lebanese government's previous disarmament efforts following the November 2024 ceasefire agreement.[19] Hezbollah has consistently stated that it will remain armed, even if the group withdraws from southern Lebanon, however.[20] Hezbollah-affiliated media also claimed on July 14 that Hezbollah has informed all “relevant parties” that the LAF is permitted to deploy “wherever it wishes,” so long as the LAF does not “approach” Hezbollah positions and the Lebanese government prioritizes securing an Israeli withdrawal before any Hezbollah-Lebanese government discussions about disarmament take place.[21]

Hezbollah and Hezbollah allies are simultaneously claiming that the pilot zone plan in the Trilateral Framework Agreement is intended to cause “internal conflict” between the LAF and Hezbollah.[22] Lebanese Parliament Speaker and Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri has continued to criticize the framework agreement and claimed that the initiative may be an Israeli “trap” to force the LAF into an internal conflict with Hezbollah.[23] Hezbollah parliamentarians have similarly claimed in recent weeks that the United States and Israel seek to provoke conflict between the LAF and Hezbollah by pressuring the LAF to disarm Hezbollah under the framework agreement.[24] Hezbollah officials have consistently threatened that any Lebanese disarmament efforts could result in “civil war.”[25]

Hezbollah's information campaign is likely capitalizing on the Lebanese government's cautious approach toward Hezbollah's disarmament.[26] The Lebanese government has sought to balance Hezbollah's disarmament with the group's continued threat to Lebanese stability despite the group's unprecedented weakness.[27] Lebanese President Joseph Aoun stated on July 10 that the Lebanese government must “cooperate with Hezbollah” in order to disarm the group, for example.[28] Any disarmament plan that relies on cooperating with Hezbollah and its supporting foreign cadres, including the IRGC, will almost certainly fail, because none of these actors will acquiesce to disarming Hezbollah.[29]

Hezbollah's information campaign also coincides with US-mediated Israel-Lebanon talks in Rome, which began on July 14 and have reportedly focused on the pilot zone plan.[30] Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar told international media on July 14 that the IDF is ready to move forward with implementing the two recently announced pilot zones.[31] The Israeli and Lebanese delegations reportedly continue to disagree over the timeframe for the IDF’s withdrawal and the LAF’s backfill of the pilot zones, the geographic scope of the LAF’s deployment, and how the United States and Israel will monitor the LAF’s efforts to disarm Hezbollah within the pilot zones, however.[32]

Unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are reportedly demanding guarantees before they disarm, including Iraqi federal government protection from future US or Israeli strikes and an end to the US military presence in Iraq.[33] Unspecified sources told Iraqi media on July 14 that the militias are concerned that surrendering their weapons to the government would leave them “vulnerable” given current regional tensions.[34] Three Shia Coordination Framework sources told Iraqi media on July 14 that the militias that refuse to disarm do not seek confrontation with the Iraqi federal government, but view existing, unspecified “guarantees” as insufficient.[35] One of the framework sources specifically noted the lack of guarantees regarding the safety of militia leaders and said that the militias seek guarantees that they will not face “political and security prosecution” in the future.[36] The US-Israeli combined force conducted numerous strikes targeting Iranian-backed Iraqi militia positions during the war to degrade the ability of the militias to attack the United States, Israel, and the Gulf states.[37] Multiple militias, including those within the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, have repeatedly refused to disarm and often cite the continued presence of US-led international coalition forces in Iraq as a reason to remain armed.[38] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[39]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah threatened on July 14 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would participate in a renewed war between Iran and the United States and Israel.[40] It is not clear how Kataib Hezbollah is defining “war,” however. Iran and the United States have exchanged more frequent and intense fire in the Persian Gulf in recent days, though below pre-ceasefire levels.[41] Iraqi militias, especially Kataib Hezbollah, frequently attacked US and foreign targets in Iraq and the region during the war in March and April.[42] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias also likely conducted several attacks targeting the Gulf states between the start of the ceasefire and mid-May.[43]

Recent Iranian-backed Iraqi militia statements reflect ongoing divisions among the militias over the Iraqi federal government's ongoing anti-corruption campaign. Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada Spokesperson Kazem al Fartousi rejected the anti-corruption campaign in an interview with Iraqi media on July 13 and said that the militia opposes the government “selectively” fighting corruption.[44] Fartousi added that the worst forms of corruption, which he implied the government should prioritize, are the quota system and nepotism in state institutions.[45] Kataib Hezbollah separately said on July 14 that it supports the anti-corruption campaign but warned the government against using the campaign to “settle scores and eliminate opponents.”[46] Iraqi authorities have primarily arrested Sunnis and allies of former Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani.[47] Kataib Hezbollah added that the campaign must focus on all governing institutions. Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada and Kataib Hezbollah are both members of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which released a statement on July 12 expressing support for the anti-corruption campaign.[48] Fartousi’s opposition to the campaign may reflect disagreements in the Islamic Resistance in Iraq about the campaign. Fartousi’s comments may also indicate internal divisions within Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada regarding the campaign.

Asaib Ahl al Haq Spokesperson Ahmed Adnan expressed support on July 14 for US investment in Iraq in contrast to the Islamic Resistance in Iraq's July 12 statement that implored the Iraqi federal government to “liberate” the Iraqi economy from “American hegemony.”[49] Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi’s visit to Washington, DC, began on July 13 and is expected to focus on expanding US-Iraq economic relations.[50] Asaib Ahl al Haq is not a member of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq and Adnan’s comments reflect the group's differing strategic priorities compared to those of the militias in the Islamic Resistance in Iraq.[51] Asaib Ahl al Haq’s leadership, including its leader Qais al Khazali, has focused more on politics than kinetic activity in recent years, including during the October 7 War.[52] The US-Israeli combined force struck multiple Asaib Ahl al Haq positions during the recent war and the US Treasury Department noted in April 2026 that the group conducted drone attacks targeting US and coalition forces in northern Iraq in March 2026, however.[53]

Iraqi Armed Forces Spokesperson Major General Sabah al Numan announced on July 14 that Iraq will establish a new security cooperation framework with the United States after the US-led coalition withdraws from Iraq in September 2026.[54] Numan stated that the framework will include enhanced military and intelligence cooperation with the United States.[55] Numan also stated that Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi will sign agreements with the United States to support training and capacity building for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) during his visit to Washington, DC, on July 14.[56] The US Treasury Department has not resumed its funding for the ISF since it halted US dollar shipments to Iraq in April 2026 due to concerns about Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks during the war.[57] US-led international coalition forces are currently based in Iraqi Kurdistan following their withdrawal from federal Iraq in January 2026.[58]

Two US officials stated on July 14 that the United States backed Saudi Arabia's July 13 airstrikes on Houthi-controlled Sanaa International Airport in Yemen.[59] Axios reported on July 14 that Saudi officials expressed concern to the United States last week about the resumption of IRGC-affiliated Mahan Air flights between Sanaa and Tehran. The flights resumed on July 3, marking the first direct flights between the two cities in over 10 years.[60] Axios reported that Saudi Arabia is concerned that Iran will use the direct air route to transfer weapons and military advisers to the Houthis.[61] Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman spoke with US President Donald Trump on July 10, during which Salman reportedly requested and received Trump's approval for “military action” against the Houthis, according to a US official.[62] Saudi forces struck Sanaa International Airport on July 13, which the Houthis responded to by launching an unspecified number of ballistic missiles and drones targeting Abha International Airport in Saudi Arabia.[63] The Houthi Political Bureau claimed on July 13 that Saudi Arabia struck Sanaa International Airport to prevent a Mahan Air passenger jet from landing at the airport.[64] The Mahan Air flight was reportedly carrying a Houthi delegation returning from former Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s funeral in Tehran but returned to Iran following the strikes.[65] The Houthis also warned commercial airlines on July 14 against using Saudi airspace.[66]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-july-14-2026/