[AdmSmith]

Iran Update Special Report, July 14, 2026

Iran has attacked at least three commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz in the past 24 hours, which indicates that Iran retains the ability and willingness to attack commercial shipping despite recent US strikes on Iran. Iran struck at least three vessels, including two Emirati tankers, on July 13 that were attempting to transit through the strait via the southern route along Oman's coast.[1] The Iranian attacks killed one crew member and wounded eight others.[2] Iran has repeatedly used force to try to deter vessels from using the alternative traffic separation scheme along Oman's coast because traffic through this route undermines Iranian efforts to assert full control over traffic in the strait. US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced on July 13 that it conducted another wave of strikes against Iranian military targets that Iran used to threaten shipping in the strait.[3] US officials, including US President Donald Trump, have stated that the current US campaign to degrade Iran's ability to threaten shipping could last several weeks. It is therefore premature to assess the effects of this campaign. The threshold for Iran to be able to disrupt shipping in the strait remains low, however, given that even individual drone and missile attacks can deter vessels from passing through the strait. Maritime traffic through the strait is dependent on the risk calculations of ship captains and shipping companies, which are generally risk averse.

Iran responded to the US strikes by attacking US military bases across Kuwait, Bahrain, and Jordan on July 14.[4] Iran reportedly used a cluster munition warhead in an attack on Bahrain for the first time. ISW-CTP cannot verify this report, but if the report is accurate, Iran's use of a cluster munition warhead to attack Bahrain would represent a notable inflection in Iranian tactics given that Iran has previously only used cluster munition warheads in attacks against Israel.[5] Cluster munition warheads contain submunitions that disperse over a wide area and are intended to maximize damage.

The Iranian Parliament held its first open session since the start of the US-Israel-Iran War and discussed proposed legislation on Iranian management of the Strait of Hormuz.[6] Parliamentarians reviewed the “Strategic Action Plan for Ensuring the Security and Sustainable Development of the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf,” which Parliament first proposed in April, among other matters, at the July 13 session.[7] Parliament did not approve the bill or publish its text. The bill is likely intended to formalize Iran's control over the Strait of Hormuz and likely will not fundamentally alter the steps Iran is currently taking to secure its control over the strait. One hundred and eighty parliamentarians also signed a letter on July 14 calling for an oversight committee to ensure the government implements the bill.[8]

Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf notably did not preside over the session, and Deputy Parliament Speaker Hamidreza Haji Babaei led the session in his absence.[9] It is unclear why Ghalibaf did not lead the session, but his absence comes after several parliamentarians have criticized Ghalibaf in recent weeks for failing to convene Parliament.[10]

Iran may be deploying forces to the Iran-Iraq border due to concerns about Kurdish opposition groups conducting anti-regime activity amid heightened tensions between the United States and Iran. Anti-regime Kurdish groups based in Iraqi Kurdistan told Iraqi media on July 14 that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) deployed 3,000 “special forces” from the IRGC Aerospace Force and IRGC Ground Forces, as well as drones, artillery, and tanks, to the Iran-Iraq border in recent weeks.[11] The groups’ leaders claimed that the IRGC is deploying these forces to prepare for a possible confrontation against them.[12] No other sources have reported this large troop deployment at the time of this writing, however. Iran has periodically launched drone and missile attacks at these groups’ bases during the US-Israel-Iran War, including during the US-Iran ceasefire.[13] ISW-CTP has observed an uptick in these groups’ attacks on Iranian security forces and Iranian security operations in Kurdish-populated areas in recent weeks.[14] Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-run outlet Defa Press also reported in June that the regime is closely monitoring fighters in Kurdish-populated provinces and has replaced “purely defensive reactions” with an “active deterrence” doctrine against these fighters.[15] The Iranian regime has historically accused Kurdish opposition groups of cooperating with Israel and the United States to conduct operations against the regime and destabilize Iran.

Hezbollah appears to be conducting an information campaign to delay the Lebanese government's disarmament efforts by attempting to convince the Lebanese government that the group will cooperate with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and that the Lebanese government must prioritize securing a complete Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon before disarmament efforts can begin. Hezbollah is attempting to portray itself as a willing partner to the Lebanese government that also seeks to preserve internal Lebanese stability, which is a key Lebanese government objective.[16] Senior Hezbollah officials, including Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem, have repeatedly stated in recent weeks that Hezbollah seeks to maintain Lebanese national unity and supports the LAF’s deployment to southern Lebanon.[17] Unspecified sources told Lebanese media on July 13 that Hezbollah agreed to withdraw from southern Lebanon and “cooperate” with the LAF.[18] Hezbollah previously agreed to withdraw its forces north of the Litani River during the Lebanese government's previous disarmament efforts following the November 2024 ceasefire agreement.[19] Hezbollah has consistently stated that it will remain armed, even if the group withdraws from southern Lebanon, however.[20] Hezbollah-affiliated media also claimed on July 14 that Hezbollah has informed all “relevant parties” that the LAF is permitted to deploy “wherever it wishes,” so long as the LAF does not “approach” Hezbollah positions and the Lebanese government prioritizes securing an Israeli withdrawal before any Hezbollah-Lebanese government discussions about disarmament take place.[21]

Hezbollah and Hezbollah allies are simultaneously claiming that the pilot zone plan in the Trilateral Framework Agreement is intended to cause “internal conflict” between the LAF and Hezbollah.[22] Lebanese Parliament Speaker and Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri has continued to criticize the framework agreement and claimed that the initiative may be an Israeli “trap” to force the LAF into an internal conflict with Hezbollah.[23] Hezbollah parliamentarians have similarly claimed in recent weeks that the United States and Israel seek to provoke conflict between the LAF and Hezbollah by pressuring the LAF to disarm Hezbollah under the framework agreement.[24] Hezbollah officials have consistently threatened that any Lebanese disarmament efforts could result in “civil war.”[25]

Hezbollah's information campaign is likely capitalizing on the Lebanese government's cautious approach toward Hezbollah's disarmament.[26] The Lebanese government has sought to balance Hezbollah's disarmament with the group's continued threat to Lebanese stability despite the group's unprecedented weakness.[27] Lebanese President Joseph Aoun stated on July 10 that the Lebanese government must “cooperate with Hezbollah” in order to disarm the group, for example.[28] Any disarmament plan that relies on cooperating with Hezbollah and its supporting foreign cadres, including the IRGC, will almost certainly fail, because none of these actors will acquiesce to disarming Hezbollah.[29]

Hezbollah's information campaign also coincides with US-mediated Israel-Lebanon talks in Rome, which began on July 14 and have reportedly focused on the pilot zone plan.[30] Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar told international media on July 14 that the IDF is ready to move forward with implementing the two recently announced pilot zones.[31] The Israeli and Lebanese delegations reportedly continue to disagree over the timeframe for the IDF’s withdrawal and the LAF’s backfill of the pilot zones, the geographic scope of the LAF’s deployment, and how the United States and Israel will monitor the LAF’s efforts to disarm Hezbollah within the pilot zones, however.[32]

Unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are reportedly demanding guarantees before they disarm, including Iraqi federal government protection from future US or Israeli strikes and an end to the US military presence in Iraq.[33] Unspecified sources told Iraqi media on July 14 that the militias are concerned that surrendering their weapons to the government would leave them “vulnerable” given current regional tensions.[34] Three Shia Coordination Framework sources told Iraqi media on July 14 that the militias that refuse to disarm do not seek confrontation with the Iraqi federal government, but view existing, unspecified “guarantees” as insufficient.[35] One of the framework sources specifically noted the lack of guarantees regarding the safety of militia leaders and said that the militias seek guarantees that they will not face “political and security prosecution” in the future.[36] The US-Israeli combined force conducted numerous strikes targeting Iranian-backed Iraqi militia positions during the war to degrade the ability of the militias to attack the United States, Israel, and the Gulf states.[37] Multiple militias, including those within the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, have repeatedly refused to disarm and often cite the continued presence of US-led international coalition forces in Iraq as a reason to remain armed.[38] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[39]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah threatened on July 14 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would participate in a renewed war between Iran and the United States and Israel.[40] It is not clear how Kataib Hezbollah is defining “war,” however. Iran and the United States have exchanged more frequent and intense fire in the Persian Gulf in recent days, though below pre-ceasefire levels.[41] Iraqi militias, especially Kataib Hezbollah, frequently attacked US and foreign targets in Iraq and the region during the war in March and April.[42] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias also likely conducted several attacks targeting the Gulf states between the start of the ceasefire and mid-May.[43]

Recent Iranian-backed Iraqi militia statements reflect ongoing divisions among the militias over the Iraqi federal government's ongoing anti-corruption campaign. Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada Spokesperson Kazem al Fartousi rejected the anti-corruption campaign in an interview with Iraqi media on July 13 and said that the militia opposes the government “selectively” fighting corruption.[44] Fartousi added that the worst forms of corruption, which he implied the government should prioritize, are the quota system and nepotism in state institutions.[45] Kataib Hezbollah separately said on July 14 that it supports the anti-corruption campaign but warned the government against using the campaign to “settle scores and eliminate opponents.”[46] Iraqi authorities have primarily arrested Sunnis and allies of former Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani.[47] Kataib Hezbollah added that the campaign must focus on all governing institutions. Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada and Kataib Hezbollah are both members of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which released a statement on July 12 expressing support for the anti-corruption campaign.[48] Fartousi’s opposition to the campaign may reflect disagreements in the Islamic Resistance in Iraq about the campaign. Fartousi’s comments may also indicate internal divisions within Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada regarding the campaign.

Asaib Ahl al Haq Spokesperson Ahmed Adnan expressed support on July 14 for US investment in Iraq in contrast to the Islamic Resistance in Iraq's July 12 statement that implored the Iraqi federal government to “liberate” the Iraqi economy from “American hegemony.”[49] Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi’s visit to Washington, DC, began on July 13 and is expected to focus on expanding US-Iraq economic relations.[50] Asaib Ahl al Haq is not a member of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq and Adnan’s comments reflect the group's differing strategic priorities compared to those of the militias in the Islamic Resistance in Iraq.[51] Asaib Ahl al Haq’s leadership, including its leader Qais al Khazali, has focused more on politics than kinetic activity in recent years, including during the October 7 War.[52] The US-Israeli combined force struck multiple Asaib Ahl al Haq positions during the recent war and the US Treasury Department noted in April 2026 that the group conducted drone attacks targeting US and coalition forces in northern Iraq in March 2026, however.[53]

Iraqi Armed Forces Spokesperson Major General Sabah al Numan announced on July 14 that Iraq will establish a new security cooperation framework with the United States after the US-led coalition withdraws from Iraq in September 2026.[54] Numan stated that the framework will include enhanced military and intelligence cooperation with the United States.[55] Numan also stated that Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi will sign agreements with the United States to support training and capacity building for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) during his visit to Washington, DC, on July 14.[56] The US Treasury Department has not resumed its funding for the ISF since it halted US dollar shipments to Iraq in April 2026 due to concerns about Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks during the war.[57] US-led international coalition forces are currently based in Iraqi Kurdistan following their withdrawal from federal Iraq in January 2026.[58]

Two US officials stated on July 14 that the United States backed Saudi Arabia's July 13 airstrikes on Houthi-controlled Sanaa International Airport in Yemen.[59] Axios reported on July 14 that Saudi officials expressed concern to the United States last week about the resumption of IRGC-affiliated Mahan Air flights between Sanaa and Tehran. The flights resumed on July 3, marking the first direct flights between the two cities in over 10 years.[60] Axios reported that Saudi Arabia is concerned that Iran will use the direct air route to transfer weapons and military advisers to the Houthis.[61] Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman spoke with US President Donald Trump on July 10, during which Salman reportedly requested and received Trump's approval for “military action” against the Houthis, according to a US official.[62] Saudi forces struck Sanaa International Airport on July 13, which the Houthis responded to by launching an unspecified number of ballistic missiles and drones targeting Abha International Airport in Saudi Arabia.[63] The Houthi Political Bureau claimed on July 13 that Saudi Arabia struck Sanaa International Airport to prevent a Mahan Air passenger jet from landing at the airport.[64] The Mahan Air flight was reportedly carrying a Houthi delegation returning from former Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s funeral in Tehran but returned to Iran following the strikes.[65] The Houthis also warned commercial airlines on July 14 against using Saudi airspace.[66]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-july-14-2026/

[AdmSmith]

Iran Update Special Report, July 15, 2026

The United States has continued to strike Iranian military targets, including some targets further inland. Iranian regime media reported on July 15 that US forces struck the Artesh Ground Forces 388th Mechanized Assault Brigade barracks in Iranshahr, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[1] The strikes reportedly killed seven Artesh soldiers, injured 13 others, and destroyed several buildings.[2] This strike is notable given that the 388th Brigade is located around 200 kilometers from the Iranian coast, while most US airstrikes in July have been concentrated around Iran's southern coast. The 388th Brigade operates under the 88th Armored Division, which is based in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[3] US forces reportedly struck a second inland site — an unspecified IRGC base — in Saravan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province on July 15.[4] The Artesh has conducted operations throughout the war and most recently claimed on July 15 that it conducted drone strikes targeting US forces at Muwaffaq Salti Airbase in Azraq, Jordan.[5] The Artesh claimed that it has recently conducted eight waves of drone attacks against US bases in the region.[6]

Iran also conducted attacks against US forces in Bahrain and Kuwait on July 15. Iraqi media separately reported on July 15 that an unknown actor launched six drones targeting Erbil International Airport and the US Consulate in Erbil, Erbil Province.[7] It is unclear whether Iran or Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducted this attack. Air defenses intercepted all of the drones.[8]

Iran is attacking vessels that have adopted alternative mechanisms to bypass Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz. Iran attacked three vessels in the strait on July 13, two of which were conducting “shuttle runs,” or repeated short trips to ports outside the strait in order to transport oil through the strait while avoiding Iranian territorial waters.[9] The Wall Street Journal reported on July 14 that the two tankers were conducting “shuttle runs” using the US-backed southern route off the coast of Oman.[10] The two vessels — Mombasa B and Al Bahyah — operate under the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC).[11] ADNOC has previously adopted new methods — such as turning off its ships’ automatic identification systems (AIS) and using ship-to-ship transfers — to evade Iranian detection.[12] The United Arab Emirates has also insisted that Iran must not be allowed to control traffic in the strait. Iran has repeatedly attacked vessels attempting to transit through the strait using the southern route along Oman's coast because maritime traffic through this alternative route undermines Iran's efforts to achieve recognized control of the strait.[13]

Iran's attacks on shipping are having some success in deterring shipping companies from using routes outside Iran's illegal traffic separation scheme, which advances Iran's objective of securing control over the strait. Seven maritime security and shipping industry sources told Reuters on July 15 that shipping companies are avoiding using the southern route despite US military escorts, highlighting how shipping companies’ willingness to use alternative routes in the strait is dependent on their risk calculations.[14] People familiar with the matter separately told the Wall Street Journal on July 14 that some tanker captains have refused to transit through the strait in recent days.[15] The threshold for Iran to disrupt shipping in the strait remains low, given that even individual attacks can deter ships from transiting through the strait.

The United States is increasing economic pressure on Iran's weapons procurement, oil export, and sanctions evasion networks through further sanctions as part of its campaign to degrade Iran's willingness to attack commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.[16] The US Treasury Department sanctioned more than 50 individuals, entities, and vessels on July 14 for supporting Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani’s oil export, shipping, and sanctions evasion network.[17] Shamkhani is the son of former senior official Ali Shamkhani. The sanctions targeted Shamkhani’s financiers, logistics facilitators, container shipping companies, vessel operators, and Caspian Sea shipping network, which move Iranian and Russian petroleum products, sanctioned goods, and cargo to Iranian-backed actors, including the Houthis.[18] The United States previously sanctioned Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani and his multinational shipping network in July 2025 and April 2026 for generating tens of billions of dollars for the Shamkhani family and the Iranian regime.[19] The US Treasury Department separately sanctioned three individuals and four entities on July 15 for supporting the procurement of weapons for the IRGC.[20] The new sanctions follow the United States’ recent decision to revoke the sanctions waiver that it had implemented under the US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) and reimpose the naval blockade on Iranian ports.[21] These economic measures are intended to reduce Iran's willingness to attack commercial vessels by imposing an economic cost on Iran for conducting such attacks.

Israeli and Lebanese officials reportedly agreed on aspects of a plan to implement “pilot zones” in southern Lebanon during US-brokered negotiations in Rome, Italy, on July 14 and 15.[22] A US State Department official told an Israeli correspondent on July 15 that the Israeli and Lebanese delegations reached an agreement on the “structure and guidelines” of a plan for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to deploy to pilot zones in accordance with the June 26 Trilateral Framework Agreement.[23] Lebanese government officials told Lebanese media on July 15 that the LAF will deploy to two zones that include towns both currently under Israel Defense Forces (IDF) control, from which the IDF will withdraw, and without an IDF ground presence.[24] Saudi media previously reported on July 14 that Israeli and Lebanese officials disagreed on whether the LAF would backfill IDF positions or deploy to territory nominally under Lebanese government control instead.[25]

Many details surrounding the pilot zones plan remain unclear, including the plan's timeline and scope, however. US and Lebanese officials said on July 15 that the IDF and LAF will implement the first pilot zones “within days,” whereas other unspecified US officials told Lebanese media on July 15 that implementation will not begin until the end of July.[26] Lebanese and international media also reported different details on the pilot zones’ territorial extents, with some media outlets claiming that the zones will include up to six towns while other reports have denied that the delegations made any changes to the zones that Israeli and Lebanese officials agreed on in June.[27] It is also unclear whether the Lebanese government will order the LAF to search private property to disarm Hezbollah in the pilot zones. Lebanese media reported on July 15 that neither the Israeli nor the Lebanese government has requested that the LAF search private property.[28] Other Lebanese media reported that the Lebanese government has authorized the LAF to conduct all “inspection operations” necessary to disarm Hezbollah, however.[29] The LAF only conducted limited private property searches at the IDF’s request during previous efforts to disarm Hezbollah after the November 2024 ceasefire.[30] Any Hezbollah disarmament plan that restricts the LAF from searching private property will likely fail because Hezbollah frequently conceals materiel in civilian homes.[31]

Unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have expressed concern that the United States is pressuring the Iraqi federal government to disarm the militias before the United States launches a “grand plan” to overthrow the Iranian regime, according to unspecified sources close to the militias speaking to Iraqi media on July 15.[32] The militias’ reported concerns come amid increased exchanges of fire between Iran and the United States in recent days.[33] Most of the militias that refuse to disarm, such as Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, maintain the closest ties to Iran.[34] These militias frequently attacked US military bases in Iraq and the Gulf countries during the US-Israel-Iran War.[35]

US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth reiterated after his meeting with Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi on July 14 that Iraq must disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[36] Hegseth said that the militias conducted over 600 attacks targeting US personnel during the war.[37] Hegseth and Zaydi discussed expanding US technical, technological, and digital cooperation with the Iraqi military and security establishment.[38] The United States has not resumed its funding for some counterterrorism and training programs for the Iraqi Security Forces since suspending funding for these programs in April 2026 due to concerns about Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks during the war.[39] Iraqi Armed Forces Spokesperson Major General Sabah al Numan announced on July 14 that Zaydi had directed the formation of an Iraqi committee to negotiate the details of a new US-Iraq security cooperation framework ahead of the scheduled withdrawal of US-led coalition forces from Iraqi Kurdistan in September 2026.[40] US-led coalition forces are currently based in Iraqi Kurdistan following their withdrawal from federal Iraq in January 2026.[41]

US and Iraqi officials have continued to describe Zaydi’s recent visit to Washington, DC, as the start of a new US-Iraqi relationship. US Special Envoy to Iraq and Syria Tom Barrack called US President Donald Trump's meeting with Zaydi on July 14 a “turning point” in US-Iraqi relations.[42] Barrack added that the future US-Iraqi relationship will focus on investment, trade, and economic opportunities in addition to security.[43] An informed source similarly told Iraqi media on July 14 that the Iraqi delegation is expected to sign more than 18 agreements with the United States covering energy, oil, education, and health during Zaydi’s visit.[44] One of these agreements could be what Iraqi and regional media have described as the “June agreement,” in which the United States will support investment in Iraq in exchange for the Iraqi federal government reducing Iranian influence in Iraq, including disarming Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[45]

The Iraqi federal government is developing alternative routes to the Strait of Hormuz for Iraqi oil exports amid Iranian efforts to control traffic in the strait. A US State Department official told Reuters on July 24 that the United States is supporting Iraqi and Syrian efforts to revive the Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline that extends from Kirkuk to the eastern Mediterranean Sea.[46] The pipeline has been largely inoperable for years, but Syrian and Iraqi officials have repeatedly discussed re-opening it since 2025.[47] The US State Department official's comments are consistent with long-standing US efforts to reduce Iraqi dependence on Iran.[48] An unspecified Western source told Saudi media on July 7 that US Special Envoy to Iraq and Syria Tom Barrack seeks to create “a new alliance of interests” between Iraq, Syria, and other regional states.[49] This effort is intended, in part, to reduce regional reliance on the Strait of Hormuz by linking Iraq, Syria, and other regional countries to the Mediterranean Sea.[50] Iraqi Oil Minister Bassem Mohammad Khudair al Abadi also said on July 13 that a consortium of US and Qatari companies is working to develop another oil pipeline from Basra in federal Iraq to Peshkabour in Iraqi Kurdistan in order to connect this pipeline to pipelines in Ceyhan in western Turkey and Baniyas in western Syria.[51]

The Iraqi federal government reportedly designated Lebanese Hezbollah as a terrorist organization in early July and issued a directive to freeze the assets of individuals and corporations affiliated with Hezbollah and the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), according to Iraqi and regional media.[52] Iraqi and regional outlets reported on July 15 that the Iraqi Foreign and Finance Ministries facilitated the designation in early July.[53] These reports follow increased US pressure on the Iraqi federal government to reduce Iranian influence in Iraq, including by dismantling Iranian-backed Iraqi militia financial networks.[54] Iranian-backed Iraqi actors exploit their access to the Iraqi economy to fund the Iranian regime and its Axis of Resistance, including Hezbollah.[55] The Iraqi federal government has previously retracted similar financial actions targeting Axis of Resistance members, however. The Iraqi Gazette, which publishes binding Iraqi federal decisions, published in December 2025 that the Iraqi government had designated Hezbollah and the Houthis as terrorist organizations.[56] Multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi actors publicly opposed the decision, however.[57] The Iraqi Committee for the Freezing of Terrorist Actions subsequently accused the Gazette of releasing the designation of the Houthis and Hezbollah as terrorist organizations “without revisions” and said that the committee would revise the decision.[58]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-july-15-2026/