Iran continues to use threats and force to compel commercial vessels to transit through its illegal traffic separation scheme in the Strait of Hormuz. Bloomberg reported that at least eight vessels attempted to exit the strait along the Omani coast between July 2 and 3 before reversing course.[1] Some of the vessels later resumed transit through Iran's traffic separation scheme, almost certainly after Iranian authorities threatened to attack the vessels. Iran has previously threatened and attacked vessels that attempted to transit through the strait via alternative routes.[2] Iran attacked a vessel on June 25 that was using the International Maritime Organization-Oman route, for example.[3] Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi also warned the United Kingdom and France against engaging in any military activity in the strait in a statement on July 4 after both countries announced that they had agreed to work with Oman to ensure safe navigation for vessels through Omani territorial waters.[4] Alternative transit routes such as the route along Oman's coast undermine Iran's efforts to establish complete control over the Strait of Hormuz. Iran likely calculates that threats and continued attacks on vessels will deter countries and international organizations from facilitating such alternative transit routes.
Senior Iranian officials continue to portray the strait as Iran's primary source of leverage against the United States. Supreme Leader Military Affairs Adviser Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi warned on July 4 that Iran could use both the strait and the Bab al Mandeb as leverage if the United States violates the US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU).[5] Iranian Parliamentarian Malek Shariati similarly emphasized on July 3 the importance of Iranian control over the strait because of its important role for global energy markets.[6] Iran has repeatedly used force and the threat of force since April 2026 to control transit through the waterway to raise global oil prices and thus increase pressure on the United States and the broader international community to meet Iranian demands.[7] Iran announced the closure of the strait on June 20 to try to compel the United States to pressure Israel to halt operations against Hezbollah, for example.[8] Long-term Iranian control over the strait would enable Iran to close the waterway at any time and for any reason in order to make its adversaries meet Iranian demands and deter its adversaries from taking action against Iran.
Senior Iranian regime officials appear to be trying to contain growing factional disputes over Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s position on the US-Iran MoU. Supreme Leader Representative to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Abdollah Haji Sadeghi told IRGC and Basij commanders and members in a letter on July 4 that Mojtaba’s recent message on the MoU is the regime's final basis for action.[9] Mojtaba stated on June 18 that he had authorized the MoU but emphasized that he had “a different opinion in principle.”[10] Haji Sadeghi stated that debates over whether officials imposed the MoU on Mojtaba, acted negligently, or betrayed Mojtaba damage regime unity and do not align with Mojtaba’s message.[11] Haji Sadeghi’s statement follows recent public divisions among members of the Assembly of Experts — an 88-member clerical body that is responsible for appointing and supervising the Supreme Leader — and parliamentarians over the MoU and negotiations with the United States.[12] Sixty Assembly of Experts members issued a statement on June 28 warning negotiators not to violate Mojtaba’s red lines.[13] The Assembly of Experts Secretariat later clarified that the statement did not represent the Assembly's official position.[14] A group of at least 84 parliamentarians, many of whom are aligned with the ultra-hardline Paydari (Stability) Front, endorsed the June 28 Assembly statement.[15] Haji Sadeghi’s directive to IRGC and Basij commanders suggests that senior regime officials close to the supreme leader and the IRGC are trying to prevent ultra-hardline factions from framing support for the MoU as disloyalty to Mojtaba.
The Iranian regime appears to be reshuffling some senior military positions after the US-Israel-Iran war. Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-run media Defa Press reported that Rear Admiral Ali Ozmaei replaced Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri as the IRGC Navy commander.[16] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed Tangsiri in an airstrike targeting Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, on March 26.[17] Ozmaei previously commanded the IRGC Navy 5th Imam Mohammad Bagher Region in Hormozgan Province, which oversees IRGC Navy operations in the southern Persian Gulf near the northern entrance of the Strait of Hormuz.[18] The United States sanctioned Ozmaei in June 2019 for acting on behalf of the IRGC and facilitating “destabilizing and provocative” actions around the strait.[19] The US sanctions against Ozmaei came after Iran conducted several attacks against commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz, including two tankers in early June 2019.[20] Iran's maritime escalation around the strait in 2019 was a response to US President Donald Trump's imposition of maximum pressure sanctions on Iran.[21] Some Iranian media outlets have also begun to publicly describe Major General Ahmad Vahidi as the IRGC commander instead of the IRGC deputy commander.[22] ISW-CTP assesses that Vahidi has been serving as the IRGC commander since the US-Israeli combined force killed the former commander on February 28.[23]
Defa Press separately referred to Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Inspection Deputy Brigadier General Mohammad Jafar Asadi as the “former” inspection deputy on July 4.[24] Iranian media identified Asadi as the inspection deputy as recently as June 14.[25] It remains unclear whether Asadi was removed, reassigned, or promoted, however. This report comes after Defa Press described Major General Ali Abdollahi Aliabadi as the AFGS deputy chief, suggesting that Aliabadi may simultaneously serve as the AFGS deputy chief and Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters commander.[26] The new characterizations of Asadi and Aliabadi in Iranian media follow unconfirmed reports in December 2025 that former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was considering merging the AFGS and Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is reportedly seeking approval from US President Donald Trump before initiating an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operation to seize remaining Hezbollah infrastructure in Ali al Taher, Nabatieh District, southeastern Lebanon, according to Israeli media on July 3.[27] The IDF reportedly postponed a planned operation to seize Hezbollah infrastructure in Ali al Taher on June 21 in order not to disrupt US-Iran negotiations.[28] An Israeli military correspondent reported on July 2 that approximately 30 Hezbollah fighters remain at an underground facility in Ali al Taher.[29] The IDF has continued to engage Hezbollah fighters who have emerged from the facility or have attempted to approach IDF positions surrounding Ali al Taher in recent days.[30] Ali al Taher contains one of Hezbollah's largest underground command and control facilities and serves as a key reconnaissance position and launch site for Hezbollah attacks into northern Israel.[31] Ali al Taher also contains the headquarters of Hezbollah's Badr Unit, which is one of Hezbollah's geographic units that is responsible for the area north of the Litani River, particularly around Nabatieh District and the southern Bekaa Valley, and one of the main Hezbollah units that has engaged Israeli forces in southern Lebanon.[32]
The Houthis sent a senior fundraising official to Tehran as part of its delegation to former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s funeral, potentially to try to obtain funds from the Iranian regime. Houthi Endowments Authority Chairman Abdulmaged bin Abdulrahman bin al Hassan bin al Hussein al Houthi gave a speech at an event in Tehran on July 4 on the sidelines of Ali Khamenei’s funeral.[33] The Houthi Endowments Authority is one of the Houthis’ primary institutions for generating revenue, according to a Washington-based Yemen analyst.[34] Abdulmaged's visit follows reports that Iran intends to use part of the economic relief it gains from the US-Iran MoU to provide funding to Hezbollah.[35] Iran may consider using economic relief to support other regional proxies and partners, including the Houthis. Iranian officials have recently emphasized the value of the Houthis in the Axis of Resistance, particularly the Houthis’ ability to disrupt shipping in the Red Sea in support of Iranian objectives. Iranian officials, including IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani and Supreme Leader Military Affairs Adviser Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi, continue to threaten that Iran and the Houthis could disrupt traffic through the Bab el Mandeb Strait alongside Iran's efforts to control shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.[36]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-july-4-2026/
Ali Khamenei was married to Mansoureh Khojasteh Bagherzadeh, with whom he had six children; four sons (Mostafa, Mojtaba, Masoud, and Meysam) and two daughters (Boshra and Hoda)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Khamenei
Mostafa, Masoud and Meysam attended the funeral, but not Mojtaba Khamenei!
https://x.com/HadiZonouzi/status/2073626635388190794
It’s probably not an AI-generated video, because if it were, they would have included Mojtaba as well.
Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz is detrimental to global commercial interests because it enables Iran to selectively determine which vessels may pass through the strait and at what cost. Iranian Ambassador to the People's Republic of China (PRC) Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli stated on July 4 that Iran will give the PRC “special considerations” in determining the cost of “service” fees because the PRC is a “friendly country.”[1] This comment suggests that Iran plans to discount the tolls that the PRC and other “friendly” countries must pay for their vessels to transit through the strait. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi previously identified the PRC, Russia, India, Iraq, and Pakistan as “friendly” states whose vessels can pass through the strait.[2] Iran's imposition of tolls on vessels belonging to countries that it deems “non-friendly” violates the principle of free navigation under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.[3] Fazli’s statement is also consistent with ISW-CTP’s ongoing assessment that Iran is prioritizing international recognition of its control of the strait over the collection of tolls.[4]
Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir announced on July 5 that the IDF has established control over Hezbollah's extensive underground tunnel networks in the vicinity of Beaufort Castle, Nabatieh District, in southern Lebanon.[5] The IDF previously established control over above-ground terrain surrounding Beaufort Castle on May 31 and began to seize and dismantle underground Hezbollah infrastructure throughout June.[6] Zamir, IDF Northern Command Commander Major General Rafi Milo, and other senior IDF field commanders visited Israeli forces and toured seized Hezbollah tunnels in the vicinity of Beaufort Castle on July 5.[7] Zamir noted that Hezbollah, with Iranian assistance, had developed extensive tunnel networks underneath the ridge surrounding Beaufort Castle for command and control (C2) and targeting northern Israeli communities.[8] Senior IDF officers have identified the Beaufort Castle ridge and terrain surrounding Ali al Taher, which is about three miles north of Beaufort Castle, as major Hezbollah operational areas.[9] Zamir urged the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to fulfill its commitment to disarming Hezbollah fighters and dismantling militant infrastructure per the terms of the June 26 Trilateral Framework Agreement.[10] Zamir also announced that the IDF will continue to attack Hezbollah in Lebanon and warned that the IDF is prepared to launch a “swift offensive” if Hezbollah violates the ceasefire.[11] The IDF has continued to attack Hezbollah positions in southern Lebanon. The IDF has conducted four airstrikes across southern Lebanon since ISW-CTP’s last data cut-off on July 4.[12]
United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported that unspecified armed actors attacked a bulk carrier off the coast of the Houthi-controlled port of Hudaydah on July 5.[13] UKMTO said that the unspecified armed actors approached the bulk carrier in a skiff 30 nautical miles southwest of Hudaydah Port and opened fire.[14] No actor has claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of this writing.
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-july-5-2026/