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Iran Update Special Report, June 27, 2026

Iran has continued to use force to try to deter the United States from undermining Iranian efforts to control the Strait of Hormuz. Iran conducted a drone attack targeting a Singapore-flagged cargo ship approximately eight nautical miles southeast of Dahit, Oman, on June 25.[1] A US official told the New York Times on June 26 that US forces struck four Iranian missile and drone storage facilities along the strait and on Qeshm Island in response.[2] Iranian forces then conducted a drone attack against US positions in Bahrain on June 27.[3] Bahraini air defenses intercepted one drone, while a second drone landed in a remote area.[4] United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) subsequently reported on June 27 that an unspecified projectile struck a tanker off the coast of Oman.[5] Iran likely attacked the vessel because it was presumably using the southern route along Oman's coast to transit through the strait instead of Iran's illegitimate traffic separation scheme (TSS).[6] The international community has recently attempted to circumvent Iran's TSS, undermining Iranian efforts to establish control over the strait. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) and Oman announced a joint effort on June 23 to move hundreds of stranded vessels through the strait through a designated safe route along the Omani coast.[7] The IMO paused this effort on June 26 after Iran attacked the Singapore-flagged cargo ship on June 25, however.[8] The Joint Maritime Information Center (JMIC), which operates under the US-led Combined Maritime Forces, told UKMTO on June 27 that the southern route in the Strait of Hormuz has been expanded to accommodate simultaneous inbound and outbound traffic.[9] It is unclear whether the southern route described by the JMIC is distinct from the IMO-Omani route.

Iran's strikes against Bahrain may also be part of an ongoing Iranian effort to coerce the Gulf states to accept Iran's control of the strait and deter them from supporting US efforts to undermine Iran's control. The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry responded to the US retaliatory strikes against Iran on June 26 by warning Gulf states not to allow the United States to attack Iran from bases within their territory.[10] Iran's attack against Bahrain comes after the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the United States explicitly rejected on June 25 any Iranian attempts to assert control over the strait, including by charging tolls.[11] The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry called the US-GCC statement “interventionist, irresponsible, and provocative.”[12] Iran's attack on Bahrain may have been, in part, intended to signal to the Gulf states that Iran could take military action against them if they support US efforts to undermine Iranian attempts to control the strait. Multiple Gulf states condemned Iran's drone attack against Bahrain.[13]

The Israel-Lebanon-United States Trilateral Framework challenges Iranian and Hezbollah efforts to facilitate an Israeli capitulation in Lebanon and threatens Hezbollah's existence as an armed group. The US State Department released the full text of the framework agreement on June 26.[14] The agreement seeks the disarmament of all non-state armed groups in Lebanon, particularly Hezbollah.[15] The second and third clauses of the agreement confirm that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) will “gradually” reassert control over all of southern Lebanon and that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will “progressively redeploy” out of mutually determined “pilot zones.”[16] These clauses assert that the LAF will assume full security responsibility for areas where armed groups have been successfully disarmed and dismantled, suggesting that the IDF’s withdrawal from Lebanon is contingent upon Hezbollah's disarmament.[17] The fourth clause of the agreement emphasizes that the LAF will completely disarm all non-state groups and ensure that they possess “no armed capabilities anywhere in Lebanon,” which would include Hezbollah's weapons north of the Litani River.[18] Hezbollah has long resisted disarmament north of the Litani River because the group has stockpiled much of its weapons in the Bekaa Valley.[19] The seventh clause of the agreement clarifies that Israel and Lebanon retain the right to self-defense, which similarly challenges Iran's demand that the IDF cease all military activity in Lebanon.[20] The eleventh clause of the agreement stipulates that the United States and Lebanon will restrict the flow of unspecified funds to any entity affiliated with Lebanese non-state armed groups.[21] Such funds presumably include Iranian funding for Hezbollah. International media reported on June 17 that Iran would use potential economic relief gained from the memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the United States to fund and reconstitute Hezbollah.[22]

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz reiterated on June 27 that the IDF will maintain its “security zone” in southern Lebanon amid continued Israeli strikes on Hezbollah targets.[23] An Israeli military correspondent reported on June 27 that Katz lauded the “historic” deal between Israel and Lebanon but said that the IDF will not “entirely withdraw” from Lebanon and that Israeli forces will maintain their “security zone,” including the Beaufort Castle ridge area.[24] He also directed the IDF to prepare for a prolonged deployment in the “security zone” and to continue to protect northern Israel from Hezbollah attacks.[25] The IDF continued strikes on Hezbollah targets on June 27. Lebanese media reported multiple IDF airstrikes on Nabatieh el Fawqa, Nabatieh District, on June 27.[26] The IDF told Reuters that one of the strikes targeted an individual who posed a threat to IDF forces but did not provide further details.[27] Lebanese media separately reported an Israeli strike near Tallouseh, Marjaayoun District, on June 27.[28] A Hezbollah-aligned journalist also claimed on June 27 that the IDF had advanced toward the outskirts of Kfarchouba, Hasbaya District, but the IDF has not confirmed this report at the time of this writing.[29]

Hezbollah is conducting an information operation to weaken the Lebanese government's resolve to disarm Hezbollah by threatening renewed civil war in Lebanon if the government attempts to implement the framework agreement. Hezbollah Parliamentarian Hassan Fadlallah denounced the tripartite agreement on June 26 and warned that attempts by the Lebanese government to implement the agreement could reignite civil war in Lebanon.[30] Fadlallah said that Hezbollah will retain its weapons and confront any Lebanese government action to disarm the group. Fadlallah also claimed that the LAF is militarily incapable of disarming Hezbollah.[31] Hezbollah supporters protested against the framework agreement in the Beirut area on June 26 and 27 in line with Fadlallah’s threat that the group would mobilize the Lebanese “street” to stop the government from implementing the agreement.[32] Hezbollah has long leveraged the threat of renewed civil war to deter the Lebanese government from attempting to disarm the group. Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem threatened in August 2025 to organize mass anti-government protests and said that there would be “no life” in Lebanon if the LAF attempted to disarm Hezbollah, for example.[33] Other Hezbollah figures have attempted to delegitimize the framework agreement by deeming it unlawful and spreading disinformation about the agreement's provisions. Hezbollah parliamentary bloc leader Mohammad Raad alleged that the tripartite agreement is a “cover up” for a permanent Israeli military presence in Lebanon, despite Israel's affirmation in the agreement that it has no territorial ambitions in Lebanon.[34] Various Hezbollah officials, including Qassem, called the framework agreement unconstitutional and a violation of the sensitive, sectarian National Pact, which suggests that Hezbollah is trying to depict the agreement as both illegal and liable to inflame sectarian tensions.[35]

The Iranian regime likely views the framework agreement as contravening the Lebanon-related clause of the US-Iran MoU and may attempt to use the agreement as a pretext to further delay nuclear negotiations with the United States. Iranian state media claimed that the framework agreement is illegitimate because it exists separately from the MoU and US-Iran negotiations and preserves the IDF’s freedom of movement in Lebanon.[36] The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry issued a statement on June 27 that characterized continued Israeli military action in Lebanon as a violation of the first clause of the MoU, which stipulates the “immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon.”[37] The Iranian regime likely views the framework agreement, which permits Israel's continued ground presence until Hezbollah is completely disarmed and enables Israel to act against Hezbollah in self-defense, as contravening the first clause of the MoU.[38] Fadlallah claimed on June 26 that Iran would not sign any agreement with the United States until Israel withdraws from Lebanese territory entirely.[39] ISW-CTP has repeatedly assessed that Iran has attempted to condition US-Iran nuclear negotiations on the United States compelling Israel to halt operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon and withdraw from Lebanese territory as part of its efforts to preserve Hezbollah and delay nuclear negotiations.[40]

The Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) appointed Haqqi Ismail al Khalidi as the PMF Anbar Operations Command commander on June 24.[41] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that answer to Iran instead of the prime minister.[42] Khalidi replaced Haider al Hammouri, who temporarily held the position after US-Israeli combined force strikes killed former PMF Anbar Operations Command Commander Dawai al Baiji in March 2026.[43] The PMF has also characterized Kataib Hezbollah-affiliated Qasim Musleh al Khafaji as the PMF Anbar Operations Command commander.[44] It is unclear how Khafaji and Khalidi’s responsibilities differ.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-27-2026/

Iran Update Special Report, June 28, 2026

Iran has continued to attack US forces in the region to try to deter the United States from undermining Iranian efforts to control the Strait of Hormuz. An Iranian drone struck the Panama-flagged M/T Kiku on June 27.[1] US military aircraft targeted Iranian military surveillance infrastructure, communications systems, air defense sites, drone storage facilities, and mine-laying capabilities in response.[2] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy then released a statement that threatened US bases in the region.[3] The IRGC launched drone and ballistic missile attacks targeting the US Fifth Fleet Naval Base in Bahrain and the Ali Al Salem Airbase in Kuwait on June 28.[4] Bahraini air defenses intercepted several projectiles, but the Iranian attack destroyed a residential building, according to Bahrain's Interior Ministry.[5] These strikes are likely intended to deter the United States from continuing to undermine Iranian efforts to control the strait by signaling to the United States that Iran will attack US forces in response to US strikes on Iran that seek to reduce Iran's ability to threaten international shipping. Iranian officials have continued to emphasize after the recent exchange of fire that Iran intends to assert sovereignty over the strait. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi stated on June 28 that Iran is “solely responsible” for managing the Strait of Hormuz under the US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU).[6] The fifth article of the MoU explicitly states that Iran must engage in dialogue with Oman and the Persian Gulf littoral states to determine the “future administration” of the strait.[7] Iranian Artesh Spokesperson Mohammad Akraminia separately stated on June 28 that Iran seeks to use control of the strait to strengthen its regional power, not just to collect tolls.[8] ISW-CTP has previously assessed that Iran is prioritizing securing recognized control over the strait over collecting tolls.[9]

Iran's strikes may also reflect an Iranian effort to dissuade the Gulf states from resisting Iranian control over the strait. Iran may have intended for its strikes to signal to Gulf states that Iran will respond with force to any Gulf opposition to its control of the strait, amid recent Gulf resistance to Iranian management of the waterway. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the United States explicitly rejected on June 25 any Iranian attempts to assert control over the strait, including by charging tolls.[10] Omani officials told CNN on June 28 that Oman opposes any mandatory fees or tolls in the Strait of Hormuz, citing international freedom of navigation.[11] Iranian media and officials have adopted a harsher tone toward Gulf countries in recent days, likely in response to these countries’ opposition to Iranian management of the strait. Iran's English-language media outlet published an article on June 26 in which it criticized the Gulf states and claimed that these countries are attempting to “conceal” the reality that Iran has established a new “regional balance” with its control over the strait, for example.[12]

Iran is also threatening to suspend negotiations as part of its efforts to deter the United States from challenging Iranian sovereignty over the strait. The IRGC Navy stated on June 27 that US strikes on Iran violated the ceasefire and “will result in the complete halt of all diplomatic processes.”[13] Iran may calculate that threatening to stop negotiations could alter US decision-making, given that US officials have repeatedly stated that they seek to resolve key nuclear issues with Iran. Iran previously suspended negotiations with the United States prior to the signing of the MoU in order to try to compel the United States to pressure Israel to halt operations against Hezbollah.[14]

The Israeli government confirmed the locations of two “pilot zones” where the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) will backfill the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in southern Lebanon as part of the June 26 trilateral framework agreement.[15] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu displayed a map of two zones located on opposite banks of the Litani River during a press conference on June 27.[16] The northern pilot zone includes territory surrounding Zawtar el Gharbiyeh, Nabatieh District, and the southern pilot zone includes territory surrounding Ghandouriyeh and Froun, Bint Jbeil District. The June 26 framework agreement's second and third clauses require the LAF to assume responsibility for security in pilot zones after it disarms and dismantles armed groups in those areas.[17] Both of the announced pilot zones lie beyond the IDF’s “anti-tank line,” which would likely reduce the risk of Hezbollah launching attacks on Israeli territory from those zones following the IDF’s withdrawal.[18] Hezbollah has also not conducted major attacks in Froun, Ghandouriyeh, or Zawtar el Gharbiyeh in recent weeks and has instead concentrated operations east of Nabatieh City.[19] An Israeli military correspondent reported on June 27 that the IDF will retain its positions on advantageous terrain surrounding Ali al Taher, Beaufort Castle, and Kfar Tebnit, which the IDF deems necessary for preventing Hezbollah anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) attacks on northern Israel.[20]

Hezbollah has continued to threaten civil war in Lebanon if the Lebanese government attempts to implement the framework agreement as part of an information operation to weaken the government's resolve to disarm Hezbollah. Hezbollah Parliamentarian Hassan Fadlallah warned on June 28 that disillusionment with the Lebanese government would drive civilians to arm and train with Hezbollah and accused the government of inciting civil war.[21] Fadlallah said that Hezbollah's “fingers will remain on the trigger” and that the group possesses the “internal strength” to counter all “conspiracies,” likely referring to the government's intention to disarm Hezbollah.[22] An unspecified Hezbollah source separately told Israeli media on June 28 that the agreement will lead to civil war in Lebanon.[23] These statements are consistent with Hezbollah's recent and long-term efforts to leverage the threat of civil war to deter the LAF from disarming the group.[24] Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem threatened in August 2025 to organize anti-government protests and said that there would be “no life” in Lebanon if the LAF attempted to disarm Hezbollah, for example.[25]

Hezbollah and the Iranian regime continue to assert that the framework agreement violates the Lebanon provision of the US-Iran MoU. Iran may use this claim to further delay nuclear talks with the United States. Fadlallah claimed on June 28 that the framework agreement's true purpose is to undermine the MoU and warned that Iran will not sign any agreement with the United States without a guaranteed Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.[26] Iranian officials and state media portrayed the agreement as a violation of Lebanese sovereignty and continued to demand a full IDF withdrawal from Lebanon as part of the MoU.[27] ISW-CTP continues to assess that Iran is attempting to condition US-Iran nuclear negotiations on the United States compelling Israel to halt operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon and withdraw from Lebanese territory as part of its efforts to preserve Hezbollah and delay nuclear negotiations.[28]

Hezbollah fighters killed an Israeli officer in Deir Seryan, Marjaayoun District, on June 28 amid continued Israeli strikes on Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon.[29] The IDF said that Hezbollah fighters killed an IDF officer and wounded a soldier during a small arms engagement in Deir Seryan.[30] The IDF said that its forces later killed the Hezbollah fighters responsible for the attack.[31] The IDF also struck likely Hezbollah targets in Deir Seryan, Baraachit, Froun, and Nabatieh el Fawqa on June 27 and 28, according to Lebanese media.[32] The IDF separately published footage of June 27 of airstrikes that targeted rocket launchers and Hezbollah fighters armed with rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) in Nabatieh City on June 28.[33]

Iraqi media reported on June 28 that unspecified Iraqi political parties with Iranian-backed Iraqi militia wings plan to publicly announce their separation from their affiliated militias in response to US pressure on the Iraqi federal government to reduce Iranian influence in Iraq.[34] This disengagement, however, is reportedly part of an effort by Iranian-backed parties to further entrench themselves in Iraqi state institutions.[35] Multiple sources, including Shia sources and a source close to the Shia Coordination Framework, told Iraqi media that political parties with armed wings are preparing to publicly announce the “removal of military uniforms,” which appears to refer to the separation of armed groups from their affiliated political parties, as part of a plan to “covertly take [over]” Iraqi state institutions.[36] Iraqi media estimated that around 3,000 senior civil servant positions could be redistributed to these political parties after their separation from armed groups.[37] Unspecified sources claimed that the United States’ opposition to militia-linked figures filling positions in the Iraqi federal government would be irrelevant if political parties disengage from their armed wings.[38] The United States has repeatedly opposed militia-affiliated individuals occupying high-level Iraqi federal government positions, even if they are affiliated with a militia that has been disarmed.[39] ISW-CTP has previously assessed that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias Asaib Ahl al Haq and Kataib al Imam Ali, which both have political wings in the Shia Coordination Framework, may have signaled willingness to disarm to reduce US opposition to their participation in the Iraqi government.[40] It is also possible that these militias seek to receive some of the 35,000 jobs in Iraqi security institutions that Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi has reportedly proposed to be allocated to militia members who disarm.[41]

Shia sources added to Iraqi media that Iraqi political parties with militia wings devised this plan following Zaydi’s meeting with US Special Envoy to Iraq and Syria Tom Barrack in mid-June, during which Barrack pressured Zaydi to implement several reforms related to reducing Iranian influence in Iraq.[42] A Shia source told Iraqi media on June 28 that Barrack presented Zaydi with a plan for “investment in exchange for arms.”[43] The United States would support US investment in Iraq in exchange for Zaydi’s government limiting Iranian influence in Iraq by disarming the militias, dismantling corrupt financial networks, and removing militia-aligned figures from senior-level government positions.[44] Regional media similarly suggested on June 17 that the United States is conditioning economic support for the Iraqi government on the government meeting the United States’ demands.[45] The Iraqi federal government has taken initial steps to strengthen its anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures following Barrack's visit, including by replacing the Central Bank of Iraq governor with the head of the bank's anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing reform office.[46] Zaydi’s government also began a large crackdown on corruption on June 27 in which Iraqi authorities have already arrested over 45 people throughout Iraq, particularly in Baghdad.[47] A Shia parliamentarian claimed on June 28 that most people who have been arrested are either Sunni or members of former Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s parliamentary coalition but denied that the campaign is a political attack.[48]

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-28-2026/