Iran is likely using discussions required by the US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) to reach arrangements with the Gulf states that would allow for sustained Iranian influence around the Strait of Hormuz during the post-war period. The fifth clause of the US-Iran MoU charges Iran with discussing the future management of the Strait of Hormuz with Oman and other littoral Persian Gulf states.[1] Iranian officials, including Iranian Parliament Speaker and chief negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, met with Omani officials in Muscat on June 23.[2] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi also discussed strengthening regional cooperation with his Saudi counterpart, Faisal bin Farhan, on June 24.[3] Iran is likely attempting to use these talks to segue discussions over the immediate management of the Strait of Hormuz and resumption of traffic into broader discussions about a new regional architecture in the Gulf region. Ghalibaf explicitly stated on June 24 that Iran is ready for security agreements with Gulf states “that are made sustainable through economic cooperation.”[4] Brigadier General Esmail Ahmadi Moghaddam, who is the Supreme National Defense University President and a longtime regime insider who plays an influential role in Iranian security discourse, also highlighted Iran's objectives to strengthen its strategic relations with its neighbors in this post-war period in a speech on June 24.[5]
Recent remarks from Qatari Foreign Minister and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al Thani suggested that some Gulf countries may be amenable to cooperating with the Iranians on a “broader economic framework.” Thani told the Financial Times on June 24 that Qatar was open to discussing Iran's plans to administer the strait alongside Oman with other Gulf countries.[6] Qatari officials met with Omani officials on June 24, likely to discuss Oman's recent discussions about the strait with Iranian officials.[7] A diplomat briefed on Thani’s visit to Muscat told Reuters that Qatari and Omani officials discussed initiating negotiations involving Iran, Iraq, and Gulf Arab states on the Strait of Hormuz.[8] The diplomat stated that the Gulf states are planning to push for no “transit fees,” and added that Iran “could” push for environmental, navigation, and security fees in these discussions.[9] The diplomat's framing, in which Gulf states oppose transit fees explicitly but do not oppose other fees explicitly, implies that some Gulf states are willing to entertain fees in return for certain Iranian concessions or guarantees. Iran could weave these fees into any regional agreement over the strait's management, for example. Thani denied that Qatar would approve any plan in which the Persian Gulf — which Thani called Qatar's “gateway to the world” — was “controlled” or subject to a toll system. Thani did not explicitly rule out other arrangements that could still be favorable to Iran and give Iran a say in the future of the strait.[10] A diplomat familiar with the matter told Agence France-Presse later on June 24 that Saudi Arabia is preparing to hold a “reconciliation summit” between Iran and Arab Gulf states separate from the US-Iran negotiations, but no date has been set at the time of this writing.[11] The Strait of Hormuz is an international waterway under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).[12] Any effort to place the Strait under the control of a state or several states would erode long-standing international norms and maritime law.
The Iranian regime may also be attempting to segue discussions with the Gulf states on the status of the Strait of Hormuz into broader conversations about limiting US or Israeli influence and partnerships in the Gulf. This effort would be consistent with a persistent Iranian narrative in which the regime describes its intent to use the post-war period to establish a regional architecture favorable to Iran. Iranian officials have asserted during and after the war in Iranian and regional media that US partnerships with the Gulf fuels instability for Gulf States, which is designed to exploit Gulf state fears of renewed Iranian drone and missile attacks on the Gulf and surrounding the current uncertainty over US-Iran negotiations.[13] ISW-CTP has previously assessed that Iran seeks to persuade Gulf countries that accommodation with Iran — rather than reliance on US and Israeli security partnerships — offers them greater stability.[14] This is ultimately part of a longstanding Iranian effort to reduce US presence and influence in the region. Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei stated on June 24 that as long as the US military interferes in the region, the Middle East will never achieve lasting peace.[15] Iran may be using recent engagements with Gulf countries to attempt to strengthen its relationships with regional countries as a result. Senior Iranian officials recently met with senior Emirati security officials, following multiple Iranian requests to meet for a rapprochement.[16]
Israeli, Lebanese, and US officials discussed proposals for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to backfill the IDF in “pilot zones” in southern Lebanon during talks in Washington, DC, on June 23 and 24. Israeli officials told Reuters and Israeli media on June 24 that Israeli and Lebanese negotiators discussed a US-backed plan to deploy US-trained and vetted LAF personnel to backfill Israeli positions.[17] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced on June 24 that the United States would help strengthen the LAF’s capacity to clear and hold territory in southern Lebanon, but did not confirm any specific plans to vet Lebanese soldiers.[18] Unspecified US sources told Lebanese media on June 24 that the Lebanese government has proposed that the IDF transfer control of territory in the vicinity of Beaufort Castle, Nabatieh District, to the LAF as part of an initial pilot zone trial.[19] Israel reportedly seeks to complete an assessment of Hezbollah's capabilities before authorizing any “broader” withdrawal from Lebanese territory, however.[20] An unnamed Lebanese official told Reuters on June 24 that the Israeli and Lebanese delegations will not announce any plans involving Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon until the conclusion of talks in Washington on June 25.[21] The IDF first transferred control of Dibbine, Marjaayoun District, to the LAF and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) after withdrawing from the town on June 4.[22]
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has continued to respond to threats in southern Lebanon as the United States, Iran, Lebanon, and mediators develop plans for the “deconfliction cell” to monitor the conflict. Qatari Foreign Minister and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al Thani stated on June 24 that a “core element” of the deconfliction cell will be to monitor ceasefire violations.[23] Qatar is a member of the deconfliction cell alongside the United States, Iran, Lebanon, and Pakistan.[24] The deconfliction cell appears to constrain Israeli action against Hezbollah by eliminating the post-2024 Israel-Lebanon ceasefire monitoring mechanism, which allowed Israel to act against Hezbollah ceasefire violations in certain circumstances.[25] Both Iran and Hezbollah could materially benefit from a constrained Israeli ability to confront Hezbollah.[26]
The IDF has continued to respond to perceived threats in southern Lebanon, however. The IDF reported that its forces killed two Hezbollah fighters who advanced toward IDF positions near Ali al Taher and posed an “immediate threat.”[27] The IDF also reported that it later struck a second group of Hezbollah fighters in a vehicle that approached IDF positions in Ali al Taher.[28] It is not yet clear how the newly-proposed “deconfliction cell” in Lebanon will handle incidents in which the IDF identifies a direct threat to troops in the future. An Israeli intelligence official told Haaretz that IDF soldiers have not received any official updates about the role that the deconfliction mechanism may play in Lebanon.[29]
The Iranian regime continues to emphasize that a full Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon is a condition for any final US-Iran deal. Iranian Parliament Speaker and lead negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf reiterated on June 24 that a complete Israeli withdrawal is a “central condition” for reaching any final agreement with the United States.[30] ISW-CTP has assessed that the Iranian regime is using the war in Lebanon to delay any substantive negotiations over Iran's nuclear program and Iranian efforts to control the Strait of Hormuz.[31] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu affirmed on June 24 that the IDF will remain deployed within the security zone in southern Lebanon while he remains in office.[32]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-24-2026/
Iran is attacking and threatening vessels in the Strait of Hormuz to advance its objective of establishing control over the waterway. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy attacked a vessel approximately eight nautical miles southeast of Dahit, Oman, on June 25.[1] The attack came after the IRGC Navy issued a warning demanding that vessels coordinate with Iranian authorities and use the Iranian-approved traffic separation scheme.[2] The IRGC Navy warned that traffic outside these routes is “very dangerous” and implicitly threatened vessels that do not comply.[3] Iran likely seeks to use force and coercion to compel vessels to use its illegitimate traffic separation scheme and implicitly acknowledge Iranian control over the strait, which is a key objective for the regime.
The recent attack and ongoing threats also likely seek to undermine international efforts to guarantee safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) and Oman announced a joint initiative on June 23 to help hundreds of stranded vessels transit the strait through a designated safe route.[4] The IRGC Navy criticized the initiative as “unacceptable and completely dangerous,” likely because Iran assesses that a viable transit route outside Iranian territorial waters would weaken its ability to control maritime traffic and use the strait as leverage.[5] Commercially available maritime data indicates that at least 67 vessels transited the strait since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff.[6] Forty-seven vessels used the IMO-Omani route along the Omani coast, while only ten used the Iranian-approved route, which illustrates how alternative transit routes may threaten Iran's efforts to manage traffic through the strait unless Iran continues to fire on shipping or otherwise compel shipping to use its transit scheme.[7] The IMO paused its evacuation plan following the IRGC attack on the vessel.[8] One of the IMO’s key responsibilities is to designate safe maritime routes.[9] Iran may calculate that attacks on vessels could discourage countries and international organizations from facilitating such alternative transit routes.
Iran is using military threats and economic incentives to try to convince Gulf states to support its efforts to control the strait, but the Gulf states appear to be resisting Iranian pressure at present. The recent Iranian threats and attacks likely serve as an implicit warning to Gulf countries—particularly Oman, given the Omani-IMO efforts described above—that Iran will continue to attack international shipping if they do not cooperate with Iran. Iran used a similar strategy during the recent US-Iran War. Iran launched hundreds of drones and missiles at Gulf states during the war in order to try to influence their decision-making to achieve Iranian objectives, which included halting US operations against Iran and driving a wedge between the United States and its Gulf allies. Iran is currently trying to diplomatically induce and militarily compel these states into cooperation. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi held a phone call with Omani Foreign Minister Badr al Busaidi on June 25, likely as part of this broader diplomatic effort.[10] The US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) requires Iran to coordinate with Oman and the other Gulf countries on the future management of the strait, which likely explains Iran's efforts to do so in recent days.[11] Iran has also offered economic incentives to attract regional support for its plans for the strait. Iranian officials told the Wall Street Journal that Iran wants Gulf states to participate in a future system that would charge vessels for services in the strait and share the revenue.[12] Officials familiar with the proposal estimated that such fees could generate roughly 40 billion USD annually “for [the] states involved.”[13] It is not immediately clear whether this means 40 billion USD annually split between the states involved, or 40 billion USD annually per state.
The Gulf states appear to be resisting Iran's efforts to control the strait and impose fees on maritime traffic, however. Delegations from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which includes Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates, met with a US delegation led by Secretary of State Marco Rubio in Manama, Bahrain, on June 25 to discuss the US-Iran MoU and maritime security in the strait, among other issues.[14] The United States and GCC foreign ministers issued a joint statement following the meeting that emphasized the importance of “free, unconditional, and unrestricted navigation” and rejected “any tolls, fees, or attempts to assert control over the strait.”[15] Iran has attempted to reframe tolls as “service fees” and has signaled its intention to impose such charges over the long term.[16] The joint statement addresses this distinction and opposes any payment requirement for transit through the strait. The statement also rejects efforts to control the strait more broadly, not merely the imposition of tolls.[17] This language implicitly opposes Iranian attempts to manage maritime traffic through measures such as its traffic separation scheme or requirements that vessels coordinate with the IRGC Navy. A senior UAE adviser similarly criticized Iranian efforts to impose a new reality in the strait and region.[18]
US Vice President JD Vance told a UK-based outlet on June 25 that the United States and Iran established a direct deconfliction channel in Doha, Qatar, to reduce the threat of conflict resuming.[19] Vance added that Iran agreed to establish a direct deconfliction channel between an IRGC representative and a US Central Command official in Doha to resolve disputes.[20] Iranian Parliament Speaker and chief negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf previously stated on June 22 that Iran and the United States agreed to establish a mechanism to quickly resolve potential problems or incidents in the Strait of Hormuz, which may be referring to the channel that Vance announced.[21]
US, Israeli, and Lebanese officials continue to discuss proposals for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to backfill Israel Defense Forces (IDF) positions in “pilot zones” in southern Lebanon as trilateral talks continue in Washington, DC, on June 25. Lebanese media reported on June 25 that the Israeli and Lebanese delegations have exchanged and rejected over ten proposals to establish “pilot zones” in southern Lebanon due to disagreements over the location and timeframe for the proposed “pilot zones.”[22] A Lebanese official told Reuters on June 25 that the Lebanese government wants the “pilot zones” to be established in Israel's “security zone” and facilitate a complete Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon.[23] Israeli and Lebanese officials stated that the Israeli delegation, however, has insisted that the ”pilot zones“ should be established in areas north of the Israeli “security zone” on an incremental, case-by-case basis without any timeline.[24] Israeli government spokesperson David Mencer said on June 25 that any “redeployment” would only come once southern Lebanon was demilitarized and Hezbollah disarmed.[25] The IDF remains deployed both within the IDF “security zone” in southern Lebanon and at points beyond the Yellow Line.[26] Israeli officials and the IDF on June 25 rejected reports that the IDF had begun to withdraw from parts of southern Lebanon.[27] The IDF announced that Israeli forces have not changed positions in southern Lebanon.[28] The IDF has also continued to respond to threats it perceived in southern Lebanon on June 25.[29] The IDF reported that its forces killed five Hezbollah fighters in a vehicle between Zawtar al Charqiyeh and Maifadoun in Nabatieh District.[30] The IDF reported that it also conducted an airstrike targeting Hezbollah fighters in the vicinity of Kfar Tebnit, Nabatieh District, on June 25.[31] Israeli officials continue to reiterate that the IDF will remain in Lebanon until Hezbollah no longer poses a threat to the IDF and Israel.[32]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-25-2026/