Iran is attacking and threatening vessels in the Strait of Hormuz to advance its objective of establishing control over the waterway. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy attacked a vessel approximately eight nautical miles southeast of Dahit, Oman, on June 25.[1] The attack came after the IRGC Navy issued a warning demanding that vessels coordinate with Iranian authorities and use the Iranian-approved traffic separation scheme.[2] The IRGC Navy warned that traffic outside these routes is “very dangerous” and implicitly threatened vessels that do not comply.[3] Iran likely seeks to use force and coercion to compel vessels to use its illegitimate traffic separation scheme and implicitly acknowledge Iranian control over the strait, which is a key objective for the regime.
The recent attack and ongoing threats also likely seek to undermine international efforts to guarantee safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) and Oman announced a joint initiative on June 23 to help hundreds of stranded vessels transit the strait through a designated safe route.[4] The IRGC Navy criticized the initiative as “unacceptable and completely dangerous,” likely because Iran assesses that a viable transit route outside Iranian territorial waters would weaken its ability to control maritime traffic and use the strait as leverage.[5] Commercially available maritime data indicates that at least 67 vessels transited the strait since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff.[6] Forty-seven vessels used the IMO-Omani route along the Omani coast, while only ten used the Iranian-approved route, which illustrates how alternative transit routes may threaten Iran's efforts to manage traffic through the strait unless Iran continues to fire on shipping or otherwise compel shipping to use its transit scheme.[7] The IMO paused its evacuation plan following the IRGC attack on the vessel.[8] One of the IMO’s key responsibilities is to designate safe maritime routes.[9] Iran may calculate that attacks on vessels could discourage countries and international organizations from facilitating such alternative transit routes.
Iran is using military threats and economic incentives to try to convince Gulf states to support its efforts to control the strait, but the Gulf states appear to be resisting Iranian pressure at present. The recent Iranian threats and attacks likely serve as an implicit warning to Gulf countries—particularly Oman, given the Omani-IMO efforts described above—that Iran will continue to attack international shipping if they do not cooperate with Iran. Iran used a similar strategy during the recent US-Iran War. Iran launched hundreds of drones and missiles at Gulf states during the war in order to try to influence their decision-making to achieve Iranian objectives, which included halting US operations against Iran and driving a wedge between the United States and its Gulf allies. Iran is currently trying to diplomatically induce and militarily compel these states into cooperation. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi held a phone call with Omani Foreign Minister Badr al Busaidi on June 25, likely as part of this broader diplomatic effort.[10] The US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) requires Iran to coordinate with Oman and the other Gulf countries on the future management of the strait, which likely explains Iran's efforts to do so in recent days.[11] Iran has also offered economic incentives to attract regional support for its plans for the strait. Iranian officials told the Wall Street Journal that Iran wants Gulf states to participate in a future system that would charge vessels for services in the strait and share the revenue.[12] Officials familiar with the proposal estimated that such fees could generate roughly 40 billion USD annually “for [the] states involved.”[13] It is not immediately clear whether this means 40 billion USD annually split between the states involved, or 40 billion USD annually per state.
The Gulf states appear to be resisting Iran's efforts to control the strait and impose fees on maritime traffic, however. Delegations from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which includes Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates, met with a US delegation led by Secretary of State Marco Rubio in Manama, Bahrain, on June 25 to discuss the US-Iran MoU and maritime security in the strait, among other issues.[14] The United States and GCC foreign ministers issued a joint statement following the meeting that emphasized the importance of “free, unconditional, and unrestricted navigation” and rejected “any tolls, fees, or attempts to assert control over the strait.”[15] Iran has attempted to reframe tolls as “service fees” and has signaled its intention to impose such charges over the long term.[16] The joint statement addresses this distinction and opposes any payment requirement for transit through the strait. The statement also rejects efforts to control the strait more broadly, not merely the imposition of tolls.[17] This language implicitly opposes Iranian attempts to manage maritime traffic through measures such as its traffic separation scheme or requirements that vessels coordinate with the IRGC Navy. A senior UAE adviser similarly criticized Iranian efforts to impose a new reality in the strait and region.[18]
US Vice President JD Vance told a UK-based outlet on June 25 that the United States and Iran established a direct deconfliction channel in Doha, Qatar, to reduce the threat of conflict resuming.[19] Vance added that Iran agreed to establish a direct deconfliction channel between an IRGC representative and a US Central Command official in Doha to resolve disputes.[20] Iranian Parliament Speaker and chief negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf previously stated on June 22 that Iran and the United States agreed to establish a mechanism to quickly resolve potential problems or incidents in the Strait of Hormuz, which may be referring to the channel that Vance announced.[21]
US, Israeli, and Lebanese officials continue to discuss proposals for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to backfill Israel Defense Forces (IDF) positions in “pilot zones” in southern Lebanon as trilateral talks continue in Washington, DC, on June 25. Lebanese media reported on June 25 that the Israeli and Lebanese delegations have exchanged and rejected over ten proposals to establish “pilot zones” in southern Lebanon due to disagreements over the location and timeframe for the proposed “pilot zones.”[22] A Lebanese official told Reuters on June 25 that the Lebanese government wants the “pilot zones” to be established in Israel's “security zone” and facilitate a complete Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon.[23] Israeli and Lebanese officials stated that the Israeli delegation, however, has insisted that the ”pilot zones“ should be established in areas north of the Israeli “security zone” on an incremental, case-by-case basis without any timeline.[24] Israeli government spokesperson David Mencer said on June 25 that any “redeployment” would only come once southern Lebanon was demilitarized and Hezbollah disarmed.[25] The IDF remains deployed both within the IDF “security zone” in southern Lebanon and at points beyond the Yellow Line.[26] Israeli officials and the IDF on June 25 rejected reports that the IDF had begun to withdraw from parts of southern Lebanon.[27] The IDF announced that Israeli forces have not changed positions in southern Lebanon.[28] The IDF has also continued to respond to threats it perceived in southern Lebanon on June 25.[29] The IDF reported that its forces killed five Hezbollah fighters in a vehicle between Zawtar al Charqiyeh and Maifadoun in Nabatieh District.[30] The IDF reported that it also conducted an airstrike targeting Hezbollah fighters in the vicinity of Kfar Tebnit, Nabatieh District, on June 25.[31] Israeli officials continue to reiterate that the IDF will remain in Lebanon until Hezbollah no longer poses a threat to the IDF and Israel.[32]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-25-2026/
Every year during the Islamic month of Muharram, millions of Shi'ite Muslims across Iran commemorate the martyrdom of Imam Hussein, the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad who was killed in 680 AD. Hardliners often invoke his example to argue Iran should continue confronting the United States, while government critics use the same symbolism to condemn injustice at home. Political messaging also comes through speeches by eulogists (maddahs), who preside over ceremonies recounting Hussein's sacrifice and heroism.
At one ceremony, well-known maddah Reza Narimani criticized President Masoud Pezeshkian for disclosing in a recent speech that funds equivalent to the value of 20 million barrels of oil had been allocated to the Revolutionary Guards’ Aerospace Force during the war.
Another popular mourning chant, which has gained prominence among religious opponents of the government in recent years, criticizes what it portrays as state-sponsored religion. “In your religion, there is God's name, but God is absent,” the lyrics say. The poem's author, Shahabeddin Mousavi, was detained for a period after it became widely known.
According to social media posts, some Ashura gatherings this year included performances of the patriotic song Az Khoon-e Javanan-e Vatan (”From the Blood of the Nation's Youth”) in memory of thousands of young people killed during the January unrest. Originally composed during Iran's Constitutional Revolution more than a century ago, the song likens the blood of fallen youth to red tulips blooming from the earth. At some ceremonies, eulogists reportedly read aloud the names of those killed.
In the central city of Arak, the mother of Mohammad Radmannia, a 29-year-old who was fatally shot in the back of the head with live ammunition in Tehran, urged mourners to continue her son's path. “The massacre of protesters in January was carried out on the direct orders of the leader of Shi’ites (Ali Khamenei), while other senior clerics remained silent,” one user wrote on X. “A couple of Yazdi or Bushehri mourning chants cannot erase that crime from our society's memory.”
Another user wrote: “The blood that was unjustly spilled will never be washed away. No lament or elegy can diminish the scale of this tragedy in our collective memory.”
Another wrote that participating in Ashura ceremonies was “part of the struggle to reclaim religious symbols” from the government. A further comment added: “When will people understand that many ordinary religious Iranians have nothing to do with the government or its hardline supporters?”
Iran is using force in an attempt to maintain its control over the Strait of Hormuz in the immediate future. Iran fired four drones into the strait over the past 24 hours, according to US President Donald Trump.[1] Trump subsequently called this attack a ceasefire violation.[2] An Iranian drone targeted a Singapore-flagged cargo ship approximately eight nautical miles southeast of Dahit, Oman, in the Strait of Hormuz on June 25.[3] The IRGC Navy issued a public warning that demanded vessels coordinate with Iranian authorities and use the Iranian-approved traffic separation scheme some time before it attacked the ship.[4]
Iran is likely attempting to prevent vessels from using non-Iranian shipping channels with force in the immediate term as it continues negotiations with the Gulf Arab states to secure long-term recognition of its control. Oman and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) announced on June 23 that they have established a joint mechanism to help hundreds of vessels move through a designated safe route along the Omani coast. US Central Command (CENTCOM) said on June 26 that it is providing “safe passage coordination” in the strait as well, though it did not specify whether “safe passage coordination” by CENTCOM is related to the IMO-Omani scheme. Iran responded with the attacks outlined above and claimed that the safe route was “completely dangerous.” This claim is an implicit threat that Iran will attack shipping using the safe route because Iran is the only threat to shipping in the strait. Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi explicitly stated on June 26 that safe passage through the strait cannot rely on “parallel routes” or decision-making outside Iran's considerations as a coastal state.[5] Iran is standing firm on its requirement to approve vessels’ passage through the strait, as it provides Iran with significant leverage that it could exploit at will.
CENTCOM struck an unspecified number of Iranian missile and drone storage sites and coastal radar sites on June 26 in response to Iran's June 25 drone attack on a commercial vessel.[6] CENTCOM added that US forces will continue to provide “safe passage coordination” and support to commercial vessels transiting the strait.[7]
Iran is also using diplomacy and threats to secure long-term diplomatic recognition of its control of the Strait of Hormuz because continued Iranian strikes in the Strait of Hormuz would be difficult to maintain. Iran needs Gulf states’ recognition of its control over Iran's route to maintain control over the strait because it cannot conduct attacks in perpetuity without risking instability and additional attacks. Iran has met with various Gulf states in recent days as part of this effort. An Iranian negotiating team member claimed on Iranian TV that Oman and Iran had formed a committee to address the strait issue. But Iran's diplomatic efforts nonetheless appear to be faltering. Oman and the IMO are also collaborating to undermine Iran's unrecognized transit scheme, as described above. The Gulf states and international organizations appear united against Iranian efforts to control the strait, however. The United States and the Gulf Cooperation Council ministers emphasized in a joint statement on June 25 that free, unconditional, and unrestricted navigation through the strait remains essential to regional and global security, and explicitly rejected any tolls, fees, or attempts to assert control over the strait.[8]
Iranian officials and state media are reacting to their faltering diplomatic efforts with a significantly more hostile tone towards the Gulf states. Iranian officials attempted on June 24 to frame Iran's post-war approach to the strait's management as part of a new regional security framework that would remove non-littoral Persian Gulf states from decision making over the strait, which would ultimately be in the Gulf states’ interests.[9] Iranian officials and entities have since become much more aggressive in response to increased opposition from the Gulf states to Iranian efforts to control the strait. The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry called the US-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) statement “interventionist, irresponsible, and provocative” and warned against continued US-backed “belligerent and interventionist” behavior in the region.[10] The ministry asserted that Iran and Oman have rights and responsibilities over safe passage through the waterway.[11] Other officials, including two advisers to the supreme leader, also harshly condemned the US-GCC statement.[12] One of the advisers called the Gulf states “peripheral minor players” who have “no seat at the table” and can only survive thanks to Iranian tolerance.[13] The Gulf states have a seat at the table in the memorandum of understanding to discuss control of the strait with Iran, notably. Iranian Parliament National Security and Foreign Policy Committee Chairman Ebrahim Azizi warned the GCC on June 26 that “outsourcing your security has made you less secure” and claimed that US military bases in the region have become a source of threats rather than security.[14]
Israel and Lebanon signed a US-brokered “framework agreement” on June 26 that describes a path towards eventual full Israeli withdrawal.[15] The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) will backfill the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) at two positions in southern Lebanon.[16] The IDF will eventually withdraw under the agreement if it is fully actualized. The full details of the plan remain unclear. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that the IDF will remain in its security zone in southern Lebanon.[17] An Israeli source also told Axios that the IDF would remain in southern Lebanon until Hezbollah is disarmed.[18] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that the IDF and the LAF will start their first “pilot zone” in two unnamed “connected villages” in southern Lebanon.[19] Israeli and US officials also told Axios that US military officers will help oversee LAF forces backfilling these positions to provide training and to confirm that Hezbollah has been removed from the area.[20] Lebanese Ambassador to the United States Nada Maawad Hamad stated that the ”framework agreement” with Israel is the “first step toward restoring Lebanon's sovereignty.“[21]
Iranian and Hezbollah officials’ response to the signing of the agreement has remained limited at the time of this writing. Both the Iranian and Hezbollah leadership have emphasized the need for Israel's withdrawal to be unconditional, however.[22] Hezbollah Parliamentarian Hassan Fadlallah condemned the signing of the “framework agreement” and warned that the Lebanese government cannot implement the agreement ”unless they resort to a civil war.”[23] Fadlallah also noted that the ”framework agreement” represents an intentional obstruction of the US-Iran MoU.[24]
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Hezbollah continued to engage each other on June 25 and June 26 in southern Lebanon. Israeli media reported that Hezbollah fighters threw a hand grenade at IDF forces operating near Beit Yahoun, South Governorate, injuring four soldiers on June 25.[25] The IDF struck Hezbollah positions in the area with artillery fire in response.[26] The IDF reported that it later conducted two airstrikes targeting Hezbollah fighters in Nabatieh al Fawqa on June 26.[27] The IDF reported that it killed seven Hezbollah fighters who were transporting weapons from a vehicle to a combat and observation post in the second strike on Nabatieh al Fawqa.[28]
The IDF separately reported on June 26 that its forces took “complete control” of Ali al Taher, Nabatieh Governate, which reportedly hosts one of Hezbollah's largest underground command and control facilities.[29] IDF Arabic-language Media Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Ella Waweya stated that Ali al Taher “no longer serves as a base [for Hezbollah] to threaten Israel's security.”[30] Hezbollah disputed the IDF’s control of Ali al Taher and stated that the area ”is free of any presence of [Israeli] forces.”[31] The IDF previously struck Hezbollah positions near Ali al Taher once on June 23, and twice on June 24.[32]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-26-2026/