Iran is taking steps to establish a joint mechanism with Oman to try to exercise long-term authority over the Strait of Hormuz. Such a mechanism would enable Iran to regulate transit through the strait and decide to restrict passage at its discretion. Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf met with Omani officials in Muscat on June 23 to discuss joint Iranian-Omani management of the strait.[1] Iranian and Omani officials released a joint statement following the talks that emphasized their commitment to clause 5 of the US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU). This clause states that Iran will work with Oman to “define the future administration and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz” in consultation with other Persian Gulf littoral states.[2] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Fars News Agency reported that both delegations agreed to continue discussions on the management of the strait, including maritime services and associated costs.[3] These discussions will almost certainly involve Iranian efforts to establish a toll system in which vessels must pay “service fees” to Iran and Oman to transit through the strait. Omani Foreign Affairs Minister Badr Albusaidi stated after the meeting that Oman supports “toll-free safe passage” through the strait.[4] Iran, however, has consistently differentiated between “tolls” and other charges, such as “service fees” and “insurance” to protect vessels against attacks. Iran continues to be the only threat against commercial shipping in the strait. Any imposition of fees would violate international law. The Strait of Hormuz is an international waterway, not territorial waters, and Article 26 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea — which permits fees in territorial waters — therefore does not apply to the strait.[5] A reality in which Iran is able to manage traffic through the strait and collect related fees would constitute a significant strategic victory for Iran and give Iran substantial leverage over global commerce.
Recent increased vessel traffic through the strait does not eliminate the threats that Iranian control over the strait poses to US interests and global commerce. Western media reporting and commercially available maritime data indicate that vessel traffic through the strait has increased in recent days.[6] Iran continues to claim that the IRGC Navy is “allowing” vessels to pass through the strait, however.[7] This framing implies that Iran has the authority to deny vessels passage whenever it chooses, which significantly undermines US interests and global commerce. Iran has already used its claimed control over traffic in the strait as a lever to try to extract concessions during negotiations with the United States. ISW-CTP previously assessed that Iran's recent announcement of the “closure” of the strait likely aimed to increase economic pressure on the United States to compel Israel to halt operations against Hezbollah and withdraw from Lebanon, for example.[8] Iran's continued efforts to establish joint control over the strait would enable Iran to retain its ability to use the strait as a tool of coercion.
Iranian regime officials have continued to deny that the United States could control how the regime spends any funds it obtains from the US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU). Any economic relief that the regime obtains could support Iranian efforts to reconstitute its military capabilities and the Axis of Resistance. Iranian Ambassador to the United Nations Ali Bahreini rejected on June 23 any US involvement in deciding how Iran could use unfrozen assets it gains access to from the MoU.[9] Iran's Central Bank Governor, Abdolnaser Hemmati, told regime media on June 23 that Iran has “no obligation” to buy US agricultural products under the terms of the MoU.[10] US Vice President JD Vance told reporters on June 22 that, if the United States unfroze Iranian assets, Iran would have to use the assets to purchase US agricultural products.[11] Regime officials have previously indicated that the regime could use any economic relief from the MoU to reconstitute Iran's military capabilities. Arab mediators told the Wall Street Journal on June 13 that IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi, whom ISW-CTP continues to assess is leading regime decision-making, has insisted that Iran's frozen assets should not be “barred from military spending,” for example.[12] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei similarly stated in May that Iran would use assets released under an agreement with the United States to advance its defense and military sectors, including Iran's missile and drone programs.[13]
Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s Telegram channel reiterated the primary objectives that Iran seeks to achieve in the current conflict.[14] The objectives include:
Ending US military operations against Iran;
Making the United States lift its naval blockade on Iranian ports;
Consolidating Iranian sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz;
US compensation for Iranian reconstruction;
The lifting of all sanctions;
“The resolution of nuclear issues,” likely referring to maintaining the Iranian nuclear program; and
Iranian access to frozen assets.
Recent Iranian reporting suggests that Major General Ali Abadi Abdollahi may now serve as the Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) deputy chief and Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters commander simultaneously. The Iranian media has not publicly announced a replacement for the AFGS deputy chief position since the current IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi, who previously served as the AFGS deputy chief, was appointed as the IRGC deputy commander in December 2025.[15] Vahidi was appointed as IRGC Commander in March 2026.[16] Iranian media, including an AFGS-affiliated outlet, identified Abdollahi as the AFGS deputy chief in May and June 2026 while reporting that he had appointed new officials to positions within the Passive Defense Organization (PDO).[17] The PDO operates under the AFGS and develops and coordinates policies to protect Iranian civilian, military, and nuclear infrastructure from attacks.[18] Abdollahi’s reported role as AFGS deputy chief in making these appointments is notable because the AFGS chief, rather than the deputy chief, has historically appointed senior PDO officials.[19] The Iranian media has not announced a new AFGS chief since Israeli strikes killed former AFGS Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi in February 2026.[20] Iranian media have simultaneously continued to identify Abdollahi as the commander of the Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters, a position to which he was appointed in September 2025, which suggests that Abdollahi may hold both positions concurrently.[21] Iranian media reports identifying Abdollahi as the AFGS deputy chief follow unconfirmed reports from December 2025 that Iranian leaders were considering merging the AFGS and Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters.[22] A single commander previously served as both the Khatam ol Anbia commander and AFGS chief before the regime separated the two organizations in 2016.[23] The regime may have decided to merge the AFGS and Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters as part of a broader effort to restructure the military establishment after the 12-day Israel-Iran War, which highlighted Iran's command-and-control issues.[24] Such a move would likely aim to increase coordination and reduce redundancies at the highest level of Iran's military establishment.
United States Central Command's (CENTCOM) proposed deconfliction initiative in Lebanon would operate at a disadvantage compared to Iran because the IRGC’s on-the-ground presence in Lebanon likely enables Iran to identify and report alleged ceasefire violations to the newly established “deconfliction cell” faster than the United States.[25] CENTCOM Spokesperson Captain Tim Hawkins told US media on June 23 that CENTCOM is monitoring kinetic activity in Lebanon for tactical deconfliction.[26] US media reported that CENTCOM’s monitoring mechanism is part of the newly established “deconfliction cell” to oversee the ceasefire in Lebanon.[27] The “deconfliction cell” includes both US and Iranian representatives, but no Israeli representation.[28] The United States does not have an on-the-ground presence in southern Lebanon, and its tactical monitoring efforts will thus presumably rely on the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). This reliance on the IDF for information would likely delay US awareness about ceasefire violations because IDF soldiers would need to report Hezbollah ceasefire violations to their superiors, who would in turn also need to notify their superiors until the report reaches a senior command echelon. The senior command echelon would presumably notify CENTCOM, which in turn would inform US officials in the “deconfliction cell.” Iran, however, has deployed IRGC Quds Force officers to southern Lebanon in the current conflict, which would likely reduce the time and complexity needed for IRGC officers to report incidents to Iranian officials involved in the “deconfliction cell.”[29] Iran may face some challenges with reporting incidents despite its overall advantage, however, because Hezbollah's combat units are decentralized and maintain limited communication with other units and higher command echelons.[30] Being able to notify the “deconfliction cell” about incidents faster would enable Iran to provide its interpretation of incidents and thereby influence the narrative over incidents in the “deconfliction cell.”
Israeli political leaders have expressed concern over the “deconfliction cell” due to Iran's role in the cell and Israel's exclusion from the mechanism.[31] Israeli Ambassador to the United States Yechiel Leiter warned Lebanese and US officials at the start of US-brokered negotiations in Washington, DC, on June 23 that negotiations are failing to expel Iranian influence from Lebanon and risk offering Hezbollah a “new lease on life.”[32]
Israeli and Lebanese officials met in Washington, DC, for the latest round of US-brokered negotiations on June 23.[33] International media reported that the talks will likely continue through June 25 and that Israeli, Lebanese, and US officials will discuss ceasefire measures, including plans to replace the IDF with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in “pilot zones” in southern Lebanon.[34] Israeli media reported on June 23 that the IDF will likely withdraw from limited specific areas in southern Lebanon and transfer control of these areas to the LAF.[35] The IDF first transferred control of Dibbine, Marjaayoun District, to the LAF and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) after withdrawing from the town on June 4.[36] Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem said in a speech on June 23 that Hezbollah is cooperating “to the fullest extent” with the LAF and urged the Lebanese government to “take advantage” of Hezbollah as a partner force in Lebanon.[37] Qassem has previously claimed that Hezbollah would work with Lebanese authorities and urged the Lebanese government to align with the group, although Qassem has also frequently criticized the Lebanese government for pursuing Hezbollah's disarmament.[38]
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported that it engaged two groups of Hezbollah fighters near Ali al Taher, Nabatieh District, on June 23. The IDF reported that its forces killed a group of Hezbollah fighters that advanced toward IDF positions near Ali al Taher.[39] The IDF also reported that it conducted a drone strike targeting four Hezbollah fighters in vehicles near IDF positions in Ali al Taher.[40] The IDF reported that this group of Hezbollah fighters “operated under civilian cover.”[41] Hezbollah claimed that Israeli forces targeted civilians as they cleared roads and recovered bodies.[42] Hezbollah accused the IDF of violating the June 19 Israel-Lebanon ceasefire.[43] Israeli forces and Hezbollah last engaged each other on June 20.[44] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the IDF warned on June 20 that Israel is committed to the ceasefire but will continue to “forcefully” strike Hezbollah if the group launches further attacks against Israeli forces.[45]
Iranian Ambassador to Iraq Mohammad Kazem Sadegh downplayed Iran's opposition to Iranian-backed Iraqi militia disarmament in an interview with Iraqi state media on June 22.[46] Sadegh claimed that Iran would respect any Iraqi government decision regarding militia disarmament and called the issue an “internal Iraqi matter,” which contradicts previous reporting about Iran's position on the issue.[47] Unspecified political and informed security sources previously told US-funded, Arabic-language media on June 10 that Iran views Iraqi militias’ possible disarmament as an issue related to the Axis of Resistance rather than merely an internal Iraqi matter.[48] The IRGC also reportedly told Iraqi militia leaders not to surrender their weapons and vowed that Iran would do “everything in its power” to keep the militias armed.[49] Sadegh’s interview comes as the Iraqi federal government has recently taken initial steps to disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including forming a disarmament committee, amid increased US pressure on the Iraqi government to dismantle the militias.[50] ISW-CTP continues to assess that any Iraqi federal government attempt to disarm the militias and integrate them into the Iraqi security establishment that does not address the militias’ networks and allegiance to Iran would likely further embed Iranian influence within the Iraqi state.[51]
Sadegh also attempted to deflect Iranian responsibility for Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks during the recent conflict.[52] He falsely claimed during the interview that Iran “did not ask any party to intervene” on its behalf during the war.[53] Eight Iraqi sources told Western media on June 19, however, that the IRGC formed multiple Iraqi militia cells that directly report to the IRGC, instead of pre-existing Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, to conduct attacks on US forces in Gulf countries.[54] Unspecified Iraqi sources also told Saudi media in April that IRGC Quds Force officers “constantly” supervised militia attacks, helped militias develop ammunition for drones, and provided militias with technical expertise regarding missiles.[55]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-23-2026/
In this Conflicted Conversation, Yeganeh Torbati, the Iran correspondent for the New York Times, discusses her excellent new book Stolen Revolution: Betrayal and Hope in Modern Iran.
Yeganeh explains how:
The 1979 revolution promised justice but created clerical authoritarianism.
Islamic law was subordinated to preservation of the supreme leader.
Institutions created to help the poor became engines of economic corruption.
The IRGC became a military-economic oligarchy.
Khatami-era reformism failed by refusing to challenge the constitutional source of authoritarian power.
Ahmadinejad promised to overthrow corrupt elites but merely installed new ones.
Rouhani promised economic normalization but enabled even greater corruption.
The destruction of all sources of organized opposition left protesters exposed to overwhelming violence.
Foreign powers encouraged expectations they did not possess the strategy or commitment to fulfil.
Iranian society continues to resist socially and culturally, making the future unstable rather than settled.
Find Yeganeh on X: https://x.com/yjtorbati
https://podcasts.apple.com/gb/podcast/the-betrayal-of-the-iranian-people/id1443491069
Iran is likely using discussions required by the US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) to reach arrangements with the Gulf states that would allow for sustained Iranian influence around the Strait of Hormuz during the post-war period. The fifth clause of the US-Iran MoU charges Iran with discussing the future management of the Strait of Hormuz with Oman and other littoral Persian Gulf states.[1] Iranian officials, including Iranian Parliament Speaker and chief negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, met with Omani officials in Muscat on June 23.[2] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi also discussed strengthening regional cooperation with his Saudi counterpart, Faisal bin Farhan, on June 24.[3] Iran is likely attempting to use these talks to segue discussions over the immediate management of the Strait of Hormuz and resumption of traffic into broader discussions about a new regional architecture in the Gulf region. Ghalibaf explicitly stated on June 24 that Iran is ready for security agreements with Gulf states “that are made sustainable through economic cooperation.”[4] Brigadier General Esmail Ahmadi Moghaddam, who is the Supreme National Defense University President and a longtime regime insider who plays an influential role in Iranian security discourse, also highlighted Iran's objectives to strengthen its strategic relations with its neighbors in this post-war period in a speech on June 24.[5]
Recent remarks from Qatari Foreign Minister and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al Thani suggested that some Gulf countries may be amenable to cooperating with the Iranians on a “broader economic framework.” Thani told the Financial Times on June 24 that Qatar was open to discussing Iran's plans to administer the strait alongside Oman with other Gulf countries.[6] Qatari officials met with Omani officials on June 24, likely to discuss Oman's recent discussions about the strait with Iranian officials.[7] A diplomat briefed on Thani’s visit to Muscat told Reuters that Qatari and Omani officials discussed initiating negotiations involving Iran, Iraq, and Gulf Arab states on the Strait of Hormuz.[8] The diplomat stated that the Gulf states are planning to push for no “transit fees,” and added that Iran “could” push for environmental, navigation, and security fees in these discussions.[9] The diplomat's framing, in which Gulf states oppose transit fees explicitly but do not oppose other fees explicitly, implies that some Gulf states are willing to entertain fees in return for certain Iranian concessions or guarantees. Iran could weave these fees into any regional agreement over the strait's management, for example. Thani denied that Qatar would approve any plan in which the Persian Gulf — which Thani called Qatar's “gateway to the world” — was “controlled” or subject to a toll system. Thani did not explicitly rule out other arrangements that could still be favorable to Iran and give Iran a say in the future of the strait.[10] A diplomat familiar with the matter told Agence France-Presse later on June 24 that Saudi Arabia is preparing to hold a “reconciliation summit” between Iran and Arab Gulf states separate from the US-Iran negotiations, but no date has been set at the time of this writing.[11] The Strait of Hormuz is an international waterway under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).[12] Any effort to place the Strait under the control of a state or several states would erode long-standing international norms and maritime law.
The Iranian regime may also be attempting to segue discussions with the Gulf states on the status of the Strait of Hormuz into broader conversations about limiting US or Israeli influence and partnerships in the Gulf. This effort would be consistent with a persistent Iranian narrative in which the regime describes its intent to use the post-war period to establish a regional architecture favorable to Iran. Iranian officials have asserted during and after the war in Iranian and regional media that US partnerships with the Gulf fuels instability for Gulf States, which is designed to exploit Gulf state fears of renewed Iranian drone and missile attacks on the Gulf and surrounding the current uncertainty over US-Iran negotiations.[13] ISW-CTP has previously assessed that Iran seeks to persuade Gulf countries that accommodation with Iran — rather than reliance on US and Israeli security partnerships — offers them greater stability.[14] This is ultimately part of a longstanding Iranian effort to reduce US presence and influence in the region. Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei stated on June 24 that as long as the US military interferes in the region, the Middle East will never achieve lasting peace.[15] Iran may be using recent engagements with Gulf countries to attempt to strengthen its relationships with regional countries as a result. Senior Iranian officials recently met with senior Emirati security officials, following multiple Iranian requests to meet for a rapprochement.[16]
Israeli, Lebanese, and US officials discussed proposals for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to backfill the IDF in “pilot zones” in southern Lebanon during talks in Washington, DC, on June 23 and 24. Israeli officials told Reuters and Israeli media on June 24 that Israeli and Lebanese negotiators discussed a US-backed plan to deploy US-trained and vetted LAF personnel to backfill Israeli positions.[17] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced on June 24 that the United States would help strengthen the LAF’s capacity to clear and hold territory in southern Lebanon, but did not confirm any specific plans to vet Lebanese soldiers.[18] Unspecified US sources told Lebanese media on June 24 that the Lebanese government has proposed that the IDF transfer control of territory in the vicinity of Beaufort Castle, Nabatieh District, to the LAF as part of an initial pilot zone trial.[19] Israel reportedly seeks to complete an assessment of Hezbollah's capabilities before authorizing any “broader” withdrawal from Lebanese territory, however.[20] An unnamed Lebanese official told Reuters on June 24 that the Israeli and Lebanese delegations will not announce any plans involving Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon until the conclusion of talks in Washington on June 25.[21] The IDF first transferred control of Dibbine, Marjaayoun District, to the LAF and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) after withdrawing from the town on June 4.[22]
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has continued to respond to threats in southern Lebanon as the United States, Iran, Lebanon, and mediators develop plans for the “deconfliction cell” to monitor the conflict. Qatari Foreign Minister and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al Thani stated on June 24 that a “core element” of the deconfliction cell will be to monitor ceasefire violations.[23] Qatar is a member of the deconfliction cell alongside the United States, Iran, Lebanon, and Pakistan.[24] The deconfliction cell appears to constrain Israeli action against Hezbollah by eliminating the post-2024 Israel-Lebanon ceasefire monitoring mechanism, which allowed Israel to act against Hezbollah ceasefire violations in certain circumstances.[25] Both Iran and Hezbollah could materially benefit from a constrained Israeli ability to confront Hezbollah.[26]
The IDF has continued to respond to perceived threats in southern Lebanon, however. The IDF reported that its forces killed two Hezbollah fighters who advanced toward IDF positions near Ali al Taher and posed an “immediate threat.”[27] The IDF also reported that it later struck a second group of Hezbollah fighters in a vehicle that approached IDF positions in Ali al Taher.[28] It is not yet clear how the newly-proposed “deconfliction cell” in Lebanon will handle incidents in which the IDF identifies a direct threat to troops in the future. An Israeli intelligence official told Haaretz that IDF soldiers have not received any official updates about the role that the deconfliction mechanism may play in Lebanon.[29]
The Iranian regime continues to emphasize that a full Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon is a condition for any final US-Iran deal. Iranian Parliament Speaker and lead negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf reiterated on June 24 that a complete Israeli withdrawal is a “central condition” for reaching any final agreement with the United States.[30] ISW-CTP has assessed that the Iranian regime is using the war in Lebanon to delay any substantive negotiations over Iran's nuclear program and Iranian efforts to control the Strait of Hormuz.[31] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu affirmed on June 24 that the IDF will remain deployed within the security zone in southern Lebanon while he remains in office.[32]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-24-2026/