The structure of the newly established “deconfliction cell” to oversee the ceasefire in Lebanon appears to constrain Israeli action against Hezbollah by eliminating the post-2024 ceasefire monitoring mechanism, which allowed Israel to act against Hezbollah ceasefire violations in certain circumstances. Iran secured a number of gains from the quadrilateral talks with the United States, Qatar, and Pakistan in Switzerland on June 21. One of these gains includes the establishment of a “deconfliction cell” to oversee the ceasefire in Lebanon that excludes Israel and appears to replace a previous monitoring mechanism that enabled Israeli operations in Lebanon under the November 2024 ceasefire.[1] The new mechanism includes the United States, Iran, Qatar, the Lebanese government, and Pakistan. The previous mechanism, often referred to as the “ceasefire monitoring committee,” enabled Israel to conduct operations against Hezbollah and degrade the threat Hezbollah posed to Israel following Israel's defeat of Hezbollah in 2024.[2] This mechanism included Israel, Lebanon, the United States, France, and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).[3] Israel, under this mechanism, reported Hezbollah ceasefire violations to the mechanism in order for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to address the violations.[4] Israel took action to neutralize the Hezbollah threats with force when the LAF failed to address or insufficiently addressed the Hezbollah violations, which frequently occurred.[5] Israeli media reported that the newly agreed-upon mechanism between the United States, Iran, Qatar, and Pakistan is designed to replace the former ceasefire monitoring committee. It is unclear how the newly established deconfliction cell will function. The disempowerment of the former mechanism in favor of a new “deconfliction cell” that excludes Israel nonetheless benefits Iran because it removes a recognized forum in which Israel raised Hezbollah violations and acted against them if necessary. Both Iran and Hezbollah could materially benefit from a constrained Israeli ability to confront Hezbollah.
The inclusion of Iran and exclusion of Israel in the “deconfliction cell” will seriously challenge the cell's ability to achieve its stated objective of ensuring the “termination of military operations” in Lebanon.[6] Both actors are actively involved in combat operations in southern Lebanon. Iran reportedly deployed Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officers to Maroun al Ras to help coordinate Hezbollah's defense against Israel Defense Forces (IDF) advances in southern Lebanon, according to a senior Israeli source speaking to regional media on June 22.[7] These IRGC deployments are consistent with recent reports that IRGC officers have embedded themselves in Hezbollah's command structure in order to rebuild the group following Hezbollah's defeat in Fall 2024.[8] The IDF continues to operate against Hezbollah on the ground in southeastern Lebanon.[9] Iran's involvement in the conflict will enable it to directly relay intelligence and information from southern Lebanon to the “deconfliction cell.” Israel will only be able to indirectly relay information to the “deconfliction cell” via the United States, however. Israel was previously able to directly raise issues to the November 2024 monitoring mechanism.[10]
The conflicting positions of the deconfliction cell's member states will also challenge the mechanism's ability to secure an end to military operations in Lebanon. The United States is reportedly allowing Israel to maintain a military presence in southern Lebanon, according to Israeli media citing Israeli sources. Right-wing Israeli media reported on June 22 that Israeli and US officials have agreed that the IDF will remain in southern Lebanon for an unspecified period of time to continue clearing Hezbollah infrastructure in areas within the IDF’s military buffer zone.[11] Left-leaning Israeli media reports indicated on June 21 that the IDF is considering “a symbolic withdrawal” from areas of southern Lebanon beyond the Yellow Line — which refers to the extent of the IDF’s “security zone” in Lebanon—as a gesture to the Lebanese government.[12] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz continue to insist that Israel has the right to protect itself and that this includes maintaining a presence in southern Lebanon to combat Hezbollah and conduct clearing operations.[13] Iran continues to demand a full ceasefire that includes a complete IDF withdrawal from southern Lebanon, however.[14] Israeli, US, and Lebanese delegations will probablydiscuss the scope of Israeli military operations in Lebanon and the new “deconfliction cell” in Israel-Lebanon ceasefire talks in Washington, DC, between June 23 and 25.[15]
Iran has also secured economic relief through a US Treasury Department sanctions waiver for Iranian oil and petrochemical exports and a reported Iran-Qatar memorandum of understanding (MoU) that facilitates the unfreezing of Iranian assets. The US Treasury Department issued a waiver on June 22 for Iranian crude oil and petrochemical exports through August 21. The waiver includes associated services such as banking transactions, insurance, and transportation. The waiver does not apply to Iranian exports to North Korea, Cuba, and Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine.[16] The United States had already committed to the sanctions waiver as part of the US-Iran MoU that the United States and Iran signed on June 17.[17] Iranian media separately reported that Iran and Qatar signed a separate MoU for Qatar to unfreeze Iranian assets.[18] Qatar has not acknowledged this claim as of this writing. US Vice President JD Vance told reporters on June 22 that Iran would use unfrozen funds to purchase US agricultural products if the United States unfroze the funds.[19] Iranian media subsequently denied Vance's comments, however.[20]
Iran does not appear to have made any nuclear concessions in the June 21 talks in Switzerland. Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei told reporters on June 22 that both the US and Iranian delegations expressed their countries’ views on Iran's nuclear program but did not negotiate on their positions during the June 21 talks.[21] Baghaei reiterated that the United States must fulfill other MoU clauses, such as the ceasefire on all fronts and economic relief clauses, in order to “pave the way for the implementation of mutual obligations.” Baghaei was likely referencing negotiations about Iran's nuclear program, which is consistent with how Iran is attempting to condition nuclear talks on economic relief and the United States compelling Israel to end operations and withdraw from Lebanon.[22] US President Donald Trump suggested on June 22 that Iran will have to agree to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections of nuclear sites.[23] Baghaei denied that Iran has made any “new commitments” over IAEA inspections and said that Iran's interactions with the IAEA would remain under Iran's existing legal frameworks, however.[24]
The US and Iranian delegations agreed on June 21 to establish a line of communication to prevent military incidents in the Strait of Hormuz as commercial vessels transit through the strait.[25] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media claimed on June 21 that this line of communication — which appears to be designed mainly to avoid maritime incidents or miscommunication — establishes Iran's sovereignty over the strait.[26] The regime may assess that this line of communication will require vessels to coordinate with Iran in order to safely pass through the strait and thereby implicitly recognize Iran's sovereignty over the strait. Commercially available maritime data indicates that 25 vessels passed through the strait between 1400 ET on June 21 and 1400 ET on June 22, despite Iranian claims on June 20 that it had closed the strait due to Israeli “violations” of the ceasefire in Lebanon.[27]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-22-2026/
Iran is taking steps to establish a joint mechanism with Oman to try to exercise long-term authority over the Strait of Hormuz. Such a mechanism would enable Iran to regulate transit through the strait and decide to restrict passage at its discretion. Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf met with Omani officials in Muscat on June 23 to discuss joint Iranian-Omani management of the strait.[1] Iranian and Omani officials released a joint statement following the talks that emphasized their commitment to clause 5 of the US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU). This clause states that Iran will work with Oman to “define the future administration and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz” in consultation with other Persian Gulf littoral states.[2] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Fars News Agency reported that both delegations agreed to continue discussions on the management of the strait, including maritime services and associated costs.[3] These discussions will almost certainly involve Iranian efforts to establish a toll system in which vessels must pay “service fees” to Iran and Oman to transit through the strait. Omani Foreign Affairs Minister Badr Albusaidi stated after the meeting that Oman supports “toll-free safe passage” through the strait.[4] Iran, however, has consistently differentiated between “tolls” and other charges, such as “service fees” and “insurance” to protect vessels against attacks. Iran continues to be the only threat against commercial shipping in the strait. Any imposition of fees would violate international law. The Strait of Hormuz is an international waterway, not territorial waters, and Article 26 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea — which permits fees in territorial waters — therefore does not apply to the strait.[5] A reality in which Iran is able to manage traffic through the strait and collect related fees would constitute a significant strategic victory for Iran and give Iran substantial leverage over global commerce.
Recent increased vessel traffic through the strait does not eliminate the threats that Iranian control over the strait poses to US interests and global commerce. Western media reporting and commercially available maritime data indicate that vessel traffic through the strait has increased in recent days.[6] Iran continues to claim that the IRGC Navy is “allowing” vessels to pass through the strait, however.[7] This framing implies that Iran has the authority to deny vessels passage whenever it chooses, which significantly undermines US interests and global commerce. Iran has already used its claimed control over traffic in the strait as a lever to try to extract concessions during negotiations with the United States. ISW-CTP previously assessed that Iran's recent announcement of the “closure” of the strait likely aimed to increase economic pressure on the United States to compel Israel to halt operations against Hezbollah and withdraw from Lebanon, for example.[8] Iran's continued efforts to establish joint control over the strait would enable Iran to retain its ability to use the strait as a tool of coercion.
Iranian regime officials have continued to deny that the United States could control how the regime spends any funds it obtains from the US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU). Any economic relief that the regime obtains could support Iranian efforts to reconstitute its military capabilities and the Axis of Resistance. Iranian Ambassador to the United Nations Ali Bahreini rejected on June 23 any US involvement in deciding how Iran could use unfrozen assets it gains access to from the MoU.[9] Iran's Central Bank Governor, Abdolnaser Hemmati, told regime media on June 23 that Iran has “no obligation” to buy US agricultural products under the terms of the MoU.[10] US Vice President JD Vance told reporters on June 22 that, if the United States unfroze Iranian assets, Iran would have to use the assets to purchase US agricultural products.[11] Regime officials have previously indicated that the regime could use any economic relief from the MoU to reconstitute Iran's military capabilities. Arab mediators told the Wall Street Journal on June 13 that IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi, whom ISW-CTP continues to assess is leading regime decision-making, has insisted that Iran's frozen assets should not be “barred from military spending,” for example.[12] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei similarly stated in May that Iran would use assets released under an agreement with the United States to advance its defense and military sectors, including Iran's missile and drone programs.[13]
Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s Telegram channel reiterated the primary objectives that Iran seeks to achieve in the current conflict.[14] The objectives include:
Ending US military operations against Iran;
Making the United States lift its naval blockade on Iranian ports;
Consolidating Iranian sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz;
US compensation for Iranian reconstruction;
The lifting of all sanctions;
“The resolution of nuclear issues,” likely referring to maintaining the Iranian nuclear program; and
Iranian access to frozen assets.
Recent Iranian reporting suggests that Major General Ali Abadi Abdollahi may now serve as the Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) deputy chief and Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters commander simultaneously. The Iranian media has not publicly announced a replacement for the AFGS deputy chief position since the current IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi, who previously served as the AFGS deputy chief, was appointed as the IRGC deputy commander in December 2025.[15] Vahidi was appointed as IRGC Commander in March 2026.[16] Iranian media, including an AFGS-affiliated outlet, identified Abdollahi as the AFGS deputy chief in May and June 2026 while reporting that he had appointed new officials to positions within the Passive Defense Organization (PDO).[17] The PDO operates under the AFGS and develops and coordinates policies to protect Iranian civilian, military, and nuclear infrastructure from attacks.[18] Abdollahi’s reported role as AFGS deputy chief in making these appointments is notable because the AFGS chief, rather than the deputy chief, has historically appointed senior PDO officials.[19] The Iranian media has not announced a new AFGS chief since Israeli strikes killed former AFGS Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi in February 2026.[20] Iranian media have simultaneously continued to identify Abdollahi as the commander of the Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters, a position to which he was appointed in September 2025, which suggests that Abdollahi may hold both positions concurrently.[21] Iranian media reports identifying Abdollahi as the AFGS deputy chief follow unconfirmed reports from December 2025 that Iranian leaders were considering merging the AFGS and Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters.[22] A single commander previously served as both the Khatam ol Anbia commander and AFGS chief before the regime separated the two organizations in 2016.[23] The regime may have decided to merge the AFGS and Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters as part of a broader effort to restructure the military establishment after the 12-day Israel-Iran War, which highlighted Iran's command-and-control issues.[24] Such a move would likely aim to increase coordination and reduce redundancies at the highest level of Iran's military establishment.
United States Central Command's (CENTCOM) proposed deconfliction initiative in Lebanon would operate at a disadvantage compared to Iran because the IRGC’s on-the-ground presence in Lebanon likely enables Iran to identify and report alleged ceasefire violations to the newly established “deconfliction cell” faster than the United States.[25] CENTCOM Spokesperson Captain Tim Hawkins told US media on June 23 that CENTCOM is monitoring kinetic activity in Lebanon for tactical deconfliction.[26] US media reported that CENTCOM’s monitoring mechanism is part of the newly established “deconfliction cell” to oversee the ceasefire in Lebanon.[27] The “deconfliction cell” includes both US and Iranian representatives, but no Israeli representation.[28] The United States does not have an on-the-ground presence in southern Lebanon, and its tactical monitoring efforts will thus presumably rely on the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). This reliance on the IDF for information would likely delay US awareness about ceasefire violations because IDF soldiers would need to report Hezbollah ceasefire violations to their superiors, who would in turn also need to notify their superiors until the report reaches a senior command echelon. The senior command echelon would presumably notify CENTCOM, which in turn would inform US officials in the “deconfliction cell.” Iran, however, has deployed IRGC Quds Force officers to southern Lebanon in the current conflict, which would likely reduce the time and complexity needed for IRGC officers to report incidents to Iranian officials involved in the “deconfliction cell.”[29] Iran may face some challenges with reporting incidents despite its overall advantage, however, because Hezbollah's combat units are decentralized and maintain limited communication with other units and higher command echelons.[30] Being able to notify the “deconfliction cell” about incidents faster would enable Iran to provide its interpretation of incidents and thereby influence the narrative over incidents in the “deconfliction cell.”
Israeli political leaders have expressed concern over the “deconfliction cell” due to Iran's role in the cell and Israel's exclusion from the mechanism.[31] Israeli Ambassador to the United States Yechiel Leiter warned Lebanese and US officials at the start of US-brokered negotiations in Washington, DC, on June 23 that negotiations are failing to expel Iranian influence from Lebanon and risk offering Hezbollah a “new lease on life.”[32]
Israeli and Lebanese officials met in Washington, DC, for the latest round of US-brokered negotiations on June 23.[33] International media reported that the talks will likely continue through June 25 and that Israeli, Lebanese, and US officials will discuss ceasefire measures, including plans to replace the IDF with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in “pilot zones” in southern Lebanon.[34] Israeli media reported on June 23 that the IDF will likely withdraw from limited specific areas in southern Lebanon and transfer control of these areas to the LAF.[35] The IDF first transferred control of Dibbine, Marjaayoun District, to the LAF and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) after withdrawing from the town on June 4.[36] Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem said in a speech on June 23 that Hezbollah is cooperating “to the fullest extent” with the LAF and urged the Lebanese government to “take advantage” of Hezbollah as a partner force in Lebanon.[37] Qassem has previously claimed that Hezbollah would work with Lebanese authorities and urged the Lebanese government to align with the group, although Qassem has also frequently criticized the Lebanese government for pursuing Hezbollah's disarmament.[38]
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported that it engaged two groups of Hezbollah fighters near Ali al Taher, Nabatieh District, on June 23. The IDF reported that its forces killed a group of Hezbollah fighters that advanced toward IDF positions near Ali al Taher.[39] The IDF also reported that it conducted a drone strike targeting four Hezbollah fighters in vehicles near IDF positions in Ali al Taher.[40] The IDF reported that this group of Hezbollah fighters “operated under civilian cover.”[41] Hezbollah claimed that Israeli forces targeted civilians as they cleared roads and recovered bodies.[42] Hezbollah accused the IDF of violating the June 19 Israel-Lebanon ceasefire.[43] Israeli forces and Hezbollah last engaged each other on June 20.[44] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the IDF warned on June 20 that Israel is committed to the ceasefire but will continue to “forcefully” strike Hezbollah if the group launches further attacks against Israeli forces.[45]
Iranian Ambassador to Iraq Mohammad Kazem Sadegh downplayed Iran's opposition to Iranian-backed Iraqi militia disarmament in an interview with Iraqi state media on June 22.[46] Sadegh claimed that Iran would respect any Iraqi government decision regarding militia disarmament and called the issue an “internal Iraqi matter,” which contradicts previous reporting about Iran's position on the issue.[47] Unspecified political and informed security sources previously told US-funded, Arabic-language media on June 10 that Iran views Iraqi militias’ possible disarmament as an issue related to the Axis of Resistance rather than merely an internal Iraqi matter.[48] The IRGC also reportedly told Iraqi militia leaders not to surrender their weapons and vowed that Iran would do “everything in its power” to keep the militias armed.[49] Sadegh’s interview comes as the Iraqi federal government has recently taken initial steps to disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including forming a disarmament committee, amid increased US pressure on the Iraqi government to dismantle the militias.[50] ISW-CTP continues to assess that any Iraqi federal government attempt to disarm the militias and integrate them into the Iraqi security establishment that does not address the militias’ networks and allegiance to Iran would likely further embed Iranian influence within the Iraqi state.[51]
Sadegh also attempted to deflect Iranian responsibility for Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks during the recent conflict.[52] He falsely claimed during the interview that Iran “did not ask any party to intervene” on its behalf during the war.[53] Eight Iraqi sources told Western media on June 19, however, that the IRGC formed multiple Iraqi militia cells that directly report to the IRGC, instead of pre-existing Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, to conduct attacks on US forces in Gulf countries.[54] Unspecified Iraqi sources also told Saudi media in April that IRGC Quds Force officers “constantly” supervised militia attacks, helped militias develop ammunition for drones, and provided militias with technical expertise regarding missiles.[55]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-23-2026/