Iran is attempting to use the sequencing of the US-Iran memorandum of understanding's (MoU) clauses to make the United States meet Iranian demands regarding Lebanon and economic relief before Iran agrees to discuss nuclear issues. Iran and the United States held quadrilateral talks with Qatari and Pakistani mediators in Burgenstock, Switzerland, on June 21.[1] Qatari officials stated that the parties established “specialized technical and expert working groups” to negotiate a final agreement covering “all aspects” of the MoU.[2] Iranian officials and media emphasized that the June 21 talks only focused on pushing the United States to implement MoU clauses that the MoU states must be implemented before nuclear negotiations can begin, however.[3] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Fars News reported on June 21 that no members of Iran's “nuclear committee” were part of the Iranian delegation.[4] Iranian negotiating team member Hossein Ghorban Zadeh said that the talks focused on implementing clause 13 of the MoU, which states that Iran and the United States will only start negotiations for a final agreement once clauses 1, 4, 5, 10, and 11 are implemented.[5] These clauses concern the ceasefire on all fronts, including Lebanon, the lifting of the US naval blockade, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, temporary oil sanctions waivers, and the release of frozen Iranian assets.[6] Ghorban Zadeh emphasized that a ceasefire in Lebanon is Iran's “top priority” and that progress on other aspects of the MoU depends on this ceasefire.[7] Iran's conditions in these talks demonstrate how Iran is using the MoU’s sequencing to demand that the United States fulfil its commitments in the MoU before Iran agrees to discuss its nuclear program. Iranian officials and media have repeatedly emphasized that Iran must solidify its military gains in the war in negotiations by using negotiations to secure Iran's strategic objectives, which include preserving Hezbollah and the Axis of Resistance writ large as well as securing Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz.[8] The talks reportedly paused after US President Donald Trump threatened Iran that the United States would strike Iran “harder” if Iran does not stop Hezbollah, which prompted the Iranian team to temporarily withdraw to its hotel “in protest,” according to Iranian media.[9] An unspecified diplomat told Axios on June 21 that the Iranian delegation had not left the venue and that US-Iran negotiations were ongoing, however.[10]
Iran is using the first clause of the MoU, which calls for a ceasefire on all fronts, to try to pressure the United States to compel Israel to cease operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon and withdraw its forces from Lebanese territory. Iran's interpretation of this clause is part of its broader effort to preserve Hezbollah as a central element of Iran's deterrence strategy against Israel. Iranian officials have interpreted the first clause of the MoU as requiring both a halt to Israeli operations against Hezbollah and an Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon.[11] This interpretation creates a win-win situation for the regime: if the United States agrees to Iran's interpretation and compels Israel to withdraw its forces from Lebanon, this would represent a strategic victory for Iran and Hezbollah. If, on the other hand, the United States does not accept Iran's interpretation of this clause, Iran can continue to postpone nuclear negotiations by claiming that the United States is violating the MoU. Hezbollah-affiliated parliamentarians have stated that the US-Iran MoU provides a path to a complete ceasefire in Lebanon and Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.[12] Israeli and Hezbollah attacks have paused since June 20, but Israeli forces continue clearing operations within the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) “security zone” in southern Lebanon.[13] The current ceasefire in Lebanon will likely not satisfy Iran's maximalist demands because Israeli officials continue to emphasize that the IDF will remain in southern Lebanon, however.[14] Israeli media reported on June 21 that the United States is pushing the IDF to withdraw to positions at and behind the Yellow Line, which denotes the extent of the IDF’s military buffer zone in Lebanon.[15] Israeli media added that Israeli political officials instructed the IDF to halt operations around Ali al Taher in order to avoid disrupting US-Iran negotiations.[16]
Iran is also attempting to frontload economic benefits from the MoU before addressing its nuclear program in negotiations. Iran likely seeks to acquire funds up front in case negotiations collapse and also likely seeks to reduce US leverage in later nuclear talks in order to make it more difficult for the United States to extract concessions from Iran. Iran could use early access to oil revenue and frozen assets to reduce US leverage during the 60-day nuclear negotiations period and try to reconstitute its military capabilities and the Axis of Resistance.[17] Fars News reported that Iran is still expecting the United States to release $12 billion USD in Iranian assets, which Fars News claimed includes a planned $500 million USD “test purchase” from Iranian assets in Qatar.[18] The Iranian Central Bank also confirmed that Central Bank Governor Abdolnaser Hemmati joined the Iranian delegation in Switzerland to work on the release of the $6 billion USD that is blocked in Qatar.[19] ISW-CTP previously assessed on June 20 that Hemmati’s inclusion in the Iranian delegation indicated that Iran intended to focus part of the talks in Switzerland on economic relief.[20]
Iran is using its announced closure of the Strait of Hormuz to increase economic pressure on the United States as part of its effort to push the United States to compel Israel to halt operations against Hezbollah and withdraw from Lebanon. The IRGC Navy announced on June 20 that it had “closed” the strait, but some vessels continue to transit through the Omani coastal route and Iran's newly asserted traffic separation scheme.[21] Commercially available maritime data indicates that 16 vessels passed through the strait between 1400 ET on June 20 and 1400 ET on June 21 despite Iranian claims that the strait remains closed.[22] The fact that shipping through the strait has continued after Iran announced the closure of the strait suggests that this announcement was likely intended to primarily have an informational effect. Iran's announcement increased global oil prices, and the Iranian regime likely calculated that an increase in oil prices would increase pressure on the United States to meet Iranian demands.[23] Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Mohammad Mokhber highlighted on June 21 how Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz enables Iran to “significantly influence the global economy.”[24] Mokhber added that Iran seeks to alter “the rules governing the strait.”
Iran's involvement in negotiations in Switzerland has exposed fissures among some Iranian factions over how Iran should advance its objectives. IRGC-affiliated outlet Fars News published an op-ed on June 20 that criticized IRGC-affiliated outlet Tasnim News Agency for allegedly supporting Iranian negotiating delegation head Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and advancing Ghalibaf’s pro-negotiations agenda.[25] Fars News also accused Tasnim of misinterpreting a recent statement from Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei in which Khamenei suggested that he did not fully support the MoU.[26] Fars News’ claim that Tasnim is affiliated with Ghalibaf is inconsistent with recent Tasnim reports that have argued that Iran shouldn't conduct negotiations with the United States until the United States achieves a ceasefire in Lebanon. Tasnim argued on June 20 that Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi had “no justification” to go to Switzerland, for example.[27]
Iranian media continues to reflect on aspects of the recent war that it assesses contributed to Iran's “success” against the United States and Israel. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-run media Defa Press published an op-ed on June 21 in which it described the effectiveness of Iran's “mosaic defense” strategy in countering US and Israeli airstrikes during the war.[28] Iran's “mosaic defense” strategy dates back to 2005 under former IRGC Commander Mohammad Ali Jafari and involves the decentralization of military decision-making to lower echelons.[29] Defa noted that, unlike traditional, centralized defense models that depend on heavy equipment and rigid command structures, Iran's “mosaic defense“ relies on numerous small, low-cost, and flexible units—such as drones, radars, and missile platforms—that can operate independently yet cohesively with other units.[30] Defa emphasized that, in this structure, losses of individual components do not compromise the overall network.[31] Defa also highlighted how systems, such as Shahed drones, that are relatively cheap to produce, can pose financial strain on Iran's adversaries by making them invest in costly countermeasures.[32]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-21-2026/
The structure of the newly established “deconfliction cell” to oversee the ceasefire in Lebanon appears to constrain Israeli action against Hezbollah by eliminating the post-2024 ceasefire monitoring mechanism, which allowed Israel to act against Hezbollah ceasefire violations in certain circumstances. Iran secured a number of gains from the quadrilateral talks with the United States, Qatar, and Pakistan in Switzerland on June 21. One of these gains includes the establishment of a “deconfliction cell” to oversee the ceasefire in Lebanon that excludes Israel and appears to replace a previous monitoring mechanism that enabled Israeli operations in Lebanon under the November 2024 ceasefire.[1] The new mechanism includes the United States, Iran, Qatar, the Lebanese government, and Pakistan. The previous mechanism, often referred to as the “ceasefire monitoring committee,” enabled Israel to conduct operations against Hezbollah and degrade the threat Hezbollah posed to Israel following Israel's defeat of Hezbollah in 2024.[2] This mechanism included Israel, Lebanon, the United States, France, and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).[3] Israel, under this mechanism, reported Hezbollah ceasefire violations to the mechanism in order for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to address the violations.[4] Israel took action to neutralize the Hezbollah threats with force when the LAF failed to address or insufficiently addressed the Hezbollah violations, which frequently occurred.[5] Israeli media reported that the newly agreed-upon mechanism between the United States, Iran, Qatar, and Pakistan is designed to replace the former ceasefire monitoring committee. It is unclear how the newly established deconfliction cell will function. The disempowerment of the former mechanism in favor of a new “deconfliction cell” that excludes Israel nonetheless benefits Iran because it removes a recognized forum in which Israel raised Hezbollah violations and acted against them if necessary. Both Iran and Hezbollah could materially benefit from a constrained Israeli ability to confront Hezbollah.
The inclusion of Iran and exclusion of Israel in the “deconfliction cell” will seriously challenge the cell's ability to achieve its stated objective of ensuring the “termination of military operations” in Lebanon.[6] Both actors are actively involved in combat operations in southern Lebanon. Iran reportedly deployed Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officers to Maroun al Ras to help coordinate Hezbollah's defense against Israel Defense Forces (IDF) advances in southern Lebanon, according to a senior Israeli source speaking to regional media on June 22.[7] These IRGC deployments are consistent with recent reports that IRGC officers have embedded themselves in Hezbollah's command structure in order to rebuild the group following Hezbollah's defeat in Fall 2024.[8] The IDF continues to operate against Hezbollah on the ground in southeastern Lebanon.[9] Iran's involvement in the conflict will enable it to directly relay intelligence and information from southern Lebanon to the “deconfliction cell.” Israel will only be able to indirectly relay information to the “deconfliction cell” via the United States, however. Israel was previously able to directly raise issues to the November 2024 monitoring mechanism.[10]
The conflicting positions of the deconfliction cell's member states will also challenge the mechanism's ability to secure an end to military operations in Lebanon. The United States is reportedly allowing Israel to maintain a military presence in southern Lebanon, according to Israeli media citing Israeli sources. Right-wing Israeli media reported on June 22 that Israeli and US officials have agreed that the IDF will remain in southern Lebanon for an unspecified period of time to continue clearing Hezbollah infrastructure in areas within the IDF’s military buffer zone.[11] Left-leaning Israeli media reports indicated on June 21 that the IDF is considering “a symbolic withdrawal” from areas of southern Lebanon beyond the Yellow Line — which refers to the extent of the IDF’s “security zone” in Lebanon—as a gesture to the Lebanese government.[12] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz continue to insist that Israel has the right to protect itself and that this includes maintaining a presence in southern Lebanon to combat Hezbollah and conduct clearing operations.[13] Iran continues to demand a full ceasefire that includes a complete IDF withdrawal from southern Lebanon, however.[14] Israeli, US, and Lebanese delegations will probablydiscuss the scope of Israeli military operations in Lebanon and the new “deconfliction cell” in Israel-Lebanon ceasefire talks in Washington, DC, between June 23 and 25.[15]
Iran has also secured economic relief through a US Treasury Department sanctions waiver for Iranian oil and petrochemical exports and a reported Iran-Qatar memorandum of understanding (MoU) that facilitates the unfreezing of Iranian assets. The US Treasury Department issued a waiver on June 22 for Iranian crude oil and petrochemical exports through August 21. The waiver includes associated services such as banking transactions, insurance, and transportation. The waiver does not apply to Iranian exports to North Korea, Cuba, and Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine.[16] The United States had already committed to the sanctions waiver as part of the US-Iran MoU that the United States and Iran signed on June 17.[17] Iranian media separately reported that Iran and Qatar signed a separate MoU for Qatar to unfreeze Iranian assets.[18] Qatar has not acknowledged this claim as of this writing. US Vice President JD Vance told reporters on June 22 that Iran would use unfrozen funds to purchase US agricultural products if the United States unfroze the funds.[19] Iranian media subsequently denied Vance's comments, however.[20]
Iran does not appear to have made any nuclear concessions in the June 21 talks in Switzerland. Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei told reporters on June 22 that both the US and Iranian delegations expressed their countries’ views on Iran's nuclear program but did not negotiate on their positions during the June 21 talks.[21] Baghaei reiterated that the United States must fulfill other MoU clauses, such as the ceasefire on all fronts and economic relief clauses, in order to “pave the way for the implementation of mutual obligations.” Baghaei was likely referencing negotiations about Iran's nuclear program, which is consistent with how Iran is attempting to condition nuclear talks on economic relief and the United States compelling Israel to end operations and withdraw from Lebanon.[22] US President Donald Trump suggested on June 22 that Iran will have to agree to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections of nuclear sites.[23] Baghaei denied that Iran has made any “new commitments” over IAEA inspections and said that Iran's interactions with the IAEA would remain under Iran's existing legal frameworks, however.[24]
The US and Iranian delegations agreed on June 21 to establish a line of communication to prevent military incidents in the Strait of Hormuz as commercial vessels transit through the strait.[25] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media claimed on June 21 that this line of communication — which appears to be designed mainly to avoid maritime incidents or miscommunication — establishes Iran's sovereignty over the strait.[26] The regime may assess that this line of communication will require vessels to coordinate with Iran in order to safely pass through the strait and thereby implicitly recognize Iran's sovereignty over the strait. Commercially available maritime data indicates that 25 vessels passed through the strait between 1400 ET on June 21 and 1400 ET on June 22, despite Iranian claims on June 20 that it had closed the strait due to Israeli “violations” of the ceasefire in Lebanon.[27]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-22-2026/