The United States and Iran reached an agreement on June 14 that apparently calls for a ceasefire on all fronts, Iran to “open” the Strait of Hormuz, and the United States to lift its naval blockade on Iranian ports.[1] US President Donald Trump announced on Truth Social that he “fully authorize[s] the toll-free opening of the Strait of Hormuz” and “authorize[s] the immediate removal of the United States Naval blockade.”[2] Iran's top national security decision-making body, the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), and Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Kazem Gharibabadi announced that Iranian officials agreed to a final draft of the memorandum of understanding (MOU) after 15 hours of meetings with Qatari officials.[3] The SNSC and Gharibabadi confirmed the ceasefire on all fronts and that the United States will lift its blockade, but notably did not comment on whether Iran would re-open the strait without tolls.[4] Both Trump and Gharibabadi said that the United States and Iran will sign the agreement with the other parties in Switzerland on June 19.[5] Gharibabadi said that both parties will discuss “termination of all sanctions” on Iran, the nuclear issue, and ”economic reconstruction and development” in Iran in the 60 days after the agreement is signed.[6] Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif noted that the mediators will conduct several meetings this week ahead of the signing ceremony and to ”lay the foundation for technical talks.”[7]
The exact terms of the MoU are not publicly available as of this writing, which makes it difficult to assess how Iran views the agreement in terms of achieving Iranian objectives. Iran's strategic objectives at this time include solidifying control over the Strait of Hormuz and bolstering the Axis of Resistance. It is not clear if a “toll-free” and “open” strait means that Iran retains any of its management functions over the strait. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi has, for example, said that Iran is committed to a “toll-free” strait but will still impose fees.[8] It is unclear if Iran will keep regulating traffic or its coercive activities in the strait, or if Iran made commitments not to disrupt shipping through the strait in the future. Iran has repeatedly emphasized that the strait is under Iranian and Omani control and that the strait is an important leverage in Iran's broader deterrence strategy.[9] Iranian statements regarding the contents of previous MOU drafts indicate that some terms of the agreement are at odds with stated US positions on the Strait of Hormuz in recent months, especially with regard to what constitutes an “open strait.”[10] An “open” strait under Iranian management is not a return to the pre-war status quo and would mean that Iran has accomplished a key war aim.
An Israeli attack in southern Beirut prompted a flurry of diplomatic efforts to reach an agreement amid Iranian threats that it would respond by attacking Israel.[11] The IDF struck a Hezbollah headquarters in Dahiyeh, Hezbollah's stronghold in Beirut's southern suburbs, and killed Hezbollah's telecommunications chief on June 14.[12] Israel conducted the attack in response to several recent Hezbollah drone attacks that landed in northern Israel.[13] Israel has repeatedly warned since June 1 that it would strike Hezbollah targets in Beirut's vicinity if Hezbollah conducted attacks in northern Israel.[14] Hezbollah likely continued to attack northern Israel despite Israeli threats in order to impose costs on Israel for its current presence in southern Lebanon and force an IDF withdrawal. Hezbollah has historically used attacks targeting northern Israel as a means through which it can impose costs and influence Israeli decision-making. This tactic, along with attacks targeting Israeli soldiers in southern Lebanon, was a key element of Hezbollah's efforts to force Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000.[15] Iran, in turn, has pledged to respond to any Israeli attack on Dahiyeh with Iranian strikes on Israel in order to deter Israeli attacks that could degrade Hezbollah.[16]
Several Iranian military and security officials warned on June 14 that Iran would respond to the Israeli attack, including Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani, Supreme National Security Council Secretary Brigadier General Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, and the Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Deputy Coordinator Brigadier General Mohammad Jafar Asadi.[17] US President Donald Trump said that he asked Iran not to launch any attacks on Israel.[18] Three Iranian officials told the New York Times that Iran called off a planned attack on Israel after Trump urged restraint.[19] Gharibabadi claimed that Iranian threats led to Iran achieving some of its requested ”reforms“ to the current agreement.[20]
An Iranian strike on Israel would have been part of the regime's broader effort to uphold Iranian deterrence against Israel and preserve Hezbollah. IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi, whom CTP-ISW currently assesses to be driving regime decision-making, has prioritized establishing Iranian deterrence with the United States and Israel since the beginning of the recent conflict.[21] The regime has used the threat of force— in addition to actual force—to attempt to establish a reality in which any Israeli or US attack on an Iranian proxy or partner would result in high costs for Israel and the United States. Iran has repeatedly threatened to attack Israel in the event that it strikes Hezbollah in Beirut's southern suburbs. Iran launched about ten missiles targeting Israel on June 7 in response to an Israeli strike.[22] Vahidi specifically advocated for these strikes against “more moderate voices,“ according to Iranian and Arab officials speaking to the Wall Street Journal.[23] Vahidi was also reportedly the actor who sought to link operations in Lebanon to the broader US-Israel-Iran war in negotiations.[24]
The Iranian regime attempted to build consensus among regime factions over the MOU ahead of the announcement of a deal. Iran's anti-negotiations camp, led by ultrahardliner faction Paydari (Stability) Front, continued to vocalize their opposition to against any form of negotiations with the United States on June 14.[25] Some Iranians even conducted small-scale peaceful protests in Iranian cities against negotiations, including by chanting for Araghchi’s resignation outside of the foreign ministry in Tehran.[26] Araghchi appears aligned with Vahidi—unlike the situation in April 2026, when Araghchi was not—and so the protests appear to be driven solely by the ultra-hardline camp. Several Iranian political officials and regime outlets emphasized national cohesion and support for regime decision-making in their messaging on June 13 and 14.[27] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian warned that negotiating with the United States does not mean that the regime is abandoning its principles.[28] IRGC-affiliated Fars News also asked Iranian citizens to support the regime and negotiating team.[29]
The IDF killed senior Hezbollah leader and Radwan Force commander Ali Musa Daqduq on June 13, who was a senior commander with deep experience working with multiple Axis of Resistance partners and the IRGC Quds Force.[30] The IDF announced on June 14 that its forces killed Daqduq in southern Lebanon on June 13.[31] The IDF said that, in addition to being commander of the Radwan Forces, Daqduq also commanded the operations department of Hezbollah's Nasr Unit, which means that he planned Hezbollah operations in the eastern section of southern Lebanon.[32] Daqduq also led Hezbollah forces operating along the Israel-Syria border during the Assad era.[33]
Daqduq had extensive regional experience and connections with the IRGC Quds Force, and his death will limit Hezbollah's already dwindling bench of senior commanders with experience supporting operations in other theaters. Senior Hezbollah cadre have long augmented IRGC Quds Force operatives in theaters like Iraq, Yemen, and Syria to train other Iranian-backed militias. Many of the commanders who were involved in these efforts have been killed since 2024. Daqduq advised and trained the Iranian-backed Iraqi Special Groups in Iran from 2006 to 2007.[34] In this role, Daqduq participated in the planning of an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq attack in which Asaib Ahl al Haq killed five US soldiers.[35] US forces imprisoned Daqduq for his role in the attack.[36] The Iraqi judiciary acquitted Daqduq and ordered his release in 2012.[37]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-14-2026/
As negotiations and “deals” take over the narrative, important to remember this:
The Islamic Republic is not a problem that can be negotiated away. The only solution is maximum support for the Iranian people. Given the opportunity and assistance they need, they can cripple—and ultimately end—this terrorist regime.
https://x.com/mdubowitz/status/2066362820950712741
US and Iranian sources have expressed diverging interpretations of some key aspects of the recent US-Iran agreement. The full text of the agreement has not yet been published, which makes it difficult to ascertain which interpretations of the agreement are accurate. The United States and Iran reached an agreement on June 14 to end the war and are expected to formally sign the agreement in Geneva on June 19.[1] The agreement reportedly calls for a ceasefire on all fronts, requires Iran to “open” the Strait of Hormuz, and requires the United States to lift its naval blockade on Iranian ports.[2] US and Iranian officials have stated that additional negotiations, including discussions over Iran's nuclear program, will occur during the 60 days following the agreement's signing.[3] US Vice President JD Vance stated on June 15 that the United States expects the strait to be open “in a toll-free way for the long term.”[4] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media, by contrast, reported on June 15 that Iran will pause imposing “fees” on vessels transiting through the strait for the next 60 days but intends to resume charging vessels “service fees” after the 60-day period.[5] Iranian officials have also continued to signal their intent to jointly manage the strait with Oman.[6] US officials have also denied Iranian claims that the agreement will immediately release a portion of Iran's frozen assets and lift some sanctions. US officials, including US President Donald Trump and Vice President JD Vance, have instead insisted that sanctions relief and the release of Iranian assets are dependent on Iran's implementation of the agreement.[7] IRGC-affiliated media argued that Iran must “strictly implement its interpretation” of the agreement and disregard the United States’ “nonsense interpretations,” which further highlights the apparent divergence between Iran and the United States’ understandings of the deal.[8] These diverging interpretations of key provisions in the agreement will likely complicate the implementation of the agreement and the next phase of negotiations.
Iran's interpretation of the agreement's provisions about the Strait of Hormuz would constitute a significant strategic victory for Iran if its interpretation becomes the recognized reality. Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei stated on June 15 that Iran and Oman will manage traffic through the strait, provide maritime “services,” and collect related fees.[9] IRGC-affiliated media similarly claimed that the text of the US-Iran agreement was revised to emphasize Iranian and Omani sovereignty over the international waterway.[10] Iranian reports that Iran intends to resume “fee” collection in some capacity are consistent with repeated Iranian claims that these charges are “service fees” rather than transit tolls and therefore do not violate a “toll-free” arrangement.[11] Imposing tolls is one mechanism through which Iran exercises authority over the strait, but ISW-CTP previously assessed that Iran likely prioritizes securing recognized sovereignty over the strait over imposing a toll scheme in the strait.[12] The Iranian regime defines an “open” strait as one that remains under Iranian management, which conflicts with US and global commercial interests. Iranian officials have repeatedly identified control of the strait as a core strategic objective and a central pillar of Iran's long-term deterrence posture.[13] ISW-CTP previously assessed that Iran likely views control over the strait as essential to restoring deterrence against the United States and Israel following the degradation of its other deterrent capabilities.[14] Any agreement that permits Iran to retain any form of authority over the strait, regardless of whether it imposes tolls or not, would allow Iran to reimpose restrictions in the international waterway at its discretion. Such authority would give Iran significant leverage over global commerce, which Iran could use to extract concessions and advance its strategic objectives.
The reopening of the Strait of Hormuz depends on the risk calculus of shipping companies and ship captains. Continued Iranian threats against commercial shipping may have a negative impact on the willingness of companies and captains to resume transiting through the strait. Trump stated on June 15 that vessels have begun transiting through the strait via the “southern highway,” almost certainly referring to the internationally recognized traffic separation scheme.[15] Shipping companies will likely remain reluctant to resume normal operations, at least for the time being, due to the ongoing risk of Iranian attacks and naval mines, however. The IRGC Navy announced on June 15 that it has not issued transit permits over the past 96 hours and emphasized that the strait remains closed to all vessels.[16] The IRGC Navy reportedly warned ships not to approach areas under Iranian control “until further notice,” which is an implicit threat to attack vessels that attempt to transit through the strait without Iranian permission.[17] These threats are part of a broader Iranian effort since March 2026 to use force to deter vessels from transiting the strait without Iranian authorization.[18] Iran's mine-laying activities and threats to mine the strait are also a key component of this effort. Reuters, citing shippers in Asia and Europe, reported that shipping companies intend to resume navigation only after authorities fully confirm the safety of the waterway.[19] Reuters, citing Western maritime security services, added that mine-clearing operations could take 40 to 50 days.[20] Trump stated on June 14 that mine-removal operations will begin after the agreement is signed on June 19.[21] Iranian officials and media have not commented publicly on potential mine-clearing efforts.
Hezbollah has signaled that it will adhere to the Lebanon ceasefire outlined in the US-Iran agreement and suggested that the group views the agreement as a precursor for Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon.[22] Hezbollah issued a statement on June 15 in which it congratulated Iran for reaching an agreement with the United States that includes “a comprehensive ceasefire across all fronts, including Lebanon.”[23] A Hezbollah official told Reuters on June 15 that the group has ceased offensive operations since the US-Iran deal was announced and that Hezbollah's compliance with the ceasefire is linked to Israel's adherence to it.[24] ISW-CTP has not observed any Hezbollah attacks on northern Israel since the United States and Iran announced the agreement. Hezbollah also implied in its statement that the US-Iran agreement sets conditions for an IDF withdrawal from southern Lebanon, stating that the agreement “is a prelude to completing the liberation” of Lebanon.[25] Hezbollah has repeatedly demanded a full IDF withdrawal from Lebanon as part of any comprehensive ceasefire agreement.[26] Iranian media similarly implied on June 15 that an IDF withdrawal from southern Lebanon is part of the US-Iran agreement.[27] The Hezbollah official speaking to Reuters added that Hezbollah rejects IDF “freedom of movement” in Lebanon, which further illustrates Hezbollah's maximalist demand for an IDF withdrawal.[28] A senior US official told an Israeli reporter on June 15 that “an Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon is not a condition for reaching an agreement with Iran,” however.[29] Israel does not appear to be a party to this agreement, which complicates the clause that calls for a ceasefire in Lebanon.[30]
Israeli officials have stated that the IDF will continue to operate in Lebanon to degrade Hezbollah. Hezbollah and Iran could make their implementation of the US-Iran agreement contingent upon the cessation of Israeli operations against Hezbollah in order to push Israel to halt these operations. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said on June 15 that Israel will maintain an indefinite IDF presence in security zones in Lebanon, Syria, and the Gaza Strip in order to maintain Israel's security.[31] Katz added that the IDF’s establishment of security zones in southern Lebanon is “among the IDF’s greatest achievements” in the war and emphasized that Israel ”oppose[s] an IDF withdrawal from Lebanon, despite all the existing pressures and those that will still come.”[32] A US official separately told an Israeli journalist that Israel has the right to respond to any Hezbollah attack.[33] Lebanese media reported that the IDF continued to strike targets in southern Lebanon as recently as the morning of June 15.[34] There are also conflicting reports on whether the IDF has continued ground operations in southern Lebanon. Two IDF soldiers in southern Lebanon told an Israeli journalist on June 15 that all IDF activity has ceased since the announcement of the US-Iran agreement.[35] Lebanese sources continue to report IDF movements and advances, including in towns beyond the ”Yellow Line,” however.[36] Iran recently linked US-Iran negotiations to the Lebanon issue in order to pressure the United States to push Israel to halt operations against Hezbollah.[37] Iran could similarly seek to make its implementation of the US-Iran agreement contingent upon Israel agreeing to a ”comprehensive ceasefire” in Lebanon.
Supporters of the US-Iran agreement within the Iranian regime continue to attempt to build a consensus around the US-Iran agreement amid criticism from the regime's anti-negotiations camp, led by the ultrahardline Paydari (Stability) Front. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf continued to defend Iran's decision to sign the agreement and repeated their calls for Iranians to maintain unity and national cohesion.[38] Pezeshkian stated on June 15 that “nearly all” Iranian parliamentarians support the agreement and emphasized that the agreement was signed under the “guidance” of Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei.[39] Pezeshkian’s comment comes amid criticisms from some Paydari Front members toward Iran's negotiating team and the US-Iran agreement. A Paydari Front parliamentarian criticized the agreement's reportedly vague timeline for the release of Iranian assets, for example..[40]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-15-2026/