The United States and Iran reached an agreement on June 14 that apparently calls for a ceasefire on all fronts, Iran to “open” the Strait of Hormuz, and the United States to lift its naval blockade on Iranian ports.[1] US President Donald Trump announced on Truth Social that he “fully authorize[s] the toll-free opening of the Strait of Hormuz” and “authorize[s] the immediate removal of the United States Naval blockade.”[2] Iran's top national security decision-making body, the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), and Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Kazem Gharibabadi announced that Iranian officials agreed to a final draft of the memorandum of understanding (MOU) after 15 hours of meetings with Qatari officials.[3] The SNSC and Gharibabadi confirmed the ceasefire on all fronts and that the United States will lift its blockade, but notably did not comment on whether Iran would re-open the strait without tolls.[4] Both Trump and Gharibabadi said that the United States and Iran will sign the agreement with the other parties in Switzerland on June 19.[5] Gharibabadi said that both parties will discuss “termination of all sanctions” on Iran, the nuclear issue, and ”economic reconstruction and development” in Iran in the 60 days after the agreement is signed.[6] Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif noted that the mediators will conduct several meetings this week ahead of the signing ceremony and to ”lay the foundation for technical talks.”[7]
The exact terms of the MoU are not publicly available as of this writing, which makes it difficult to assess how Iran views the agreement in terms of achieving Iranian objectives. Iran's strategic objectives at this time include solidifying control over the Strait of Hormuz and bolstering the Axis of Resistance. It is not clear if a “toll-free” and “open” strait means that Iran retains any of its management functions over the strait. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi has, for example, said that Iran is committed to a “toll-free” strait but will still impose fees.[8] It is unclear if Iran will keep regulating traffic or its coercive activities in the strait, or if Iran made commitments not to disrupt shipping through the strait in the future. Iran has repeatedly emphasized that the strait is under Iranian and Omani control and that the strait is an important leverage in Iran's broader deterrence strategy.[9] Iranian statements regarding the contents of previous MOU drafts indicate that some terms of the agreement are at odds with stated US positions on the Strait of Hormuz in recent months, especially with regard to what constitutes an “open strait.”[10] An “open” strait under Iranian management is not a return to the pre-war status quo and would mean that Iran has accomplished a key war aim.
An Israeli attack in southern Beirut prompted a flurry of diplomatic efforts to reach an agreement amid Iranian threats that it would respond by attacking Israel.[11] The IDF struck a Hezbollah headquarters in Dahiyeh, Hezbollah's stronghold in Beirut's southern suburbs, and killed Hezbollah's telecommunications chief on June 14.[12] Israel conducted the attack in response to several recent Hezbollah drone attacks that landed in northern Israel.[13] Israel has repeatedly warned since June 1 that it would strike Hezbollah targets in Beirut's vicinity if Hezbollah conducted attacks in northern Israel.[14] Hezbollah likely continued to attack northern Israel despite Israeli threats in order to impose costs on Israel for its current presence in southern Lebanon and force an IDF withdrawal. Hezbollah has historically used attacks targeting northern Israel as a means through which it can impose costs and influence Israeli decision-making. This tactic, along with attacks targeting Israeli soldiers in southern Lebanon, was a key element of Hezbollah's efforts to force Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000.[15] Iran, in turn, has pledged to respond to any Israeli attack on Dahiyeh with Iranian strikes on Israel in order to deter Israeli attacks that could degrade Hezbollah.[16]
Several Iranian military and security officials warned on June 14 that Iran would respond to the Israeli attack, including Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani, Supreme National Security Council Secretary Brigadier General Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, and the Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Deputy Coordinator Brigadier General Mohammad Jafar Asadi.[17] US President Donald Trump said that he asked Iran not to launch any attacks on Israel.[18] Three Iranian officials told the New York Times that Iran called off a planned attack on Israel after Trump urged restraint.[19] Gharibabadi claimed that Iranian threats led to Iran achieving some of its requested ”reforms“ to the current agreement.[20]
An Iranian strike on Israel would have been part of the regime's broader effort to uphold Iranian deterrence against Israel and preserve Hezbollah. IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi, whom CTP-ISW currently assesses to be driving regime decision-making, has prioritized establishing Iranian deterrence with the United States and Israel since the beginning of the recent conflict.[21] The regime has used the threat of force— in addition to actual force—to attempt to establish a reality in which any Israeli or US attack on an Iranian proxy or partner would result in high costs for Israel and the United States. Iran has repeatedly threatened to attack Israel in the event that it strikes Hezbollah in Beirut's southern suburbs. Iran launched about ten missiles targeting Israel on June 7 in response to an Israeli strike.[22] Vahidi specifically advocated for these strikes against “more moderate voices,“ according to Iranian and Arab officials speaking to the Wall Street Journal.[23] Vahidi was also reportedly the actor who sought to link operations in Lebanon to the broader US-Israel-Iran war in negotiations.[24]
The Iranian regime attempted to build consensus among regime factions over the MOU ahead of the announcement of a deal. Iran's anti-negotiations camp, led by ultrahardliner faction Paydari (Stability) Front, continued to vocalize their opposition to against any form of negotiations with the United States on June 14.[25] Some Iranians even conducted small-scale peaceful protests in Iranian cities against negotiations, including by chanting for Araghchi’s resignation outside of the foreign ministry in Tehran.[26] Araghchi appears aligned with Vahidi—unlike the situation in April 2026, when Araghchi was not—and so the protests appear to be driven solely by the ultra-hardline camp. Several Iranian political officials and regime outlets emphasized national cohesion and support for regime decision-making in their messaging on June 13 and 14.[27] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian warned that negotiating with the United States does not mean that the regime is abandoning its principles.[28] IRGC-affiliated Fars News also asked Iranian citizens to support the regime and negotiating team.[29]
The IDF killed senior Hezbollah leader and Radwan Force commander Ali Musa Daqduq on June 13, who was a senior commander with deep experience working with multiple Axis of Resistance partners and the IRGC Quds Force.[30] The IDF announced on June 14 that its forces killed Daqduq in southern Lebanon on June 13.[31] The IDF said that, in addition to being commander of the Radwan Forces, Daqduq also commanded the operations department of Hezbollah's Nasr Unit, which means that he planned Hezbollah operations in the eastern section of southern Lebanon.[32] Daqduq also led Hezbollah forces operating along the Israel-Syria border during the Assad era.[33]
Daqduq had extensive regional experience and connections with the IRGC Quds Force, and his death will limit Hezbollah's already dwindling bench of senior commanders with experience supporting operations in other theaters. Senior Hezbollah cadre have long augmented IRGC Quds Force operatives in theaters like Iraq, Yemen, and Syria to train other Iranian-backed militias. Many of the commanders who were involved in these efforts have been killed since 2024. Daqduq advised and trained the Iranian-backed Iraqi Special Groups in Iran from 2006 to 2007.[34] In this role, Daqduq participated in the planning of an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq attack in which Asaib Ahl al Haq killed five US soldiers.[35] US forces imprisoned Daqduq for his role in the attack.[36] The Iraqi judiciary acquitted Daqduq and ordered his release in 2012.[37]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-14-2026/