Hezbollah and Iranian leaders continue to reject any ceasefire framework in Lebanon that does not meet their maximalist demand for total Israeli capitulation in Lebanon. Hezbollah and Iran's insistence on this demand is part of an effort to defer negotiations about key points of disagreement between Iran and the United States, particularly Iranian efforts to control the Strait of Hormuz, and strengthen Iran's negotiating position vis-à-vis the United States. The United States, Israel, and Lebanon issued a joint statement on June 3 agreeing to implement a ceasefire contingent upon Hezbollah's agreement to halt all attacks and evacuate its fighters south of the Litani River.[1] The joint statement indicates that Israel, Lebanon, and the United States seek to develop a framework to achieve their respective long-term objectives in Lebanon.[2] The statement announced that Israel and Lebanon would coordinate to establish “pilot zones” in southern Lebanon. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) would deploy to these zones “to the exclusion of all non-state actors.”[3] The Lebanese government confirmed that the LAF has begun deploying to southern Lebanese territory that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) seized during ground operations against Hezbollah.[4] Lebanese President Joseph Aoun called the joint statement the “last opportunity” to obtain “a final and comprehensive ceasefire” in Lebanon on June 4.[5] Israeli Ambassador to the United States Yechiel Leiter separately said on June 4 that a ceasefire in Lebanon would be contingent upon Hezbollah's “complete dismantling.”[6] Hezbollah rejected the joint statement's condition that the group cease attacks and withdraw to north of the Litani River.[7] Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem said on June 4 that Hezbollah's accession to the joint statement would constitute surrender and instead reiterated the group's long-standing demands for a “comprehensive ceasefire” that would require Israel to cease all military operations and withdraw from Lebanon.[8] Qassem indicated that Hezbollah will continue its attacks until Israel accedes to the group's demands.[9] These demands constitute total Israeli capitulation in Lebanon because agreeing to them would force Israel to abandon its core political objective for operations in Lebanon, which is to dismantle Hezbollah as a militant group.[10]
Hezbollah and Iranian leaders are unified in viewing Israeli capitulation in Lebanon as inextricable from Iranian negotiations with the United States. Qassem acknowledged Iran's role in pushing for a complete ceasefire in Lebanon and noted that Iran's push for a complete ceasefire is an “integral part” of Iran's own efforts against the United States.[11] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani also called for a full ceasefire in Lebanon and complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon on June 4.[12] The IRGC similarly stated on June 4 that a ceasefire on “all fronts” was Iran's “initial condition” for the US-Iran ceasefire, which went into effect in early April.[13] Senior Iranian officials, including former IRGC Commander and current IRGC Baghiyatollah Sociocultural Headquarters Commander Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari, previously described a ceasefire in Lebanon as a precondition for negotiations with the United States.[14] Iranian officials have re-emphasized this issue in recent days amid the deadlock in US-Iran negotiations over Iran's nuclear program and the status of the Strait of Hormuz, however.[15]
Iranian officials have continued to emphasize the Lebanon issue in order to try to deflect focus away from key points of disagreement in the US-Iran negotiations, particularly the Strait of Hormuz and Iran's nuclear program, which the regime seeks to avoid making concessions on. The United States and Iran do not currently appear to be discussing Iran's nuclear program, given that Iran suspended negotiations until a complete ceasefire in Lebanon is reached.[16] ISW-CTP previously noted that a protracted discussion about Lebanon deflects from negotiations over Iran's highly enriched uranium stockpile and ability to enrich uranium. Iranian officials and media have also not commented on US demands regarding Iran's nuclear program in recent days. Iranian officials and media continue to insist that Iran will not cede control of the Strait of Hormuz, however. A newspaper published on the Supreme Leader's website, Voice of Iran, published an op-ed on June 2 claiming that Iran has the “winning cards” in negotiations over the strait and that the status of the strait will not return to pre-war conditions.[17] This comment reflects how the Iranian regime does not solely seek to survive this war and return to the pre-war status quo; the regime has positive objectives that it seeks to achieve, including securing Iranian sovereignty over the strait.[18]
Iran has continued to try to justify its control over the Strait of Hormuz by attempting to give its illegal actions in the strait a veneer of legality. Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi claimed that Iran is complying with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) because Iran is offering “services” and “protection” to vessels in Iranian waters in an interview with Iranian media on June 4.[19] The “protection” that Iran is “offering” vessels is protection from Iranian attacks, which means that Iran has effectively established a protection racket in the strait. Iran has repeatedly used force, including attacks on commercial vessels and naval mines, to make vessels sail through Iranian territorial waters. Iranian officials then claim that Iran has the right to extract a fee from these vessels.[20]
Iran also continues to demand other preconditions for negotiations, such as immediate economic relief upon the signing of any US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MOU). ISW-CTP previously assessed that, even if Iran's maximalist demands in Lebanon are met, Iran could condition further negotiations with the United States on additional US concessions.[21] Gharibabadi told Iranian media on June 4 that Iran still seeks the immediate release of at least half of its frozen assets upon the signing of an MoU and the second half in the subsequent negotiating period in his interview with Iranian media on June 4.[22]
Iran additionally continues to seek to erode US regional influence by trying to strain relations between the United States and the Gulf countries. Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei claimed on June 4 that the war has caused a “tangible divergence of countries from” the United States, possibly in reference to the Gulf states.[23] Mojtaba previously claimed in late April that US bases in the region cannot defend the United States’ Gulf partners, also likely as part of an effort to sow divisions between the United States and its Gulf partners and push Gulf countries to expel US forces from their territory.[24] Iran has continued to launch missile and drone attacks targeting the Gulf states following the ceasefire in April, most recently Kuwait and Bahrain on June 2.[25]
The Iraqi federal government has begun to try to restrict arms to the state through the disarmament and integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi security establishment, including the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[26] Iraqi Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr's “deputy for jihad affairs” formally handed over the flag of Sadr's militia, Saraya al Salam, to representatives of the federal government's committee in charge of restricting arms to the state on June 4.[27] Sadr announced on May 27 the dissolution of Saraya al Salam and the “full integration” of the militia's members into the Iraqi state.[28] The Iraqi Joint Operations Command deputy commander, who heads the federal government's disarmament committee, said that the “mechanism” linking Saraya al Salam to the PMF will be abolished and that the militia will be “directly linked” to the prime minister, presumably after it is integrated into the PMF.[29] Saraya al Salam controls the 313th, 314th, and 315th PMF brigades.[30] The federal government committee also includes representatives from the defense and interior ministries and the PMF and is responsible for developing “mechanisms, technical contexts, and arrangements related to weapons and restructuring, leading to [the] full integration” of militia members into the Iraqi security establishment.[31] Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi’s spokesperson said on June 3 that the government's efforts to restrict arms to the state apply to all armed groups operating outside of the PMF.[32] A Shia Coordination Framework member also said on June 3 that the federal government has formed joint committees with militias to develop inventories of militia weapons and supervise the handover of operations to the PMF.[33] Zaydi held separate meetings with delegations from Asaib Ahl al Haq and Kataib al Imam Ali on June 3 to discuss disarmament.[34] Both militias announced their readiness to restrict arms to the state on June 2.[35]
Zaydi is also reportedly pursuing a plan, approved by unidentified framework leaders, in which disarmed militia members would integrate into other Iraqi security institutions, such as the Counter Terrorism Service (CTS).[36] Informed sources told Iraqi media on June 4 that Zaydi presented US officials with a proposal to gradually disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in exchange for US investment in Iraq.[37] Zaydi’s plan reportedly includes granting jobs in formal security institutions, including CTS, to 35,000 militia members who disarm.[38] Saraya al Salam members would fill 15,000 of these positions, according to the informed sources.[39] Unidentified framework leaders reportedly approved this plan and agreed that officials from the defense and interior ministries would be “involved” in overseeing the federal government's disarmament efforts.[40] The framework is a loose coalition of Iraqi Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs, and it is unclear which specific elements of the framework supported this plan. Asaib Ahl al Haq head Qais al Khazali and Kataib al Imam Ali head Shibl al Zaidi, who are both framework members, almost certainly supported the plan, however. The informed sources added to Iraqi media that the political wings of multiple Iraqi militias have threatened to leave the framework and boycott the Iraqi political process if the framework proceeds with US pressure to disarm the militias and dissolve or integrate the PMF.[41]
Multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Kataib Hezbollah–whose political wing is part of the framework, continue to reject disarmament. A Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba official said on June 3 that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq refuses to disarm.[42] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, includes Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Kataib Hezbollah, Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, and Ansar Allah al Awfiya.[43] These militias have, both historically and during the war, been the most kinetically active and are more subordinate to Iran than other Iraqi militias.[44] Kataib Hezbollah said on June 4 that it would not disarm until foreign troops in Iraq, almost certainly in reference to US and Turkish forces, withdraw and foreign interference in Yemen ends.[45] Kataib Hezbollah added that it would only surrender its weapons to the “Imam Mahdi.”[46] The Imam Mahdi is the twelfth and final Imam in Shia Islam, who, according to Twelver Shia, is hiding and will reveal himself in the future.[47] Kataib Hezbollah also said that militias that have agreed to disarm have already severed their ties to Iran, stopped obeying Iran's orders, and stopped conducting attacks against the “adversary,” in reference to Asaib Ahl al Haq and Kataib al Imam Ali.[48] Iraq analysts have long noted that Asaib Ahl al Haq’s leadership, particularly its head Qais al Khazali, has focused more on politics than kinetic activity in recent years, including during the October 7 War.[49] Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba criticized Asaib Ahl al Haq in November 2023 for failing to conduct attacks against US forces in Iraq and Syria.[50] The US Treasury Department noted in April 2026, however, that Asaib Ahl al Haq fighters had conducted drone attacks targeting US and coalition forces in northern Iraq in March 2026.[51] Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada separately said on June 3 that it would not disarm until US forces leave Iraq.[52] Likely Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada front group Saraya Awliya al Dam conditioned its disarmament on the Iraqi federal government fulfilling a large list of demands that include ending all financial and economic dependence that “restricts Iraqi sovereignty” and securing modern air defense and radar systems.[53]
Any Iraqi federal government attempt to disarm the militias and integrate them into the Iraqi security establishment that does not address the militias’ networks and allegiance to Iran will likely further embed Iranian influence within the Iraqi state. Some Iraqi officials have discussed reorganizing militia forces within Iraqi security institutions but have not specified how they plan to do so.[54] Zaydi’s spokesperson said on June 3 that the government's effort to “disengage” militias from the PMF refers to “reorganizing these forces within the security institutions” in a way that preserves militia members’ rights and legal protections, for example.[55] It is unclear if the Iraqi federal government plans to integrate the militias into Iraqi security institutions as units or individuals. Militia-controlled PMF brigades could be reflagged as new units, which would largely retain the units’ composition, networks, and structure. Integrating the militias into the PMF or other Iraqi security institutions as reflagged units would further entrench the militias into the Iraqi state's security sector, which would enable deeper Iranian infiltration. Zaydi’s spokesperson also said that the first step toward restricting arms to the state is “realigning” the forces, likely in reference to Iranian-backed Iraqi militia members who operate outside of militia-controlled PMF brigades, and ensuring that the “forces” only respond to the prime minister.[56]
Failing to properly address the militias’ networks and loyalty to Iran during their disarmament and integration into the Iraqi security establishment would also likely pose a threat to the institutions that the militia members would reportedly join, assuming the details of Zaydi’s proposal are accurate. The replacement of most of CTS’s top leadership during former Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s administration has led to worsening corruption and militia infiltration of what most analysts consider to be Iraq's most effective security service.[57] The risk posed by militia infiltration of Iraq's security services is especially great, given the extent to which the United States funds the Iraqi security establishment.[58] CTS gave a Kataib Hezbollah-owned company $12 million USD in its 2023 budget, for example.[59]
The Badr Organization denied on June 3 that the framework and Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri had formed a committee to restrict arms to the Iraqi state.[60] Iraqi and regional reporting noted in early May that the committee, which included Ameri, Zaydi, and Sudani, had been preparing a plan to disarm the militias.[61] Iraqi media previously reported that the framework chose Ameri for the committee because his ties to Iran were meant to “help build trust with the militias and persuade them to engage with the state.”[62] Badr has integrated itself into Iraqi state institutions to a greater extent than other Iranian-backed Iraqi militias since 2003.[63] Badr would likely face economic blowback to a greater extent than other militias if the United States imposed sanctions or other financial pressure on the Iraqi federal government over failing to address the militias, given the extent of Badr’s dealings with the Iraqi state. Ameri may have denied the committee's existence in response to backlash from more ideologically hardline elements of the Badr Organization.
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-4-2026/
STOLEN REVOLUTION: Betrayal and Hope in Modern Iran, by Yeganeh Torbati and Bozorgmehr Sharafedin
Before the bombs began falling on Iran earlier this year, the war was sold by its advocates as a possible catalyst for regime change — a final blow against a government already weakened by years of economic crisis and political unrest. To many outside observers, the Islamic Republic appeared vulnerable to collapse. Yet the coordinated bombing campaign by the United States and Israel has only strengthened the most hard-line elements of the Iranian state.
Those of us who have spent years studying modern Iran understood that this was always the more likely outcome. Again and again, moments that seemed poised to break the system instead became the conditions through which it adapted and endured. It is a recurring pattern that the New York Times journalist Yeganeh Torbati and the veteran Iran correspondent Bozorgmehr Sharafedin trace in “Stolen Revolution,” their deeply reported and quietly devastating account of half a century of upheaval in the country. The result is one of the most perceptive books on modern Iran in years, capturing not only the machinery of repression but the fragile forms of hope that survive beneath it.
Stolen revolution: Betrayal and hope in modern Iran Brookings Institution
The Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings will host authors Torbati and Sharafedin to discuss the personal narratives spotlighted in “Stolen Revolution” and reflect on how the events of modern Iranian history have led to the current moment. The discussion will be moderated by Suzanne Maloney, Iran scholar and vice president and director of the Foreign Policy program at Brookings.
Hezbollah and Iranian leaders continue to reject any ceasefire framework in Lebanon that does not meet their maximalist demand for total Israeli capitulation in Lebanon. Hezbollah officials and allies have continued to reiterate their maximalist demand for a complete ceasefire in Lebanon that would require Israel to cease all military operations and withdraw from Lebanon.[1] Lebanese Parliament Speaker and Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri stated on June 5 that he would agree to Hezbollah's withdrawal from southern Lebanon if Israeli troops withdrew from the territory they hold in Lebanon and Israel agreed to a “complete and comprehensive ceasefire without conditions.”[2] Berri stated that the June 3 US-Israel-Lebanon agreement is “unjust” and “unworthy of discussion,” which echoes Hezbollah's rejection of the agreement.[3] The United States, Israel, and Lebanon agreed on June 3 to implement a ceasefire in Lebanon contingent upon Hezbollah's agreement to halt all attacks and evacuate its fighters south of the Litani River. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) would halt strikes targeting the group after Hezbollah ceased attacks against Israel and withdrew its forces from south of the Litani.[4] The US and Lebanese governments previously proposed on June 2 that a ceasefire between the IDF and Hezbollah would be geographically limited, with the IDF halting strikes against Beirut in exchange for Hezbollah halting all attacks on Israeli territory.[5] The June 3 agreement did not specify the geographic scope of the proposed ceasefire.[6] Hezbollah and Iranian officials have repeatedly insisted that an acceptable ceasefire must require Israel to halt attacks across Lebanon and withdraw from Lebanese territory.[7] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi told Hezbollah-affiliated media on June 3 that the IDF must withdraw from territories it has “occupied” in Lebanon as part of an end to the war.[8]
Hezbollah and Iran's maximalist demands seek to undermine US and Lebanese government efforts to end the conflict with Israel and restrict weapons to the Lebanese state. Hezbollah and Iran have repeatedly rejected ceasefire proposals mediated and supported by the United States and the Lebanese government, which has complicated ongoing US-mediated Israel-Lebanon negotiations.[9] Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam stated on June 5 that Iran is using Lebanon as a bargaining chip in US-Iran negotiations.[10] Salam emphasized that the conflict in Lebanon is “not being fought for us, but on our land and at the expense of our people.”[11] The June 3 US-Israel-Lebanon joint statement suggests that these parties seek to develop a framework to achieve their respective long-term objectives in Lebanon, including ending the conflict in Lebanon and disarming Hezbollah so that weapons are restricted to the Lebanese state.[12] Aoun stated that current Israel-Lebanon negotiations are “tough,” but that the most recent US-Israel-Lebanon joint statement could be a path forward for “lasting peace.”[13]
Iran and Hezbollah continue to link Israeli capitulation in Lebanon to US-Iran negotiations to try to delay discussions about key points of disagreement between the United States and Iran, particularly Iran's nuclear program and its efforts to control the Strait of Hormuz. Araghchi told Hezbollah-affiliated media on June 3 that the US-Iran war will not end until the war in Lebanon ends.[14] Supreme Leader Military Adviser Mohsen Rezaei similarly stated on June 5 that Lebanon is an “inseparable part” of any US-Iran agreement or ceasefire.[15] ISW-CTP previously assessed that Iran is likely trying to use prolonged discussions about a ceasefire in Lebanon to divert attention from negotiations over its nuclear program and activities in the Strait of Hormuz.[16] Iranian officials have repeatedly insisted that Iran will not negotiate on its nuclear program until the United States accepts an initial agreement that includes a complete ceasefire in Lebanon, among other Iranian preconditions.[17] These preconditions likely seek to reduce US leverage ahead of any future nuclear negotiations, which would make it more difficult for the United States to extract nuclear concessions from Iran. Iranian officials have shown no willingness to meet US demands regarding Iran's highly enriched uranium stockpile or enrichment activities.[18] Iran is similarly using the Lebanon issue to shift attention away from its efforts to expand and legitimize its control over the Strait of Hormuz. Iran continues to try to legitimize its illegal actions in the strait and pursue long-term control over this critical waterway, which is detrimental to US and Gulf interests.[19]
Iranian officials and media are highlighting the growing ties between the UAE and Israel, likely to try to exploit anti-Israel sentiment among Gulf states to drive a wedge between the UAE and its Gulf neighbors. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated outlet Tasnim News Agency, citing a senior source in the Axis of Resistance, claimed that senior UAE official Anwar Gargash has secretly cooperated with Israeli intelligence services, including Mossad.[20] Tasnim claimed that Mossad shaped Gargash’s positions and agenda through a series of meetings, likely referring to Gargash’s recent statements advocating for a more aggressive stance toward Iran.[21] Gargash stated in March 2026 that the UAE’s “main concentration is…the Iranian threat on [the UAE’s] security” and has repeatedly argued that Gulf states cannot accept a future defined by persistent Iranian missile and nuclear threats.[22] Gargash’s statements followed repeated Iranian attacks on Gulf countries during the war and Iranian efforts to control the strait. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi similarly emphasized the UAE’s relationship with Israel on June 5 and stated that the UAE has established close ties with Israel.[23] Araghchi stated that the UAE would have had a better relationship with Iran if it had pursued a policy more similar to that of other Gulf states.[24] Araghchi may have been implicitly warning other Gulf states against adopting the UAE’s approach toward Israel and Iran. Iran targeted the UAE more than any other country during the recent war, and Araghchi’s comments may have sought to warn other Gulf states that they can avoid similar Iranian retaliation by distancing themselves from Israel and refraining from adopting a more aggressive stance toward Iran.[25] The UAE and Israel have deepened bilateral ties since the UAE signed the Abraham Accords in 2020.[26] Israel's recognition of Somaliland—the first country to formally do so—in 2025 and its reported deployment of forces there further illustrate the growing alignment of Emirati and Israeli interests, given that the UAE and Somaliland share deep economic and defense ties.[27]
A drone strike recently caused an explosion near the Mina al Fahal Port in Oman, according to people familiar with the matter speaking to Reuters.[28] Three unspecified sources said that oil loading was suspended at the port following the explosion.[29] Petroleum Development Oman stated on June 5 that operations at the port have resumed.[30]
Israel reportedly deployed military and intelligence units to Azerbaijan during the recent war with Iran, according to unspecified sources speaking to CNN. This report could intensify long-standing Iranian concerns that Azerbaijan is facilitating Israeli operations against Iran. CNN reported on June 5 that Israel secretly deployed elite military and intelligence units to Azerbaijan as part of a network of covert sites across the Middle East to facilitate operations against Iran, according to four sources familiar with the matter.[31] The Azerbaijani Embassy in Washington denied CNN's report.[32] Israeli forces reportedly operated from several locations in southern Azerbaijan, which is adjacent to Iran's northern border and roughly 60 miles from Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province.[33] CNN reported that the Israeli strike on March 4 that killed IRGC Intelligence Division head Rahman Moghaddam was launched from Azerbaijan.[34] Iran notably launched a drone attack targeting Nakhchivan International Airport in Azerbaijan a day after Moghaddam was killed.[35] Iran denied its involvement in the attack.[36] CNN added that Azerbaijan's State Security Service reported that it had disrupted an IRGC plot to attack critical infrastructure and Israeli and Jewish targets in Azerbaijan on March 6.[37] Iranian officials and regime-linked media have repeatedly accused Azerbaijan of allowing Israel to use Azerbaijani territory and airspace to conduct operations against Iran.[38] An Iranian hardline newspaper close to the supreme leader claimed in July 2025 that Israeli strikes on Tehran and Alborz provinces during the June 2025 Israel-Iran War came from the direction of the Caspian Sea and passed through Azerbaijani airspace, for example.[39]
The IDF and Hezbollah have continued to engage one another in southern Lebanon. The IDF has continued to strike Hezbollah infrastructure and personnel throughout southern Lebanon amid ongoing Hezbollah attacks on IDF soldiers and vehicles in southern Lebanon.[40] Hezbollah injured two 84th (Givati) Infantry Brigade (91st Division) soldiers during a direct engagement in Zawtar al Charqiyeh, Nabatieh District, on June 5.[41] A Hezbollah drone also severely injured an IDF officer in southern Lebanon on June 4.[42] IDF and Hezbollah strikes and engagements have remained geographically limited to southern Lebanon since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff on June 4. ISW-CTP has not observed any reports of IDF strikes on Hezbollah targets in the vicinity of Beirut or Hezbollah attacks in northern Israel at the time of this writing. The United States, Israel, and Lebanon announced on June 3 that Israel and Lebanon would coordinate to establish “pilot zones” in southern Lebanon.[43] The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)would deploy to these zones “to the exclusion of all non-state actors.”[44] The Lebanese government confirmed on June 4 that the LAF has begun deploying to southern Lebanese territory that the IDF seized during ground operations against Hezbollah.[45] The Associated Press reported on June 5 that the LAF and United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) personnel backfilled IDF positions in Dibbine, Marjaayoun District, after the IDF withdrew from the town.[46]
Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi announced on June 4 that the Houthis are in “full coordination” with other Axis of Resistance members and will take “necessary” actions in response to recent developments in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories.[47] This statement is likely part of a broader Iranian and Axis of Resistance information operation to pressure the United States to convince Israel to halt its operations against Hezbollah by threatening to enter the conflict.[48] Iran and the Houthis have repeatedly threatened to resume attacks against shipping in the Bab el Mandeb Strait throughout the war, but have not acted on those threats, which suggests that their current threats are intended to achieve the effect of pressuring the United States to convince Israel to halt its operations against Hezbollah.[49]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-5-2026/