Hezbollah and Iranian leaders continue to reject any ceasefire framework in Lebanon that does not meet their maximalist demand for total Israeli capitulation in Lebanon. Hezbollah officials and allies have continued to reiterate their maximalist demand for a complete ceasefire in Lebanon that would require Israel to cease all military operations and withdraw from Lebanon.[1] Lebanese Parliament Speaker and Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri stated on June 5 that he would agree to Hezbollah's withdrawal from southern Lebanon if Israeli troops withdrew from the territory they hold in Lebanon and Israel agreed to a “complete and comprehensive ceasefire without conditions.”[2] Berri stated that the June 3 US-Israel-Lebanon agreement is “unjust” and “unworthy of discussion,” which echoes Hezbollah's rejection of the agreement.[3] The United States, Israel, and Lebanon agreed on June 3 to implement a ceasefire in Lebanon contingent upon Hezbollah's agreement to halt all attacks and evacuate its fighters south of the Litani River. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) would halt strikes targeting the group after Hezbollah ceased attacks against Israel and withdrew its forces from south of the Litani.[4] The US and Lebanese governments previously proposed on June 2 that a ceasefire between the IDF and Hezbollah would be geographically limited, with the IDF halting strikes against Beirut in exchange for Hezbollah halting all attacks on Israeli territory.[5] The June 3 agreement did not specify the geographic scope of the proposed ceasefire.[6] Hezbollah and Iranian officials have repeatedly insisted that an acceptable ceasefire must require Israel to halt attacks across Lebanon and withdraw from Lebanese territory.[7] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi told Hezbollah-affiliated media on June 3 that the IDF must withdraw from territories it has “occupied” in Lebanon as part of an end to the war.[8]
Hezbollah and Iran's maximalist demands seek to undermine US and Lebanese government efforts to end the conflict with Israel and restrict weapons to the Lebanese state. Hezbollah and Iran have repeatedly rejected ceasefire proposals mediated and supported by the United States and the Lebanese government, which has complicated ongoing US-mediated Israel-Lebanon negotiations.[9] Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam stated on June 5 that Iran is using Lebanon as a bargaining chip in US-Iran negotiations.[10] Salam emphasized that the conflict in Lebanon is “not being fought for us, but on our land and at the expense of our people.”[11] The June 3 US-Israel-Lebanon joint statement suggests that these parties seek to develop a framework to achieve their respective long-term objectives in Lebanon, including ending the conflict in Lebanon and disarming Hezbollah so that weapons are restricted to the Lebanese state.[12] Aoun stated that current Israel-Lebanon negotiations are “tough,” but that the most recent US-Israel-Lebanon joint statement could be a path forward for “lasting peace.”[13]
Iran and Hezbollah continue to link Israeli capitulation in Lebanon to US-Iran negotiations to try to delay discussions about key points of disagreement between the United States and Iran, particularly Iran's nuclear program and its efforts to control the Strait of Hormuz. Araghchi told Hezbollah-affiliated media on June 3 that the US-Iran war will not end until the war in Lebanon ends.[14] Supreme Leader Military Adviser Mohsen Rezaei similarly stated on June 5 that Lebanon is an “inseparable part” of any US-Iran agreement or ceasefire.[15] ISW-CTP previously assessed that Iran is likely trying to use prolonged discussions about a ceasefire in Lebanon to divert attention from negotiations over its nuclear program and activities in the Strait of Hormuz.[16] Iranian officials have repeatedly insisted that Iran will not negotiate on its nuclear program until the United States accepts an initial agreement that includes a complete ceasefire in Lebanon, among other Iranian preconditions.[17] These preconditions likely seek to reduce US leverage ahead of any future nuclear negotiations, which would make it more difficult for the United States to extract nuclear concessions from Iran. Iranian officials have shown no willingness to meet US demands regarding Iran's highly enriched uranium stockpile or enrichment activities.[18] Iran is similarly using the Lebanon issue to shift attention away from its efforts to expand and legitimize its control over the Strait of Hormuz. Iran continues to try to legitimize its illegal actions in the strait and pursue long-term control over this critical waterway, which is detrimental to US and Gulf interests.[19]
Iranian officials and media are highlighting the growing ties between the UAE and Israel, likely to try to exploit anti-Israel sentiment among Gulf states to drive a wedge between the UAE and its Gulf neighbors. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated outlet Tasnim News Agency, citing a senior source in the Axis of Resistance, claimed that senior UAE official Anwar Gargash has secretly cooperated with Israeli intelligence services, including Mossad.[20] Tasnim claimed that Mossad shaped Gargash’s positions and agenda through a series of meetings, likely referring to Gargash’s recent statements advocating for a more aggressive stance toward Iran.[21] Gargash stated in March 2026 that the UAE’s “main concentration is…the Iranian threat on [the UAE’s] security” and has repeatedly argued that Gulf states cannot accept a future defined by persistent Iranian missile and nuclear threats.[22] Gargash’s statements followed repeated Iranian attacks on Gulf countries during the war and Iranian efforts to control the strait. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi similarly emphasized the UAE’s relationship with Israel on June 5 and stated that the UAE has established close ties with Israel.[23] Araghchi stated that the UAE would have had a better relationship with Iran if it had pursued a policy more similar to that of other Gulf states.[24] Araghchi may have been implicitly warning other Gulf states against adopting the UAE’s approach toward Israel and Iran. Iran targeted the UAE more than any other country during the recent war, and Araghchi’s comments may have sought to warn other Gulf states that they can avoid similar Iranian retaliation by distancing themselves from Israel and refraining from adopting a more aggressive stance toward Iran.[25] The UAE and Israel have deepened bilateral ties since the UAE signed the Abraham Accords in 2020.[26] Israel's recognition of Somaliland—the first country to formally do so—in 2025 and its reported deployment of forces there further illustrate the growing alignment of Emirati and Israeli interests, given that the UAE and Somaliland share deep economic and defense ties.[27]
A drone strike recently caused an explosion near the Mina al Fahal Port in Oman, according to people familiar with the matter speaking to Reuters.[28] Three unspecified sources said that oil loading was suspended at the port following the explosion.[29] Petroleum Development Oman stated on June 5 that operations at the port have resumed.[30]
Israel reportedly deployed military and intelligence units to Azerbaijan during the recent war with Iran, according to unspecified sources speaking to CNN. This report could intensify long-standing Iranian concerns that Azerbaijan is facilitating Israeli operations against Iran. CNN reported on June 5 that Israel secretly deployed elite military and intelligence units to Azerbaijan as part of a network of covert sites across the Middle East to facilitate operations against Iran, according to four sources familiar with the matter.[31] The Azerbaijani Embassy in Washington denied CNN's report.[32] Israeli forces reportedly operated from several locations in southern Azerbaijan, which is adjacent to Iran's northern border and roughly 60 miles from Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province.[33] CNN reported that the Israeli strike on March 4 that killed IRGC Intelligence Division head Rahman Moghaddam was launched from Azerbaijan.[34] Iran notably launched a drone attack targeting Nakhchivan International Airport in Azerbaijan a day after Moghaddam was killed.[35] Iran denied its involvement in the attack.[36] CNN added that Azerbaijan's State Security Service reported that it had disrupted an IRGC plot to attack critical infrastructure and Israeli and Jewish targets in Azerbaijan on March 6.[37] Iranian officials and regime-linked media have repeatedly accused Azerbaijan of allowing Israel to use Azerbaijani territory and airspace to conduct operations against Iran.[38] An Iranian hardline newspaper close to the supreme leader claimed in July 2025 that Israeli strikes on Tehran and Alborz provinces during the June 2025 Israel-Iran War came from the direction of the Caspian Sea and passed through Azerbaijani airspace, for example.[39]
The IDF and Hezbollah have continued to engage one another in southern Lebanon. The IDF has continued to strike Hezbollah infrastructure and personnel throughout southern Lebanon amid ongoing Hezbollah attacks on IDF soldiers and vehicles in southern Lebanon.[40] Hezbollah injured two 84th (Givati) Infantry Brigade (91st Division) soldiers during a direct engagement in Zawtar al Charqiyeh, Nabatieh District, on June 5.[41] A Hezbollah drone also severely injured an IDF officer in southern Lebanon on June 4.[42] IDF and Hezbollah strikes and engagements have remained geographically limited to southern Lebanon since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff on June 4. ISW-CTP has not observed any reports of IDF strikes on Hezbollah targets in the vicinity of Beirut or Hezbollah attacks in northern Israel at the time of this writing. The United States, Israel, and Lebanon announced on June 3 that Israel and Lebanon would coordinate to establish “pilot zones” in southern Lebanon.[43] The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)would deploy to these zones “to the exclusion of all non-state actors.”[44] The Lebanese government confirmed on June 4 that the LAF has begun deploying to southern Lebanese territory that the IDF seized during ground operations against Hezbollah.[45] The Associated Press reported on June 5 that the LAF and United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) personnel backfilled IDF positions in Dibbine, Marjaayoun District, after the IDF withdrew from the town.[46]
Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi announced on June 4 that the Houthis are in “full coordination” with other Axis of Resistance members and will take “necessary” actions in response to recent developments in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories.[47] This statement is likely part of a broader Iranian and Axis of Resistance information operation to pressure the United States to convince Israel to halt its operations against Hezbollah by threatening to enter the conflict.[48] Iran and the Houthis have repeatedly threatened to resume attacks against shipping in the Bab el Mandeb Strait throughout the war, but have not acted on those threats, which suggests that their current threats are intended to achieve the effect of pressuring the United States to convince Israel to halt its operations against Hezbollah.[49]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-5-2026/
Iranian officials and media continue to demand US concessions ahead of any US-Iran deal, likely to reduce US leverage before any negotiations over points of key disagreement between the United States and Iran, particularly Iran's nuclear program and the Strait of Hormuz. The regime is seeking immediate economic relief as one of these preconditions. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-run media Defa Press argued on June 6 that any future US-Iran agreement must include economic compensation for Iran and guarantees that would impose a “significant cost” on the United States if it withdraws from the agreement.[1] Iranian officials have often cited the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2018 as a reason to mistrust US commitments to any deal.[2] Defa Press argued that Iran must obtain tangible economic benefits as quickly as possible and that any Iranian commitments must occur “simultaneously” with unspecified tangible US concessions.[3] Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee Member Brigadier General Esmail Kowsari similarly said on June 6 that Iran has emphasized the need for compensation throughout the negotiations.[4] Supreme Leader Military Adviser and former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Mohsen Rezaei told CNN on June 5 that any potential US-Iran peace deal hinges on the United States agreeing to release $24 billion USD in frozen Iranian assets.[5] These statements are representative of the broader Iranian effort to secure US concessions before discussing key points of disagreement over which the regime seeks to avoid making concessions of its own, such as Iran's nuclear program or the Strait of Hormuz.[6] Iranian officials, such as IRGC Baghiyatollah Sociocultural Headquarters Commander and former IRGC commander Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari, have also demanded that the United States lift sanctions and recognize Iran's sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz.[7]
Iran is also continuing to leverage its support for Lebanon in order to delay substantive negotiations with the United States over its nuclear program and the strait.[8] Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam accused Iran of using Lebanon as a “bargaining chip” in US-Iran negotiations.[9] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi rejected Aoun’s remarks on June 6, even though Iranian officials have repeatedly linked a US-Iran agreement to a complete ceasefire in Lebanon.[10] Iran recently suspended negotiations until a complete ceasefire in Lebanon is reached.[11] IRGC-affiliated Mehr News again argued on June 6 that the regime sees Lebanon's security as tied to Iran's and that any efforts to end the war with Iran must include Lebanon.[12]
Iran has continued to use force to impose its illegal traffic separation scheme, which is prompting US responses to prevent Iran from using force to impose its illegal traffic separation scheme. The IRGC Public Relations Office claimed on June 5 that four oil tankers attempted to violate Iran's illegal traffic separation scheme under US military “guidance.”[13] It is unclear at this time which vessels Iran targeted or where, but US forces have coordinated the passage of over 100 commercial vessels through the strait over the past month, according to an unspecified US official.[14] The IRGC Navy ”targeted” one vessel with unspecified weapons, and Iranian forces also fired “warning shots” at unspecified “US ships” near Larak Island, according to Iranian state media.[15] US Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed that it shot down four Iranian drones targeting maritime traffic in the strait.[16] CENTCOM struck Iranian surveillance radar sites on Qeshm Island and in Goruk, Hormozgan Province, in response to the Iranian attacks on commercial vessels.[17] Strikes against these surveillance targets would presumably make it more difficult for Iran to attack commercial shipping in the strait. Iranian forces then launched several missiles targeting US bases in Bahrain and Kuwait on June 5.[18] It is not immediately clear why Iran targeted these specific bases. Kuwaiti forces intercepted seven Iranian missiles, while the Bahraini forces intercepted three missiles and several drones.[19] No casualties were reported.
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-6-2026/