US President Donald Trump called for the Strait of Hormuz to “immediately open” without tolls and with the removal of mines. Iran's demands for “control” of the Strait of Hormuz directly contradict Trump's position. These Iranian demands would be a fundamental change to long-held international maritime law and are at odds with the free flow of commerce. Trump stated on Truth Social that Iran must “immediately open” the strait with no tolls and remove remaining mines.[1] Trump's definition of an “open” strait is different from Iranian officials’, however. Trump's statement refers to the pre-war version of the strait – one in which international shipping was unencumbered by Iranian threats to fire at ships or mine waterways and Iranian efforts to disrupt shipping by moving traffic separation schemes and charging tolls on transiting vessels. Iranian officials and media continue to state that an “open” strait is one in which the IRGC Navy escorts vessels through an unrecognized traffic separation scheme in Iranian territorial waters, whether vessels pay a toll or not. Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei stated on May 29 that the strait has been and will continue to be under Iran's “special measures,” including the blockage of commercial vessels that Iran deems “hostile” through coordination with Iranian authorities.[2] Parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Committee Chairman Ebrahim Azizi also stated on May 29 that Iran will pursue “management of the Strait of Hormuz” permanently.[3] IRGC-affiliated outlet Fars News Agency reported on May 29that Iran is preparing for arrangements to monitor ships, provide services, and ensure security in the strait.[4] All of these positions are at odds with the free flow of commerce on the ocean. The regime's English-media outlet Press TV argued on May 29 that the Iran's sovereignty over the strait is “non-negotiable” and represents a vital strategic tool for Iran to deter future US military action against Iran.[5]
Iran can try to establish its unrecognized traffic separation scheme for the Strait of Hormuz either by obtaining US and then International Maritime Organization (IMO) recognition of its traffic separation scheme or, failing that, by force. The IMO recognizes traffic separation schemes, which are governed by the 1972 Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS).[6] President Trump's statement opposes the recognition of Iran's traffic separation scheme.[7] This means that Iran would need to fire at or otherwise threaten ships in the strait in order to enforce its rules if Iran agreed to Trump‘s demands. Iran has repeatedly used force, including attacks on commercial vessels and naval mines, to force vessels to transit through its illegal traffic separation scheme and comply with Iranian transit regulations since March 4.[8] US efforts to blockade Iranian ships and ports and US strikes against Iran are part of an effort to prevent Iran from enforcing the coercive actions.
The IRGC is using force to try to create the reality that Iran controls the Strait of Hormuz. US Central Command (CENTCOM) has continued to respond to Iranian efforts, most recently by issuing a notice to mariners and airmen on May 29 that the US Navy will conduct military operations north of the Musandam Peninsula in the Strait of Hormuz.[9] The US Navy will target any vessels “engaged in, or supporting, mine-laying activities.”[10] The notice added that Iran continues to attempt to impede safe navigation and mine clearance in the strait.[11]
Iranian officials continue to indicate that Iran will not accept US President Donald Trump's most recent demands regarding Iran's nuclear program. Trump stated on Truth Social on May 29 that Iran must commit to not producing a nuclear weapon and agree to “destroy” or move its highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile.[12] Iranian officials have indicated that Iran will not agree to these demands and therefore have refused to make concessions, however.[13] Iranian Parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Committee Chairman Ebrahim Azizi stated on May 29 that Iran does not intend to transfer its enriched uranium stockpile to a third country.[14] The committee's spokesperson Ebrahim Rezaei also stated that Iran opposes suspending uranium enrichment or moving its HEU from Iranian territory because Iran is “victorious” and should make “maximum demands” of the United States.[15] Hardliner Parliamentarian and member of the Iranian negotiating team Mahmoud Nabavian stated on May 29 that Iran has the right to conduct nuclear research, development, and production without the interference of the United States, because it is a member of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) agreement.[16] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim News Agency also denied Western media reports on May 29 that Iran and the United States had agreed to a 60-day memorandum of understanding (MoU), adding that the sides did not reach a final agreement and that there was no discussion of Iran's nuclear program. Tasnim added that Iran has ”repeatedly emphasized” that Iran will not accept any agreement until the United States has ”clarified” the status of Iranian frozen assets.[17]
The United States is continuing to apply economic pressure on Iran by targeting the networks that facilitate its illicit oil trade. The Iranian regime heavily relies on the oil trade to generate revenue.[18] The US Treasury Department sanctioned five front companies supporting the Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-controlled Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars Company on May 28, for facilitating Iranian oil shipments, including exports to the People's Republic of China.[19] The US State Department also sanctioned three entities and an individual linked to Iran's petrochemical products trade and designated eight entities and eight vessels as blocked property for transporting Iranian petroleum or petrochemical products on May 28.[20]
CENTCOM denied Iranian claims that Iranian air defense systems downed US aircraft near Bushehr Province in southern Iran on May 28.[21] CENTCOM confirmed that all US air assets are accounted for. IRGC-affiliated media claimed that it intercepted a “hostile aircraft” over the Persian Gulf near Jam City, Bushehr Province, on May 28.[22]
The Wall Street Journal reported on May 29 that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) conducted dozens of airstrikes targeting Iran in coordination with the United States and Israel during the US-Israeli air campaign.[23] The Wall Street Journal added that Saudi officials complained to the United States in early April that UAE strikes increased the risk that Iran would target regional energy facilities.[24] Unspecified people familiar with the matter told the Wall Street Journal that the UAE began strikes in the “early days” of the war and continued them through the day after the April ceasefire announcement.[25] It is unclear on which day the UAE strikes began based on this reporting, but Iran first struck Gulf energy infrastructure on March 1, when it hit a structure at Jabel Ali Port‘s oil terminal in Dubai, UAE, and Ras Tanura Refinery in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.[26] This means that for Iran's first attacks on energy to have been in retaliation for UAE strikes, the UAE would have had to take part in the air campaign beginning on February 28 or early on March 1. Iran also targeted the UAE with 346 projectiles on February 28, which was the first day of the war.[27]
Hezbollah has adapted to increasing IDF night operations by fielding thermal camera-equipped first-person view (FPV) drones that enable nighttime attacks. The IDF initially began conducting more operations at night due to the risks of FPV attacks during the day. Hezbollah published a video of a thermal camera-equipped FPV drone that struck and wounded two IDF soldiers near Iskandarounah in southern Lebanon at night on May 23.[28] Hezbollah has increased nighttime drone attacks, according to an IDF soldier speaking to the Wall Street Journal. Hezbollah's thus far limited deployment of thermal camera-equipped FPV drones is likely an adaptation to IDF night operations, as many Israeli units in Lebanon have begun to operate at night to avoid the daytime threat posed by FPVs.[29] This new capability will force the IDF to further adapt to Hezbollah's nascent nighttime FPV drone capabilities as well as to continue to combat daytime FPV drone attacks. The soldier who spoke to the Wall Street Journal warned that the IDF currently does not have a solution to Hezbollah's adaptation “beyond covering weapons and equipment with [anti-drone] nets.”[30]
Hezbollah appears to be dictating the pace of adaptation to the IDF at this time by quickly overcoming relatively rudimentary Israeli countermeasures. Israeli media observed in early April 2026 that Hezbollah was “increasingly” deploying fiber-optic drones, which suggests that Hezbollah began the war relatively more reliant on radio-controlled drones.[31] The increasing Hezbollah reliance on fiber optic drones also indicates that Israeli electronic countermeasures may have pressured Hezbollah to begin using fiber-optic drones. Hezbollah, without the Israeli employment of electronic warfare, would have no reason to shift to fiber-optic drones. The IDF has adapted to fiber optic drones through a series of rudimentary passive defenses, none of which are particularly effective as presently implemented by tactical units.[32] Hezbollah published FPV footage from May 15, for example, that shows an IDF position where IDF soldiers deployed nets over top but not around their vehicles, making it easy for the drones to fly under the nets and detonate.[33] The drones also forced the IDF to operate increasingly at night, but the emergence of drones equipped with thermal cameras will also negate that IDF countermeasure.[34]
Iran has continued to use the ceasefire to reconstitute its ballistic missile force by restoring access to missiles and launchers buried in underground missile bases. The US-Israeli air campaign blocked the entrances to many underground bases to prevent missile crews from firing, but CNN reported on May 27 that satellite imagery shows that Iran has excavated at least 50 of 69 tunnel accesses at 18 underground missile bases.[35] Iran has used construction equipment to reopen the entrances and restore access roads.[36] Excavating these bases is part of a wider effort to reconstitute tactical units in the ballistic missile force and make them combat effective again. Other reconstitution activities—like reorganization of operational-level commands and regeneration of logistics networks, for example—need to take place for the units to be capable of executing their mission of massing and sustaining fire against US and Israeli targets.[37]
ISW-CTP continues to assess that Iran's ability to regain access to missiles and launchers stored in underground bases and restore some capacity to fire missiles does not mean that Iran has reconstituted its broader ballistic missile program, however. US-Israeli airstrike campaign aimed to generate qualitative effects across Iran's entire missile program (not just the operational force), including the assets that sustain it.
Israeli and Lebanese military officials discussed Lebanon's efforts to disarm Hezbollah in a round of security talks at the Pentagon on May 29.[40] These talks are the first direct military talks between Lebanon and Israel since 1993.[41] Israeli and Lebanese diplomatic officials have met at least three times in Washington, DC, over the past two months to discuss an end to the Israel-Hezbollah conflict.[42] Diplomatic officials are set to meet at the US State Department on June 2 and 3 to continue talks.[43]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-29-2026/
Updated link https://www.iranintl.com/en/liveblog/202605308417
Iran continues to try to frame the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) “management” of transit through the Strait of Hormuz as the new status quo. The United States and international community must continue to reject Iranian efforts to try to establish this new status quo, as it is detrimental to international commercial interests and sets a dangerous precedent for freedom of navigation in international waterways. The IRGC Navy has begun publishing daily roll-ups of the number of vessels that use Iran's illegal traffic separation scheme. The IRGC Navy reported that 20 vessels passed through Iran's traffic separation scheme on May 30.[1] Iran has repeatedly used force, including attacks on commercial vessels and naval mines, to force vessels to use Iran's illegal and unrecognized traffic separation scheme. The IRGC Navy also claimed that it provided “safe passage” to some vessels for “humanitarian reasons,” likely to try to portray the IRGC Navy as a reasonable actor despite its deployment of mines, as well as attacks and harassment of vessels in the Strait of Hormuz. The Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters separately stated on May 30 that Iranian armed forces are “fully” managing the strait and that all vessels must transit only through Iran's traffic separation scheme after receiving permission from the IRGC Navy.[2] The headquarters warned that Iranian armed forces will target any military vessel that intervenes in Iran's management of the strait or disrupts maritime traffic, likely in response to a May 29 US CENTCOM notice that the US Navy will conduct military operations north of the Musandam Peninsula in the Strait of Hormuz and target vessels “engaged in, or supporting, mine-laying activities.”[3]
Neither the United States nor Iran has indicated that the two sides have narrowed gaps on key issues in the US-Iran negotiations, such as economic relief for Iran.[4] An unspecified senior Trump administration official told the New York Times on May 29 that the Trump administration believes it is close to an agreement but that the United States and Iran have still not resolved certain issues, including the unfreezing of Iranian assets.[5] Trump announced that “no money will be exchanged” in a social media post on May 29, likely referring to frozen Iranian assets.[6] Iranian officials have repeatedly demanded the release of frozen assets as a “precondition” for talks about nuclear issues.[7] An Iranian negotiating team member close to Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf asserted on May 30 that Iran's “irreversible” access to $12 billion USD in frozen assets is one of Iran's “main” conditions for any possible agreement.[8] Iranian state media, citing “unofficial details of a possible US-Iran memorandum of understanding,” separately claimed that the United States would give Iran full access to $12 billion USD in frozen assets within 60 days.[9] Ghalibaf recently led an Iranian delegation to Qatar to try to secure the “immediate” and “unconditional” release of $12 billion USD, but Qatar rejected Iran's request, according to anti-regime media on May 29.[10]
Iran likely seeks unrestricted access to its frozen assets to reduce the effect of US sanctions and the naval blockade and support its military reconstitution. US sanctions and the naval blockade have hindered Iran's ability to raise revenue that the regime could use to reconstitute its military capabilities.[11] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei stated on May 25 that assets released under a potential agreement with the United States would go toward Iran's defense and military sectors, including Iran's missile and drone programs.[12] ISW-CTP previously assessed that granting Iran economic relief by unfreezing funds or removing sanctions would likely decrease Iranian military reconstitution timelines.
The hardline faction within the Iranian regime is not a monolith but contains a spectrum of actors with varying priorities, opinions, and political positions. ISW-CTP continues to assess that hardline IRGC officials, particularly IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi and his inner circle, are unwilling to make meaningful concessions in negotiations with the United States. Analysts close to the Iranian regime told the New York Times on May 29 that hardliners, whom they claimed represent a “minority view,” are attempting to derail negotiations.[13] The hardliners in this report likely specifically refer to ultrahardliners affiliated with the Paydari (Stability) Front. Two unspecified senior Iranian officials told the New York Times that Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Deputy Secretary Ali Bagheri Kani criticized Iran's negotiating team for being “too conciliatory” during the first round of US-Iran negotiations in Islamabad in April.[14] Bagheri Kani has close ties to Paydari (Stability) Front leader Saeed Jalili.[15] The Paydari (Stability) Front represents only one element of the hardline faction, and other, non-Paydari (Stability) Front hardliners have also posed an obstacle to negotiations by refusing to make concessions and insisting on maximalist demands. Vahidi and his inner circle, whom ISW-CTP assesses are currently dominating regime decision-making, have not signaled any willingness to soften their maximalist demands in negotiations, for example. The hardline faction in the regime also includes some “pragmatist” officials, such as Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who leads Iran's negotiating delegation. ISW-CTP previously assessed that Ghalibaf may not be aligned with key decision-makers in Tehran, such as Vahidi, and may be more willing to make concessions in negotiations.
Iran may have used a Chinese-made man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) to target US aircraft during the war, according to three individuals familiar with the matter speaking to Western media. The three individuals told NBC News on May 29 that Iran “probably” struck the US F-15 fighter jet over southwestern Iran on April 3 using a Chinese-made shoulder-launched missile.[16] Iran was reportedly in discussions with the People's Republic of China (PRC) before the war began in late February 2026 to acquire MANPADS.[17] The PRC may have also provided Iran with a radar system to bolster its integrated air defense system before the war.[18] One of the sources and a US official told NBC News that the PRC may have given Iran a YLC-8B long-range anti-stealth surveillance radar in the “early days of the war.”[19]
The possible PRC military transfers underscore the nature of the PRC's military partnership with Iran. The PRC has demonstrated a willingness to bolster Iran's military capabilities without risking direct entanglement in the conflict and is one of the few technologically advanced countries that appears willing to sell military equipment to Iran. The PRC reportedly sold Iran an advanced reconnaissance satellite that Iran used to target US military bases across the region during the war, for example.[20] The PRC is also a key partner helping Iran reconstitute its missile program and has continued this support by sending Iran missile fuel precursor during the conflict.[21]
US Central Command (CENTCOM) continues to enforce its naval blockade against Iranian ports. US forces disabled the Gambia-flagged M/V Lian Star by firing at its engine room as the vessel attempted to run the blockade on May 29. CENTCOM said it issued numerous warnings to the vessel before firing. US forces have disabled five vessels and redirected 116 vessels since initiating the blockade on April 13.[22] US CENTCOM noted in a May 30 notice to mariners that ships that aid Iranian efforts to violate the blockade, such as conducting ship-to-ship transfers with Iranian vessels, are also in violation of the blockade.[23]
The Iranian regime continues to face threats from Kurdish anti-regime groups in northwestern Iran. Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Border Guard Commander Brigadier General Ali Akbar Javidan announced on May 29 that a likely Kurdish opposition group attacked a border guard unit in Chaldran County, West Azerbaijan Province, near Iran's northwestern border.[24] IRGC forces also killed two Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) members in Kermanshah Province on May 28.[25] The regime has historically accused Kurdish armed groups of inciting anti-regime unrest in Iran. The regime previously accused Kurdish opposition groups of inciting protests in Kurdish areas during the Mahsa Amini movement, for example.[26] The regime has also historically accused Kurdish opposition groups and Israel of using Iraqi Kurdistan to facilitate operations in Iran.[27]
Hezbollah attacked Israel Defense Forces (IDF) positions and communities in northern Israel with drones and rockets on May 29 and 30, likely in response to recent IDF advances in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah claimed that it has conducted at least 13 drone and rocket attacks targeting northern Israel since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff, including attacks targeting the northern Israeli towns of Safed, Kiryat Shmona, and Nahariya.[28] Hezbollah fired over 30 rockets in the attacks, some of which struck the commercial center of Kiryat Shmona and landed off the coast of Nahariya on May 30.[29] A Hezbollah drone also struck a military area near Shomera on May 30.[30] Israeli media reported that the Hezbollah attacks did not cause any casualties.[31]
Hezbollah likely launched attacks on northern Israel in response to IDF advances beyond the “Yellow Line” in southern Lebanon in recent days. The IDF 36th Division crossed the Litani River on May 29 to remove the threat of anti-tank fire to the Galilee Panhandle, according to an Israeli Army Radio correspondent.[32] A Lebanese open-source intelligence (OSINT) analyst and Lebanese media reported that the IDF advanced into western Yohmor, Nabatieh District, on May 28, citing satellite imagery of IDF armored vehicles.[33] Israeli forces reportedly advanced south of Dibbine, Marjaayoun District, on May 29, and into Ghandouriyeh, Bint Jbeil District, on May 30.[34] Hezbollah claimed that it conducted a complex improvised explosive device (IED) ambush on IDF forces in Ghandouriyeh on May 30, in which the group fired mortars and rockets at Israeli forces after detonating the IED.[35] The attack may support the analyst's claim that the IDF advanced into the town.[36] A Hezbollah-aligned journalist also reported that Hezbollah engaged the IDF in Ghandouriyeh on May 30.[37]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-30-2026/