Iran seeks to achieve positive strategic objectives beyond the negative objective of surviving the war. Iran's principal positive strategic objective at this time is to secure recognition of its sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, which would fundamentally remake regional and global maritime norms in a manner extremely detrimental to US interests. Iran has denied access to the Strait of Hormuz during the war through mining, drone and missile attacks, and harassment by fast attack craft. Sea denial of the Strait of Hormuz can only be maintained through attacks, however. Long-term control of the Strait would require Iran to secure US recognition of its claims to the Strait of Hormuz through a negotiated agreement so that Iran could order ships to comply with its rules legitimately and then intercept those ships that fail to comply. Iranian negotiators increasingly prioritized securing its control over the Strait in negotiations, likely because it believes Iranian control over the Strait would act as a safeguard against future wars between Iran and Israel and the United States. The Strait under recognized Iranian control would act as a safeguard because Iran could close the Strait and disrupt markets at will, punish states in the Persian Gulf region for “collaborating” with Israel or the United States, and generate revenue through a system of tolls.[1] All of this and more would become legitimate with US recognition of Iranian claims to the Strait if the United States agreed to Iran's demands in negotiations. Recognition would also provide Iran with the legitimacy to intercept ships violating its rules. US, Israeli, or Gulf efforts to disrupt Iranian efforts to manage traffic to Tehran’s benefit would be perceived as acts of aggression if the United States were to recognize Iranian claims to the Strait in negotiations.
Iran has already begun to take steps that demonstrate what these new norms could look like. Iran's “Persian Gulf Strait Authority” also sent an email on May 6 to shipping companies with vessels in the Persian Gulf stipulating that for safe passage through, crews must pay the body in Iranian rials and gain issuances of guarantees from Iranian banks, which would force everyone who wants to use the Strait to violate US sanctions.[2] These demands would be legitimate if Iran achieves its positive strategic aim of securing control over the Strait of Hormuz. The email makes it clear that countries whose ships want to go through the Strait have to lift sanctions.[3]
Iran is also seeking economic relief as a positive objective from the war, which could enable Iran to accelerate its efforts to reconstitute its ballistic missile program. US sanctions on Iranian oil have contributed to severely weakening Iran's ability to raise revenue that the regime has used to fund the development of its ballistic missile program.[4] Iran is also seeking for the United States to unfreeze nearly $100 billion USD in Iranian assets, which could quickly provide the regime with the needed funds for investment into reconstituting its ballistic missile program on the strategic level.[5] These funds would be needed to rebuild missile production plants, development facilities, and plants for raw materials like steel, many of which were destroyed during the current war.[6] Iran has used its ballistic missiles to attack US bases and allies in the recent conflict and in previous conflicts like the 12 Day War.[7] CNN reported on May 6 that Israel is particularly worried about the possible lifting of economic sanctions on Iran and has pushed for restrictions to be imposed on Iran's ballistic missile program.[8] Economic relief would also support ”negative” strategic objectives like preventing regime collapse caused by protests that result from serious economic instability (see below).
The introduction of these positive strategic objectives does not mean that Iran has abandoned its “negative” strategic objectives, which include limiting discussions on its nuclear program and avoiding an economic collapse that could trigger severe domestic unrest, leading to the collapse of the regime. Avoiding the collapse of one's regime is an objective of all regimes. Iranian leaders also almost always insist on the legitimacy of at least some form of a nuclear program. These two objectives are constant and do not represent a comprehensive positive vision for the future of the region. Iran now possesses such a vision. The Iranian objectives, if accomplished in full, would result in an extremely strong Iran that would be able to compel most regional states to follow its lead through control of the Strait of Hormuz.
The Iranian regime is preparing for economic instability that could cause domestic unrest. This effort supports the “negative” strategic objective of preventing regime collapse caused by protests that result from serious economic instability. Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf published an audio message on May 6, in which he framed the maritime blockade, economic pressure, and media operations as part of an “enemy effort” to undermine national cohesion and force Iran to surrender.[9] These remarks demonstrate that the Iranian regime is attempting to bolster itself against domestic instability that could result from economic pressure rather than preparing to surrender. Ghalibaf called on officials to reduce the effects of economic pressure on the public, urged wartime-style planning, and “jihadi management.”[10] Ghalibaf also called on the Basij to “enter the field seriously” and asked Basij members in mosques, neighborhoods, and social groups to help solve public problems.[11] The regime uses the Basij for civil defense, social control, and protest suppression.[12] Anti-regime media reported on April 27 that Iran's Supreme National Security Council, which is the highest national security body, was reportedly preparing for a potential protest wave as economic deterioration and social pressure intensified.[13] Iranian officials are reportedly concerned about inflation, unemployment, rising prices, shutdowns in the oil, petrochemical, and steel sectors, and broader economic disruption.[14] Iranian officials’ public emphasis on economic management suggests that the regime recognizes that economic pressure could create internal stability risks and is preparing mechanisms to manage those risks. These statements, concerns, and preparations do not on their own indicate that the Iranian regime is prepared to surrender as a result of economic pressure.
ISW-CTP continues to assess that Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi is driving decisionmaking over Iran's war and negotiating posture. Iranian officials may still disagree over how to proceed in negotiations, however, and some may present positions that do not necessarily reflect Vahidi’s approval. This may help to explain US officials’ assessment that Iranian decisionmaking remains fragmented, even though Vahidi likely drives decisionmaking due to his proximity to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei.[15]
It remains unclear what specific demands the US and Iranian delegations are currently negotiating over. A Pakistani source familiar with the negotiations told a New York Post journalist that there are multiple proposals circulating.[16] This makes it difficult to determine the precise terms currently being negotiated or even whether both sides are referring to the same framework. US officials leaked to Axios on May 6 that the White House believes it is close to a one-page memorandum of understanding with Iran that would declare an end to the war and open a 30‑day window for negotiations on a more detailed deal, however.[17] The US sources noted that nothing has been finalized but described this as the closest the sides have come to an agreement since the conflict began.[18] The reported framework would include an Iranian moratorium on nuclear enrichment for 12-15 years, partial sanctions relief and the release of frozen Iranian funds, and a gradual lifting of restrictions in the Strait of Hormuz, with future steps contingent on the success of follow‑on negotiations in venues such as Islamabad or Geneva.[19] It is unclear what is implied by ”restrictions” or if any Iranian official has seen the same memorandum leaked by US officials to Axios.
Iranian officials and media have largely rejected the Axios reporting, insisting that Iran has not agreed to any deal and has not yet formally responded to the latest US proposal, which they say contains unacceptable provisions.[20] Several outlets framed the US media narrative as pressure tactics or market manipulation.[21] The outlets instead emphasized Iran's own previous proposals and stated red lines, including rejection of uranium removal from Iran.[22] US President Donald Trump publicly reinforced a tougher US position at odds with the memorandum leaked by Axios, telling PBS later on May 6, that any deal would require Iran to export its highly enriched uranium, cease operating underground facilities, and accept no future enrichment even at low levels after a moratorium period.[23]
The US naval blockade and sanctions are imposing costs on Iran. US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced on May 6 that US naval forces have directed 52 vessels to turn around or return to ports since the blockade began on April 13.[24] CENTCOM separately stated that a US Navy F/A-18 Super Hornet disabled the rudder of the Iranian-flagged oil tanker M/T Hasna after it tried to violate the blockade in the Gulf of Oman.[25] The US blockade is also straining Iran's oil storage by restricting exports and forcing Iran to store unsold oil. An unspecified Iranian Oil Ministry official told the New York Times on May 6 that Iran has started cutting oil production at some oil wells to mitigate a storage shortage crisis.[26] The official estimated that Iran's onshore and offshore storage could run out in about 40 to 45 days.[27] The US blockade is creating operational and economic pressure for Iran, but the regime appears to be preparing to manage that pressure as a domestic-control problem rather than treating it as a reason to concede (see topline section).
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-6-2026/
Meanwhile, Project Freedom has been paused which frankly disappoints me because I had hoped our great United States Navy would have been able to ramp up 50 to 100 or more commercial ships through the Strait of Hormuz. And if there's a 30-day period of negotiations, the United States Navy's blockade would gradually be lifted. This too is disappointing. At this point, though, the blockade is very much still in place. So again, we'll wait to see more information. Another piece to this Iran story is President Trump's trip to Communist China. Is this part of the negotiation process?
https://www.foxbusiness.com/politics/without-regime-change-can-we-ever-really-trust-iran
US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced on May 7 that US forces “eliminated inbound threats” and struck Iranian military facilities responsible for attacks on US forces after Iran targeted US naval assets in and around the Strait of Hormuz.[1] CENTCOM stated that the United States “does not seek escalation.” CENTCOM reported that Iranian forces launched multiple missiles, drones, and fast attack craft at US naval assets, including the USS Truxtun, USS Rafael Peralta, and USS Mason, while the vessels were transiting the strait. CENTCOM confirmed that the munitions did not hit any US assets. US forces subsequently struck Iranian military targets responsible for the attacks, including missile and drone launch sites, command-and-control centers, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance sites. A senior US official told Fox News that US forces struck Bahman Port on Qeshm Island, an unspecified target in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, and the Bandar Kargan naval checkpoint, also in Hormozgan Province.[2] The official added that the strikes do not indicate a resumption of the war.[3]
Iranian media claimed that Iran fired missiles at US warships south of Chabahar Port after US forces targeted two Iranian vessels near Jask, Hormozgan Province, and Fujairah Port in the United Arab Emirates (UAE).[4] Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Spokesperson Ebrahim Zolfaghari warned Emirati civilians to “stay away from oil and military centers” following the attacks.[5] The recent strikes follow a series of Iranian attacks against the UAE on May 4 and 5, including a strike on the Fujairah Petroleum Industrial Zone, a key port that the UAE uses to bypass the strait.[6] ISW-CTP will continue to monitor this situation and provide further analysis in its May 8 morning thread on X.
The United States and Iran remain divided over key issues, particularly issues related to Iran's nuclear program and Iranian efforts to assert sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz. The Wall Street Journal, citing senior US officials, reported on May 6 that the US Government has seven main demands.[7] These demands include the dismantlement of Fordow, the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center, and Natanz, a ban on underground nuclear activities, on-demand inspections, a 20-year moratorium on enrichment, an Iranian commitment not to seek a nuclear weapon, the removal of all enriched nuclear material from Iran, and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.[8] Iranian officials continue to reject many of these demands, however.[9] Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission Vice Chairman Behnam Saeedi stated on May 7 that Iran's red lines include enrichment, the Strait of Hormuz, complete sanctions relief, and the release of frozen Iranian assets.[10] Saeedi added that negotiations will fail if the United States does not accept Iran's “right” to enrichment.[11] Unspecified individuals familiar with the matter told the Wall Street Journal on May 6 that key issues, including the length of any enrichment moratorium, the possible removal of Iran's HEU from Iran, and Iran's assertion of sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, “remain unresolved and are expected to complicate any talks.”[12]
Iran's highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile and enrichment activities continue to be some of the main obstacles to a deal. Israeli media reported on May 6 that US President Donald Trump insists on the removal of Iran's HEU stockpile from Iran and will not sign an agreement that does not address that demand.[13] Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-run Defa Press rejected on May 7 both diluting and handing over Iran's HEU, stating that diluting uranium is equivalent to handing over uranium to “the enemy.”[14] Three Iranian officials similarly told the New York Times on May 7 that talks with the United States remain stalled over US demands that Iran commit in advance to hand over its HEU stockpile, close the Fordow, Natanz, and Esfahan nuclear facilities, and suspend enrichment for 20 years.[15] The officials stated that Iran has instead proposed diluting “some” of its HEU stockpile, transferring the remainder to a third country, possibly Russia, and suspending enrichment for 10 to 15 years.[16] Iranian officials also appear divided over how much the regime should concede on the nuclear file.[17] ISW-CTP previously assessed that Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi, who has not publicly indicated any willingness to concede on these nuclear issues, is currently the main decisionmaker in the regime..[18]
Iran is increasingly attempting to formalize recognition of its sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz in a way that would fundamentally remake regional and global maritime norms in a manner extremely detrimental to US interests. Iran recently designed and implemented a new system under which vessels receive transit regulations and instructions by email and must comply with Iranian procedures to obtain authorization for passage through the strait.[19] CNN reviewed a “Vessel Information Declaration” form on May 7, which was issued by Iran's Persian Gulf Strait Authority, that requires vessels to provide extensive ownership, nationality, and crew information before being granted permission to transit through the strait.[20] Iranian parliamentarians stated that vessels cannot pass through the strait without accepting Iranian sovereignty over the strait and argued that the United States must submit to Iran's “new legal regime” in the waterway.[21] Supreme Leader Military Adviser Major General Mohsen Rezaei told Hezbollah-affiliated Al Mayadeen on May 6 that Iran has two main objectives in the Strait of Hormuz: “security” and trade.[22] Rezaei argued that Iran must control and manage the strait because the United States and Israel used the strait and the Persian Gulf to attack Iran during the war.[23] Iranian officials’ statements indicate that Iran is trying to secure long-term recognition of its control over strait transit.
Iranian regime media highlighted a meeting between Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei and President Masoud Pezeshkian, likely to display unity amid reports of divisions within the regime. Iranian state media reported on May 7 that Pezeshkian met with Mojtaba for nearly two and a half hours but did not provide details about what Mojtaba and Pezeshkian discussed.[24] Pezeshkian stated after the meeting that Mojtaba’s “behavior can naturally be a model for the country's management and administrative system.”[25] This meeting comes after anti-regime media reported on May 5 that Pezeshkian was “angry” with IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi’s decision to attack the United Arab Emirates (UAE).[26] Pezeshkian reportedly sought an emergency meeting with Mojtaba to ask him to stop the IRGC’s attacks on the UAE and to prevent their reoccurrence.[27] The fact that Iranian media and Mojtaba’s office have not provided details about what Mojtaba and Pezeshkian discussed suggests that Pezeshkian did not convince Mojtaba to alter the regime's current policies. ISW-CTP continues to assess that Vahidi is the regime's primary decisionmaker. Israeli media reported on April 19 that Vahidi is the only Iranian official with direct access to Mojtaba and is serving as a conduit for relaying key decisions to other regime officials.[28] Anti-regime media previously reported on April 1 that Pezeshkian had repeatedly tried to contact Mojtaba, but that a “military council” formed by Vahidi had prevented Pezeshkian from contacting Mojtaba.[29]
Iranian-backed Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri has reportedly formed a committee with Iraqi Prime Minister-designate Ali al Zaidi and caretaker Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani to develop a plan to disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[45] US-funded Arabic media reported on May 5 that the Shia Coordination Framework, which is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, compelled the three officials to convene and develop an “implementable” plan to restrict arms to the Iraqi government.[46] Ameri met with Zaidi on May 7 to discuss government formation and the need for unity among “national political forces.”[47] An unnamed Shia Coordination Framework source claimed that several Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Asaib Ahl al Haq and the Imam Ali Brigades, have expressed support for the disarmament initiative if it incorporates the militias’ unspecified conditions for disarmament.[48] An unnamed Iraqi National Security Council official stated that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba have rejected disarmament.[49] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba leader Akram al Kaabi rejected militia disarmament on May 6 and called the group's weapons a “red line.”[50]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-7-2026/