Iran has conducted a series of attacks against the United Arab Emirates (UAE) over the past 48 hours that are likely intended, in part, to isolate the UAE from other Gulf states.[1] The UAE Defense Ministry reported on May 5 that Emirati air defense systems engaged Iranian missiles and drones.[2] ISW-CTP has not observed any reports of missile or drone impacts in the UAE at the time of this writing. Iran previously launched four waves of attacks against the UAE on May 4, including a drone attack against an unspecified target in the Fujairah Petroleum Industrial Zone.[3] Iran's decision to solely attack the UAE, as opposed to multiple Gulf states, indicates that Iran likely seeks to isolate the UAE and exploit fractures between the Gulf states to sow further divisions between the UAE and other countries in the Gulf. Iranian attacks on multiple Gulf countries would presumably unite these countries against Iran, in contrast.
Iran's attacks against the UAE also likely seek to drive a wedge between the UAE and the United States and Israel in response to the UAE taking steps to strengthen its partnership with the United States and Israel. Iranian state-controlled media has suggested that Iran's attacks against the UAE were driven by the UAE’s increasing alignment with the United States and Israel.[4] An analyst close to the Iranian regime stated on May 4 that Iran targeted the UAE in response to the UAE’s “unprecedented hostile approach” toward Iran, including UAE cooperation with the United States and Israel on security and military matters.[5] An Iranian media outlet affiliated with former Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani separately cited Israel's reported provision of air defense systems to the UAE as further evidence of the UAE’s alignment with the United States and Israel.[6] IRGC-affiliated media similarly claimed on May 4 that the UAE has become an Israeli “pawn.”[7] Iran also likely seeks to send a message to other Gulf countries that they could become targets if they similarly increase cooperation with the United States and Israel.
Iran's recent attacks against the UAE are also a response to US efforts to restore freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. US President Donald Trump announced on May 3 the launch of Project Freedom to guide commercial vessels through the Strait of Hormuz and undermine Iranian efforts to “control” shipping through the strait.[8] Iran attacked an Emirati-linked vessel and UAE territory following the announcement, likely to demonstrate Iranian “control” over the strait and deter vessels from attempting to transit through the waterway.[9] The UAE has a direct interest in reopening maritime traffic through the strait. Iran's attacks on the UAE therefore likely seek to impose costs on a key US regional partner that benefits from Project Freedom and demonstrate that Iran can contest US efforts to reopen the strait.
Iran's escalation against the UAE also likely reflects internal Iranian regime dynamics and IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi’s efforts to constrain diplomacy. ISW-CTP previously assessed that Vahidi may seek to derail negotiations and may have accepted the risk of potential renewed conflict with the United States and Israel.[10] Vahidi and his inner circle have blocked “pragmatist” officials’ efforts to push Iran toward a more flexible negotiating position.[11] Iran's recent attacks against the UAE and commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz highlight how Vahidi has prevailed in the regime's internal power struggle and marginalized “pragmatist” actors, particularly Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf.[12]
Vahidi continues to dictate the regime's approach toward the Strait of Hormuz and Iran's broader conflict with the United States and Israel. Anti-regime media reported on May 5 that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian is “angry” with Vahidi’s decision to attack the UAE and called the attack an “irresponsible step” that was taken without Pezeshkian’s knowledge.[13] Pezeshkian is part of a group of pro-negotiations regime officials who view negotiations with the United States as preferable to renewed military conflict and better for the Iranian economy.[14] Pezeshkian reportedly sought an emergency meeting with Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei to ask him to stop the IRGC’s attacks on the UAE and to prevent their reoccurrence.[15] Israeli media reported on April 19 that Vahidi is the only Iranian official with direct access to Mojtaba and is serving as a conduit for relaying key decisions to other regime officials, however.[16] Anti-regime media also reported on April 1 that Pezeshkian tried repeatedly to contact Mojtaba, but that a “military council” formed by Vahidi prevented Pezeshkian from contacting Mojtaba.[17]
Iranian officials have confirmed that Iran conducted the recent attacks against the UAE. The Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters spokesperson denied that Iranian armed forces conducted “any missile or drone operations” against the UAE and claimed that the UAE Defense Ministry's recent announcements about Emirati air defenses intercepting Iranian missiles and drones are false.[18] Senior Iranian officials, including Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei, have acknowledged that Iran conducted the attacks, however.[19] The Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters spokesperson also warned that the UAE must not become a “den” for US and Israeli forces, which echoes threats from other Iranian officials that Iran can target states that host US forces or bases.[20] The spokesperson threatened a “crushing and regret-inducing response” if the UAE targets Iranian islands, ports, or coasts in response to Iran's attacks.[21]
Iran is expanding its efforts to establish bureaucratic frameworks to assert its sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz. The Iranian regime's English-language media outlet, Press TV, reported on May 5 that Iran has designed and implemented “a new mechanism for exercising sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz.”[22] The mechanism stipulates that ships that wish to transit through the strait will receive an email outlining “transit regulations” and that vessels must abide by these “regulations” to receive a “transit permit” to transit through the strait.[23] Iranian officials have previously stated that Iran will impose a “new management” in the Strait of Hormuz that will reap “economic benefits” for Iran.[24] Iran has proposed various toll schemes that would enable Iran to charge vessels of its choosing to pass through the strait.[25] This report comes amid other Iranian efforts to formalize Iranian “control” over the strait. Iranian media reported on April 19 that Iran's parliament is drafting a bill that would ban Israeli-linked vessels from transiting the Strait of Hormuz, require vessels from “hostile countries” to obtain approval from Iran's Supreme National Security Council to transit the strait, and bar states that have “caused damage” to Iran from transiting the strait until they pay reparations to Iran.[26]
Iranian officials have continued to emphasize the regime's intention to exert control over the Strait of Hormuz in the long term. ISW-CTP continues to assess that it is against the United States’ interests to allow Iran to exert control over the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf stated on May 5 that “the new equation of the Strait of Hormuz is in the process of being solidified.”[27] IRGC Political Deputy Brigadier General Yadoleh Javani similarly stated that Iran's “new management” of the Strait of Hormuz will be the “foundation of the global and international order.”[28] Allowing Iran to assert “sovereignty” over the strait would enable Iran to impose economic costs on the United States and the international economy while simultaneously giving it leverage in negotiations over other important issues, such as Iran's nuclear program.[29] Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-run Defa Press argued on May 2 that the US-Iran conflict is one of attrition, in which each side is trying to impose economic costs on the other in a bid to extract concessions.[30]
US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine stated that Iranian attacks in the Strait of Hormuz and against the UAE on May 4 were not violations of the US-Iran ceasefire in a Pentagon press briefing on May 5.[31] Hegseth stated that “right now the ceasefire with Iran holds.”[32] Hegseth added that Project Freedom is “separate and distinct” from the ceasefire with Iran.[33] Caine stated that nine recent Iranian attacks on vessels and two Iranian vessel seizures in the Strait of Hormuz are “below the threshold of restarting major combat operations at this point.”[34] Caine acknowledged that Iran attacked Oman once and the UAE three times on May 4. US officials have not commented on Iran's May 5 attack on the UAE at the time of this writing.[35]
Iran has reportedly pressured its Iraqi partners to end Iranian-backed Iraqi militias’ kinetic operations, while strengthening Iranian-backed Iraqi political influence, likely to try to avoid US financial pressure against Iraq that negatively impacts Iran.[40] Unspecified informed sources told Iraqi media on May 5 that IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani warned about “real dangers” that could result in a loss of unspecified military privileges and discussed the need for an “alternative plan” regarding militia disarmament during meetings with unspecified militias and Shia Coordination Framework leaders in Baghdad on April 18.[41] The United States has pressured the Iraqi federal government since early 2025 to disarm Iraqi militias and dissolve the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[42] The PMF is an Iraqi state security institution that includes many Iraqi militias that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi Prime Minister.[43] US pressure on the Iraqi federal government to reduce Iranian influence in Iraq has increased during the war due to attacks by the militias, including those within the PMF, against US and foreign targets in Iraq and the region.[44] US and Iraqi officials told the Wall Street Journal on April 22 that the US Treasury Department has temporarily halted shipments of Iraq's oil export revenue via the US Federal Reserve due to concerns about militia behavior.[45] The officials said that the United States first blocked a shipment of oil export revenue to the Central Bank of Iraq when the war began in late February 2026 and recently blocked a cargo plane delivery of nearly $500 million USD.[46] The Central Bank of Iraq has managed an account at the New York Federal Reserve on behalf of the Iraqi Finance Ministry since 2003 that holds the Iraqi federal government's revenue from oil exports in US dollars.[47] Oil revenue accounts for about 90 percent of the Iraqi state's budget.[48] Iran uses the Iraqi economy for sanctions evasion and to help fund the Axis of Resistance. The US Treasury Department's actions therefore heavily impact Iran as the regime already faces immense economic pressure from the United States.[49]
Ghaani proposed a so-called “Grand Settlement” plan regarding militia disarmament, according to the informed sources speaking to Iraqi media.[50] Iraqi media reported that unspecified actors first proposed a similar version of this plan in early 2025.[51] The first part of Ghaani’s plan reportedly calls on multiple Iraqi militias, specifically Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, to end their kinetic activity in exchange for maintaining the PMF’s role within the Iraqi state.[52] These militias have, both historically and during the war, been the most kinetically active and are more subordinate to Iran than other militias.[53] Ghaani reportedly outlined a second phase that would seemingly only occur if the first phase failed to reduce tensions with the United States. The second phase would integrate the PMF into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).[54] The PMF currently operates separately from the ISF and reports, at least on paper, to the Iraqi Prime Minister instead of the Iraqi Defense Minister.[55] The informed sources implied that Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders would be offered senior PMF positions in exchange for their suspension of kinetic operations.[56] Ghaani’s plan reportedly seeks to avoid provoking the United States, while simultaneously consolidating Iranian influence in Iraq via the further infiltration of Iranian-backed Iraqi actors into Iraqi government, diplomatic, and security institutions.[57]
ISW-CTP continues to assess that Iran could decide to build a new, loyal cadre of ideological militias, over which Iran has strong control, that would supplement the political activity of Iranian-backed Iraqi actors. An Iranian-backed Iraqi militia source told UK-based Amwaj Media in November 2025 that Iran would consider funding and politically supporting smaller Iraqi militias that are not affiliated with the PMF, which would place these militias fully outside state structures and control.[58] Iran has previously established splinter groups or front groups to ensure militia loyalty to Iran or to obfuscate the involvement of larger militias in military activity against the United States.[59]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-5-2026/
Iran seeks to achieve positive strategic objectives beyond the negative objective of surviving the war. Iran's principal positive strategic objective at this time is to secure recognition of its sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, which would fundamentally remake regional and global maritime norms in a manner extremely detrimental to US interests. Iran has denied access to the Strait of Hormuz during the war through mining, drone and missile attacks, and harassment by fast attack craft. Sea denial of the Strait of Hormuz can only be maintained through attacks, however. Long-term control of the Strait would require Iran to secure US recognition of its claims to the Strait of Hormuz through a negotiated agreement so that Iran could order ships to comply with its rules legitimately and then intercept those ships that fail to comply. Iranian negotiators increasingly prioritized securing its control over the Strait in negotiations, likely because it believes Iranian control over the Strait would act as a safeguard against future wars between Iran and Israel and the United States. The Strait under recognized Iranian control would act as a safeguard because Iran could close the Strait and disrupt markets at will, punish states in the Persian Gulf region for “collaborating” with Israel or the United States, and generate revenue through a system of tolls.[1] All of this and more would become legitimate with US recognition of Iranian claims to the Strait if the United States agreed to Iran's demands in negotiations. Recognition would also provide Iran with the legitimacy to intercept ships violating its rules. US, Israeli, or Gulf efforts to disrupt Iranian efforts to manage traffic to Tehran’s benefit would be perceived as acts of aggression if the United States were to recognize Iranian claims to the Strait in negotiations.
Iran has already begun to take steps that demonstrate what these new norms could look like. Iran's “Persian Gulf Strait Authority” also sent an email on May 6 to shipping companies with vessels in the Persian Gulf stipulating that for safe passage through, crews must pay the body in Iranian rials and gain issuances of guarantees from Iranian banks, which would force everyone who wants to use the Strait to violate US sanctions.[2] These demands would be legitimate if Iran achieves its positive strategic aim of securing control over the Strait of Hormuz. The email makes it clear that countries whose ships want to go through the Strait have to lift sanctions.[3]
Iran is also seeking economic relief as a positive objective from the war, which could enable Iran to accelerate its efforts to reconstitute its ballistic missile program. US sanctions on Iranian oil have contributed to severely weakening Iran's ability to raise revenue that the regime has used to fund the development of its ballistic missile program.[4] Iran is also seeking for the United States to unfreeze nearly $100 billion USD in Iranian assets, which could quickly provide the regime with the needed funds for investment into reconstituting its ballistic missile program on the strategic level.[5] These funds would be needed to rebuild missile production plants, development facilities, and plants for raw materials like steel, many of which were destroyed during the current war.[6] Iran has used its ballistic missiles to attack US bases and allies in the recent conflict and in previous conflicts like the 12 Day War.[7] CNN reported on May 6 that Israel is particularly worried about the possible lifting of economic sanctions on Iran and has pushed for restrictions to be imposed on Iran's ballistic missile program.[8] Economic relief would also support ”negative” strategic objectives like preventing regime collapse caused by protests that result from serious economic instability (see below).
The introduction of these positive strategic objectives does not mean that Iran has abandoned its “negative” strategic objectives, which include limiting discussions on its nuclear program and avoiding an economic collapse that could trigger severe domestic unrest, leading to the collapse of the regime. Avoiding the collapse of one's regime is an objective of all regimes. Iranian leaders also almost always insist on the legitimacy of at least some form of a nuclear program. These two objectives are constant and do not represent a comprehensive positive vision for the future of the region. Iran now possesses such a vision. The Iranian objectives, if accomplished in full, would result in an extremely strong Iran that would be able to compel most regional states to follow its lead through control of the Strait of Hormuz.
The Iranian regime is preparing for economic instability that could cause domestic unrest. This effort supports the “negative” strategic objective of preventing regime collapse caused by protests that result from serious economic instability. Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf published an audio message on May 6, in which he framed the maritime blockade, economic pressure, and media operations as part of an “enemy effort” to undermine national cohesion and force Iran to surrender.[9] These remarks demonstrate that the Iranian regime is attempting to bolster itself against domestic instability that could result from economic pressure rather than preparing to surrender. Ghalibaf called on officials to reduce the effects of economic pressure on the public, urged wartime-style planning, and “jihadi management.”[10] Ghalibaf also called on the Basij to “enter the field seriously” and asked Basij members in mosques, neighborhoods, and social groups to help solve public problems.[11] The regime uses the Basij for civil defense, social control, and protest suppression.[12] Anti-regime media reported on April 27 that Iran's Supreme National Security Council, which is the highest national security body, was reportedly preparing for a potential protest wave as economic deterioration and social pressure intensified.[13] Iranian officials are reportedly concerned about inflation, unemployment, rising prices, shutdowns in the oil, petrochemical, and steel sectors, and broader economic disruption.[14] Iranian officials’ public emphasis on economic management suggests that the regime recognizes that economic pressure could create internal stability risks and is preparing mechanisms to manage those risks. These statements, concerns, and preparations do not on their own indicate that the Iranian regime is prepared to surrender as a result of economic pressure.
ISW-CTP continues to assess that Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi is driving decisionmaking over Iran's war and negotiating posture. Iranian officials may still disagree over how to proceed in negotiations, however, and some may present positions that do not necessarily reflect Vahidi’s approval. This may help to explain US officials’ assessment that Iranian decisionmaking remains fragmented, even though Vahidi likely drives decisionmaking due to his proximity to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei.[15]
It remains unclear what specific demands the US and Iranian delegations are currently negotiating over. A Pakistani source familiar with the negotiations told a New York Post journalist that there are multiple proposals circulating.[16] This makes it difficult to determine the precise terms currently being negotiated or even whether both sides are referring to the same framework. US officials leaked to Axios on May 6 that the White House believes it is close to a one-page memorandum of understanding with Iran that would declare an end to the war and open a 30‑day window for negotiations on a more detailed deal, however.[17] The US sources noted that nothing has been finalized but described this as the closest the sides have come to an agreement since the conflict began.[18] The reported framework would include an Iranian moratorium on nuclear enrichment for 12-15 years, partial sanctions relief and the release of frozen Iranian funds, and a gradual lifting of restrictions in the Strait of Hormuz, with future steps contingent on the success of follow‑on negotiations in venues such as Islamabad or Geneva.[19] It is unclear what is implied by ”restrictions” or if any Iranian official has seen the same memorandum leaked by US officials to Axios.
Iranian officials and media have largely rejected the Axios reporting, insisting that Iran has not agreed to any deal and has not yet formally responded to the latest US proposal, which they say contains unacceptable provisions.[20] Several outlets framed the US media narrative as pressure tactics or market manipulation.[21] The outlets instead emphasized Iran's own previous proposals and stated red lines, including rejection of uranium removal from Iran.[22] US President Donald Trump publicly reinforced a tougher US position at odds with the memorandum leaked by Axios, telling PBS later on May 6, that any deal would require Iran to export its highly enriched uranium, cease operating underground facilities, and accept no future enrichment even at low levels after a moratorium period.[23]
The US naval blockade and sanctions are imposing costs on Iran. US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced on May 6 that US naval forces have directed 52 vessels to turn around or return to ports since the blockade began on April 13.[24] CENTCOM separately stated that a US Navy F/A-18 Super Hornet disabled the rudder of the Iranian-flagged oil tanker M/T Hasna after it tried to violate the blockade in the Gulf of Oman.[25] The US blockade is also straining Iran's oil storage by restricting exports and forcing Iran to store unsold oil. An unspecified Iranian Oil Ministry official told the New York Times on May 6 that Iran has started cutting oil production at some oil wells to mitigate a storage shortage crisis.[26] The official estimated that Iran's onshore and offshore storage could run out in about 40 to 45 days.[27] The US blockade is creating operational and economic pressure for Iran, but the regime appears to be preparing to manage that pressure as a domestic-control problem rather than treating it as a reason to concede (see topline section).
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-6-2026/
Continued Iranian attacks on Saudi Arabia and other countries like UAE already seem to be successfully “driving a wedge” between the US and Saudi Arabia and others. During today’s news at noon at least two of those countries have decided to deny us the military use of their land space for Iran operations.