Iran does not appear to have altered its negotiating position over the management of the Strait of Hormuz and its nuclear program in its latest proposal. Some elements of the Iranian regime may calculate that Iran can impose sufficient economic and political costs on the United States to coerce the United States to make concessions. Two senior Iranian officials told the New York Times on May 1 that Iran's new proposal, which Iran submitted to the United States via Pakistani mediators on April 30, removed a previous condition that required the United States to lift its naval blockade on Iranian ports before Iran and the United States could begin negotiations.[1] Iran's proposal also reportedly states that Iran is willing to “open” the Strait of Hormuz before the United States announces an end to its blockade.[2] Iran similarly offered to “open” the strait in its previous proposal on April 26, but caveated that it would charge vessels a toll to transit through the strait.[3] Iranian officials have not publicly indicated that the regime will abandon its proposed toll scheme. Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei stated on April 30 that Iran will impose a “new management” in the strait that will reap “economic benefits” for Iran, for example.[4] Iran's latest proposal also pushes discussions over nuclear issues to a later stage, similar to Iran's April 26 proposal.[5] ISW-CTP previously noted that any proposal that pushes nuclear negotiations to a later stage would not force Iran to make concessions regarding its highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile or ability to enrich uranium up front, but would rather grant Iran more time to engage in talks about these issues.[6] US President Donald Trump expressed dissatisfaction with Iran's revised proposal on May 1.[7]
Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-run Defa Press argued on May 2 that the war between the United States and Iran has shifted from a direct conflict to a conflict focused on the “imposition of costs.”[8] Defa Press argued that “patience” will be one of the “ultimate determinants of victory,” which suggests that some elements of the regime may be willing to endure the United States’ economic and military pressure while simultaneously imposing economic and political costs on the United States to try to pressure the United States to soften its negotiating demands.
Senior Iranian military and security officials have also expressed pessimism about the prospects for compromise between Iran and the United States. Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Coordination Deputy Brigadier General Mohammad Jafar Asadi and an Iranian security official speaking to Agence-France Presse (AFP) both described renewed military conflict between Iran, the United States, and Israel as “likely” and emphasized that Iranian armed forces remain on full alert.[9] The Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters is responsible for joint and wartime operations.
Iran is taking steps to try to withstand the US naval blockade. Iran has begun reducing its oil production as its storage capacity reaches its limits, according to a senior Iranian official speaking to Bloomberg on May 2.[10] Iran is likely reducing oil production rather than halting it because shutting down oil production could cause significant damage to Iranian oil fields.[11] Pentagon officials told Axios on May 1 that 31 tankers carrying roughly 53 million barrels of Iranian oil, worth at least $4.8 billion USD, remain in the Persian Gulf because of the US naval blockade on Iranian ports.[12] The United States has simultaneously expanded economic sanctions to deepen Iran's isolation and restrict its access to energy markets and financial channels.[13]
Hezbollah may be domestically producing first-person view (FPV) drones. Hezbollah posted footage on May 2 showing Hezbollah fighters domestically producing drones, but it is unclear if the drones in the video are FPV drones.[14] Hezbollah's video comes after an Israeli military official told the Associated Press on April 30 that Israel believes that Hezbollah is domestically manufacturing FPV drones.[15] The official noted that FPV drones are relatively easy to produce and require minimal additional parts compared to non-FPV drones.[16] Hezbollah has had the ability to domestically produce drones since at least 2011, and prioritized domestic drone production following the Fall 2024 conflict.[17] Israeli media also reported on May 1 that Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir instructed the IDF to target Hezbollah's FPV drone production and supply chain infrastructure “beyond southern Lebanon.”[18]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-2-2026/
02MAY2026: Ahmad Vahidi: Commander-in-Chief of the IRGC
Vahidi became Commander-in-Chief of the IRGC following the opening US/Israeli strikes of Operation Epic Fury on February 28, 2026, which killed former Commander-in-Chief of the IRGC Mohammad Papkour. Vahidi is known to be one of the figures who pushed strongly for Mojtaba Khamenei’s appointment as Supreme Leader following his father’s death, and has said to be blocking attempts by President Masoud Pezeshkian to appoint a new intelligence minister following the Israeli strike that killed Esmail Khatib on March 18th, 2026. Vahidi also reportedly pressured Pezeshkian to name Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr as Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC).
Vahidi’s greater credibility across the IRGC and broader significance within the security establishment makes him far more significant as a decision maker in the post-Ali Khamenei era of governance than publicly suggested. All scholarship points to Vahidi being a fundamentalist who believes in the path of resistance above all else, and further militarization of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Vahidi was believed to have unsuccessfully pushed for Zolghadr’s inclusion in the delegation headed to Islamabad for recent talks with the United States led by Vice President JD Vance. Vahidi allegedly received pushback from the leaders of the delegation, Araghchi and Ghalibaf, who pointed to Zolghadr’s lack of diplomatic experience. Vahidi is reportedly liaising directly with Mojtaba Khamenei, excluding other senior officials who have not been able to meet with the new Supreme Leader. This positions Vahidi as one of the most powerful actors on the Islamic Republic’s political stage today.
https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/ahmad-vahidi-commander-chief-of-irgc
Iran's counterproposal to the United States reportedly includes a three-phase plan that seeks to quickly end the war, guarantee no future combined force strikes on Iran, and address the Strait of Hormuz in the first phase, while delaying talks on Iran's nuclear program to a second phase. US President Donald Trump expressed doubt on May 2 that the proposal “would be acceptable.”[1] Al Jazeera, citing unspecified sources, reported on May 3 that Iran's counterproposal to the United States comprises three phases.[2] The first phase includes a “complete end to the war” within 30 days, a mutual “guarantee of non-aggression” between the United States, Israel, Iran, and the Axis of Resistance, anend to the US blockade on Iranian ports in exchange for the “reopening” of the Strait of Hormuz, compensation for Iran “in a new and innovative format,” and the complete withdrawal of US forces from Iran's “maritime perimeter.”[3] It is unclear whether the compensation clause refers to Iran's demand for war reparations or Iran's proposal to establish a toll scheme in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran included a plan to charge vessels that transit through the strait a fee in its previous proposal on April 26.[4] Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei stated on April 30 that Iran will impose a “new management” in the strait that will reap “economic benefits” for Iran, likely referring to the toll scheme.[5] An Iranian media outlet affiliated with former Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani similarly reported on May 2 that Iran's counterproposal includes “a new mechanism” for the Strait of Hormuz.[6] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media separately reported on May 2 that the Iranian Parliament plans to approve a 12-point plan that would place restrictions on which ships are allowed to traverse the Strait of Hormuz.[7] Ships belonging to “hostile countries” would be required to pay war reparations to Iran in order to pass through the strait under this plan.[8]
The second phase of Iran's proposal reportedly includes negotiations between the United States and Iran about Iran's nuclear program.[9] Iran appears to be offering the possibility of discussing nuclear issues at a later date in order to push the United States to end the war and lift its blockade on Iranian ports. Iran does not appear to have made any firm commitments to make concessions regarding its nuclear program in its latest proposal, however. Axios reported on May 2 that Iran would agree to conduct a month of nuclear negotiations if the United States and Iran reached an agreement regarding the Strait of Hormuz and an end to the war in the next month, citing two sources briefed on the proposal.[10] Al Jazeera reported that Iran offered to “discuss the idea” of pausing uranium enrichment for “up to 15 years,” which is longer than previous Iranian proposals to pause enrichment for up to five years.[11] The Iranian proposal also posits that Iran could enrich up to 3.6 percent after the pause ends.[12] The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action previously allowed Iran to enrich up to 3.67 percent.[13] President Trump has previously indicated that he would not accept a pause in enrichment and instead seeks for Iran to permanently suspend enrichment.[14] The proposal also states that Iran would be willing to “discuss the fate of” Iran's highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile, with possible options including transferring the stockpile abroad or diluting it.[15] The United States has demanded that Iran hand over its HEU stockpile.[16] The proposal also insists that Iran will not dismantle any of its nuclear facilities.[17] The proposal emphasizes the need for sanctions relief for Iran in exchange for Iran's nuclear “concessions.”[18] The Wall Street Journal similarly reported on May 1 that Iran's proposal “calls for discussing the issues around Iran's nuclear file in exchange for US sanctions relief.”[19] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei insisted on May 3 that Iran's 14-point counterproposal is exclusively focused on ending the war and does not address nuclear issues.[20]
Baghaei announced on May 3 that the United States has responded to Iran's counterproposal and that the Iranian regime is reviewing the United States’ response.[21] President Trump previously stated on May 1 that he was “not satisfied” with the Iranian counterproposal.[22]
The IRGC Navy likely attacked a vessel in the Strait of Hormuz on May 3, likely to sustain high shipping costs and oil prices to pressure the United States to make concessions.[23] United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported that multiple small craft attacked a vessel—likely the Liberian-flagged, Greek-owned Minoan Falcon—11 nautical miles west of Sirik, Hormozgan Province, Iran.[24] The vessel sailed northbound through the Strait of Hormuz before it abruptly turned south, likely due to the attack.[25] UKMTO confirmed that the vessel's crew members are safe.[26] The IRGC Navy previously attacked and likely redirected two Greek-owned vessels toward Iran on April 22.[27] CTP-ISW assessed on May 2 that some elements of the regime may be willing to endure the United States’ economic and military pressure while simultaneously imposing economic and political costs on the United States to try to pressure the United States to soften its negotiating demands.[28]
Hezbollah has continued to claim attacks, including first-person view (FPV) drone attacks, against Israeli forces in southern Lebanon.
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-may-3-2026/