Iran appears to be attempting to exploit its leverage over the Strait of Hormuz to end the war in a way that removes the US blockade of Iranian ports without Iran having to make nuclear concessions. Iran presented a new proposal to the United States in which it reportedly offered to “reopen” the Strait of Hormuz and end the war, while postponing US-Iran nuclear negotiations to a later date.[1] US President Donald Trump described the proposal on April 25 as “much better” than previous Iranian proposals but stated that the proposal is “not enough.”[2] US Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt said on April 27 that Trump discussed the Iranian proposal with his top national security aides and reiterated that Trump seeks to ensure freedom of navigation through the strait and to remove Iran's highly enriched uranium (HEU).[3] The Iranian proposal would not force Iran to make concessions regarding its HEU or ability to enrich uranium up front, but would rather grant Iran more time to engage in talks about these nuclear issues. It is unclear if Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi and his inner circle, which ISW-CTP continues to assess dominates Iranian decision-making, support this new proposal. One source with knowledge on the topic told Axios on April 27 that Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi told Pakistani, Egyptian, Turkish, and Qatari mediators in recent days that there is no consensus among Iran's leaders on how to address US demands.[4]
Iran's rapidly depleting oil storage capacity likely explains, at least in part, why Iran is pushing for a peace agreement that would lift the US naval blockade.[5] The Wall Street Journal reported on April 27 that the US blockade on Iranian ports has forced Iran to store oil in “disused oil tanks in poor condition” and in “containers” in the cities of Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province, and Asaluyeh, Bushehr Province, according to unspecified current and former Iranian officials.[6] Hamid Hosseini, the spokesperson for Iran's oil exporting union, told the Wall Street Journal that Iran is trying to send its oil to China by rail.[7] The Wall Street Journal noted that most exporters avoid transporting oil by rail because rail shipments are less efficient and less profitable than seaborne shipments, however.[8] The Wall Street Journal's April 27 report is consistent with a prior April 12 estimate from a US sanctions analyst that Iran had roughly 13 days of onshore storage capacity remaining before it would be forced to shut down oil production.[9] ISW-CTP is unable to independently assess the exact status of Iran's onshore and offshore storage capacity. Any shutdown of Iranian oil wells could cause permanent reservoir damage, however, which would affect Iran's ability to produce its most valuable export.[10]
An Iranian delegation led by Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi emphasized the importance of Russo-Iranian strategic relations in a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg on April 27.[11] This meeting notably occurs as Iran prepares for a potential resumption of conflict with the United States and Israel. Russia has facilitated Iranian strikes in the Middle East throughout the war, such as by providing Iran with satellite imagery of US, Gulf, and Turkish military assets in the Middle East.[12]
Hezbollah has increasingly used first-person view (FPV) drones to attack Israeli forces in Lebanon since the ceasefire came into effect on April 16.[13] Hezbollah has claimed that it used FPV drones in 12 of its 18 claimed attacks on Israeli ground forces in Lebanon since April 16.[14] Hezbollah has also posted footage of recent FPV drone attacks targeting Israeli personnel and vehicles.[15] Some of the footage shows Hezbollah operating fiber-optic FPV drones. Israeli media reported that Hezbollah has begun using fiber-optic FPV drones as its main strike platform for attacks on Israeli forces in southern Lebanon.[16] Israeli media claimed that Hezbollah's fiber-optic FPV drones have an operational range of up to 15 kilometers and can carry explosive payloads of up to six kilograms.[17] Fiber-optic FPV drones pose a greater threat to Israeli ground forces than rockets or other Hezbollah weapons because they are immune to jamming, difficult to intercept using conventional air defense systems, and can target individuals and vehicles with high precision.[18] A Hezbollah FPV drone attack killed one IDF soldier and wounded six others in Taybeh, Marjaayoun District, on April 26.[19] Hezbollah launched a subsequent FPV drone attack targeting the same Israeli unit while it was conducting a casualty evacuation from Taybeh. Israeli soldiers shot down the FPV drone several meters away from the evacuation site.[20]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-27-2026/
Iran's National Information Network, a state-controlled domestic intranet that progressively severs citizens’ access to the open internet, was modeled on the Great Firewall of China and built with Chinese technical assistance.
The practical consequences came into focus during the January 2026 massacres. When the regime imposed a near-total internet shutdown to prevent footage of the killings from reaching the outside world, it did so on infrastructure that Chinese firms had years helping to construct. The surveillance technology that enables the IRGC to track, identify, and suppress dissidents was supplied by the same companies that perform identical functionsfor the Chinese Communist Party in Xinjiang. Beijing is providing the Islamic Republic with the tools to survive its own population's rejection and is doing so for the same reason it buys the oil: a dependent Iran is a useful Iran.
China has stepped into this uncertainty with commercial patience and diplomatic ambition. Saudi Arabia now sells more oil to China than to any other country. The UAE has woven Huawei technology into its critical tech infrastructure. Chinese firms are building ports, railways, 5G networks, and smart cities across the Gulf. And in March 2023, Beijing brokered the Saudi-Iranian normalization agreement, a diplomatic achievement that announced China's arrival as a Middle Eastern power broker. That same year, Saudi Investment Minister Khalid Al-Falih declared publicly that a multipolar world had emerged and that cooperation between the Gulf states and China would be “a significant part of the new order.”
The pattern should be legible by now: Iran's threat pushes Gulf states to diversify their partnerships, and this very diversification increases Chinese leverage. And the more leverage China holds over Gulf capitals, the less likely those capitals are to side with Washington on the questions Beijing cares about most: Taiwan, semiconductor export controls, sanctions enforcement, and the future of the dollar-based financial order.
Trump didn't launch Operation Epic Fury to only punish Khamenei for his massacres. He launched it because every year Washington spends managing Tehran is another year Beijing buys in the Pacific, and the administration has decided the trade isn't worth it anymore. The orientation of the Middle East will determine whether the United States can prevail in the defining confrontation of this century: a Chinese move against Taiwan.
In January 2024, the IRGC launched ballistic missiles from shipping containers aboard a converted cargo vessel purchased for less than 20 million dollars—a fraction of what a warship costs, yet merchant hulls are far harder to sink than frigates, as decades of naval experience have shown. Iran now possesses a mobile, survivable, and largely undetectable strike platform that can operate from any port or shipping lane, hitting from vectors no existing defense plan anticipates. A state that can threaten American carriers from unmarked hulls in any ocean cannot be managed through arms control. Its total removal from the board changes the geometry of great-power competition entirely.
Chinese satellites provided Tehran with real-time intelligence on American force deployments, including detection of F-35A, F-15E, A-10C, and THAAD system arrivals at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan.
And the desperation runs in both directions. At the SCO summit, Pezeshkian begged Xi to treat Iran as “a friendly and determined ally.” Beijing is obliging, because the collapse of the Islamic Republic under American pressure would sever China's corridors.
No comparable opportunity to inflict this kind of strategic damage on Chinese positioning has presented itself since the end of the Cold War.
It bears repeating: the Iran question was never about Iran. Remove the Islamic Republic from the equation and China loses its pawns for a Taiwan contingency. Leave it in place and the Middle East remains what Beijing designed it to be: a second front that Washington can never afford to leave and can never afford to stay in.
https://www.zinebriboua.com/p/the-iran-question-is-all-about-china
An interesting article—I encourage you to read the whole thing—but China's subsidized exports are destroying the manufacturing industry, and not just for consumer goods, in both Iran and other countries.
Iran's latest proposal in negotiations offers no concessions and represents an Iranian effort to end the war on Tehran’s terms. The proposal, according to unspecified officials familiar with the matter speaking to the Wall Street Journal and an Iranian political analyst close to the regime, centers on a three-stage plan.[1] In the first stage, the United States and Israel would commit to a permanent and guaranteed end to the war.[2] In the second stage, the United States and Iran would negotiate over the status of the Strait of Hormuz, and the United States would lift its blockade on Iranian ports.[3] Iran still aims to exert sovereignty over the Strait after the war by charging tolls on vessels passing the Strait and would seek to satisfy this demand in negotiations, according to the New York Times and Wall Street Journal.[4] In the third stage, Iran and the United States would begin negotiating over the nuclear issue.[5]
The proposal illustrates that Iran's current decisionmaker, Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi, believes Iran is winning despite the serious damage Iran has suffered. This agreement satisfies Vahidi and his inner circle because it refuses to discuss the nuclear issue up front, and it demands nearly all of Iran's key demands, like a permanent and guaranteed end to the war and sovereignty over the Strait. Officials in Tehran, likely Vahidi and his inner circle, ordered the Iranian negotiating team not to discuss nuclear issues during the Islamabad talks.[6] Vahidi likely hopes to extract concessions from the United States, like an end to the blockade, without offering any serious concessions in response. Vahidi would have very little incentive to offer concessions on the nuclear program in the third phase of this plan if the United States committed to permanently ending hostilities with Iran and lifting the blockade. Iran and the United States remain far apart on the nuclear issue. Iran demanded a temporary suspension of enrichment for five years and stockpile dilution in its April 25 proposal.[7] The United States has asked for a 20-year enrichment suspension period.[8]
The United States remains opposed to the most recent April 26 proposal because it failed to address both Iran's nuclear program and enabled Iran to assert “control” over the Strait of Hormuz. US President Donald Trump was reportedly dissatisfied with Iran's revised April 26 proposal as it did not address Iran's nuclear program, according to administration officials speaking to Western media on April 27.[9] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio told Fox News on April 27 that the United States cannot tolerate Iran determining who uses an international waterway or charging for access.[10] Rubio’s comments, one day after the White House became aware of the Iranian proposal, represent implicit opposition to Iran's proposal.
Iran's growing challenges in storing and exporting its oil could be one mechanism by which Iranian calculations change in negotiations. A US Sanctions analyst at Foundation for Defense of Democracies assessed on April 12 that Iran had about 13 remaining days of usable oil storage, which he calculated based on 50 to 55 million barrels of total onshore storage that was 60% full on April 12.[11] Iran likely extended the number of days before its oil storage is full by using old oil tanks in poor condition. Iran reactivated a 30-year-old very large crude carrier (VLCC) during April to hold oil, for example.[12] The VLCC had been unused for three years.[13] Market intelligence firm Kpler assessed on April 27 that Iran has between 12 and 22 remaining days before its oil storage is full.[14] Kpler’s 12-day estimate assumes that not all storage tanks can be used, but the basis for that assumption is not clear. Iran has recently activated storage facilities that are suboptimal, but those storage facilities presumably have other costs for Iranian capacity and oil exports associated with them. US President Donald Trump posted on April 28 on Truth Social that Iran told the United States that it is in a “state of collapse” and that Iran wants an end to the US blockade as soon as possible.[15]
Iran faces significant pressure on other parts of its economy. Combined force strikes during the war, as well as Iran's difficulties with storing and exporting oil, have had negative ripple effects on other sectors of Iran's economy. Reuters reported on April 27 that combined force strikes, including strikes on major Iranian steel producers such as the Mobarakeh Steel Company and Khuzestan Steel Company, reportedly destroyed about 25 to 30 percent of Iran's total steel output.[16] A chemical engineer working at one of Iran's biggest private construction contractors told the Associated Press on April 28 that it had to shut down a project with Mobarakeh, which cost 1,000 jobs.[17] The son of an Iranian rugmaker told AP that around 80% of rug and carpet manufacturers have stopped operations in the industrial zone of Kashan, Esfahan Province, due to the plummet of Iranian exports during the war.[18] A US sanctions analyst assessed on April 27 that the US blockade has exacerbated Iran's gasoline crisis by preventing Iran from importing gasoline to sufficiently address Iran's fuel needs.[19] Gasoline shortages previously caused mass protests in 2019.[20]
It is unclear, however, whether this pressure on Iran's economy will cause Vahidi and his inner circle to make concessions to the United States. Vahidi is an ideologue who has served in various capacities in the regime since the revolution. His ideological nature means he is more likely to judge ultimate success on whether or not he upholds the precepts of the Islamic Revolution. General economic pain imposed on the populace is unlikely to seriously affect his calculus, therefore, unless such economic pain threatens his current position or the regime's stability.[21]
Iran's highest national security decision-making body is reportedly preparing for a potential protest wave as economic deterioration and social pressure intensify, according to anti-regime media. Anti-regime media reported on April 28 that the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) convened a meeting chaired by SNSC Secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr—a close ally of Vahidi—after intelligence assessments warned of a possible resumption of protests in the coming days.[22] Unspecified sources told anti-regime media that Iran's security institutions expressed concern about potential protest calls and assessed that worsening economic conditions, such as inflation, unemployment, and rising prices, could trigger renewed unrest.[23] The report stated that security agencies presented a highly critical picture of Iran's economy, citing shutdowns in the oil, petrochemical, and steel sectors, widespread unemployment partly driven by internet disruptions, and a broader halt in economic activity due to the closure of financial markets.[24] These assessments warned that Iran's economy cannot withstand more than six to eight weeks of a naval blockade and that reconstruction of damaged industrial sectors could take years.[25] The SNSC coordinates and authorizes the regime's protest response, while internal security forces execute the crackdown.[26] Former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ordered the SNSC in January 2026 to crush the protests “by any means necessary.”[27]
Iran's prolonged internet shutdown is also posing severe economic damage and accelerating unemployment, which likely increases pressure on regime stability. Iranian security institutions also assessed that approximately 20 percent of internet-dependent workers have lost their jobs and projected that up to two million additional private-sector workers could become unemployed by the end of spring.[28] An Iranian Chamber of Commerce official stated on April 14 that the internet shutdown is causing $30 to $40 million USD in “direct” daily losses and up to $80 million USD when including “indirect” losses, which he argued is equivalent to the destruction of multiple major infrastructure assets each day.[29] NetBlocks reported on April 28 that Iran's nationwide internet blackout, now exceeding 60 days, had severely disrupted financial transactions, commercial activity, and business operations.[30] NetBlocks estimates that the countrywide internet shutdown costs the Iranian economy over $37 million USD per day.[31]
Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf appears to be trying to retain political support and remain a key actor in negotiations despite prior signs of opposition from Vahidi and his inner circle. Two hundred and sixty-one Iranian Parliament members issued a statement on April 27 declaring support for Iran's negotiating team and Ghalibaf.[32] Parliamentarians added that they trust the negotiating delegation, especially Ghalibaf, and expressed support for its defense of national interests.[33] This statement follows recent reports indicating that Ghalibaf has grown frustrated with internal divisions and has considered resigning from the negotiating delegation.[34] Some outlets have claimed that he has already resigned due to disagreements over nuclear concessions.[35] Ghalibaf publicly defended negotiations on Iranian state television on April 18, arguing that diplomacy with the United States, alongside military power, is necessary to secure Iran's objectives.[36] Ghalibaf also criticized hardline officials, including SNSC member Saeed Jalili and hardline parliamentarian Amirhossein Sabeti, both affiliated with the ultraconservative Paydari (Stability) Front, for opposing negotiations.[37] Paydari Front–affiliated members of Parliament also did not sign the recent parliament statement.[38]
Infighting among hardline factions has escalated into a public media confrontation amid intra-regime competition over negotiations. Intra-regime power struggle between pragmatic hardliners and ultrahardliners indicates the absence of a decisive central arbiter, which has allowed factional disputes to unfold publicly. IRGC-affiliated Tasnim published an Op-Ed on April 24 and criticized negotiation expectations by arguing that talks aim to avoid war and its costs and must proceed based on the principles of “dignity, wisdom, and expediency.”[39] Tasnim warned that some actors raise “unrealistic expectations,” including full sanctions relief, a comprehensive ceasefire that includes the Axis of Resistance, long-term peace guarantees for Iran, and economic flourishing.[40] Tasnim warned that viewing negotiations through an “unrealistic expectations” lens reflects unrealistic wishful thinking. Ultraconservative Paydari (Stability) Front-affiliated Raja News accused Tasnim of downplaying the Supreme Leader's red lines by framing these demands as unrealistic and argued that Tasnim’s proposed approach repeats the logic that led to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action because Tasnim depicts core demands such as full sanctions relief and a lasting ceasefire as ”unattainable.” [41] Raja News suggested that this logic resulted in ”pure damage.”[42] The lack of a decisive central authority due to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s absence has likely allowed these disputes to escalate into the public domain rather than remain contained within regime channels.
Iran continues to cooperate with key US adversaries, such as Russia and China, as it prepares for a potential resumption of conflict with the United States and Israel. An Iranian defense delegation, including Defense Ministry Spokesperson Brigadier General Reza Talaei Nik, attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organization defense ministerial summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on April 27 and 28.[43] The Iranian delegation held separate meetings with the Russian, Chinese, and Belarusian defense ministers on the sidelines of the summit.[44] Talaei Nik and Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov emphasized that Iran and Russia will continue to support each other “regardless of the situation.”[45] The SCO summit comes after Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi emphasized the importance of Russo-Iranian strategic relations in a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg on April 27.[46] These meetings may be part of a broader Iranian effort to secure support ahead of a potential resumption of conflict with the United States and Israel. Russia helped support Iranian strikes in the Middle East throughout the war, such as by providing Iran with satellite imagery of US, Gulf, and Turkish military assets in the Middle East.[47]
Lebanese military officials claim that Israeli military action and Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) deployments have constrained Hezbollah's ability to smuggle weapons into Lebanon through Syria.[73] An unnamed Lebanese military source told Saudi media on April 28 that the Beirut-Damascus International Highway's closure since April 16 has hindered Hezbollah's attempts to replenish its arms and ammunition stocks.[74] Lebanese authorities closed the highway after the IDF conducted an airstrike targeting a segment of the roadway in the vicinity of Dahr al Baidar, central Lebanon, shortly before the ceasefire came into effect on April 16.[75] The source also claimed that the LAF’s newly established checkpoints have “contributed to stopping the movement of weapons and ammunition” between Hezbollah units in central and southern Lebanon.[76] Syrian authorities have interdicted several shipments of Hezbollah arms and ammunition, including Iranian-origin weapons, bound for Lebanon since Hezbollah began targeting Israel on March 2.[77]
Lebanese media reported on April 28 that Lebanese Parliament Speaker and longtime Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri privately supports Lebanese President Joseph Aoun’s stance on negotiations with Israel.[78] Lebanese media reported that Berri is “on board” with Aoun’s efforts to extend the ceasefire and pursue direct Israel-Lebanon talks, but cannot announce his support out of concern that it may alienate Berri’s Shia constituency.[79] Berri has reportedly urged Aoun to ensure that negotiations with Israel guarantee a “real” ceasefire, Israel's full withdrawal from southern Lebanon, the return of Lebanese prisoners from Israel, and reconstruction for southern Lebanon.[80] Berri and his political party, the Amal Movement, have historically aligned with Hezbollah, but Berri has distanced Amal from Hezbollah over disapproval of Hezbollah's attacks on Israel.[81] Berri‘s basic positions on the negotiations do not satisfy some key Israeli asks, however, such as the disarmament of Hezbollah. Amal supported the Lebanese government's decision to ban Hezbollah's military activities on March 2.[82]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-28-2026/