It is cheaper to change the regime in Iran and in North Yemen (Houthis)
The United States and Iran agreed to a two-week ceasefire brokered by Pakistan on April 7 and will begin negotiations in Islamabad, Pakistan, on April 11.[1] The Iranian Supreme National Security Council announced that the regime agreed to the ceasefire on April 7, several hours after US President Donald Trump announced that he had agreed to the ceasefire on the condition that Iran reopen the Strait of Hormuz.[2] Trump made his announcement around three hours after Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif announced on X that diplomatic efforts toward a US-Iran agreement were “progressing steadily, strongly, and powerfully.”[3] Sharif called on Iran to “open” the Strait of Hormuz as a goodwill gesture and urged all warring parties to observe a ceasefire during the two-week period to facilitate a “conclusive” end to the war.[4] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi confirmed Iran's acceptance of the ceasefire and stated that Iran will allow the “safe passage” of vessels through the Strait of Hormuz during the two-week period “via coordination with Iran's armed forces and with due consideration of technical limitations.”[5]
President Trump described Iran's 10-point counterproposal that it sent to the United States on April 5 as “a workable basis on which to negotiate.”[6] Iran's demands included a permanent end to the war with guarantees that the United States or Israel will not attack Iran again.[7] Iran also demanded the lifting of all primary and secondary sanctions on Iran, the termination of all UN Security Council and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors resolutions against Iran, the payment of reparations to Iran, the withdrawal of US forces from the region, and the cessation of war on all fronts, including Israeli operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon.[8] Iran also reportedly stated that it will charge vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz a fee of up to $2 million US dollars, the revenue from which it will split with Oman and use for post-war reconstruction.[9] Iran's proposal to charge vessels that transit the Strait of Hormuz highlights Iran's attempt to use the strait as a point of leverage and for its financial gain.
Israel has reportedly agreed to cease operations against Iran and Hezbollah if Iran halts its operations in the Strait of Hormuz.[10] Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif posted on X on April 7 that Iran and the United States’ allies, presumably referring to Iran's Axis of Resistance and Israel, respectively, have agreed to an immediate ceasefire “everywhere, including [in] Lebanon and elsewhere.”[11] Israel and members of Iran's Axis of Resistance have not commented on the ceasefire at the time of this writing.
Combined force strikes on Iranian railways and roads may have cut off several Iranian lines of transportation to move weapons, including missiles and missile launchers or components, across Iran. The IDF struck eight rail bridges and road segments that the Iranian regime uses to move weapons and other military equipment.[12] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that the IDF struck routes that Iran has used to transport missile launchers across Iran in order to evade combined force targeting.[13] These strikes primarily appear to impact transport routes in northwestern and central Iran, which mirrors the combined force's strikes on Iranian missile infrastructure primarily in western and central Iran. The destruction of key railway and road infrastructure may also have multiple secondary effects, such as further disrupting Iran's economy or limiting the regime's ability to move military and security forces across the country.
Several of the strikes appear to have been designed to disrupt the movement of missiles or other weapons to Iran's northwest by severing key Iranian railways connecting Tehran, Zanjan, and Tabriz. It is unclear how heavily Iranian forces rely on railways to transfer this equipment, however. Geolocated images show a cratered railway bridge in Chaharbagh, west of Karaj.[14] This railway connects Tehran to the Caspian Sea through Gilan Province and to other rail lines that lead to Tabriz and Urmia, the capitals of Iran's East Azerbaijan and West Azerbaijan provinces. Iran has two prominent missile bases located near Tabriz—the Southwest Tabriz and Amand missile bases—that the combined force has struck several times in this conflict.[15] Iran has increasingly launched missiles from central Iran as the combined force has degraded its ability to launch missiles from western Iran. Iran may seek to transfer missiles to western Iran that do not have a sufficient range to reach Israel if they are launched from central Iran. OSINT accounts on X reported that the combined force struck a railway bridge in Aminabad, Zanjan Province.[16] Anti-regime media claimed that there is an ammunition and missile depot located near this bridge.[17]
Israeli strikes on roadways and overpasses along routes that connect Tehran to western Iran may have also aimed to disrupt Iranian transfers of missile launchers or other weapons to these areas. An open-source intelligence (OSINT) account posted footage on X of a combined force strike that destroyed an overpass along a highway in eastern Karaj.[18] This strike reportedly took place along a highway that connects Karaj and Tehran to western Iran, and the strike took place around five kilometers south of Karaj’s B1 (Bileghan) Bridge, which is located along the same route. US forces struck the B1 Bridge on April 2 to disrupt Iran's ability to transfer missiles to western Iran.[19] The IDF also struck a bridge along the Hashtroud-Tabriz highway in East Azerbaijan Province.[20] The Hashtroud-Tabriz highway is the main highway that links Tehran to Tabriz through Zanjan. There are presumably alternative routes that Iranian forces could theoretically use, however.
The strikes may also disrupt to some degree Iranian movement of equipment by rail or road between Tehran and central Iran, including in Esfahan. An Israeli journalist posted footage of a reported strike on a railway bridge in Kashan, Esfahan Province, along the main rail line that connects Esfahan City to Qom to the north and ultimately, Tehran.[21] This strike appears to have severed a key rail line between Tehran and not only Esfahan, but also Shiraz and Kerman. Anti-regime media and OSINT accounts on X reported that the combined force struck an unspecified bridge in Qom City, Qom Province.[22] The combined force also struck a rail bridge near Qaleh No, Tehran Province, along the railway that connects Tehran to Mashhad in northeastern Iran.[23]
Russia may be helping Iran conduct attacks on international shipping in the Strait of Hormuz by providing Iran with satellite imagery of the strait.[24] Reuters reported on April 7 that Russian satellites are “actively surveying” the Strait of Hormuz, according to Ukrainian intelligence.[25] Russia has provided Iran with satellite imagery of US, Gulf, and Turkish military assets in the Middle East to help Iran conduct attacks since the war began.[26] Russia previously provided the Houthis with targeting intelligence in 2024 to support their attacks targeting international shipping.[27] United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) has received 28 reports of attacks or incidents affecting civilian vessels transiting the strait since the war began.[28] A source familiar with Ukrainian intelligence separately told Israeli media on April 7 that Russia provided Iran with a list of 55 critical energy infrastructure targets in Israel.[29]
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi and Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Commander Ali Abdollahi Aliabadi are reportedly driving decisions related to Iran's kinetic response to the US and Israeli air campaign, according to two sources close to President Masoud Pezeshkian’s office speaking to anti-regime media on April 7.[30] Pezeshkian accused both commanders on April 4 of acting unilaterally and fueling escalation through attacks on regional countries, according to the sources.[31] These internal tensions come amid a separate British media report on April 6 that Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei is incapacitated and receiving medical treatment in Qom, citing a diplomatic memo based on US and Israeli intelligence shared with Gulf allies.[32]
The IDF continued to target IRGC headquarters in Tehran. The IDF struck an IRGC headquarters in Shahrak-e Valfajr, Tehran City, on April 6. There are several military and internal security sites in this area, including the IRGC General Command Headquarters.[56] The IDF previously struck the IRGC General Command Headquarters on March 4 and damaged at least four buildings.[57] The IRGC is the primary body responsible for controlling the Iranian missile and drone arsenals and managing and supporting Iran's Axis of Resistance.[58] The IRGC also oversees the IRGC Ground Forces, which have historically played a role in maintaining internal security.
The IDF said that it also struck an IRGC site that “served the armed forces responsible for suppressing the civilian population in Iran.”[59] CTP-ISW could not confirm the exact site that was struck, but there are several IRGC facilities located near the targeted area, including the IRGC Intelligence Protection Organization and IRGC Ground Forces Headquarters.
US forces “restruck” Iranian military targets on Kharg Island on April 7.[60] The United States reportedly conducted over 90 strikes on military infrastructure on Kharg Island on April 7.[61] A US official told the New York Times that the US strikes were “restrikes” targeting previously targeted military sites on the island.[62] The United States struck bunkers, ammunition storage facilities, a radar station, and other military targets.[63] The United States previously struck military targets on Kharg Island on March 13.[64] The United States did not target oil infrastructure or port facilities in either the March 13 or April 7 strikes.[65] The most recent strikes on Kharg Island come after unspecified sources familiar with US intelligence reports told CNN on March 26 that Iran has reinforced Kharg Island with man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) and other military equipment in recent weeks.[66]
Iran continued to conduct drone and missile attacks against the Gulf states. Iran fired 22 drones and 11 ballistic missiles at Saudi Arabia between 2:00 PM ET on April 6 and 2:00 PM ET on April 7.[73] The Saudi Defense Ministry reported that debris from seven intercepted Iranian ballistic missiles fell near Saudi energy facilities in Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province.[74] Multiple media outlets and OSINT accounts published footage of an explosion at the Jubail Industrial City in eastern Saudi Arabia.[75] The IRGC claimed that it launched missiles and drones targeting US energy companies located in Jubail.[76] Saudi Arabia closed the King Fahd Causeway, the only road that links Saudi Arabia to Bahrain, due to the threat of further Iranian attacks targeting the Eastern Province.[77] The United Arab Emirates (UAE) recorded the lowest number of Iranian drone launches at the UAE since March 26 and the lowest number of ballistic missile launches at the UAE since March 25 (see below).[78] An OSINT account reported that an Iranian ballistic missile injured two Pakistani nationals and damaged a Thuraya Telecommunications Company building in Shajarah Governorate, the UAE, on April 7.[79] The Kuwaiti Army reported that it intercepted 17 drones targeting Kuwait in the past 24 hours.[80] This is a notable decrease from the 14 ballistic missiles, two cruise missiles, and 46 drones that the Kuwaiti Army intercepted on April 6.[81]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-7-2026/
US President Donald Trump announced on April 7 that the United States and Iran had agreed to a two-week ceasefire deal mediated by Pakistan.[1] Trump stated that Iran sent a ten-point proposal to form the basis of upcoming negotiations in Islamabad, Pakistan, on April 10.[2] Trump stated that “almost all” of the previous points of contention between the sides have been agreed to.[3] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media reported on April 8 that Iran will withdraw from the ceasefire agreement if Israel continues to attack Lebanon, citing an informed source, however.[4] Iran's proposal includes multiple points that contradict the US 15-point proposal on March 24.[5] Iran's proposed ten points are as follows:
A guarantee of no further US attacks against Iran
Iran maintains control of the Strait of Hormuz.
Ending the regional war on all fronts, including against Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from all bases and positions in the region.
Reparations to Iran for war damages.
Acceptance of Iran's right to nuclear enrichment.
Lifting all primary sanctions on Iran.
Lifting all secondary sanctions on Iran.
Termination of all resolutions against Iran by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Termination of all United Nations Security Council resolutions against Iran.[6]
The US proposal stipulated that Iran would not enrich uranium on Iranian soil and dismantle its nuclear program.[7] Trump has demanded multiple times that Iran reopen the Strait of Hormuz.[8]
Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf stated on April 8 that the United States and/or Israel violated three of Iran's points in the ten-point proposal.[9] Iran's proposal is a framework for negotiation and not a binding agreement on the United States, however. Ghalibaf claimed that Israel violated Iran's demand by continuing to strike Lebanon despite Lebanon not being part of the ceasefire agreement (see below).[10] Ghalibaf also claimed that the United States denied Iran's “right” to enrich uranium.[11] Iran's “right” to enrich uranium was one of the main points of negotiation before the war, and Iran never made a serious compromise on the point of uranium enrichment. Uranium enrichment will remain a major point of negotiation in the upcoming talks on April 10.[12]
Senior US and Israeli officials stated on April 7 and 8 that the Israeli campaign in Lebanon is not a part of the US-Iran ceasefire deal. Hezbollah officials claimed that unspecified actors informed the group that it would be a party to the ceasefire deal.[13] US President Donald Trump told PBS News on April 8 that Lebanon is not included in the US-Iran ceasefire deal.[14] Trump claimed that the Israeli campaign in Lebanon is “a separate skirmish.”[15] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's Office released a statement on April 7 saying that the two-week ceasefire does not apply to Lebanon.[16] Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff General Eyal Zamir said that Israel will continue to launch strikes targeting Hezbollah “non-stop” in Lebanon.[17] Hezbollah parliamentarian Ibrahim Moussawi told Reuters on April 8 that Hezbollah halted attacks against Israel after unspecified actors ”informed [Hezbollah] that it [was] part of the ceasefire – so we abided by it.”[18] A Hezbollah official told AP that Hezbollah would give mediators a chance to secure a ceasefire in Lebanon.[19] The official said that Hezbollah had not agreed to the ceasefire yet because Israel had yet to adhere to it.[20] Three Lebanese sources close to Hezbollah told Reuters that Hezbollah stopped attacking Israeli targets on April 8.[21] Hezbollah parliamentarian Hassan Fadlallah told Reuters that Israeli strikes on Lebanon were a ceasefire violation that would have” repercussions for the entire agreement.”[22] All claimed Hezbollah attacks occurred before the US and Iran implemented the ceasefire, with the last claimed attack occurring at 18:00 ET on April 7.[23] ISW-CTP has not observed any Israeli reports of Hezbollah attacks on northern Israel at the time of this writing.
The IDF conducted the largest number of airstrikes against Hezbollah personnel and infrastructure throughout Lebanon, including central Beirut, since the start of the Israeli campaign in Lebanon.[24] The IDF struck over 100 Hezbollah headquarters, command-and-control centers, missile launch sites, and Hezbollah drone unit and Radwan Force sites in Beirut, southern Lebanon, and the Bekaa Valley.[25] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said that the Israeli strikes were the “largest concentrated blow” dealt to Hezbollah since the September 2024 Israeli pager operation, which killed 39 people and wounded more than 3,400.[26] Open source (OSINT) accounts published and geolocated footage showing Israeli strikes in areas of central Beirut, including Ain al Mraiseh and Mazraa.[27] The IDF has repeatedly struck sites in Beirut's southern suburbs since the start of the conflict.[28] The IDF has rarely targeted Hezbollah personnel or sites in central Beirut, however.[29] IDF Arabic spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Ella Waweya reported on April 8 that Hezbollah has begun to relocate forces from Beirut's southern suburbs to densely populated civilian areas in central Beirut to complicate the IDF’s ability to target the group.[30] The IDF reportedly killed Hezbollah-aligned cleric Sadiq al Nabulsi in an airstrike on the al Zahraa complex in Sidon, Sidon District.[31] Lebanese media reported that Nabulsi was not an official Hezbollah member but preached in favor of Hezbollah.[32] IDF strikes killed 182 people and wounded 890 others, according to the Lebanese Health Ministry.[33] The Health Ministry's numbers did not distinguish between combatants and non-combatants.[34]
Iran has continued to threaten shipping in the Strait of Hormuz despite the ceasefire, which is making vessels reticent to transit the strait. Unspecified Iranian maritime and military authorities have issued radio warnings that vessels transiting without permission could be destroyed.[35] Iran is levying these threats so that it can extract tolls on traffic through an international waterway. The Iranian Oil, Gas, and Petrochemical Product Exporters’ Union spokesperson, close to the Iranian regime, told the Financial Times on April 8 that Iran intends to continue to monitor everything entering and exiting the strait to prevent unspecified weapons transfers to unspecified states.[36] The spokesperson added that Iran requires vessels to transit along Iran's coastline and to submit cargo details by email to Iranian authorities.[37] The spokesperson added that Iran will impose a $1‑per‑barrel tariff on oil shipments—reportedly payable in bitcoin to bypass sanctions—while empty tankers would transit for free.[38] The Wall Street Journal reported in April that fees could alternatively be paid in Chinese yuan and could rise as high as $2 million for large tankers.[39] Iranian shipping officials on April 8 have publicly defended tolls and monitoring as lawful and enforceable under international maritime norms, citing environmental protection and enforcement obligations.[40] Omani Transport Minister Saeed bin Hamoud bin Saeed al Maawali stated on April 8 that Oman will not impose fees as it has signed international maritime agreements; however, and pointed to a legal vacuum created by non‑signatory states such as Iran and the United States.[41] A hardline Iranian Parliament member added on April 8 that political conditions, including mandating the use of the term “Persian Gulf” on shipping documents and pledging to devote 30 percent of Strait‑related revenues to defense and 70 percent to war‑loss compensation.[42] These measures follow parliament's approval of a new management plan that introduces transit fees and Iranian approval for passage on March 30.[43]
Traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remains significantly low amid Iran's lingering threats and uncertainty over a fragile ceasefire. Commercial maritime tracking data showed only five Iranian‑flagged cargo vessels entered the strait, while just three international oil tankers, six international cargo vessels, and one unknown Iranian-flagged vessel exited via Iran's alternative route between April 7 at 2:00 PM ET and April 8 at 2:00 PM ET.[44] The S&P Global Market Intelligence recorded that Iran permitted only four vessels to transit on April 7, the lowest daily total so far in April.[45] Major shipping companies, including Maersk and Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, continue to suspend or tightly limit transits, citing the absence of clear rules and security guarantees.[46] Shipping and maritime intelligence executives told the Financial Times that daily traffic has fallen to just 10 to 15 vessels, compared with roughly 135 per day before the crisis.[47] Around 800 tankers are now waiting to transit, with an estimated 300 to 400 vessels effectively stranded inside the Persian Gulf.[48]
Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi had to convince Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders to accept the US proposal for a ceasefire, according to a regional source familiar with the talks speaking to Axios.[49] The ceasefire follows reports that a group of veteran hardline IRGC commanders has consolidated power within the Iranian regime in recent weeks and is playing an increasingly central role in decision-making, such as appointments to key positions.[50] These commanders have been deeply involved in the highest levels of the regime since its foundation in 1979. That Araghchi reportedly had to convince members of the IRGC to accept the ceasefire suggests that the IRGC maintains significant influence over key regime decisions and continues to push for more hardline, anti-Western policies. Sources familiar with talks also described Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s approval for the ceasefire as a “breakthrough” and added that he approved all major decisions related to the ceasefire on April 6 and 7.[51] This suggests that Mojtaba may also retain at least some level of decision-making authority amid reports that Mojtaba is badly injured due to US-Israeli airstrikes and is absent from decision-making.
The combined force struck multiple Iranian petrochemical facilities before the ceasefire went into effect. Anti-regime media reported airstrikes on the Amir Kabir Petrochemical Company, the Bandar Imam Petrochemical Company, and the Mahshahr Fajr Petrochemical Company in Khuzestan Province on April 7.[52] The IDF previously struck the Amir Kabir Petrochemical Company and the Mahshahr Fajr Petrochemical Company on April 4.[53] The IDF has struck several Iranian petrochemical facilities in the days before the ceasefire.[54]
Iran launched multiple strikes targeting Gulf countries after the ceasefire went into effect. The United Arab Emirates (UAE)’s Defense Ministry announced on April 8 that Iran launched 17 ballistic missiles and 35 drones at the UAE after the ceasefire went into effect.[61] Kuwait's Defense Ministry said that Iran launched 28 drones at Kuwait since 1:00 AM ET on April 8, with Kuwait intercepting most of the drones.[62] Kuwait did not characterize these attacks as ceasefire violations, however. Iranian drones struck several sites, including oil facilities and three power and water desalination plants, at the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation and Ministry of Electricity, Water, and Renewable Energy in Kuwait City on April 8, causing significant material damage.[63] Iran did not claim attacks targeting the UAE and Kuwait, but Iranian media noted that the attacks occurred after the reported attacks targeting Iranian oil facilities on Lavan island.[64] The IDF denied its involvement in the attacks targeting the oil facilities.[65]
More text, maps and graphs:
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-8-2026/