Senior officials in Tehran have signaled that they seek to use the Strait of Hormuz and energy flows around it as points of leverage that Iran can use after the war to extract concessions and secure strategic aims. Multiple Iranian officials and institutions, including Iranian parliament speaker and key regime leader Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, several IRGC-linked media platforms, and an analyst close to Iranian security institutions, all highlighted the strait's value as leverage and Iran's ability to use its leverage over shipping through the strait to “ensure” the regime's survival now and in the future.[1] Some of the officials discussing the value of the Hormuz are not decisionmakers, but their statements reflect a broader discussion in Tehran about how to achieve short- and long-term military and strategic aims. The analyst close to the regime stated on April 1 that Iran can remove the ability of the United States and Israel to threaten it if it maintains its “legal-security dominance” over the strait even after the war ends.[2]
These statements indicate that Iran could continue to use its proven ability to disrupt shipping in the strait after the war ends to deter the United States and its partners or compel them to avoid actions that would have negative impacts on Iran. Iran would not need to continue attacks indefinitely to retain the ability to deter and coerce the United States and its partners using the leverage Tehran has over the straits. Iran now has a proven ability to disrupt the global economy by shutting down the Strait, and it could threaten to disrupt shipping in the future for any reason and at any time. Iran may be especially incentivized to leverage its control around the strait if it concludes that such actions are an effective means of coercing the United States and its partners.
Iran has continued attacks on shipping amid discussions in Tehran about Iran's leverage over the strait. Iran attacked the Panamanian-flagged AQUA 1 oil tanker, leased by Qatari state-owned energy firm, 17 nautical miles northwest of Ras Laffan, Qatar.[3] The tanker's hull sustained damage.[4] This is the second Iranian attack on a civilian vessel in two consecutive days.[5] Such attacks are one of the ways that Iran can impede shipping around the strait.
The UAE, among other Gulf countries, appears to support more aggressive action to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. Emirati leaders almost certainly view Iran's efforts to control the strait, combined with sustained Iranian missile and drone strikes against the UAE, as a direct threat to the UAE’s security. The United Nations Security Council is expected to vote on April 2 on a resolution that would authorize the use of “all necessary means” to protect shipping in and around the strait.[6] Unspecified Arab officials told the Wall Street Journal that the UAE has lobbied in favor of this resolution.[7] The resolution comes amid reports that the UAE may be willing to deploy assets to secure international shipping in the strait.[8] The UAE almost certainly views Iranian efforts to assert sovereignty over the strait as a direct threat to its economic security. Iran has significantly disrupted shipping in the strait, which serves as a critical maritime chokepoint for the UAE and other Gulf states, since the war began. Senior UAE official Anwar Gargash stated on March 17 that the UAE’s “main concentration is…the Iranian threat on [the UAE’s] security.”[9] He emphasized that the strait is an international waterway and that states that rely on it share a responsibility to ensure the free flow of trade. The strait is critical to the UAE’s oil exports, liquefied natural gas trade, and food imports. Gargash also warned that Gulf states cannot accept a future defined by persistent Iranian missile and nuclear threats.[10] Iran has launched more missiles and drones at the UAE than at any other country since the war began, including Israel.[11] Iran retaining the ability to disrupt international shipping and resume missile and drone attacks on Gulf countries at any time poses a direct threat to the UAE and other Gulf countries.
Iranian officials have signaled that they will not accept a ceasefire or halt disruptions to international shipping in the Strait of Hormuz unless the United States and Israel cease all attacks on Iran. This position is inconsistent with the stated US position on a ceasefire. US President Donald Trump stated on April 1 that Iran's “new regime president” has requested a ceasefire and emphasized that the United States will only consider one when the Strait of Hormuz is “open, free, and clear.”[12] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei rejected Trump's claim as “false and baseless.”[13] Iranian officials have repeatedly stated that they seek a permanent end to the war that guarantees the United States and Israel will cease all attacks on Iran.[14] Iran views the period between the Israeli strikes in June 2025 and the current conflict as a ”pause” in one war. The demands for a ”permanent end” are akin to a guarantee that the United States and Israel will not attack Iran in the future as well. Iranian officials have stated that Iran will not grant the United States access to the Strait of Hormuz to secure a ceasefire, even after the war ends.[15]
The combined force has continued decapitation strikes targeting senior Iranian officials. The IDF confirmed on April 1 that it killed IRGC Quds Force Lebanon Corps Engineering Head Mehdi Vafaei in Mahallat, Markazi Province.[36] Vafaei was responsible for advancing underground projects in Lebanon and Syria for Hezbollah and the Assad regime and he managed dozens of underground facilities in Lebanon used to store advanced weapons.[37] The IRGC separately confirmed on March 31 that an Israeli airstrike killed an adviser to the Armed Forces General Staff chief in Tehran Province.[38] The United States sanctioned Eshaghi in February 2025 for his role in an international network that facilitated illicit oil sales to China, which generated hundreds of millions of dollars for Iran's armed forces and supported the Axis of Resistance.[39] The combined force also reportedly killed Mohammad Sadeghi, who was an engineering officer under the IRGC Aerospace Force al Ghadir Missile Command.[40] Sadeghi reportedly was responsible for constructing underground tunnels and missile infrastructure.[41]
The IRGC appears to have further consolidated control over Iran's political system by sidelining the Iranian president, Masoud Pezeshkian’s government and restricting access to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei. Anti-regime media reported on March 31 that growing friction between Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and the IRGC has pushed Pezeshkian into a “complete political deadlock.”[98] The IRGC reportedly blocked Pezeshkian’s decisions, with IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi pressuring him and preventing the selection of a new intelligence minister.[99] Vahidi reportedly insisted that all sensitive positions must be selected and managed directly by the IRGC during the war.[100] Anti-regime media also reported on March 31 that a “military council” composed of senior IRGC officers has assumed control over the regime's core decision-making apparatus and established a security perimeter around Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei.[101] The ”military council” reportedly prevented government reports from reaching him and ignored Pezeshkian’s repeated requests for a meeting with Mojtaba.[102]
Anti-regime media separately reported on March 31 that an “unprecedented crisis” is emerging within the inner circle of Mojtaba, with some close associates reportedly seeking to remove former Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Political and Security Affairs, Ali Asghar Hejazi, from the Supreme Leader's office.[103] The report added that this effort stems from Hejazi’s opposition to Mojtaba’s succession, including warnings that Mojtaba lacks leadership qualifications and that hereditary succession is incompatible with the “Islamic Republic.”[104] Hejazi reportedly also warned that Mojtaba’s selection would effectively hand full control of the state to the IRGC and permanently sideline administrative institutions.[105]
These reports are consistent with earlier reports that the IRGC has expanded its influence over regime decision-making following Mojtaba Khamenei’s selection as supreme leader.[106] Senior Iranian sources told Reuters on March 10 that the IRGC “forced through” Mojtaba’s appointment to ensure alignment with hardline policies and overpowered opposing political and clerical figures.[107] Mojtaba’s inner circle is dominated by long-standing IRGC commanders, including Ahmad Vahidi, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and Mohammad Ali Jafari, who played key roles in securing his selection and shaping regime decision-making.[108] CTP-ISW previously assessed on March 21 that the IRGC has increasingly filled a leadership vacuum caused by decapitation strikes and Mojtaba’s apparent inability to govern, consolidating control over political, military, and internal security institutions.[109]
The Iranian regime has continued its nationwide counterintelligence and internal security operations. The regime conducted mass arrests and disrupted alleged espionage and militant networks across multiple provinces between March 30 and April 1.[110] Iranian authorities reported over 1,000 arrests in March alone, including individuals for espionage, filming sensitive sites, and supporting adversary-linked networks.[111] The United Nations Human Rights Office reported on April 1 that approximately 2,345 individuals have been arrested in Iran since the start of the war on charges related to national security, including terrorism, dissent, alleged espionage, and “cooperation with the enemy.”[112]
The regime has also expanded public securitization measures, including the deployment of security personnel and equipment across civilian infrastructure and the integration of society into internal defense efforts. Reporting indicates that Iranian forces have operated in at least 70 civilian locations, including schools, hospitals, and mosques.[113] The Basij and affiliated organizations have also increased recruitment and mobilization efforts, including volunteer registration campaigns and, in some cases, the use of minors in checkpoint and patrol roles.[114] Iranian authorities have also reinforced legal deterrence by warning that individuals accused of espionage or collaboration with hostile actors may face execution and asset seizure.[1]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-1-2026/
updated link to liveblog https://www.iranintl.com/en/liveblog/202604015564
The combined force has begun striking targets in Iran beyond narrowly defined military targets, such as military vehicles or ammunition depots. The combined force struck the Darou Pakhsh Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Company and the Pasteur Institute of Iran in Tehran Province on April 1 and 2. The Japanese government has listed Darou Pakhsh and the Pasteur Institute of Iran as entities associated with Iranian biological and chemical weapons activities. The combined force has also recently targeted Iranian steel factories, which are critical for both Iran's military production capabilities and the Iranian economy.
US President Donald Trump stated that the United States’ “strategic objectives” for the war are “nearing completion” during a press conference on April 1. Trump said that the United States will continue the war effort until US objectives are “fully achieved.” Trump said that the United States will strike Iran over the “next two to three weeks” while indirect talks between the United States and Iran continue.
US forces struck the B1 (Bileghan) Bridge connecting Tehran and Karaj, Alborz Province, on April 2 to disrupt Iran's ability to transfer missiles to western Iran. A US official told Axios on April 2 that Iran used the bridge to transport missiles and missile components from Tehran to launch sites in western Iran. Iran has increasingly launched missiles from central Iran as the combined force has degraded its ability to launch missiles from western Iran. Iran may seek to transfer missiles to western Iran that do not have a sufficient range to reach Israel if they are launched from central Iran.
Hezbollah may be increasing fire at Israel during Passover to impose psychological impacts on Israeli civilians. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said on April 2 that Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem will pay a “very heavy price” for “the intensified fire toward Israeli civilians as they…celebrate Passover.”
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-2-2026/