Iran's ballistic missile program is a military organization that consists of both combat and support elements, and it is impossible to evaluate the overall degradation of Iran's ballistic missile program based on one element of the system. The ballistic missile program consists of combat elements—Iran's missile stockpile and launchers—but it also includes support elements, such as research facilities, development institutions, and industrial facilities. Any evaluation of the degradation that discounts the status of the support elements of the program is therefore incomplete. The US–Israeli campaign has targeted nearly every element of Iran's ballistic program (see below).
The majority of Iranian ballistic missiles are combat ineffective, even if they remain “intact.”[1] About 50 percent of Iranian missile launchers are still “intact,” according to recent US intelligence assessments.[2] This figure, however, appears to include launchers that have been damaged or rendered inaccessible. A unit is considered combat ineffective when it cannot accomplish its assigned mission. A unit does not necessarily need to be destroyed to be considered combat ineffective. A missile launcher that is buried is combat ineffective for the period it is buried. It is also combat ineffective if it cannot move from its underground storage facility.[3]
Assessing Iran's missile threat accurately requires distinguishing between different missile types. Iran possesses short-, medium-, and long-range ballistic missiles in its arsenal. Iran relies on medium-range ballistic missiles to target Israel. Iran fires its short-range missiles to target Gulf states and US assets in these countries. Estimates on the status of Iran's missile program do not distinguish between the two, which limits the ability to use these estimates to completely understand the status of Iran's missile program.
The combined force has rendered many of Iran's missile launchers combat ineffective, but it is entirely unclear whether these “launchers” refer to launchers for medium-range or short-range systems or whether any of the launchers are interchangeable between medium-range and short-range systems. The combined force has struck several tunnel entrances and at least five underground missile facilities to prevent Iranian forces from being able to access missile launchers in these facilities.[4] CNN analyzed 107 Iranian tunnel entrances on March 21 and found that the combined force had struck 77 percent of the tunnel entrances.[5] The status of the launchers in these underground facilities is unclear, but striking these tunnel entrances has at least temporarily rendered these launchers combat ineffective. The combined force has also targeted Iran's efforts to clear rubble from collapsed tunnel entrances.[6] Western media also reported that Iran retains 50 percent of its drone capabilities.[7] Combat ineffectiveness is a temporary state, but other combined force strikes have worked to make it more difficult for Iran to make its ballistic missile forces combat effective again (see below for information on defense industrial strikes).
The rate of Iranian missile fire suggests that Iran's medium-range ballistic missile force has been significantly degraded. The US military assessed that Iranian missile fire has reduced by around 90 percent since the start of the war.[8] ISW-CTP previously observed that Iran has been firing only a few missiles per salvo, and sometimes just one, at Israel in recent weeks.[9] Smaller salvoes are relatively easier for the IDF to intercept, as demonstrated by their performance against small Houthi salvoes between 2023 and 2025.
The short-range ballistic missile force has continued to conduct attacks at a steady rate, but the status of the short-range missile force remains unclear. Iranian missile fire targeting the Gulf states has remained relatively steady since the start of the war, excluding Iran's large missile launches targeting the UAE on the first day of the war. Iran's relatively consistent rate of missile fire at the Gulf states in the weeks since may reflect constraints in specific types of missiles compared to others. The status of Iranian short-range missile capabilities, which target the Gulf states, is difficult to assess using open-source information at this time. Missile fire at the Gulf states has remained relatively steady in recent weeks, but there is limited clarity about how large the remaining stockpiles are and what tactical limitations the Iranian short-range missile units are facing.
The combined force has also targeted Iran's drone program, including drone launchers, but the status of the program is unclear.[10] Western media estimated that Iran retains 50 percent of its drone capabilities.[11] Neither the United States nor Israel has released information about the total number of drone targets struck, but reports suggest drone launches have decreased since the start of the war.[12]
US-Israeli strikes, particularly decapitation strikes, have also created a pervasive fear that may be cause Iranian forces to prioritize their survival and impede their ability to execute their assigned mission. US and Israeli strikes have severely degraded Iran's medium-range missile capabilities. Iranian missile fire targeting Israel has steadily declined since the beginning of the war. Iran has, on average, fired only a few missiles per salvo at Israel since March 20. This impact is less clear within the short-range missile force. US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth stated on March 31 that combined force airstrikes have degraded the Iranian military's morale and even led to “widespread desertions, key personnel shortages, and caused frustrations amongst senior leaders.[13] The IDF stated on March 24 that ballistic missile units have refused to go to launch sites due to fear of IDF strikes.[14] Iranian forces also appear to be struggling with recruitment and retention.[15] Some reserve forces have reportedly failed to show up at military centers, for example.[16] These factors can render missile systems combat ineffective because they lack available or willing forces to operate them.
The US-Israeli campaign has solidified the operational success generated by rendering launchers combat ineffective and destroying missile stockpiles by targeting Iran's defense industrial base extensively. Strikes on these sites will make it more challenging for Iran to reconstitute its missile and drone program over the long-term. Iran retains an unclear number of missiles and drones in its stockpiles, but ongoing strikes on Iranian defense industrial sites degrade Iran's ability to rebuild these stockpiles. Iran has also used a sizable portion of its weapons stockpiles in attacks on Israel and the Gulf since the war began. The force has conducted extensive strikes targeting Iran's missile and drone production capabilities. The IDF announced on March 31 that it estimates that it has targeted nearly 70 percent of Iran's defense industry.[17] Combined force strikes have severely damaged Iran's four major missile production sites, including the Khojir, Shahroud, Parchin, and Hakimiyeh facilities, for example.[18] Strikes on defense industrial targets have degraded several components of the missile program, including research, fuel production, components, and testing facilities. The combined force has targeted Iran's steel production capabilities, which are critical for Iran's ballistic missile production capabilities.[19] Iran has ceased operations at its main steel production facility in Esfahan Province, due to damage from repeated airstrikes.[20] The IDF announced on April 3 that it had destroyed 70 percent of Iran's steel production capacity.[21]
The pattern of recorded US-Israeli strikes shows a gradual shift towards targets in central and eastern Iran in more recent weeks of the campaign, but this effect could be the result of existing data limitations. The map above depicts reported and confirmed combined force airstrikes throughout the five weeks of the campaign. The strike data is aggregated in a series of tessellated cells in which each cell represents the average date of reported strikes within a given area. The combined force concentrated airstrikes targeting West Azerbaijan, East Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, Kermanshah, and Sistan and Baluchistan provinces at the beginning of the campaign, for example. The combined force gradually began to target Gilan, Yazd, Markazi, and Mazandaran provinces in central Iran at a greater scale during the later weeks of the campaign. The combined force has consistently struck Iranian targets in Tehran and Esfahan provinces throughout the campaign, likely given both regions relative importance to the Iranian military and defense industrial apparatus.
This map only depicts a small sample of the combined force's overall strike pattern and reflects the data limitations created by several conditions, including the Iranian regime's internet shutdown. Unverified textual reporting on strikes was excluded from the assessment. Restrictions upon commercially available satellite imagery limit ISW-CTP’s ability to visually confirm strikes. ISW-CTP defines confirmed airstrikes as kinetic activity that Israel or the United States confirmed through official channels or that were geolocated by visual means. ISW-CTP defines reported airstrikes as kinetic activity reported by authoritative sources with or without footage, but has not been confirmed with collaborative evidence.
Unspecified US and Israeli officials confirmed that Iran shot down a US Air Force F-15E over Iran on April 3.[22] This incident is the first known US combat aircraft lost over Iranian territory since the beginning of the war.[23] An unspecified Israeli official and a second source with knowledge of the situation told Axios on April 3 that the two crew members ejected safely after the aircraft was hit.[24] Unspecified US and Israeli sources told the New York Times on April 3 that US forces rescued one crew member and are searching for a second crew member.[25] An unspecified senior Israeli official told Axios on April 3 that Israel canceled planned strikes in Iran to avoid disrupting the rescue effort.[26] Unspecified US officials told CBS News on April 3 that two helicopters participated in the search-and-rescue mission and recovered the F-15E pilot after ejection.[27] The officials added that small arms fire hit the helicopter carrying the recovered pilot, wounding crew members on board, but that the helicopter landed safely.[28] A US A-10 Warthog involved in the search and rescue mission crashed near the Strait of Hormuz.[29] Unspecified US officials said that the aircraft came under Iranian fire and was damaged.[30] The pilot was safely recovered.[31]
Iranian strikes and intercepted fragments damaged several Gulf energy facilities on April 3. Iran continues to target Gulf energy infrastructure, which is part of the Iranian effort to drive up global energy prices and coerce the Gulf states into pressuring the United States and Israel to end their campaign. An Iranian drone struck Kuwait's Mina al Ahmadi Refinery, causing a fire.[70] The Kuwaiti government also acknowledged that an Iranian attack inflicted “material damage” to an unspecified Kuwaiti power and water desalination plant.[71] Iran previously attacked a Kuwaiti desalination plant on March 29.[72] Debris from an unspecified Iranian projectile led to two fires and caused ”significant damage” to Abu Dhabi’s Habshan Gas Complex.[73] At least one person was killed.[74]
Iran continues to launch cruise missiles targeting Gulf states. Iran launched four cruise missiles targeting the UAE and two cruise missiles targeting Kuwait on April 3.[76] Iran has launched at least 45 cruise missiles targeting Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE since the beginning of the war.[77] Iran has used cruise missiles to target civilian ships in the Persian Gulf and also the Gulf states’ territory.
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-3-2026/