The combined force campaign targeting Iranian commanders is likely impeding their ability to conduct sizable and coordinated attacks. Officials familiar with US and Western intelligence assessments speaking to The New York Times on March 30 said that the deaths of local Iranian commanders have degraded the ability of local Iranian commanders to communicate to launch large and coordinated attacks.[1] The targeted killing of local commanders has immediate practical effects by removing key commanders who give orders. Decapitation also creates a pervasive fear that can cause targeted commanders to take precautions to survive that impede their ability to execute their assigned mission.[2] US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth stated on March 31 that combined force airstrikes have degraded the Iranian military's morale and even led to “widespread desertions, key personnel shortages and causing frustrations amongst senior leaders.”[3] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) are evidently facing recruitment struggles as they lowered the recruitment age to 12 to support patrols, checkpoints, and logistics.[4]
Iran launched only three missile barrages at Israel since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff at 2:00 PM ET on March 30, marking its lowest barrage rate of the war to date.[5] These salvoes also contain only a small number of missiles, which may be a byproduct of Iranian command-and-control challenges highlighted previously. Iran has been firing only a few missiles per salvo at Israel since March 20.[6] The three waves only consisted of one missile in two of the waves and a “small” number of missiles in the third wave.[7] Smaller salvoes are relatively easier for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)’s air defense systems to intercept, as demonstrated by their performance against small Houthi salvoes between 2023 and 2025.[8] Iran has only been launching one missile per salvo and three to seven salvoes per day at Israel for the past four days.[9] This is considerably less compared to what Iran fired at the start of the war.[10] The IDF also assessed that Iran's missile fire targeting Israel has slowed to around 10-15 missiles a day over the past two weeks.[11] The low salvo and missile-per-salvo rate targeting Israel does not necessarily imply Iran is suffering the same challenges when it comes to its short-range ballistic missiles that target the Gulf states, though March 31 saw a lower number of missiles targeting the Gulf states than the average.[12] Hegseth separately confirmed on March 31 that Iran launched its lowest number of missiles and drones in general in the past 24 hours.[13]
The combined force's extensive airstrikes targeting Iranian missile bases and production sites have also degraded Iran's ability to launch missile strikes against Israel. CTP-ISW recorded that the combined force has struck over 20 missile bases since the start of the war.[14] The Washington Post on March 29 identified ”severe damage” on satellite imagery to Iran's four major missile production sites, including Khojir, Shahroud, Parchin, and Hakimiyeh.[15] The IDF announced on March 31 that the Israeli Air Force (IAF) has struck 70 percent of Iran's defense industrial sites, which are essential to reconstituting Iran's missile capabilities.[16]
Iran is asserting sovereignty over international waterways by demanding payment from ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz. The Iranian Parliament National Security Commission passed a bill on March 30 titled the “Strait of Hormuz Management Plan,” which outlines a series of policies that assert that Iran has sovereignty over international waterways in the Strait of Hormuz.[17] The plan forces other countries to negotiate with Iran for safe passage through the strait and for some vessels to pay to transit through the strait, which is an international waterway. It also bans US and Israeli shipping or any ships from countries that sanction Iran.
Iran's parliament has little real power but its decision to pass this bill represents a desire in Tehran to continue to impede international shipping around the Strait after the war. Senior Iranian officials, including Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, have warned in recent weeks that the situation in the Strait of Hormuz “won't return to its pre-war status” following the war.[18] Expediency Discernment Council member Mohammad Mokhber stated on March 19 that Iran can use its position along the strait to “sanction [the West] and prevent their ships from passing through this waterway” even after the war ends.[19] Daily oil exports from the Middle East have fallen by at least 60 percent since the start of the war.[20] United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) has received 25 reports of attacks or incidents affecting civilian vessels transiting the strait since the war began.[21] Efforts to impede shipping around the strait could take a number of forms and would include efforts to threaten, disrupt, and selectively control traffic through the strait at any time or for any reason. Iran could use these threats to coerce concessions from the United States or its partners or deter them. Iran may be especially incentivized to leverage its control around the strait if it concludes that such actions are an effective means of coercing the United States and its partners.Iran has continued attacks on shipping in the Persian Gulf. An Iranian drone struck the Kuwaiti oil tanker al Salmi northwest of Dubai on March 30.[22] The attack did not injure any crew members aboard the vessel. This oil tanker is the first vessel that Iran has struck since March 18.[23] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy inaccurately claimed that it targeted the Singaporean-flagged Haiphong Express, which it probably mistook for the al Salmi.[24]
An unidentified senior official in Baghdad told a Kurdistan Democratic Party-affiliated journalist on March 30 that “more than a thousand” Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) fighters are believed to have crossed into Iran.[91] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service but many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias control PMF brigades that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[92] This confirmation comes after anti-regime media previously reported on March 30 that PMF fighters have deployed to Basij bases in western Iran.[93] The Basij is a paramilitary force that is responsible for civil defense and social control.[94] CTP-ISW assessed on March 30 that the Iranian regime may be mobilizing PMF fighters, in part, to strengthen control over previous protest hotspots.[95] Large protests took place in both Khorramshahr and Abadan during the December 2025-January 2026 protests.[96]
Unspecified European officials told Bloomberg on March 30 that Iran is pushing the Houthis to launch a renewed campaign against international shipping in the Red Sea, contingent on any further US escalation.[99] The officials added that Houthi leadership is divided on how aggressive its actions should be. This report comes after an unspecified journalist in Yemen told Israeli media on March 29 that “additional IRGC experts” recently arrived in Sanaa to strengthen coordination between the Houthis and Iran.[100]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-31-2026/
Senior officials in Tehran have signaled that they seek to use the Strait of Hormuz and energy flows around it as points of leverage that Iran can use after the war to extract concessions and secure strategic aims. Multiple Iranian officials and institutions, including Iranian parliament speaker and key regime leader Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, several IRGC-linked media platforms, and an analyst close to Iranian security institutions, all highlighted the strait's value as leverage and Iran's ability to use its leverage over shipping through the strait to “ensure” the regime's survival now and in the future.[1] Some of the officials discussing the value of the Hormuz are not decisionmakers, but their statements reflect a broader discussion in Tehran about how to achieve short- and long-term military and strategic aims. The analyst close to the regime stated on April 1 that Iran can remove the ability of the United States and Israel to threaten it if it maintains its “legal-security dominance” over the strait even after the war ends.[2]
These statements indicate that Iran could continue to use its proven ability to disrupt shipping in the strait after the war ends to deter the United States and its partners or compel them to avoid actions that would have negative impacts on Iran. Iran would not need to continue attacks indefinitely to retain the ability to deter and coerce the United States and its partners using the leverage Tehran has over the straits. Iran now has a proven ability to disrupt the global economy by shutting down the Strait, and it could threaten to disrupt shipping in the future for any reason and at any time. Iran may be especially incentivized to leverage its control around the strait if it concludes that such actions are an effective means of coercing the United States and its partners.
Iran has continued attacks on shipping amid discussions in Tehran about Iran's leverage over the strait. Iran attacked the Panamanian-flagged AQUA 1 oil tanker, leased by Qatari state-owned energy firm, 17 nautical miles northwest of Ras Laffan, Qatar.[3] The tanker's hull sustained damage.[4] This is the second Iranian attack on a civilian vessel in two consecutive days.[5] Such attacks are one of the ways that Iran can impede shipping around the strait.
The UAE, among other Gulf countries, appears to support more aggressive action to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. Emirati leaders almost certainly view Iran's efforts to control the strait, combined with sustained Iranian missile and drone strikes against the UAE, as a direct threat to the UAE’s security. The United Nations Security Council is expected to vote on April 2 on a resolution that would authorize the use of “all necessary means” to protect shipping in and around the strait.[6] Unspecified Arab officials told the Wall Street Journal that the UAE has lobbied in favor of this resolution.[7] The resolution comes amid reports that the UAE may be willing to deploy assets to secure international shipping in the strait.[8] The UAE almost certainly views Iranian efforts to assert sovereignty over the strait as a direct threat to its economic security. Iran has significantly disrupted shipping in the strait, which serves as a critical maritime chokepoint for the UAE and other Gulf states, since the war began. Senior UAE official Anwar Gargash stated on March 17 that the UAE’s “main concentration is…the Iranian threat on [the UAE’s] security.”[9] He emphasized that the strait is an international waterway and that states that rely on it share a responsibility to ensure the free flow of trade. The strait is critical to the UAE’s oil exports, liquefied natural gas trade, and food imports. Gargash also warned that Gulf states cannot accept a future defined by persistent Iranian missile and nuclear threats.[10] Iran has launched more missiles and drones at the UAE than at any other country since the war began, including Israel.[11] Iran retaining the ability to disrupt international shipping and resume missile and drone attacks on Gulf countries at any time poses a direct threat to the UAE and other Gulf countries.
Iranian officials have signaled that they will not accept a ceasefire or halt disruptions to international shipping in the Strait of Hormuz unless the United States and Israel cease all attacks on Iran. This position is inconsistent with the stated US position on a ceasefire. US President Donald Trump stated on April 1 that Iran's “new regime president” has requested a ceasefire and emphasized that the United States will only consider one when the Strait of Hormuz is “open, free, and clear.”[12] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei rejected Trump's claim as “false and baseless.”[13] Iranian officials have repeatedly stated that they seek a permanent end to the war that guarantees the United States and Israel will cease all attacks on Iran.[14] Iran views the period between the Israeli strikes in June 2025 and the current conflict as a ”pause” in one war. The demands for a ”permanent end” are akin to a guarantee that the United States and Israel will not attack Iran in the future as well. Iranian officials have stated that Iran will not grant the United States access to the Strait of Hormuz to secure a ceasefire, even after the war ends.[15]
The combined force has continued decapitation strikes targeting senior Iranian officials. The IDF confirmed on April 1 that it killed IRGC Quds Force Lebanon Corps Engineering Head Mehdi Vafaei in Mahallat, Markazi Province.[36] Vafaei was responsible for advancing underground projects in Lebanon and Syria for Hezbollah and the Assad regime and he managed dozens of underground facilities in Lebanon used to store advanced weapons.[37] The IRGC separately confirmed on March 31 that an Israeli airstrike killed an adviser to the Armed Forces General Staff chief in Tehran Province.[38] The United States sanctioned Eshaghi in February 2025 for his role in an international network that facilitated illicit oil sales to China, which generated hundreds of millions of dollars for Iran's armed forces and supported the Axis of Resistance.[39] The combined force also reportedly killed Mohammad Sadeghi, who was an engineering officer under the IRGC Aerospace Force al Ghadir Missile Command.[40] Sadeghi reportedly was responsible for constructing underground tunnels and missile infrastructure.[41]
The IRGC appears to have further consolidated control over Iran's political system by sidelining the Iranian president, Masoud Pezeshkian’s government and restricting access to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei. Anti-regime media reported on March 31 that growing friction between Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and the IRGC has pushed Pezeshkian into a “complete political deadlock.”[98] The IRGC reportedly blocked Pezeshkian’s decisions, with IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi pressuring him and preventing the selection of a new intelligence minister.[99] Vahidi reportedly insisted that all sensitive positions must be selected and managed directly by the IRGC during the war.[100] Anti-regime media also reported on March 31 that a “military council” composed of senior IRGC officers has assumed control over the regime's core decision-making apparatus and established a security perimeter around Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei.[101] The ”military council” reportedly prevented government reports from reaching him and ignored Pezeshkian’s repeated requests for a meeting with Mojtaba.[102]
Anti-regime media separately reported on March 31 that an “unprecedented crisis” is emerging within the inner circle of Mojtaba, with some close associates reportedly seeking to remove former Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Political and Security Affairs, Ali Asghar Hejazi, from the Supreme Leader's office.[103] The report added that this effort stems from Hejazi’s opposition to Mojtaba’s succession, including warnings that Mojtaba lacks leadership qualifications and that hereditary succession is incompatible with the “Islamic Republic.”[104] Hejazi reportedly also warned that Mojtaba’s selection would effectively hand full control of the state to the IRGC and permanently sideline administrative institutions.[105]
These reports are consistent with earlier reports that the IRGC has expanded its influence over regime decision-making following Mojtaba Khamenei’s selection as supreme leader.[106] Senior Iranian sources told Reuters on March 10 that the IRGC “forced through” Mojtaba’s appointment to ensure alignment with hardline policies and overpowered opposing political and clerical figures.[107] Mojtaba’s inner circle is dominated by long-standing IRGC commanders, including Ahmad Vahidi, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and Mohammad Ali Jafari, who played key roles in securing his selection and shaping regime decision-making.[108] CTP-ISW previously assessed on March 21 that the IRGC has increasingly filled a leadership vacuum caused by decapitation strikes and Mojtaba’s apparent inability to govern, consolidating control over political, military, and internal security institutions.[109]
The Iranian regime has continued its nationwide counterintelligence and internal security operations. The regime conducted mass arrests and disrupted alleged espionage and militant networks across multiple provinces between March 30 and April 1.[110] Iranian authorities reported over 1,000 arrests in March alone, including individuals for espionage, filming sensitive sites, and supporting adversary-linked networks.[111] The United Nations Human Rights Office reported on April 1 that approximately 2,345 individuals have been arrested in Iran since the start of the war on charges related to national security, including terrorism, dissent, alleged espionage, and “cooperation with the enemy.”[112]
The regime has also expanded public securitization measures, including the deployment of security personnel and equipment across civilian infrastructure and the integration of society into internal defense efforts. Reporting indicates that Iranian forces have operated in at least 70 civilian locations, including schools, hospitals, and mosques.[113] The Basij and affiliated organizations have also increased recruitment and mobilization efforts, including volunteer registration campaigns and, in some cases, the use of minors in checkpoint and patrol roles.[114] Iranian authorities have also reinforced legal deterrence by warning that individuals accused of espionage or collaboration with hostile actors may face execution and asset seizure.[1]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-1-2026/