The Turkish Defense Ministry announced on March 30 that NATO air defense systems intercepted an Iranian ballistic missile over the eastern Mediterranean Sea that had entered Turkish airspace.[1] This marks the fourth confirmed instance of an Iranian projectile entering Turkish airspace since the war began.[2] Iran has not commented on the attack at the time of this writing, but Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei denied on March 20 that Iran had conducted previous attacks on Turkey, calling them an Israeli ”false flag tactic.“[3] Iranian Defense Minister Majid Ibn al Reza held a phone call with Turkish Defense Minister Yasar Guler on March 30 to discuss the ongoing regional conflict, according to Iranian regime media.[4] The officials likely discussed Iran's violation of Turkish airspace. This incident comes after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky told NBC News on March 28 that Russia is providing Iran with satellite imagery of US and allied military assets in the Middle East, including Incirlik Airbase in Turkey.[5] ISW-CTP previously noted that Russia's provision of satellite imagery to Iran is helping Iran conduct attacks not only on US assets but also against US partners, such as Turkey.
Anti-regime media and a Kurdistan Democratic Party-affiliated journalist reported that Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) fighters have deployed to western Iran.[6] An Iraqi official speaking to anti-regime media claimed on March 30 that PMF fighters have deployed to Basij bases in Khorramshahr and Abadan in Khuzestan Province.[7] The Basij is a paramilitary force that is responsible for civil defense and social control.[8] The reported PMF deployment is notable given recent Iranian regime efforts to recruit new security force members.[9] The regime may be mobilizing PMF fighters, in part, to strengthen control over previous protest hotspots. Large protests took place in both Khorramshahr and Abadan during the December 2025-January 2026 protests.[10] Anti-regime media reported on March 29 that the combined force struck a border crossing checkpoint in Shalamcheh, Khuzestan Province.[11] Anti-regime media previously reported that PMF fighters had entered Iran via the Shalamcheh crossing.[12]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with Jordanian King Abdullah II in Amman, Jordan, on March 29 to discuss a potential security partnership.[13] This meeting comes after Ukraine signed defense agreements with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar on March 28.[14] Zelensky expressed Ukraine's willingness to help Jordan defend against missile and drone attacks.[15] Zelensky and King Abdullah II also discussed security issues related to the Strait of Hormuz, noting that Ukraine has experience unblocking maritime trade routes with unmanned surface vessels and is prepared to assist partners.[16] CNN reported on March 30 that Zelensky suggested that Ukrainian sea drones could be deployed in the Strait of Hormuz.[17]
US President Donald Trump told the Financial Times on March 30 that the combined force has struck 13,000 targets since the start of the war on February 28.[18] Trump added that the combined force still has around 3,000 targets left to strike.[19] The Israeli Air Force (IAF) stated on March 30 that it struck 170 targets over the past day.[20] The combined force has struck multiple Iranian military bases, defense industrial sites, and internal security institutions since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff.
An OSINT account reported that the US-Israeli combined force struck the Artesh Air Force 2nd Tactical Airbase in Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province, on March 29.[21] The account reported seven explosions at the base.[22] The combined force previously struck the 2nd Tactical Airbase around March 3.[23] The IDF also struck the 2nd Tactical Airbase during the 12-Day War in June 2025.[24] An OSINT account noted at the time that the 2nd Tactical Airbase is home to MiG-29 and F-5 aircraft belonging to the 21st, 22nd, and 23rd tactical fighter squadrons.[25]
An OSINT account reported that the combined force struck two missile bases near Shiraz, Fars Province, on March 30, including a base that Iran has used to launch missiles at Israel in previous rounds of conflict.[26] One of the bases that the combined force struck on March 30 is the Shiraz South Missile Base.[27] The combined force has previously struck this base during the war. Commercially available satellite imagery captured on March 7 showed that the combined force had used ground-penetrating munitions to target underground facilities at the Shiraz South Missile Base.[28] The Shiraz South Missile Base is one of Iran's 25 primary bases for launching medium-range ballistic missiles.[29]
The combined force continued to suppress Iranian air defenses. The IDF stated on March 30 that it has destroyed more than 80 percent of Iran's air defense systems.[30] The IDF struck an Iranian air defense site in Nowshahr, Mazandaran Province.[31] The air defense site is located near the Caspian Sea. The IDF previously targeted ”dozens of vessels” at the 4th Artesh Naval District Headquarters at Bandar Anzali Port, Gilan Province, on the Caspian Sea coast on March 18.[32] Anti-regime media reported explosions in Amol, Chalus, Babol, Nur, and Babolsar in Mazandaran Province on March 30.[33]
The combined force continued to strike internal security sites in western Iran. The IDF stated on March 30 that it struck Basij bases in Dehgolan and Divandarreh, Kurdistan Province.[34] The IDF also stated that it struck Law Enforcement Command (LEC) buildings in Sanandaj and Saghez, Kurdistan Province.[35] Iranian security forces suppressed protests in Dehgolan and Sanandaj in January 2026.[36]
White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated on March 30 that the United States has destroyed 150 Iranian vessels, including 92 percent of Iran's “largest vessels,” since the war began.[66] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine previously stated on March 19 that CENTCOM had destroyed 44 Iranian mine-laying vessels.[67] Iranian media reported that four vessels were struck in Bandar Lengeh, Hormozgan Province, on March 30.[68] The IRGC Navy 5th District is headquartered near Bandar Lengeh.[69]
Iran targeted a water desalination plant in Kuwait on March 29 as part of its ongoing drone and missile attack campaign against the Gulf countries.[73] The Kuwaiti Electricity, Water, and Renewable Energy Ministry confirmed that an Iranian strike damaged a service building at one of the ministry's power and water desalination facilities on March 29, killing one worker.[74] The Kuwaiti Armed Forces stated on March 30 that 13 drones entered Kuwaiti airspace in the past 24 hours.[75]
The Bahraini Defense Ministry announced that it intercepted seven drones and eight missiles launched from Iran on March 30.[76] The United Arab Emirates Defense Ministry reported that its air defenses intercepted 27 Iranian drones and 11 ballistic missiles.[77] Saudi Arabia's defense ministry confirmed that it intercepted seven Iranian drones and eight missiles.[78] The Qatari Defense Ministry announced that it intercepted an unspecified number of Iranian drones on March 30.[79]
The Houthis conducted a drone attack targeting Israel on March 29. The IDF said on March 29 that it intercepted two Houthi drones near Eilat, southern Israel.[113] This attack marks the third time that the Houthis have attacked Israel since entering the conflict on March 28.[114] The Houthis have not claimed the drone attack at the time of this writing.
IRGC advisers reportedly recently arrived in Houthi-controlled Saana, Yemen, to coordinate Houthi activities with Iran.[115] An unspecified journalist in Yemen told Israeli media on March 29 that “additional IRGC experts” recently arrived in Sanaa to strengthen coordination between the Houthis and Iran.[116]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-30-2026/
Although the three Ukrainian ports in Odesa region still experience Russian missile and drone strikes, they're visited by about 200 cargo ships a month, said Andrii Klymenko, head of the monitoring group on the situation in the Black Sea region with the Institute for Black Sea Strategic Studies. “Ukraine managed to create a complex system of cargo ship protection from all kinds of threats on the sea route from the territorial waters of Romania to the Odesa region,” Klymenko said. “I call it a tunnel.”
Ukraine hasn't gone into details about its strategy, but the system includes defense from air attacks, protection from sea mines and joint work by coastal artillery, the air force and other units, Klymenko said. A crucial factor were the sea drones used against the Russian fleet. “As of today, Ukraine's marine drones are not only kamikaze boats, but also platforms that can carry machine guns, rocket launchers and FPV drones,” Ihor Fedirko, CEO of Ukraine's Council of Defence Industry, told POLITICO.
https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-volodymyr-zelenskyy-help-unblock-strait-of-hormuz-iran-war/
The combined force campaign targeting Iranian commanders is likely impeding their ability to conduct sizable and coordinated attacks. Officials familiar with US and Western intelligence assessments speaking to The New York Times on March 30 said that the deaths of local Iranian commanders have degraded the ability of local Iranian commanders to communicate to launch large and coordinated attacks.[1] The targeted killing of local commanders has immediate practical effects by removing key commanders who give orders. Decapitation also creates a pervasive fear that can cause targeted commanders to take precautions to survive that impede their ability to execute their assigned mission.[2] US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth stated on March 31 that combined force airstrikes have degraded the Iranian military's morale and even led to “widespread desertions, key personnel shortages and causing frustrations amongst senior leaders.”[3] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) are evidently facing recruitment struggles as they lowered the recruitment age to 12 to support patrols, checkpoints, and logistics.[4]
Iran launched only three missile barrages at Israel since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff at 2:00 PM ET on March 30, marking its lowest barrage rate of the war to date.[5] These salvoes also contain only a small number of missiles, which may be a byproduct of Iranian command-and-control challenges highlighted previously. Iran has been firing only a few missiles per salvo at Israel since March 20.[6] The three waves only consisted of one missile in two of the waves and a “small” number of missiles in the third wave.[7] Smaller salvoes are relatively easier for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)’s air defense systems to intercept, as demonstrated by their performance against small Houthi salvoes between 2023 and 2025.[8] Iran has only been launching one missile per salvo and three to seven salvoes per day at Israel for the past four days.[9] This is considerably less compared to what Iran fired at the start of the war.[10] The IDF also assessed that Iran's missile fire targeting Israel has slowed to around 10-15 missiles a day over the past two weeks.[11] The low salvo and missile-per-salvo rate targeting Israel does not necessarily imply Iran is suffering the same challenges when it comes to its short-range ballistic missiles that target the Gulf states, though March 31 saw a lower number of missiles targeting the Gulf states than the average.[12] Hegseth separately confirmed on March 31 that Iran launched its lowest number of missiles and drones in general in the past 24 hours.[13]
The combined force's extensive airstrikes targeting Iranian missile bases and production sites have also degraded Iran's ability to launch missile strikes against Israel. CTP-ISW recorded that the combined force has struck over 20 missile bases since the start of the war.[14] The Washington Post on March 29 identified ”severe damage” on satellite imagery to Iran's four major missile production sites, including Khojir, Shahroud, Parchin, and Hakimiyeh.[15] The IDF announced on March 31 that the Israeli Air Force (IAF) has struck 70 percent of Iran's defense industrial sites, which are essential to reconstituting Iran's missile capabilities.[16]
Iran is asserting sovereignty over international waterways by demanding payment from ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz. The Iranian Parliament National Security Commission passed a bill on March 30 titled the “Strait of Hormuz Management Plan,” which outlines a series of policies that assert that Iran has sovereignty over international waterways in the Strait of Hormuz.[17] The plan forces other countries to negotiate with Iran for safe passage through the strait and for some vessels to pay to transit through the strait, which is an international waterway. It also bans US and Israeli shipping or any ships from countries that sanction Iran.
Iran's parliament has little real power but its decision to pass this bill represents a desire in Tehran to continue to impede international shipping around the Strait after the war. Senior Iranian officials, including Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, have warned in recent weeks that the situation in the Strait of Hormuz “won't return to its pre-war status” following the war.[18] Expediency Discernment Council member Mohammad Mokhber stated on March 19 that Iran can use its position along the strait to “sanction [the West] and prevent their ships from passing through this waterway” even after the war ends.[19] Daily oil exports from the Middle East have fallen by at least 60 percent since the start of the war.[20] United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) has received 25 reports of attacks or incidents affecting civilian vessels transiting the strait since the war began.[21] Efforts to impede shipping around the strait could take a number of forms and would include efforts to threaten, disrupt, and selectively control traffic through the strait at any time or for any reason. Iran could use these threats to coerce concessions from the United States or its partners or deter them. Iran may be especially incentivized to leverage its control around the strait if it concludes that such actions are an effective means of coercing the United States and its partners.Iran has continued attacks on shipping in the Persian Gulf. An Iranian drone struck the Kuwaiti oil tanker al Salmi northwest of Dubai on March 30.[22] The attack did not injure any crew members aboard the vessel. This oil tanker is the first vessel that Iran has struck since March 18.[23] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy inaccurately claimed that it targeted the Singaporean-flagged Haiphong Express, which it probably mistook for the al Salmi.[24]
An unidentified senior official in Baghdad told a Kurdistan Democratic Party-affiliated journalist on March 30 that “more than a thousand” Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) fighters are believed to have crossed into Iran.[91] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service but many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias control PMF brigades that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[92] This confirmation comes after anti-regime media previously reported on March 30 that PMF fighters have deployed to Basij bases in western Iran.[93] The Basij is a paramilitary force that is responsible for civil defense and social control.[94] CTP-ISW assessed on March 30 that the Iranian regime may be mobilizing PMF fighters, in part, to strengthen control over previous protest hotspots.[95] Large protests took place in both Khorramshahr and Abadan during the December 2025-January 2026 protests.[96]
Unspecified European officials told Bloomberg on March 30 that Iran is pushing the Houthis to launch a renewed campaign against international shipping in the Red Sea, contingent on any further US escalation.[99] The officials added that Houthi leadership is divided on how aggressive its actions should be. This report comes after an unspecified journalist in Yemen told Israeli media on March 29 that “additional IRGC experts” recently arrived in Sanaa to strengthen coordination between the Houthis and Iran.[100]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-31-2026/