Any US-Iran deal that does not limit Iran's ability to develop its ballistic missile program and support the Axis of Resistance would harm US interests in the Middle East. Iranian officials have continued to insist that Iran will not negotiate on its ballistic missile program and support for the Axis of Resistance, which are key pillars of the Iranian regime's defense and deterrence strategies.[1] Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani, who reportedly manages Iran's nuclear file and traveled to Oman on February 10, told Omani media on February 10 that Iran would consider expanding the scope of negotiations with the United States to include “other areas” if the current US-Iran talks are successful, but he did not specify which “areas” he was referring to.[2] Larijani claimed that the United States previously tied “missile and military issues” to the nuclear issue and that “military issues have nothing to do with the nuclear issue.“[3] Larijani separately met with the Oman-based Houthi spokesperson, Mohammad Abdulsalam, on February 10, likely to discuss regional events, such as developments in the Gaza Strip and potential US or Israeli military action against Iran.[4] Iranian regime media highlighted how Larijani’s meeting with Abdulsalam reflects Iran's continued support for its regional proxies and partners.[5] Iran possesses the capability to strike US interests in the Middle East using ballistic missiles and the Axis of Resistance, and it has previously demonstrated a willingness to do so even in the absence of direct US action against Iran.[6]
Iran's insistence on continuing to develop its ballistic missile program and support the Axis of Resistance comes as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will meet with US President Donald Trump on February 11, reportedly to urge Trump not to accept a deal with Iran that only addresses the nuclear issue.[7] Netanyahu will present Trump with Israeli intelligence about Iran's military capabilities, including an assessment that Iran could have 1,800-2,000 ballistic missiles within weeks or months, according to an Israeli source speaking to CNN on February 10.[8] This estimate differs from Israeli media reporting in December 2025 that Iran had already reconstituted its ballistic missile stockpile to 2,000 missiles.[9] Israeli media reported on February 9 that Jared Kushner and US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff seek to quickly reach a deal with Iran “with or without an Iranian commitment on the issue of ballistic missiles.”[10] Israeli media added that Netanyahu seeks to urge Trump to “act against the recommendation of” Kushner and Witkoff. Netanyahu's meeting with Trump comes after Trump suggested on February 7 that he could accept a deal that only addresses the nuclear issue.[11] Trump later told Israeli journalist Barak Ravid on February 10 that any deal with Iran must address Iran's ballistic missile program in addition to its nuclear program, however.[12]
The Iranian regime's exacerbation of its population's economic and sociocultural grievances increases the likelihood that protests will break out again. The regime is continuing to securitize Iranian society at the expense of Iranians’ economic well-being. Al Jazeera reported on February 10 that Iranian authorities have closed dozens of small- and medium-sized businesses, mostly in Tehran, in recent days that supported the protests by striking in December 2025.[13] Workers at one of Iran's largest gas refineries went on strike for the sixth consecutive day on February 10 due to poor employment and livelihood conditions.[14] The regime has also sustained its internet shutdown, which costs the Iranian economy about $37 million USD per day.[15] Internet monitor Filterwatch reported on February 3 that the regime plans to grant access to the international internet only to certain individuals, rather than all Iranians.[16] A system that only allows some Iranians to access the international internet may exacerbate Iranians’ frustration with the regime and create conditions for further unrest.[17]
The regime's ongoing securitization measures come as some Iranian university students have held demonstrations in recent days to protest Iranian security forces’ killing of university students during the recent protests and arrest of medical personnel who treated injured protesters. Iranian university students at a university in Fars Province and two universities in Khorasan Razavi Province held protests between February 2 and 9.[18] Students at Islamic Azad University in Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province, protested on February 3 the death of a student during the protests, while students at Ferdowsi University in Mashhad protested on February 9 against security forces’ killing of two students and the arrest of another student.[19] Medical students at Shiraz University in Fars Province held sit-ins between February 2 and at least February 7 to protest the killing of protesters and arrest of medical staff who treated protesters.[20] These limited protests highlight how the regime's repression of its population creates greater disaffection and anger toward the regime, which can in turn set conditions for further anti-regime activity, including protests.
Iran continues to reinforce and harden the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC)’s underground complex entrances against potential US or Israeli military action. The Institute for Science and International Security reported on February 9 that Iran has completely covered the ENTC’s middle and southern tunnel entrances with soil, according to satellite imagery from early February 2026.[43] The Institute added that Iran has backfilled the northern ENTC tunnel entrance.[44] Western media previously reported in June 2025 that US strikes during the Israel-Iran War blocked the tunnel entrances to the underground complex at the ENTC that reportedly stores part of Iran's enriched uranium stockpile.[45] The Institute assessed that Iran's efforts to protect the ENTC’s tunnel entrances would “help dampen” potential airstrikes and complicate any ground raid intended to seize or destroy any uranium at the complex.
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-february-10-2026/
Iran may be floating the possibility of talks about Iran's ballistic missile program in an effort to delay possible US military action and extract concessions from the United States in nuclear negotiations. Israeli media, citing unspecified sources, reported on February 10 that Iran communicated to regional mediators that it is not willing to make any compromises on its ballistic missile program at this time but may be willing to discuss its ballistic missiles “in the future.”[1] Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani separately told Omani media on February 10 that Iran could agree to expand the scope of its talks with the United States “to other areas” if the current nuclear negotiations are successful.[2] Iran's suggestion that it could discuss its ballistic missile program at an unspecified point in the future is consistent with Iranian officials’ statements that Iran will not negotiate on its ballistic missiles in the current talks. This signaling may also be intended to drag out the current talks by leaving open the possibility for discussions about other issues apart from the nuclear issue. Iran may calculate that continuing to reject any possibility of discussing its ballistic missile program with the United States could increase the risk of US or Israeli military action against Iran.
Iran appears to be conditioning the possibility of talks about its ballistic missile program on US concessions in the current nuclear talks. Larijani’s statement to Omani media suggests that Iran would only be willing to entertain the possibility of talks on its ballistic missiles in the event that the United States and Iran reach a nuclear agreement. Iran's nuclear-related demands include the United States recognizing Iran's “right” to enrich uranium and lifting sanctions in return for any Iranian concessions on its nuclear program.[3] Iran has thus far only offered limited concessions on its nuclear program. Some regime officials have suggested that Iran may be willing to dilute its enriched uranium from 60 percent to 20 percent, but only if the United States provides full sanctions relief.[4] This hypothetical deal would require a less significant concession from Iran than it agreed to in the 2015 deal, when Iran was relatively stronger compared to its position today. The 2015 nuclear deal made Iran cap its enrichment at 3.67 percent for a period of 15 years.[5] The deal also prompted the UN Security Council to impose an eight-year ban on Iran's long-range ballistic missiles and a five-year ban on conventional arms transfers, including missile systems, to Iran.[6]
Iran may calculate that prolonging the talks with the United States provides Iran with additional time to reconstitute its ballistic missile program, which Iran may calculate would raise the costs of US or Israeli military action against Iran. Two unspecified Israeli sources told CNN on February 10 that Israeli officials are concerned about Iran's rapid progress in restoring its ballistic missile stockpile and capabilities to their pre-Israel-Iran War levels.[7] The sources added that Iran could possess between 1,800 and 2,000 missiles “within weeks or months.”[8] CNN's report comes after other Israeli sources reported in December 2025 that the Iranian regime may only need one to two years to produce enough ballistic missiles to overwhelm Israeli air defenses, which is an estimate calculated based on Iran's ability to produce about 300 ballistic missiles per month.[9] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met with US President Donald Trump in Washington, DC, on February 11 to urge Trump to force Iran to agree to limit its ballistic missile program, according to Israeli and US officials.[10] The officials said that Netanyahu sought to convince Trump to launch a strike against Iran's ballistic missile production facilities if he cannot secure a diplomatic agreement that includes restrictions on Iran's missile program.[11] Iran's prolongment of the negotiations may be part of an attempt to buy more time to replenish its ballistic missile stockpile before another possible round of fighting between Iran and the United States or Israel. Iran launched multiple barrages of missiles at Israel during the Israel-Iran War and Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened to fire missiles at US bases in the region if the United States attacks Iran.[12]
Iran is also pursuing multiple diplomatic tracks to try to prevent a US strike. A Wall Street Journal journalist reported on February 11 that Larijani discussed Iran's highly enriched uranium with Omani officials during his February 10 trip to Moscow.[13] CTP-ISW assessed on February 9 that Larijani may have conveyed details about potential nuclear concessions during his visit to Oman.[14] Larijani’s trip to Oman followed his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on January 30 in which Larijani and Putin likely discussed the US-Iran talks and ways to prevent US military action against Iran.[15] Russia recently offered to store Iranian enriched uranium on February 4.[16] Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov called his Omani counterpart on February 9 to express support for Oman's mediation efforts, almost certainly in relation to Larijani’s visit to Oman.[17] Larijani is Iran's principal negotiator with Russia.[18] Larijani also met with Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al Thani and Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammad bin Abdulrahman al Thani on February 11 to discuss regional developments.[19] The Qatari Emir also held a phone call with Trump on February 11 to discuss “efforts for regional de-escalation.”[20] Larijani’s diplomatic efforts are taking place alongside Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi’s diplomatic efforts. Araghchi is Iran's principal negotiator with the United States and led the Iranian delegation to Oman on February 6, after which he traveled to Qatar.[21]
US government officials have discussed seizing tankers involved in transporting Iranian oil but refrained from doing so due to concerns over Iran's “near-certain” retaliation and the impact that tanker seizures would have on international oil markets, according to unspecified US officials speaking to the Wall Street Journal on February 10.[22] Iranian officials, including Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy Commander Brigadier General Alireza Tangsiri, have previously threatened to target shipping transiting the Strait of Hormuz if the United States disrupts Iran's oil trade.[23] Iran has demonstrated its willingness and ability to disrupt regional maritime and energy security, such as by attacking oil tankers in the Persian Gulf and Saudi energy facilities in 2019 during US President Donald Trump's first term.[24] The US government previously considered seizing and inspecting tankers carrying Iranian oil in March 2025 in order to disrupt Iran's illicit oil trade, according to unspecified sources speaking to Reuters.[25] The US government ultimately did not adopt this strategy. The United States and Iran later started nuclear negotiations in April 2025.[26]
The IRGC, Law Enforcement Command (LEC), and intelligence agents dismantled a “terrorist cell” in Khash and Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on February 10, likely in response to a Mobarizoun Popular Front attack that injured two LEC officers on February 9.[27] Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-affiliated Defa Press reported that security forces killed four “terrorists,“ arrested several individuals affiliated with the cell, and seized several firearms.[28] Intelligence Minister Esmail Khatib stated on February 11 that counterterrorism forces, in cooperation with the IRGC and the LEC, also arrested and killed some “terrorists” in Kerman Province.[29] The Mobarizoun Popular Front is a coalition of anti-regime Baloch groups that formed in December 2025.[30] The Mobarizoun Popular Front conducted an attack in Khash on February 9 that injured two LEC officers.The Mobarizoun Popular Front also claimed that it attacked and destroyed vehicles belonging to a special forces unit in Iranshahr on February 11.[31]
Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi spoke with Pakistani Foreign Minister Mohammad Ishaq Dar on February 10, likely to discuss anti-regime militancy in Sistan and Baluchistan Province[32] Iranian officials often discusses cross-border issues, including anti-regime militant activity, with Pakistani officials because anti-regime militant groups operate in the Iran-Pakistan border area..[33] Anti-regime militancy in Sistan and Baluchistan Province has long posed an internal security challenge for the Iranian regime. Jaish al Adl, which is part of the Mobarizoun Popular Front, and other Baloch groups frequently attack Iranian regime security forces and institutions in Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[34]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-february-11-2026/