Iran may be floating the possibility of talks about Iran's ballistic missile program in an effort to delay possible US military action and extract concessions from the United States in nuclear negotiations. Israeli media, citing unspecified sources, reported on February 10 that Iran communicated to regional mediators that it is not willing to make any compromises on its ballistic missile program at this time but may be willing to discuss its ballistic missiles “in the future.”[1] Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani separately told Omani media on February 10 that Iran could agree to expand the scope of its talks with the United States “to other areas” if the current nuclear negotiations are successful.[2] Iran's suggestion that it could discuss its ballistic missile program at an unspecified point in the future is consistent with Iranian officials’ statements that Iran will not negotiate on its ballistic missiles in the current talks. This signaling may also be intended to drag out the current talks by leaving open the possibility for discussions about other issues apart from the nuclear issue. Iran may calculate that continuing to reject any possibility of discussing its ballistic missile program with the United States could increase the risk of US or Israeli military action against Iran.
Iran appears to be conditioning the possibility of talks about its ballistic missile program on US concessions in the current nuclear talks. Larijani’s statement to Omani media suggests that Iran would only be willing to entertain the possibility of talks on its ballistic missiles in the event that the United States and Iran reach a nuclear agreement. Iran's nuclear-related demands include the United States recognizing Iran's “right” to enrich uranium and lifting sanctions in return for any Iranian concessions on its nuclear program.[3] Iran has thus far only offered limited concessions on its nuclear program. Some regime officials have suggested that Iran may be willing to dilute its enriched uranium from 60 percent to 20 percent, but only if the United States provides full sanctions relief.[4] This hypothetical deal would require a less significant concession from Iran than it agreed to in the 2015 deal, when Iran was relatively stronger compared to its position today. The 2015 nuclear deal made Iran cap its enrichment at 3.67 percent for a period of 15 years.[5] The deal also prompted the UN Security Council to impose an eight-year ban on Iran's long-range ballistic missiles and a five-year ban on conventional arms transfers, including missile systems, to Iran.[6]
Iran may calculate that prolonging the talks with the United States provides Iran with additional time to reconstitute its ballistic missile program, which Iran may calculate would raise the costs of US or Israeli military action against Iran. Two unspecified Israeli sources told CNN on February 10 that Israeli officials are concerned about Iran's rapid progress in restoring its ballistic missile stockpile and capabilities to their pre-Israel-Iran War levels.[7] The sources added that Iran could possess between 1,800 and 2,000 missiles “within weeks or months.”[8] CNN's report comes after other Israeli sources reported in December 2025 that the Iranian regime may only need one to two years to produce enough ballistic missiles to overwhelm Israeli air defenses, which is an estimate calculated based on Iran's ability to produce about 300 ballistic missiles per month.[9] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met with US President Donald Trump in Washington, DC, on February 11 to urge Trump to force Iran to agree to limit its ballistic missile program, according to Israeli and US officials.[10] The officials said that Netanyahu sought to convince Trump to launch a strike against Iran's ballistic missile production facilities if he cannot secure a diplomatic agreement that includes restrictions on Iran's missile program.[11] Iran's prolongment of the negotiations may be part of an attempt to buy more time to replenish its ballistic missile stockpile before another possible round of fighting between Iran and the United States or Israel. Iran launched multiple barrages of missiles at Israel during the Israel-Iran War and Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened to fire missiles at US bases in the region if the United States attacks Iran.[12]
Iran is also pursuing multiple diplomatic tracks to try to prevent a US strike. A Wall Street Journal journalist reported on February 11 that Larijani discussed Iran's highly enriched uranium with Omani officials during his February 10 trip to Moscow.[13] CTP-ISW assessed on February 9 that Larijani may have conveyed details about potential nuclear concessions during his visit to Oman.[14] Larijani’s trip to Oman followed his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on January 30 in which Larijani and Putin likely discussed the US-Iran talks and ways to prevent US military action against Iran.[15] Russia recently offered to store Iranian enriched uranium on February 4.[16] Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov called his Omani counterpart on February 9 to express support for Oman's mediation efforts, almost certainly in relation to Larijani’s visit to Oman.[17] Larijani is Iran's principal negotiator with Russia.[18] Larijani also met with Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al Thani and Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammad bin Abdulrahman al Thani on February 11 to discuss regional developments.[19] The Qatari Emir also held a phone call with Trump on February 11 to discuss “efforts for regional de-escalation.”[20] Larijani’s diplomatic efforts are taking place alongside Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi’s diplomatic efforts. Araghchi is Iran's principal negotiator with the United States and led the Iranian delegation to Oman on February 6, after which he traveled to Qatar.[21]
US government officials have discussed seizing tankers involved in transporting Iranian oil but refrained from doing so due to concerns over Iran's “near-certain” retaliation and the impact that tanker seizures would have on international oil markets, according to unspecified US officials speaking to the Wall Street Journal on February 10.[22] Iranian officials, including Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy Commander Brigadier General Alireza Tangsiri, have previously threatened to target shipping transiting the Strait of Hormuz if the United States disrupts Iran's oil trade.[23] Iran has demonstrated its willingness and ability to disrupt regional maritime and energy security, such as by attacking oil tankers in the Persian Gulf and Saudi energy facilities in 2019 during US President Donald Trump's first term.[24] The US government previously considered seizing and inspecting tankers carrying Iranian oil in March 2025 in order to disrupt Iran's illicit oil trade, according to unspecified sources speaking to Reuters.[25] The US government ultimately did not adopt this strategy. The United States and Iran later started nuclear negotiations in April 2025.[26]
The IRGC, Law Enforcement Command (LEC), and intelligence agents dismantled a “terrorist cell” in Khash and Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on February 10, likely in response to a Mobarizoun Popular Front attack that injured two LEC officers on February 9.[27] Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-affiliated Defa Press reported that security forces killed four “terrorists,“ arrested several individuals affiliated with the cell, and seized several firearms.[28] Intelligence Minister Esmail Khatib stated on February 11 that counterterrorism forces, in cooperation with the IRGC and the LEC, also arrested and killed some “terrorists” in Kerman Province.[29] The Mobarizoun Popular Front is a coalition of anti-regime Baloch groups that formed in December 2025.[30] The Mobarizoun Popular Front conducted an attack in Khash on February 9 that injured two LEC officers.The Mobarizoun Popular Front also claimed that it attacked and destroyed vehicles belonging to a special forces unit in Iranshahr on February 11.[31]
Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi spoke with Pakistani Foreign Minister Mohammad Ishaq Dar on February 10, likely to discuss anti-regime militancy in Sistan and Baluchistan Province[32] Iranian officials often discusses cross-border issues, including anti-regime militant activity, with Pakistani officials because anti-regime militant groups operate in the Iran-Pakistan border area..[33] Anti-regime militancy in Sistan and Baluchistan Province has long posed an internal security challenge for the Iranian regime. Jaish al Adl, which is part of the Mobarizoun Popular Front, and other Baloch groups frequently attack Iranian regime security forces and institutions in Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[34]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-february-11-2026/
Iran Update, February 12, 2026
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu presented US President Donald Trump with evidence that the Iranian regime continued to kill protesters even after it told the United States that it would stop harming civilians and that Iran has never intended to discuss non-nuclear issues with the United States, according to Israeli media.[61] Netanyahu and Trump met at the White House on February 11.[62] AUS-based human rights organization has recorded a total of 7,002 deaths and over 52,000 arrests in the recent protests as of February 11.[63] Unspecified Iranian lawyers defending detained protesters in Iran separately told Western media on February 6 that the Iranian regime plans to execute “thousands” of Iranians who participated in the recent protests.[64] CTP-ISW cannot verify the reliability of this report. The Iranian judiciary conducted its first execution of a protester from the 2022-2023 Mahsa Amini protest movement in December 2022, two months after the start of the protest movement.[65]
Trump and Netanyahu also discussed the Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile programs.[66] Trump stated that he insisted that “negotiations with Iran continue” during his meeting with Netanyahu.[67] Netanyahu’s office stated that Netanyahu emphasized Israel’s security needs during the meeting.[68] Israeli media previously reported that Netanyahu sought to urge Trump not to accept a deal with Iran that does not address Iran’s ballistic missile program.[69]
The Iranian regime is unlikely to make any concessions on its ballistic missile program because it views its missile capabilities as an essential component of its defensive and deterrence strategies. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-affiliated outlet Defa Press published an op-ed on February 12 in which it suggested that strengthening Iran’s defense readiness and missile capabilities could increase Iran’s leverage in negotiations with the United States.[70] Defa Press added that Iran can use its “military winning card,” likely referring to its ballistic missiles, to respond to any US actions.[71] Iranian officials have continued to insist that Iran will not negotiate on its ballistic missile program and support for the Axis of Resistance during the current US-Iran talks.[72] Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani told Omani media on February 10 that Iran could agree to expand the scope of its talks with the United States “to other areas” if the current nuclear negotiations are successful. Larijani likely made this comment in an attempt to float the possibility that Iran may be willing to negotiate on its ballistic missile program to drag out the current talks and prevent US or Israeli military action against Iran.[73] Larijani did not state that Iran would be willing to make concessions on its ballistic missile program even if it agreed to “discuss” the issue with the United States, however. The Iranian regime is unlikely to make any concessions that would limit its ability to produce and maintain its ballistic missile stockpile due to the centrality of the missile program in Iranian defensive and deterrence strategies. Former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Mohammad Ali Jafari argued in October 2025 that Iran’s missile program is its main form of deterrence and that Iran deliberately prioritized developing its missile and drone capabilities over its air and ground forces to counter the superior capabilities of the United States and Israel.[74]
The Institute for Science and International Security assessed on February 11 that Iran is likely fortifying entrances at its Kolang Gaz La Mountain nuclear facility in Esfahan Province to protect the facility from future US or Israeli strikes.[90] The Institute published imagery that shows concrete-reinforced headworks, additional dirt overburdens, and heavy construction machinery at multiple tunnel portals.[91] The Institute reported that construction materials and heavy machinery suggest that the site is likely still not operational.[92] The Institute previously assessed that Iran could use the Kolang Gaz La facility to house an advanced centrifuge assembly plant or potentially a small undeclared enrichment plant.[93] The Institute has assessed in recent weeks that Iran is also hardening infrastructure at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center and Parchin Military Complex’s Taleghan 2 facility in preparation for possible future strikes.[94]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-february-12-2026/