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Iran Update, December 12, 2025
An Israeli journalist reported that Iran has reconstituted its “heavy” missile stockpile to around 2,000 missiles, which is consistent with other Israeli reports that Iran has prioritized rebuilding its missile program and stockpile after the Israel-Iran War.[10] “Heavy” ballistic missiles presumably refer to medium-range ballistic missiles that can reach Israel. This assumption would suggest that Iran reconstituted its stockpile from between 1,100 and 1,300 missiles to 2,000 missiles between June 2025 and December 2025, also assuming that post-war Israel Defense Forces (IDF) estimates about the missile stockpile were correct.[11] CTP-ISW assessed on December 9 that Iran views reconstituting its ballistic missile program as an immediate strategic priority, likely because reconstituting the program is more achievable in the short term than other defense projects.[12] Some Iranian officials appear to want to improve the technical capabilities of these missiles over time, but could calculate that the perceived immediacy of future Israeli strikes requires an expansion of the stockpile of current systems.[13]
This rapid reconstitution indicates that Israel either failed to destroy all of Iran’s planetary mixers or that Iran has acquired or built new planetary mixers used to produce solid fuel ballistic missiles. Israeli Military Intelligence head Major General Shlomi Bender told US Ambassador to the United Nations Mike Waltz on December 8 that Israeli damage to Iran’s ballistic missile industry was “less severe” than initially assessed, and that Iran has already restored its production capacity.[14] Iran could theoretically use a trough mixer, though planetary mixers are more efficient.[15]
An unspecified Israeli official told the Israeli journalist that the rebuilt ballistic missile program is an unacceptable threat.[16] The official said that Israel “must coordinate with the [United States on] the red lines and actions [Israel] will take in the future, perhaps even in the near future.”[17]
Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-affiliated media proposed on December 12 that Iran establish a “joint operations room” with the Axis of Resistance to mitigate their weaknesses in the wake of conflict since October 7, 2023.[18] The concept of an Axis of Resistance joint operations room is not new, and Iran has historically relied on joint operations rooms to coordinate activity across the Axis of Resistance.[19] Iran and the Axis of Resistance use these joint operations rooms to accomplish operational objectives in pursuit of their shared strategic objectives, but Hamas’s October 7 attack was poorly coordinated and resulted in a series of Israeli operations that badly degraded elements of the Axis.[20] Operations rooms could be used for expansive objectives on the regional level — such as destroying Israel — as well as less expansive objectives on the country level, like expelling US forces from Iraq. This new proposal demonstrates how Iran is considering mechanisms to facilitate learning from unsuccessful Axis of Resistance campaigns in this period of reconstitution for the Axis of Resistance.[21]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-december-12-2025/
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Iranian Artesh Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Ali Jahanshahi appointed Brigadier General Second Class Abbas Malekizadeh as the new Artesh Ground Forces Southeast Regional Headquarters commander on December 13, possibly in response to the recent establishment of the Mobarizoun Popular Front.[32] The Artesh Ground Forces is responsible for defending Iran from foreign attacks, and the Southeast Regional Headquarters oversees Artesh Ground Forces units in Hormozgan, Kerman, and Sistan and Baluchistan provinces, as well as in parts of Yazd Province.[33] Malekizadeh replaced Brigadier General Amir Gholam Alian, who had commanded the headquarters since August 2020.[34] Malekizadeh had previously served as the deputy commander of the Artesh Ground Forces Southeast Regional Headquarters since at least July 2022.[35] Malekizadeh served as the commander of the Artesh Ground Forces 388th Mechanized Assault Brigade, which is based in Iranshahr, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, before becoming the deputy commander of the Southeast Regional Headquarters.[36]
The People's Republic of China (PRC) continues to support Iran's efforts to reconstitute its missile program following the Israel–Iran War. Unspecified US officials told the Wall Street Journal on December 12 that US special operations forces seized military and dual use components from a vessel that was heading from the PRC to Iran in November 2025.[37] A second unspecified US official familiar with the seizure stated that US intelligence assessed that the cargo was destined for Iranian companies that procure components for Iran's missile program.[38] US officials did not identify the vessel or its owner.[39] The PRC has previously helped Iran rebuild its ballistic missile program by supplying Iran with sodium perchlorate, which is a chemical precursor for solid missile propellant. The PRC sent at least two shipments of sodium perchlorate to Iran before the Israel-Iran War, and European intelligence sources are tracking 10 to 12 shipments to Iran following the war, according to CNN.[40] Iranian efforts to procure components and solid fuel ingredients for its missile program from the PRC are consistent with CTP-ISW’s assessment that Iran views reconstituting its ballistic missile program as an immediate strategic priority, likely because reconstituting the program is more achievable in the short term than other defense projects.[41] An Israeli journalist recently reported on December 11 that Iran has reconstituted its “heavy” ballistic missile stockpile to approximately 2,000 missiles.[42]
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy possibly seized the Marshall Islands-flagged oil tanker Talara on November 14 in response to the US interdiction of the PRC-origin, Iran-bound vessel.[43] The United States interdicted the vessel on an unspecified date in November 2025. The IRGC circulated a Quranic verse on X after the Talara’s seizure that suggested Iran seized the Talara in retaliation for a previous incident.[44] Iranian officials have recently expressed concern that the United States and its allies could enforce United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1929, which calls on United Nations member states to inspect any Iranian vessel within their territorial waters suspected of “carrying prohibited cargo, including banned conventional arms or sensitive nuclear or missile items.”[45]
Iranian Brigadier General Alireza Elhami replaced Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard as the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters commander and Artesh Air Defense Force commander on December 15.[46] Sabahi Fard’s removal from these positions may reflect Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s dissatisfaction with Sabahi Fard’s performance during the Israel-Iran War. Elhami previously served as deputy commander of the Artesh Air Defense Force, commander of the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Academy, and operations deputy of the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters.[47] Former Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri appointed Sabahi Fard as the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters commander in February 2025.[48] Sabahi Fard maintained his position as Artesh Air Defense Force commander, which he had held since June 2018, when he was appointed as the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters commander.[49] The Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters is responsible for coordinating air defense activity between the Artesh and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).[50] Sabahi Fard’s removal is notable given the poor performance of Iranian air defenses under his command during the Israel-Iran War in June 2025. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) established air superiority over western Iran and Tehran by destroying over 40 Iranian air defense systems in the first 24 hours of the war.[51] The regime has not appointed Sabahi Fard to a new position at the time of this writing.
A delegation from a US-sanctioned, Iranian regime-controlled shipping company met with Sudanese port authorities in Port Sudan on December 13 to discuss re-establishing the company's operations at the Red Sea port after a seven-year hiatus.[60] The US Treasury sanctioned the Hafez Darya Shipping Company, which is a subsidiary of Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, in 2018 for transporting unspecified cargo to at least one known front company for the Iranian regime-controlled Defense Industries Organization.[61] The Defense Industries Organization, which the US Treasury sanctioned in 2007 for materially contributing to the development of Iran's nuclear and missile programs, is a subsidiary of the Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry.[62] The Iranian ambassador to Sudan organized the meeting between Sudanese port officials and the Hafez Darya Shipping Company delegation.[63] A representative from Hafez Darya Shipping Company claimed that the company seeks to transport “containers only” from Sudan but did not specify what type of cargo the company would transport in the containers.[64] Iranian access to a Red Sea port in Sudan may allow Iran to expand its trade and influence in the Red Sea. It remains unclear if Iran seeks to use potential Red Sea port access to support other regional activities, such as Iran's illicit oil trade, weapons smuggling, or surveillance to support campaigns against international shipping.
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-december-15-2025/