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Iran Update, December 15, 2025

Iranian Artesh Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Ali Jahanshahi appointed Brigadier General Second Class Abbas Malekizadeh as the new Artesh Ground Forces Southeast Regional Headquarters commander on December 13, possibly in response to the recent establishment of the Mobarizoun Popular Front.[32] The Artesh Ground Forces is responsible for defending Iran from foreign attacks, and the Southeast Regional Headquarters oversees Artesh Ground Forces units in Hormozgan, Kerman, and Sistan and Baluchistan provinces, as well as in parts of Yazd Province.[33] Malekizadeh replaced Brigadier General Amir Gholam Alian, who had commanded the headquarters since August 2020.[34] Malekizadeh had previously served as the deputy commander of the Artesh Ground Forces Southeast Regional Headquarters since at least July 2022.[35] Malekizadeh served as the commander of the Artesh Ground Forces 388th Mechanized Assault Brigade, which is based in Iranshahr, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, before becoming the deputy commander of the Southeast Regional Headquarters.[36]

The People's Republic of China (PRC) continues to support Iran's efforts to reconstitute its missile program following the Israel–Iran War. Unspecified US officials told the Wall Street Journal on December 12 that US special operations forces seized military and dual use components from a vessel that was heading from the PRC to Iran in November 2025.[37] A second unspecified US official familiar with the seizure stated that US intelligence assessed that the cargo was destined for Iranian companies that procure components for Iran's missile program.[38] US officials did not identify the vessel or its owner.[39] The PRC has previously helped Iran rebuild its ballistic missile program by supplying Iran with sodium perchlorate, which is a chemical precursor for solid missile propellant. The PRC sent at least two shipments of sodium perchlorate to Iran before the Israel-Iran War, and European intelligence sources are tracking 10 to 12 shipments to Iran following the war, according to CNN.[40] Iranian efforts to procure components and solid fuel ingredients for its missile program from the PRC are consistent with CTP-ISW’s assessment that Iran views reconstituting its ballistic missile program as an immediate strategic priority, likely because reconstituting the program is more achievable in the short term than other defense projects.[41] An Israeli journalist recently reported on December 11 that Iran has reconstituted its “heavy” ballistic missile stockpile to approximately 2,000 missiles.[42]

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy possibly seized the Marshall Islands-flagged oil tanker Talara on November 14 in response to the US interdiction of the PRC-origin, Iran-bound vessel.[43] The United States interdicted the vessel on an unspecified date in November 2025. The IRGC circulated a Quranic verse on X after the Talara’s seizure that suggested Iran seized the Talara in retaliation for a previous incident.[44] Iranian officials have recently expressed concern that the United States and its allies could enforce United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1929, which calls on United Nations member states to inspect any Iranian vessel within their territorial waters suspected of “carrying prohibited cargo, including banned conventional arms or sensitive nuclear or missile items.”[45]

Iranian Brigadier General Alireza Elhami replaced Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard as the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters commander and Artesh Air Defense Force commander on December 15.[46] Sabahi Fard’s removal from these positions may reflect Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s dissatisfaction with Sabahi Fard’s performance during the Israel-Iran War. Elhami previously served as deputy commander of the Artesh Air Defense Force, commander of the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Academy, and operations deputy of the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters.[47] Former Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri appointed Sabahi Fard as the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters commander in February 2025.[48] Sabahi Fard maintained his position as Artesh Air Defense Force commander, which he had held since June 2018, when he was appointed as the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters commander.[49] The Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters is responsible for coordinating air defense activity between the Artesh and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).[50] Sabahi Fard’s removal is notable given the poor performance of Iranian air defenses under his command during the Israel-Iran War in June 2025. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) established air superiority over western Iran and Tehran by destroying over 40 Iranian air defense systems in the first 24 hours of the war.[51] The regime has not appointed Sabahi Fard to a new position at the time of this writing.

A delegation from a US-sanctioned, Iranian regime-controlled shipping company met with Sudanese port authorities in Port Sudan on December 13 to discuss re-establishing the company's operations at the Red Sea port after a seven-year hiatus.[60] The US Treasury sanctioned the Hafez Darya Shipping Company, which is a subsidiary of Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, in 2018 for transporting unspecified cargo to at least one known front company for the Iranian regime-controlled Defense Industries Organization.[61] The Defense Industries Organization, which the US Treasury sanctioned in 2007 for materially contributing to the development of Iran's nuclear and missile programs, is a subsidiary of the Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry.[62] The Iranian ambassador to Sudan organized the meeting between Sudanese port officials and the Hafez Darya Shipping Company delegation.[63] A representative from Hafez Darya Shipping Company claimed that the company seeks to transport “containers only” from Sudan but did not specify what type of cargo the company would transport in the containers.[64] Iranian access to a Red Sea port in Sudan may allow Iran to expand its trade and influence in the Red Sea. It remains unclear if Iran seeks to use potential Red Sea port access to support other regional activities, such as Iran's illicit oil trade, weapons smuggling, or surveillance to support campaigns against international shipping.

https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-december-15-2025/