The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy continued its two-day naval exercise on December 5 that likely aims to simultaneously deter the United States and its allies from seizing Iranian vessels and prepare for potential future maritime escalation.[25] The exercise took place in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman. The IRGC Navy fired medium-range Ghadr-110 ballistic missiles, Ghadr-380 anti-ship cruise missiles, Ghadir cruise missiles, and unspecified “303” ballistic missiles from multiple inland launch sites.[26] Iranian media did not provide any details about the “303” ballistic missile. The ship-mounted surface-to-air Navab air defense system struck projectiles targeting IRGC Navy fast attack craft and Iran's coastline.[27] Iranian media claimed that the IRGC Navy used the Sejjil anti-ship cruise missile, which reportedly has a range of 180 kilometers, for the first time during the exercise.[28] Iran has reportedly previously tried to send Sejjil anti-ship cruise missiles to the Houthis.[29] The Iranian regime's primary English language news outlet stated on December 4 that this exercise sent a “dual message” of peace toward Iran's regional partners and a warning to Iran's adversaries that Iran will confront any “miscalculations” with “a decisive response.”[30]
Iran is trying to portray itself as a reliable security partner for Eurasian countries, particularly Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC). Armed Forces General Staff-affiliated Defa Press published an op-ed on December 5 in which it argued that Iran's recent “Sahand 2025” counterterrorism exercise demonstrated Iran's importance to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and its reliability as a security partner.[31] Iran held the exercise near the IRGC Ground Forces Imam Zaman Mechanized Brigade's headquarters in East Azerbaijan Province between December 1 and 5.[32] All ten SCO members, which include Russia, Belarus, and the PRC, sent military delegations to participate in the exercise.[33] The op-ed stated that the exercise sent a “geopolitical message” that Iran is ready to “form a new security order alongside the great Asian powers.”[34] The op-ed claimed that the exercise increased SCO members’ confidence in Iran's ability to guarantee the “security of economic and strategic routes.” Defa Press was likely referring to regional transportation routes, which Iran has sought to develop as a means to facilitate trade with regional countries and undermine sanctions. IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Pakpour stated on December 4 that Iran is also prepared to share its counterterrorism expertise with SCO members “without any restrictions.”[35] Iran may be trying to position itself as a reliable security partner to SCO members as part of Iran's longstanding effort to undermine the US-led international order by strengthening ties with partners in multilateral security and economic institutions.[36]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-december-5-2025/
Senior Iranian military officials called on students at Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-controlled universities to help the Iranian armed forces improve their technological and “preemptive” capabilities. Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Mohammad Pakpour gave speeches to students at the IRGC-controlled Command and Staff University and Imam Hossein University, respectively, on December 7.[67] Both officials called on the Iranian armed forces to develop and utilize advanced technologies, such as artificial intelligence.[68] Mousavi emphasized the need for Iran to keep up with technological developments and strengthen the armed forces’ “preemptive capabilities.”[69] Iranian media noted that developing “preemptive capabilities” is consistent with Iran's “active deterrence” strategy, which is an offensive strategy that Iran has employed since at least 2014.[70] “Active deterrence” emphasizes the need for Iran to intervene in situations abroad in order to expand Iranian influence and confront threats before they endanger Iran.[71] Pakpour highlighted applications for artificial intelligence in surveillance and targeting and stated that “stealth technology” could improve Iranian missiles’ ability to penetrate Israeli air defenses.[72] Pakpour emphasized that “more work should be done at Imam Hossein University in areas such as air defense and stealth technology.”[73] Mousavi and Pakpour’s emphasis on technological developments comes after Israel reportedly used artificial intelligence to identify Iranian targets during the war.[74]
Unspecified European diplomats told Al Monitor on December 6 that Israel would likely strike Iran in the next year if Iran resumes enriching uranium at high levels.[75] The diplomats stated that Israel would likely attack Iran if Iran takes “serious steps” to enrich uranium and advance its ballistic missile capabilities, and if the United States and Iran do not reach a nuclear deal. The European diplomats did not provide any evidence for these assertions, however. Iran has made minimal progress in repairing its three main nuclear sites that Israel and the United States damaged during the June 2025 Israel-Iran War but has conducted “extensive” clean-up efforts at several nuclear weaponization sites, according to satellite imagery analyzed by the Institute for Science and International Security.[76] The Institute assessed on November 21 that Iran's clean-up efforts at three nuclear weaponization sites “may be the prelude to rebuilding or related to sanitization activities.”[77] There are no indications that Iran has resumed enriching uranium or retrieved its highly-enriched uranium stockpile after the war. Iran possessed 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent before the start of the war, which is enough uranium, if enriched further, to produce at least 10 nuclear weapons.[78] A political analyst with ties to the Iranian regime assessed on December 7 that the probability of a “limited” and ”targeted” Israeli attack on Iran is high and that President Donald Trump's newly released National Security Strategy aims to uphold “the status quo” by containing Iran rather than pursuing strategic reconciliation or full-scale war.[79] The analyst claimed that the United States aims to keep Iran in a permanent state of “defense and effort to preserve survival” and prevent Iran from rebuilding its deterrence and influence.[80] The analyst suggested that Iran can impose costs on Israel and Arab states to reduce their willingness to contain Iran in line with the US National Security Strategy.[81]
Iran is pragmatically pursuing closer diplomatic and trade ties with Azerbaijan amid Iranian concerns about Azerbaijan's relationships with the United States and Israel, which Iran perceives as a threat to its security. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Baku on December 8 to discuss strengthening Iranian-Azerbaijani relations.[82] Araghchi reaffirmed Iran's support for the 3+3 format, which is a diplomatic initiative involving Iran, Turkey, Russia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan to ensure security in the Caucasus through trade “without any foreign interference.”[83] Araghchi and his Azerbaijani counterpart, Jeyhun Bayramov, also discussed how Iran and Azerbaijan are expanding bilateral trade through border infrastructure projects, such as the Rasht-Astara Railway and the Aghband-Kalalah highway bridge.[84] An Iranian expert on the Caucasus told Iranian media on December 8 that Iran wants Azerbaijan to join the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) to remove trade barriers between the two countries.[85] Iran is not an EAEU member but has had an “observer status” in the union since 2024 and signed a free trade agreement with the EAEU in May 2025. Member or observer status in the union reduces tariffs by 90 percent.[86] The Iranian expert noted that increased trade between Iran and Azerbaijan would activate Iran‘s land trade routes with Russia and support Iran's regional trade network.[87] Iran's efforts to increase trade with Azerbaijan come amid Iranian officials’ concerns about US and Israeli interference in the Caucasus. The United States proposed in August 2025 to oversee the development of the Zangezur Corridor in southern Armenia to connect Azerbaijan to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Region.[88] The corridor would run along Iran's only shared border with Armenia and sever Iran's land access to Russia and Europe via Armenia, which could hinder Iranian efforts to become a major transit hub. Some Iranian media outlets separately accused Azerbaijan of allowing Israel to launch attacks against Iran from Azerbaijani territory during the June 2025 Israel-Iran War, which Azerbaijan has denied.[89] Iran remains concerned about Israeli infiltration into Iranian territory from Azerbaijan, as well as Azerbaijan's deepening relationship with Israel.[90]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-december-8-2025/