Iran Update, December 2, 2025
Iran and key US adversaries likely shared tactical and technological lessons on December 2 as part of a five-day military exercise in Iran. Iran is holding the “Sahand 2025” counterterrorism exercise at the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces’ Imam Zaman Mechanized Brigade in East Azerbaijan Province from December 1 to 5.[1] Iran faces security threats along its northwestern border near East Azerbaijan Province from Kurdish groups, including the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), Komala, the Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK), and the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK).[2] All ten members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which includes Russia, Belarus, and China, sent military delegations to participate in the exercise.[3] The SCO has historically emphasized counterterrorism as a key goal of the institution.[4] Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, Oman, and Iraq also attended as observers.[5] IRGC-affiliated media published photos of Iranian forces using first person view (FPV) drones during the exercise, which are widely used by both Russia and Ukraine and have changed the character of the modern battlefield.[6] These drones, when employed at scale, can “perform a wide array of functions but have been particularly transformative in creating a nearly-transparent battlefield.”[7] This transparency has applications outside of conventional warfare, as seen in Ukraine. Drones could be employed in Iran to assist counterinsurgency operations in border regions or to help suppress protests, for example.
The Iranian Armed Forces announced new Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Artesh appointments on December 2 amid Iran’s broader efforts to reshuffle senior military leadership after the Israel-Iran War.
· Artesh Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Ali Jahanshahi appointed Brigadier General Bahador Khajehvand as the new commander of the Artesh Ground Forces Northeastern Regional Headquarters.[31] The Northeastern Regional Headquarters is one of the Artesh Ground Forces’ five regional headquarters.[32] Khajehvand replaced Brigadier General Sirous Amanollahi.[33] Khajehvand most recently served as the 58th Zolfaghar Division commander in Shahrud, Semnan Province.[34]
· Jahanshahi appointed Amanollahi as the new Artesh Ground Forces Operations deputy.[35] Amanollahi most recently served as the Artesh Ground Forces Northeastern Regional Headquarters commander. He also served as the commander of the Artesh Ground Forces Northwestern Regional Headquarters from 2023 to 2024. Amanollahi notably commanded the 65th Airborne Special Forces Brigade from approximately 2016 to 2019, when Jahanshahi was the Coordination Deputy of the Artesh Ground Forces.[36] He was also the deputy commander of the 65th Airborne Special Forces Brigade from early 2011 to 2016. The 65th Brigade is one of the most specialized forces within the Artesh Ground Forces and was deployed to Syria during the Syrian Civil War.[37] The Iranian Armed Forces have historically promoted commanders from the 65th Brigade. The regime promoted Brigadier General Nozar Nemati, who oversaw this brigade’s deployment to Syria, to Artesh Ground Forces coordination deputy and deputy commander in October 2016 and January 2017, respectively.[38]
· IRGC Commander Brigadier General Mohammad Karami appointed Brigadier General Esmali Khalilzadeh as the new deputy commander of the Hamzeh Sayyid ol Shohada Operational Base, which oversees Kurdistan and West Azerbaijan provinces.[39] Karami also appointed Brigadier General Yadollah Abroshan as the new commander of the Shahid Boroujerdi headquarters and Colonel Mansour Abdollahzadeh as the new commander of the Northwest Combat Medical Center.[40]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-december-2-2025/
Iran Update, December 3, 2025
Iran may have sought to develop laser-based anti-drone systems in response to Israeli drone attacks on Iran in recent years. Israel has conducted a series of drone attacks on Iran in recent years, including a drone strike on a centrifuge manufacturing facility in Karaj, Alborz Province, in 2021, a strike that destroyed a drone manufacturing facility in Kermanshah Province in 2022, and a drone attack on a munitions factory in Esfahan in 2023.[25] These attacks may have driven Iran to seek to develop laser-based anti-drone systems, which cost significantly less than traditional air defense systems.[26] Israel also used small drones in June 2025 to kill Iranian nuclear scientists and destroy Iranian ballistic missile launchers, which may further drive Iran to develop its anti-drone capabilities.[27] US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced on December 3 that it has launched a one-way attack drone force in the Middle East, which highlights how drones will continue to play a large role in future conflicts in the region.[28] Russia may be able to share knowledge about laser based anti-drone systems with Iran, given that Russia has developed such systems to counter Ukrainian drone strikes.[29] Russia unveiled a truck-mounted anti-drone laser system in October 2025, for example, that can detect, track, and destroy small drones by damaging onboard sensors, wiring, and batteries and causing the drone to crash.[30] Iran would likely prioritize laser-based anti-drone systems over laser based anti-ballistic missile systems in the near future, given that the latter requires much more energy than the former.[31] Most existing laser-based air defense systems, such as the Israeli Iron Beam, can shoot down small drones, rockets, and other systems, but currently do not have the capability to shoot down ballistic missiles.[32]
Iranian officials have met with several African counterparts over the last week to discuss greater defense and economic ties. Iranian Director General for African Affairs Akbar Khosravinejad met with the three foreign ministers of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) — Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger — in Burkina Faso on November 28.[48] The officials discussed ways to expand cooperation broadly. Iran has increased cooperation with the AES since the anti-Western bloc formed in 2023, and Iranian officials have met with their Sahelian counterparts on numerous occasions.[49] Iran has signed various agreements with Burkina Faso and Niger on energy, finance, health, industry, mining, and engineering, although CTP has observed little implementation.[50]
The Iranian deputy foreign minister for economic diplomacy led an Iranian delegation to Uganda on December 2, marking at least the second Iranian delegation to Uganda in 2025.[51] Iranian media emphasized that the trip aimed to strengthen economic ties and specifically noted that the two sides discussed bilateral relations, preparations for the upcoming joint economic and technical commission, and sectoral meetings with Ugandan business leaders to expand trade and investment ties.[52] Iran and Uganda have a decades long partnership rooted in anti-colonial political allyship and agricultural ties.[53] The previous three Iranian presidents visited Uganda during their terms, and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni has visited Iran several times.[54]
Iran seeks to bolster partnerships with African countries as part of its continued effort to break its international isolation, including through growing its geopolitical influence and increasing trade, hard currency acquisition, and access to natural resources, such as uranium, to mitigate sanctions. Iran has used defense ties as a foundation to strengthen partnerships, including its pursuit of Red Sea and uranium access. Iran has sent Ababil-3 and Mohajer-6 multi-role drones to Ethiopia, Sudan, and Western Sahara since 2021.[55] The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) rejected an Iranian request for a naval base or dual-use port on Sudan’s Red Sea coast in exchange for continued aid and a helicopter-carrying ship.[56] The Nigerien junta similarly turned down an Iranian offer of drones and surface-to-air missiles in exchange for uranium yellowcake in 2024.[57] CTP also assessed that Iran likely aimed to secure access to Zimbabwe’s rich uranium deposits through increased defense engagement with Zimbabwe in 2024.[58]
Iran has used internal oppression and regime security assistance to bolster its partnerships with some African states, including Burkina Faso. The Iranian Law Enforcement commander visited Burkina Faso and Ethiopia in May.[59] CTP previously assessed that this visit was likely part of a broader Iranian effort to build partnerships and simultaneously open new avenues for economic partnerships and revenue streams.[60] Uganda’s authoritarian regime could be open to similar support, especially as aging President Yoweri Museveni considers passing power to his son.[61]
Iran has separately sought to expand trade, investment, and infrastructure initiatives in Africa, in line with its latest moves in Uganda. Iran held the Third Iran-Africa Economic Cooperation Summit in April 2025, where it signed multiple commercial and investment deals with African partners and emphasized expanding joint chambers of commerce, trade centers, and financing mechanisms.[62] Iran has previously struggled to follow through on aspirational cooperation goals with African countries, but Iranian officials explicitly reorganized the 2025 summit to focus on four priority sectors — mining, agriculture, petrochemicals, and medical equipment — to ensure the summit remained “outcome-driven.”[63] Greater bilateral trade with Africa helps Iran increase its capital inflows to prevent economic collapse under Western sanctions and normalizes economic cooperation with non-Western countries despite sanctions. Iran-Africa trade remains a tiny portion of its overall gross domestic product, however, and CTP has previously assessed that increased trade with Africa will not solve the problems that underlie Iran’s economic instability.[64]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-december-3-2025/