Iran Update, December 3, 2025
Iran may have sought to develop laser-based anti-drone systems in response to Israeli drone attacks on Iran in recent years. Israel has conducted a series of drone attacks on Iran in recent years, including a drone strike on a centrifuge manufacturing facility in Karaj, Alborz Province, in 2021, a strike that destroyed a drone manufacturing facility in Kermanshah Province in 2022, and a drone attack on a munitions factory in Esfahan in 2023.[25] These attacks may have driven Iran to seek to develop laser-based anti-drone systems, which cost significantly less than traditional air defense systems.[26] Israel also used small drones in June 2025 to kill Iranian nuclear scientists and destroy Iranian ballistic missile launchers, which may further drive Iran to develop its anti-drone capabilities.[27] US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced on December 3 that it has launched a one-way attack drone force in the Middle East, which highlights how drones will continue to play a large role in future conflicts in the region.[28] Russia may be able to share knowledge about laser based anti-drone systems with Iran, given that Russia has developed such systems to counter Ukrainian drone strikes.[29] Russia unveiled a truck-mounted anti-drone laser system in October 2025, for example, that can detect, track, and destroy small drones by damaging onboard sensors, wiring, and batteries and causing the drone to crash.[30] Iran would likely prioritize laser-based anti-drone systems over laser based anti-ballistic missile systems in the near future, given that the latter requires much more energy than the former.[31] Most existing laser-based air defense systems, such as the Israeli Iron Beam, can shoot down small drones, rockets, and other systems, but currently do not have the capability to shoot down ballistic missiles.[32]
Iranian officials have met with several African counterparts over the last week to discuss greater defense and economic ties. Iranian Director General for African Affairs Akbar Khosravinejad met with the three foreign ministers of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) — Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger — in Burkina Faso on November 28.[48] The officials discussed ways to expand cooperation broadly. Iran has increased cooperation with the AES since the anti-Western bloc formed in 2023, and Iranian officials have met with their Sahelian counterparts on numerous occasions.[49] Iran has signed various agreements with Burkina Faso and Niger on energy, finance, health, industry, mining, and engineering, although CTP has observed little implementation.[50]
The Iranian deputy foreign minister for economic diplomacy led an Iranian delegation to Uganda on December 2, marking at least the second Iranian delegation to Uganda in 2025.[51] Iranian media emphasized that the trip aimed to strengthen economic ties and specifically noted that the two sides discussed bilateral relations, preparations for the upcoming joint economic and technical commission, and sectoral meetings with Ugandan business leaders to expand trade and investment ties.[52] Iran and Uganda have a decades long partnership rooted in anti-colonial political allyship and agricultural ties.[53] The previous three Iranian presidents visited Uganda during their terms, and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni has visited Iran several times.[54]
Iran seeks to bolster partnerships with African countries as part of its continued effort to break its international isolation, including through growing its geopolitical influence and increasing trade, hard currency acquisition, and access to natural resources, such as uranium, to mitigate sanctions. Iran has used defense ties as a foundation to strengthen partnerships, including its pursuit of Red Sea and uranium access. Iran has sent Ababil-3 and Mohajer-6 multi-role drones to Ethiopia, Sudan, and Western Sahara since 2021.[55] The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) rejected an Iranian request for a naval base or dual-use port on Sudan’s Red Sea coast in exchange for continued aid and a helicopter-carrying ship.[56] The Nigerien junta similarly turned down an Iranian offer of drones and surface-to-air missiles in exchange for uranium yellowcake in 2024.[57] CTP also assessed that Iran likely aimed to secure access to Zimbabwe’s rich uranium deposits through increased defense engagement with Zimbabwe in 2024.[58]
Iran has used internal oppression and regime security assistance to bolster its partnerships with some African states, including Burkina Faso. The Iranian Law Enforcement commander visited Burkina Faso and Ethiopia in May.[59] CTP previously assessed that this visit was likely part of a broader Iranian effort to build partnerships and simultaneously open new avenues for economic partnerships and revenue streams.[60] Uganda’s authoritarian regime could be open to similar support, especially as aging President Yoweri Museveni considers passing power to his son.[61]
Iran has separately sought to expand trade, investment, and infrastructure initiatives in Africa, in line with its latest moves in Uganda. Iran held the Third Iran-Africa Economic Cooperation Summit in April 2025, where it signed multiple commercial and investment deals with African partners and emphasized expanding joint chambers of commerce, trade centers, and financing mechanisms.[62] Iran has previously struggled to follow through on aspirational cooperation goals with African countries, but Iranian officials explicitly reorganized the 2025 summit to focus on four priority sectors — mining, agriculture, petrochemicals, and medical equipment — to ensure the summit remained “outcome-driven.”[63] Greater bilateral trade with Africa helps Iran increase its capital inflows to prevent economic collapse under Western sanctions and normalizes economic cooperation with non-Western countries despite sanctions. Iran-Africa trade remains a tiny portion of its overall gross domestic product, however, and CTP has previously assessed that increased trade with Africa will not solve the problems that underlie Iran’s economic instability.[64]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-december-3-2025/
Iranian-backed Iraqi actors reportedly pressured the Iraqi federal government to reverse its decision to designate the Houthis and Lebanese Hezbollah as terrorist organizations.[13] Iraqi state media reported on December 4 that the Iraqi Committee for Freezing Terrorist Funds had designated the Houthis and Hezbollah as terrorist organizations and froze the groups’ assets in mid-November 2025.[14] The committee later announced that it would remove the Houthis and Hezbollah from the list of designated terrorist organizations.[15] Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani ordered an investigation of the incident on December 4.[16] Two Iraqi officials told the Associated Press on December 4 that the Iraqi federal government reversed its terrorist designation of the Houthis and Hezbollah due to pressure from Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and politicians.[17] The militias reportedly accused the government of targeting regional allies and risking conflict with Iran. Many Iranian-backed Iraqi actors condemned the Iraqi federal government's designation of the Houthis and Hezbollah on December 4.[18] This incident comes as the United States has repeatedly pressured the Iraqi federal government to reduce Iranian influence in Iraq.[19]
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy began an annual two-day military exercise on December 4 in which it displayed its “interception” capabilities, likely as part of an Iranian effort to deter the United States and its allies from seizing Iranian vessels.[45] The exercise took place in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman. The IRGC Navy claimed on December 4 that it alerted US vessels in the region about the exercise.[46] The Iranian regime's primary English language news outlet stated on December 4 that this exercise sends a “dual message” of peace toward Iran's regional partners and a warning to Iran's adversaries that Iran will confront any “miscalculations” with “a decisive response.”[47] The IRGC Navy previously used this annual exercise to signal Iran's commitment to “sustainable security” in the region but did not issue a warning to the United States and its allies.[48] The IRGC Navy also named this year's exercise after deceased IRGC Navy commander Mohammad Nazeri, who was reportedly involved in the seizure of two US patrol boats and 10 US personnel in the Persian Gulf in January 2016.[49] Senior Iranian military officials have consistently threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz if the United States blocks Iranian oil exports since the Israel-Iran War.[50]
Iran is using recent Israeli actions in the Middle East to try to rally regional countries against Israel. Iranian efforts to discourage regional countries, including the Gulf states, from cooperating with the United States and Israel are unlikely to succeed, however. Tehran Mayor Alireza Zakani emphasized in an interview on December 2 that Iran must create a “new front” in the region to counter Israeli and US influence.[51] Zakani is a hardline politician who has served as the mayor of Tehran since 2021. Zakani claimed that regional countries, including Turkey, realized that they cannot trust the United States and Israel after the June 2025 Israel-Iran War. Zakani added that some regional countries realized after the war that Western military equipment and defense coalitions cannot protect them against Israeli threats. Zakani’s comments come after Iranian officials highlighted the opportunity for Iran and Turkey to work together to counter Israel's presence in Syria during Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s visit to Tehran on December 1.
Zakani’s remarks about regional countries not being able to trust Israel bear similarities to Iran's effort to isolate Israel and the United States after the Israeli strike in Doha in September 2025. Iranian officials used Israel's strike in Doha to frame the United States as an unreliable security guarantor for Gulf states in an effort to break up the nascent anti-Iran coalition in the region.[52] Gulf states condemned the Israeli strike in Doha and Iran exploited the Gulf states’ frustration by questioning the reliability of the United States as a security partner.[53] Iranian officials, for example, misrepresented the degree of US knowledge of the Israeli strike and suggested that US-brokered agreements are incapable of defending Arab states from Israeli attacks.[54]
Iran seeks to increase defense cooperation with the People's Republic of China (PRC) through joint educational and security research.General Xiao Tianliang, signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on security research cooperation in Beijing on December 4.[55] The MoU includes the exchange of students and instructors as well as joint courses between the two universities.[56] Tianliang is one of the PRC's most important military strategic thinkers.[57] Tianliang’s expertise suggests that Moghaddam and Tianliang may have had a high-level strategic discussion during Moghaddam’s visit to Beijing.[58] Moghaddam served as the Iranian Law Enforcement commander between 2005 and 2015 and has been involved in the regime's crackdowns on domestic dissent.[59] The United States sanctioned Moghaddam in 2011 for human rights abuses.[60] Iran has recently held similar military-education cooperation meetings with other partners, such as Belarus.[61]
https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-december-4-2025/