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Iran Update, August 28, 2025

The E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) initiated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback process on August 28.[1] The JCPOA snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance” of JCPOA commitments.[2] The JCPOA gives the UNSC 10 days to initiate a resolution to continue providing sanction relief to Iran after an E3 member notifies the UNSC of Iran's ”significant non-performance.”[3] All prior UN sanctions would return 30 days after the initial referral to the UNSC if the resolution does not pass or a permanent member vetoes it.[4] The snapback mechanism is currently set to expire on October 18, 2025. The triggering of snapback sanctions comes after Iran failed to meet the E3’s conditions for extending the mechanism's deadline by the end of August.[5] The E3 previously set an August 31 deadline for Iran to show real progress toward a nuclear deal by renewing cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and restarting negotiations with the United States.[6] Iranian negotiators met with the E3 in Geneva on August 26 but failed to “put tangible, detailed deliverables on the table,” which prompted the E3 to move forward with the snapback process before the snapback mechanism‘s expiration.[7] The snapback mechanism would reimpose six UNSC resolutions on Iran, which would impose restrictions on Iran's conventional arms trade, missile program, uranium enrichment activities, and development of nuclear-capable missiles.[8]

Iran has demolished buildings at the Mojdeh site (Lavisan-2) at Shahid Rajaei University in Lavisan, Tehran Province, which Israel damaged during the 12-day Israel-Iran War. The Institute for Science and International Security assessed on August 27 that Iran is likely trying to conceal undeclared nuclear weapons research and development activities at this site.[9] Israel damaged at least four buildings at the Mojdeh site between June 14 and 20 during the war.[10] Satellite imagery from August 20 shows that Iran has demolished two of the damaged buildings, including a building affiliated with the Iranian Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research‘s (SPND) Shahid Karimi Group that is involved in explosives research.[11] The Mojdeh site previously housed the SPND headquarters, which played a leading role in the Iranian nuclear weapons research program before 2003.[12] Shahid Rajaei University is affiliated with Iran's nuclear program, and some US officials believe that the university has been involved in nuclear warhead design research.[13]

The IAEA reported on August 27 that there is no evidence Iran has moved its stockpile of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) stored underground at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) since the US strikes on June 21, using satellite imagery.[14] IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated on August 27 that “there is nothing to contradict the notion that the material is where it [previously] was.“[15] Grossi confirmed on June 23 that US and Israeli airstrikes damaged tunnel entrances used for storing enriched material at the ENTC. The Institute for Science and International Security similarly reported, citing satellite imagery, that Iran ”backfilled” these entrances ahead of US strikes likely to try to contain an explosion or prevent the dispersion of hazardous material.[16] Iran cannot currently access the ENTC and, therefore, likely cannot conduct a conclusive damage assessment or extract materials. Senior Israeli intelligence officials said that any Iranian attempts to recover the material would “almost certainly” be detected.[17] The US strikes also destroyed components of Iran's nuclear program that would be necessary for further enrichment and weaponization to create a deliverable nuclear weapon.[18]

The Iranian rial depreciated to 1,016,500 rials per one US dollar on August 28.[37] This value is close to the April 2025 record low of 1,059,000 rials per US dollar.[38] This drop comes after the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered the JCPOA snapback process on August 28, which would reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran.[39]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-28-2025

Rial graph https://www.bonbast.com/graph/usd

Iran Update, August 29, 2025

Iranian parliamentarians introduced a three-part bill on August 28 to withdraw Iran from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), likely to pressure the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) to not reimpose UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran.[1] The bill would require Iran to leave the NPT and the Additional Protocol, end all negotiations with the United States and the E3, and terminate cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).[2] The Iranian parliament recently passed a law on June 25 that suspended Iranian cooperation with the IAEA, which makes the last clause largely performative.[3] The E3 triggered the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism on August 28.[4] The JCPOA snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UNSC sanctions on Iran in the event of Iran’s “significant non-compliance” of JCPOA commitments.[5] The process to reimpose UNSC sanctions on Iran lasts 30 days, and Iran likely seeks for the E3 to reverse its decision to reimpose these sanctions during the 30-day period.

The introduction of this bill may reflect differences between various regime institutions about how the regime should respond to the E3 decision to trigger the snapback mechanism. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi wrote a letter to the European Union on August 29 in which he stated that Iran “remains committed” to diplomacy and is willing to resume negotiations to reach a “fair and balanced” agreement.[6] This statement contrasts with the three-part bill, which would suspend all negotiations between Iran and the United States and the E3. The difference between parliament and the executive branch’s views comes after hardline parliamentarians recently criticized the Iranian government for allowing IAEA inspectors to return to Iran. Parliamentarians claimed that the decision violated the law that parliament passed on June 25.[7] IAEA inspectors returned to Iran on August 27 to supervise a fuel replacement at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. IAEA inspectors do not have access to other Iranian nuclear facilities, such as Natanz or Fordow.

Iran called on the UNSC to approve a Russian-Chinese draft resolution that would extend Resolution 2231 and the JCPOA until at least April 18, 2026.[8] The snapback mechanism is currently set to expire on October 18, 2025. Iran’s Mission to the UN said on August 28 that UNSC members face a “decisive” choice between backing the Russian–Chinese resolution and preserving diplomacy or reimposing UNSC sanctions, which it claimed would cause “grave consequences.”[9] Iran previously rejected an E3 proposal to extend the snapback deadline by six months, arguing that extending the snapback deadline gives the E3 more time to reimpose UNSC sanctions on Iran.[10] The E3 offered to extend the snapback deadline in return for Iran resuming full cooperation with the IAEA, resuming negotiations with the United States, and accounting for its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile.[11] The Russian-Chinese resolution does not appear to include these conditions and simply urges all parties to resume negotiations, which makes this resolution much more favorable for Iran than the E3 proposal.[12] The Russian-Chinese resolution also reportedly bans the E3 from reimposing UNSC sanctions on Iran during the six-month extension period.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-29-2025