The Israeli Air Force (IAF) conducted airstrikes on June 23 targeting roads leading to the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) in order to “disrupt” access to the site. Israeli strikes on access roads to Fordow may prevent Iran from being able to assess damage at Fordow or move materials from the site to another location.
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has continued to target Iranian internal security and social control institutions in Tehran. The IDF targeted the Basij headquarters in Tehran. The IDF also struck Evin Prison, which is Iran's primary facility for holding regime dissidents. An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that the IDF struck the prison's entrances to facilitate the escape of regime dissidents.
Iran Update Special Report, June 23, 2025, Evening Edition
Information Cutoff: 5:00 PM ET
US President Donald Trump announced that Israel and Iran agreed to a ceasefire, beginning the evening of June 23. A senior Iranian official confirmed to Reuters that the ceasefire would occur following Qatari mediation.
Iran conducted a missile attack targeting the US al Udeid Airbase in Qatar in retaliation for the US strikes on the Iranian nuclear program. The attack was largely symbolic and inflicted no casualties or damage, however.
Iranian elite, including some moderate leaders, have reportedly tried to pressure Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to accept a ceasefire or sideline him entirely. It is unclear what role these individuals played in the US-announced ceasefire.
Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Policy Majid Takht Ravanchi announced that Iran will remain a member of the NPT. Iranian officials have previously threatened to withdraw from the NPT in response to US and Israeli strikes.
IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi confirmed that the United States likely inflicted “very significant damage” in its strikes on the Fordow nuclear site. Iran may have moved some of its nuclear material to undisclosed locations beforehand, however.
Iran's retaliatory attack resembles Iran's last direct attack on US forces in 2020, but Iran appears to have assumed less risk that the United States would respond forcefully to this attack than it did in its 2020 attack. Iran launched between 15 and 22 ballistic missiles at Ain al Asad Airbase and another US site in Iraq in January 2020 in retaliation for the United States killing former IRGC Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani in Baghdad.[15] The attack injured at least 64 US servicemembers at Ain al Asad Airbase, even though the United States received similar advanced warning that allowed personnel to enter bunkers.[16] The Qatari Foreign Ministry confirmed on June 23 that al Udeid Airbase in Qatar “had been evacuated [before the attack],” which suggests that there was limited risk to US servicemembers during the attack.[17] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 17 showed that unsheltered US aircraft at al Udeid Airbase relocated to an unspecified location, further suggesting that there was limited risk to US assets as well as personnel.[18] Iran's decision to strike an evacuated US base suggests that Iran designed the attack to try to prevent further escalation. Iranian leaders accept a certain level of risk when conducting any attack on US interests, as such an attack could harm or kill US servicemembers, however. Trump warned prior to the Iranian attack on al Udeid Airbase that the United States would respond to Iran if it harmed US personnel.
There appear to be internal fissures within the Iranian regime over how to respond to the conflict with the United States and Israel. Opposition media reported on June 21 that former moderate Iranian President Hassan Rouhani reportedly met with senior clerics in Qom in recent days to persuade them to pressure Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to concede to key US and Israeli demands, including the suspension of uranium enrichment.[29] The clerics included Mousa Shobeyri, Hossein Vahid Khorasani, and Nasser Makarem Shirazi. Rouhani framed the meetings as an effort to “save” the Islamic Republic. It is unclear how the clerics responded to Rouhani’s requests. IRGC-affiliated media claimed on June 19 that a “few suspicious and disreputable” individuals within the regime were trying to convince clerics in Qom to push for a compromise with Israel.[30] Rouhani, as well as Supreme Leader adviser Ali Larijani and Expediency Discernment Council head Sadegh Amoli Larijani, have reportedly unsuccessfully tried to contact Khamenei in recent days to advocate for renewed negotiations with the United States.[31] Ali Larijani’s reported support for negotiations is notable given that he made threats to US forces in the region in a post on X on June 23.[32]
Unspecified Iranian leaders have reportedly developed a contingency plan to govern Iran without Khamenei in the event that Khamenei is killed or informally sidelined.[33] The individuals developing this plan have agreed that a leadership committee would functionally replace Khamenei and negotiate a ceasefire with the United States and Israel. The individuals have considered Rouhani for a “key role” in the leadership committee. Some military officials involved in the plan have engaged Gulf countries to try to gain support for such political change in Iran. It is very notable that senior Iranian military, political, and religious leaders are discussing a potential post-Khamenei leadership structure in Iran. Reuters reported on June 23 that there have been increased efforts to appoint a successor for Khamenei, citing five insiders with knowledge of the discussions.[34] These efforts suggest that senior officials are highly concerned about the stability of the regime and seek to ensure regime survival in the event that Khamenei is killed or removed.
The Washington Post revealed that Israel conducted an intelligence operation to intimidate and divide senior Iranian military officials as part of its campaign against Iran.[49] Persian-speaking Israeli intelligence operatives called more than 20 senior Iranian leaders on their cellphones after Israel killed key Iranian military leaders on June 13.[50] The Israeli intelligence operatives threatened to kill Iranian leaders and their families unless they ceased their support for the Iranian regime and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.[51] In an audio recording obtained by the Washington Post, an Israeli intelligence operative called an unspecified senior IRGC official and told the official that he and his family would be killed unless he sent a video disavowing the Iranian regime to the Israeli intelligence operative within 12 hours.[52] Three unspecified Israeli sources told the Washington Post that the official is still believed to be alive and that the primary objective of the operation was to deter and confuse the Iranian leadership.[53]
Iran may have moved some materials from its nuclear facilities to other locations ahead of US or Israeli strikes. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi sent Grossi a letter on June 13 in which he stated that Iran would “adopt special measures to protect our nuclear equipment and materials.”[63] Israeli officials told the New York Times on June 22 that Iran may have moved materials and equipment from Fordow ahead of the US strikes.[64] CTP-ISW reported in its June 23 Morning Update that Israel conducted airstrikes on June 23 targeting roads leading to Fordow in order to “disrupt” access to the site, which may prevent Iran from being able to assess damage at Fordow or move materials from the site to other locations.[65]
Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on June 23, reportedly to request Russian assistance for Iran. An Iranian delegation led by Araghchi met with Putin, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Presidential Aide Yuri Ushakov, and Chief of the General Staff's Main Directorate Igor Kostykov.[68] Iranian Ambassador to Russia Kazem Jalali and Deputy Foreign Minister for International and Legal Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi also attended the meeting.[69] An unspecified senior source told Reuters that Araghchi was expected to deliver a letter from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to Putin that sought “more help” from Russia.[70] Unspecified Iranian sources said that Iran has been unsatisfied with Russian support for Iran against the United States and Israel.[71] Putin stated that Russia is “making efforts” to assist Iran, according to a Kremlin readout.[72] Putin also said that “unprovoked” attacks against Iran have “no justification.”[73] Iran's reported dissatisfaction with Russian support likely reflects Russian constraints in its ability to provide direct support to Iran due to its war in Ukraine, and also showcases the immediate limitations of the Russo-Iranian strategic relationship.[74] Iran and Russia's recent Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement notably lacks a mutual defense clause.[75] Russia has likely resigned itself to providing diplomatic overtures and declarations of support for Iran, which underscores the limited benefits that Russia can provide its partners as it focuses on fighting Ukraine.[76]
⭕️ The Israeli army will operate in these areas, as it has done in recent days throughout Iran to attack the Iranian regime's military infrastructure.
⭕️ Dear citizens, for your safety and health, we ask that you immediately leave the areas designated on the map and do not approach them in the coming hours.
⭕️ Your presence in these areas puts your life at risk.
The ceasefire between Iran and Israel appears to be holding despite both Israeli and Iranian claims of violations. Israel has responded to perceived Iranian violations of the ceasefire but has not resumed its campaign at this time.
Iran has conducted at least seven ballistic missile attacks targeting Israel since CTP-ISW’s last data cutoff at 5:00 PM ET on June 23. Iran launched five of the attacks before the ceasefire went into effect at 12:00 AM ET, one attack at 12:06 AM ET, and one attack around 3:25 AM ET. Israel conducted several waves of airstrikes in Tehran on June 23 and 24 before and after the ceasefire went into effect.
An unspecified senior US military official told the Associated Press on June 24 that the United States intercepted drones that targeted Ain al Asad Airbase and another unspecified base near Baghdad Airport overnight on June 23 and 24.
Iran Update Special Report, June 24, 2025, Evening Edition
Information Cutoff: 5:00PM ET
The Institute for Science and International Security assessed that US and Israeli strikes on Iran have “effectively destroyed” Iran's enrichment program.[16] The Institute said it will take a “long time” for Iran to restore its enrichment capabilities to pre-strike levels. This assessment is based on the destruction Iran suffered at Natanz nuclear facility, Fordow nuclear facility, Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center and the elimination of many nuclear scientists.[17] The six entry point craters for the US bunker-buster bombs at Fordow were above two weak points, and the bombs would have detonated within the facility.[18] The Institute for Science and International Security assesses that the bomb blast would have been channeled by the centrifuge cascade hall's side walls, which would have destroyed all of the installed centrifuges there.[19] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) battle damage assessments indicate that Israeli strikes also likely damaged or destroyed several thousand centrifuges at Natanz.[20] Israel and the United States conducted airstrikes targeting the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant above ground and Fuel Enrichment Plant underground at Natanz, respectively.[21] The IAEA added that it was possible that uranium isotopes may have been dispersed within the facility (though not outside), which would make it difficult to access.[22] This means it may be some time before even the Iranians can determine the true extent of the damage.
The Institute for Science and International Security stated that Iran still retains stockpiles of 3 to 5 percent, 20 percent, and 60 percent enriched uranium, however.[23] Weapons-grade uranium (WGU) is uranium enriched up to 90 percent. The destruction of so many centrifuges will make enriching from 60 percent to 90 percent much slower. A US weapons expert stated that US and Israeli strikes have also made it significantly more difficult and time-consuming for Iran to turn WGU into a usable nuclear weapon.[24] He said the strikes have “significantly” increased the time required for Iran to “even build a non-missile deliverable weapon,“ such as a nuclear bomb. There are significant challenges associated with miniaturizing a nuclear weapon to install it on a ballistic missile warhead.
Israel has killed at least 14 Iranian nuclear scientists since June 12 as part of its campaign to delay Iran's ability to weaponize its nuclear capabilities.[31] The IDF killed Sayyed Asghar Hashemi Tabar in Tehran Province on June 20.[32] Hashemi Tabar was a weapons expert at the Shahid Chamran Group, which is a subsidiary of the Iranian Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND), and specialized in pulse power research.[33] Pulsed power is a technology that stores and releases energy in intense bursts to simulate nuclear detonation effects for research, but pulsed power does not trigger actual nuclear explosions.[34] The United States sanctioned the Shahid Chamran Group and Hashemi Tabar in 2019 for research related to Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation.[35] The IDF also killed Iranian nuclear scientist Mostafa Sadati Ermaki in Tehran Province.[36]
The IDF has targeted Iran's internal security institutions, including the Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC), Basij, and IRGC provincial units since June 15.[39] Israeli strikes on regime security institutions continued on June 23 before the ceasefire. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz announced on June 20 that he ordered “intensified” strikes on regime symbols and domestic repression centers in Tehran Province.[40] The IDF struck the IRGC Imam Hassan Mojtaba Corps headquarters in Alborz Province on June 23 and killed at least 23 IRGC members, including Provincial Deputy Commander Brigadier General Mojtaba Karami and Deputy for Social Affairs Brigadier General Akbar Enayati.[41]
The IDF also killed three senior security and intelligence commanders on June 23, including Deputy for social affairs of the Basij Organization Brigadier General Meysam Rezvanpour, LEC Intelligence Organization Deputy Brigadier General Alireza Lotfi and Basij Counterintelligence Commander Mohammad Taghi Yousefvand, likely to degrade the regime's security and intelligence infrastructure.[42] The Iranian regime has maintained social control by violently cracking down on protests and other expressions of popular anti-regime sentiment through internal security organizations like the Basij, LEC, and the IRGC.[43] Basij units have been deployed to support LEC forces during major protest movements like the Mahsa Amini protests and the Iranian Green Movement.[44]
The IDF assessed that Iran launched between 500 and 550 ballistic missiles and more than 1,000 drones targeting Israel during its “Operation True Promise III.”[53] The IDF’s assessment is consistent with CTP-ISW’s observation of 543 Iranian ballistic missiles. CTP-ISW has recorded 43 waves of Iranian ballistic missile attacks targeting Israel since the start of “Operation True Promise III” on June 13. Iran's ballistic missile barrages during “Operation True Promise III” varied in size. Iran used around 40 missiles in its largest barrage and one missile in its smallest barrage.[54] Iran's missile barrages in the recent conflict are much smaller compared to its barrages in its October 2024 attack on Israel when Iran launched around 100 ballistic missiles per barrage in two barrages.[55] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on June 24 that Israeli air defense systems successfully intercepted 80 to 90 percent of Iran's ballistic missiles.[56] Israel also reportedly had a 99.99 percent interception rate of Iranian drones, with only one drone making impact.[57]
