Iran Update Special Report, June 24, 2025, Morning Edition
The ceasefire between Iran and Israel appears to be holding despite both Israeli and Iranian claims of violations. Israel has responded to perceived Iranian violations of the ceasefire but has not resumed its campaign at this time.
Iran has conducted at least seven ballistic missile attacks targeting Israel since CTP-ISW’s last data cutoff at 5:00 PM ET on June 23. Iran launched five of the attacks before the ceasefire went into effect at 12:00 AM ET, one attack at 12:06 AM ET, and one attack around 3:25 AM ET. Israel conducted several waves of airstrikes in Tehran on June 23 and 24 before and after the ceasefire went into effect.
An unspecified senior US military official told the Associated Press on June 24 that the United States intercepted drones that targeted Ain al Asad Airbase and another unspecified base near Baghdad Airport overnight on June 23 and 24.
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Iran Update Special Report, June 24, 2025, Evening Edition
Information Cutoff: 5:00PM ET
The Institute for Science and International Security assessed that US and Israeli strikes on Iran have “effectively destroyed” Iran's enrichment program.[16] The Institute said it will take a “long time” for Iran to restore its enrichment capabilities to pre-strike levels. This assessment is based on the destruction Iran suffered at Natanz nuclear facility, Fordow nuclear facility, Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center and the elimination of many nuclear scientists.[17] The six entry point craters for the US bunker-buster bombs at Fordow were above two weak points, and the bombs would have detonated within the facility.[18] The Institute for Science and International Security assesses that the bomb blast would have been channeled by the centrifuge cascade hall's side walls, which would have destroyed all of the installed centrifuges there.[19] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) battle damage assessments indicate that Israeli strikes also likely damaged or destroyed several thousand centrifuges at Natanz.[20] Israel and the United States conducted airstrikes targeting the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant above ground and Fuel Enrichment Plant underground at Natanz, respectively.[21] The IAEA added that it was possible that uranium isotopes may have been dispersed within the facility (though not outside), which would make it difficult to access.[22] This means it may be some time before even the Iranians can determine the true extent of the damage.
The Institute for Science and International Security stated that Iran still retains stockpiles of 3 to 5 percent, 20 percent, and 60 percent enriched uranium, however.[23] Weapons-grade uranium (WGU) is uranium enriched up to 90 percent. The destruction of so many centrifuges will make enriching from 60 percent to 90 percent much slower. A US weapons expert stated that US and Israeli strikes have also made it significantly more difficult and time-consuming for Iran to turn WGU into a usable nuclear weapon.[24] He said the strikes have “significantly” increased the time required for Iran to “even build a non-missile deliverable weapon,“ such as a nuclear bomb. There are significant challenges associated with miniaturizing a nuclear weapon to install it on a ballistic missile warhead.
Israel has killed at least 14 Iranian nuclear scientists since June 12 as part of its campaign to delay Iran's ability to weaponize its nuclear capabilities.[31] The IDF killed Sayyed Asghar Hashemi Tabar in Tehran Province on June 20.[32] Hashemi Tabar was a weapons expert at the Shahid Chamran Group, which is a subsidiary of the Iranian Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND), and specialized in pulse power research.[33] Pulsed power is a technology that stores and releases energy in intense bursts to simulate nuclear detonation effects for research, but pulsed power does not trigger actual nuclear explosions.[34] The United States sanctioned the Shahid Chamran Group and Hashemi Tabar in 2019 for research related to Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation.[35] The IDF also killed Iranian nuclear scientist Mostafa Sadati Ermaki in Tehran Province.[36]
The IDF has targeted Iran's internal security institutions, including the Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC), Basij, and IRGC provincial units since June 15.[39] Israeli strikes on regime security institutions continued on June 23 before the ceasefire. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz announced on June 20 that he ordered “intensified” strikes on regime symbols and domestic repression centers in Tehran Province.[40] The IDF struck the IRGC Imam Hassan Mojtaba Corps headquarters in Alborz Province on June 23 and killed at least 23 IRGC members, including Provincial Deputy Commander Brigadier General Mojtaba Karami and Deputy for Social Affairs Brigadier General Akbar Enayati.[41]
The IDF also killed three senior security and intelligence commanders on June 23, including Deputy for social affairs of the Basij Organization Brigadier General Meysam Rezvanpour, LEC Intelligence Organization Deputy Brigadier General Alireza Lotfi and Basij Counterintelligence Commander Mohammad Taghi Yousefvand, likely to degrade the regime's security and intelligence infrastructure.[42] The Iranian regime has maintained social control by violently cracking down on protests and other expressions of popular anti-regime sentiment through internal security organizations like the Basij, LEC, and the IRGC.[43] Basij units have been deployed to support LEC forces during major protest movements like the Mahsa Amini protests and the Iranian Green Movement.[44]
The IDF assessed that Iran launched between 500 and 550 ballistic missiles and more than 1,000 drones targeting Israel during its “Operation True Promise III.”[53] The IDF’s assessment is consistent with CTP-ISW’s observation of 543 Iranian ballistic missiles. CTP-ISW has recorded 43 waves of Iranian ballistic missile attacks targeting Israel since the start of “Operation True Promise III” on June 13. Iran's ballistic missile barrages during “Operation True Promise III” varied in size. Iran used around 40 missiles in its largest barrage and one missile in its smallest barrage.[54] Iran's missile barrages in the recent conflict are much smaller compared to its barrages in its October 2024 attack on Israel when Iran launched around 100 ballistic missiles per barrage in two barrages.[55] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on June 24 that Israeli air defense systems successfully intercepted 80 to 90 percent of Iran's ballistic missiles.[56] Israel also reportedly had a 99.99 percent interception rate of Iranian drones, with only one drone making impact.[57]
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Iran Update, June 25, 2025
Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET
Preliminary intelligence assessments suggest the US and Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities caused serious damage to the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP). The New York Times published a June 25 report on a leaked, low-confidence US intelligence assessment of the recent US strikes on the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant.[1] The New York Times and other Western media outlets cite very little direct information from the report. Unspecified sources, in their characterization of the assessment, said that the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) assessed that the US and Israeli strikes.[2] Unspecified officials added that the findings indicated that US bunker-buster bombs sealed entrances to two unspecified nuclear sites but failed to “collapse their underground buildings.”[3]
The destruction of the centrifuges and equipment inside does not necessarily require the collapse of the facility itself. The Institute of Science and International Security, a nuclear nonproliferation think tank that has long studied the Iranian nuclear program, assessed that it was very likely the strikes destroyed or damaged most of the centrifuges at Fordow on the basis of the impact locations and the effects of the blast waves.[4] It is notable in the context of the leaked US assessments that the Institute did not assess the damage on the basis of whether facilities “collapsed.” This is consistent with claims by other unspecified officials to the New York Times, who said that the Fordow, Natanz, and Esfahan nuclear facilities had all suffered “moderate to severe damage.”[5] CTP-ISW has no basis for forming an independent assessment of the damage from US and Israeli strikes at these three nuclear facilities.[6] Early Israeli assessments placed more confidence in the damage to enrichment facilities. The Israel Atomic Energy Commission separately assessed that the US strike on Fordow destroyed the site's critical infrastructure and “rendered the enrichment facility inoperable.”[7] US President Donald Trump told reporters on June 25 that Israeli agents concluded that Fordow suffered ”total obliteration” after visiting the site, suggesting that Israeli assessments have been formed with intelligence collected by Israeli agents in Iran. [8]
A conclusive battle damage assessment of nuclear facilities will take time, given the buried nature of Iran's nuclear sites and limited on-site access. A US nuclear weapons expert stated on June 24 that US and Israeli strikes likely destroyed 20,000 centrifuges at Natanz and Fordow and severely damaged weaponization infrastructure.[9] The expert stated that the early, low-confidence assessment ”focused too narrowly” on breakout timelines.[10] Breakout refers to the time required to enrich 90 percent enriched uranium (also known as weapons-grade uranium). Weaponization requires one to build nuclear weapons. Axios reported on June 25 that intercepted communications suggested Iranian military officials have delivered false situation reports to senior Iranian leaders to downplay the extent of the damage, citing an unspecified Israeli source.[11] This fact is notable because the leaked US intelligence assessment reportedly relied in part upon signals intelligence.[12]
Senior Iranian leadership suggested that Iran may not be willing to cooperate with various international organizations and treaties in the future, despite Iran's historic and current non-adherence to such agreements. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi and other senior Iranian officials have suggested in recent days that Iran may reconsider its stance on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).[13] Araghchi stated that the agreement “failed” to protect Iran's nuclear program despite years of Iran's compliance with the NPT.[14] A May 2025 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) NPT Safeguards Agreement report found Iran's cooperation with the IAEA ”less than satisfactory” and raised concerns about undeclared Iranian nuclear sites and material.[15] Iran has threatened to withdraw from the NPT repeatedly over the past several years, but has not done so yet.[16]
Iranian parliament passed a bill on June 25 to suspend all cooperation with the IAEA.[17] Iran's parliamentary national security committee claimed on June 24 that the May 2025 IAEA report that accused Iran of failing to cooperate was inaccurate and served as a pretext for the Israeli air campaign. [18]The committee's June 24 statement recommended that Iran suspend cooperation with the IAEA.[19] Iran has already restricted IAEA oversight, including by withdrawing the certifications of several inspectors in September 2023 and barring other top inspectors in November 2024.[20] Iranian parliamentary speaker Mohammed Bagher Ghalibaf stated that Iran could resume cooperation with the IAEA following a report from Iran's Atomic Energy Authority and the national security and foreign affairs committee.[21] The June 25 bill must be approved by Iran's Guardian Council, whose members are appointed by the Iranian Supreme Leader, to be entered into law.
The head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, Mohammed Eslami, stated on June 24 that Iran is assessing the damage to its nuclear program and planning to resume operations.[22] Israel destroyed Iranian nuclear facilities and enrichment capacity with US support and killed key nuclear scientists who were critical to the development and weaponization of Iran's program. The Institute for Science and Security assessed that US and Israeli airstrikes on Iran have ”effectively destroyed” Iran's enrichment program and that it will take a ”long time” for Iran to restore its enrichment capabilities to pre-strike levels.[23] IRGC Major General Mohsen Rezaei stated during an interview on June 19 that Iran relocated its enriched material to a secure location to prevent it from being destroyed.[24] The Institute stated that Iran still retains stockpiles of 3 to 5 percent, 20 percent, and 60 percent enriched uranium.[25] The destruction of Iran's enrichment capabilities will make enriching uranium from 60 percent to 90 percent much slower, however.
Trump stated on June 25 that the United States would not allow Iran to rebuild its uranium facilities and that he would be willing to strike Iran again to prevent it from doing so.[26] The United States and Iran have maintained their negotiating positions from before the conflict on Iranian uranium enrichment. Iranian Vice President Mohammed Reza Aref reiterated on June 25 that Iran will not negotiate on Iran‘s right to enrich uranium on Iranian territory.[27] The United States has maintained its demand for Iran to maintain zero uranium enrichment capabilities.[28] The United States and Iran are expected to meet the week of June 29 to discuss a potential nuclear deal.[29] US President Donald Trump suggested that a nuclear deal with Iran may not be necessary due to damage inflicted on the nuclear program.[30]
The Iranian regime has taken steps to securitize the country, which likely reflects the regime's paranoia about Israeli infiltration and signals a shift to prioritization of counterintelligence. Iranian media reported that Iranian security forces have arrested at least 700 Iranians on political or security charges since the start of the Israel-Iran War on June 12.[31] The arrests include several individuals whom the regime characterized as “Mossad spies.”[32] Such arrests likely reflect Iranian recognition of the scale of Israeli infiltration and covert operations in Iran, which was revealed during Israel's opening attacks on Israel. Three Iranian senior officials told Reuters that Iran is concerned about internal unrest, especially in Kurdish areas, and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Basij units have been put on alert.[33] One source said Iranian forces have deployed to Iran's borders with Pakistan, Iraq, and Azerbaijan to prevent the infiltration of “terrorists.”[34] Large Iranian Kurdish separatist factions said that Iranian authorities have arrested several members of the Kurdish groups.[35] A member of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan—one of several large Iranian Kurdish separatist factions—said IRGC units deployed to schools in Kurdish areas of Iran and conducted house searches for suspects and weapons following Israeli airstrikes in Iran on June 12. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei recently appointed Brigadier General Mohammad Karami as the IRGC Ground Forces commander, which further illustrates the regime's concerns about potential domestic unrest, given that Karami was previously involved in suppressing internal dissent.[36]
Iran's efforts to securitize the country (and the particular focus on Kurdish areas) may reflect the regime's concerns that Israel could exploit instability in Kurdish or minority areas to further infiltrate Iran. The Iranian regime has historically been concerned about unrest in Kurdish-dominated areas of northwestern Iran. A significant portion of the protests during the Mahsa Amini Protest movement in December 2022 occurred in cities in Tehran, Esfahan, Kurdistan, and West Azerbaijan provinces.[37] Kurdistan and West Azerbaijan provinces have a large Iranian Kurdish population that resonated with the protest movement. The recent arrests were reportedly concentrated in Kermanshah, Esfahan, Khuzestan, Fars, Lorestan, and Tehran provinces.[38] Iran has historically also accused Kurdish opposition groups and Israel of using Iraqi Kurdistan to facilitate operations into Iran. Iranian state media accused Kurdish opposition groups of helping Israel smuggle military equipment into Iran that Israel used in its January 2023 drone attack on a munitions factory in Esfahan, for example.[39]
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