Iran is also making remarks that risk stoking sectarian tension. Senior Iranian officials, including the supreme leader, have repeatedly suggested that the Syrian youth will “rise up” in Syria.[13] The Iranian supreme leader compared these “Syrian youth” to the Iraqi militia groups that systematically hunted down and killed Sunni civilians in Baghdad as part of a campaign of sectarian cleansing in Iraq.[14] Core HTS fighters from Jabhat al Nusra and al Qaeda in Iraq, like Shara, are intimately familiar with the Iraqi context and would presumably read “Syrian youth” as a much more sectarian call than it immediately appears. Sectarian Iranian remarks would provide an opening for Sunni sectarian elements in Syria to portray all Alawites and Shia as pro-Iranian proxies to justify a violent crackdown.
Syrian Foreign Affairs Minister Asaad Hassan al Shaibani responded to these Iranian statements. He warned Iran against “spreading chaos in Syria” and stated that Syria will hold Iran “accountable for the repercussions of [its] latest remarks,” likely referring to ongoing rhetoric from senior Iranian officials suggesting that Syrian youth will “rise up” in Syria.[15]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-26-2024
Iran Update, December 27, 2024
It appears increasingly unlikely, however, that the HTS-led government’s leadership views negotiating with the SDF as a priority as it formalizes relations with Turkey. HTS, while not a Turkish proxy or beholden to Turkey, has been quick to deepen its cooperation with Turkey since the fall of the Assad regime. HTS’s intensifying alignment with Turkish interests continues to pose an existential threat to the SDF as Turkey continues to signal a possible Turkish incursion into Syria or a Turkish-backed operation in northern Syria to “eliminate” the SDF. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced on December 27 that Turkey shall ensure security “beyond its southern borders” and “eliminate terrorist threats” starting in 2025.[25] Abdi warned of a potential “catastrophe” facing Kobani from the Turkish military buildup on the border.[26] Syrian media reported on December 27 that Turkish military reinforcements arrived in the town of Suluk, which is located north of Raqqa in SNA-controlled territory.[27]
The SNA continued to engage the SDF west of Tishreen Dam in the Manbij countryside.[28] Local sources reported that the SNA sent reinforcements to the frontlines near the Tishreen Dam.[29] The SDF claimed on December 27 that it engaged SNA forces near Abu Qalqal in the Manbij countryside.[30]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-27-2024