Iranian Regime tv Channel One hacked while it was airing Khamenie speech

So the reality is that Iran is attacking commercial shipping from its base in Houthi-Land. I figured as much. Houthis are inbred morons who fall off their camels when they try to ride them.

Iranians are smart. So none of that traditional Moooslim inbreeding there. Most Iranians are not serious Mooooslims. To make Iran great again, they just need to kill all the top Ayatollahs and return to Persian Zoroastrianism.

Iran’s economy is controlled by so called foundations that are run by the top Ayatollahs extended families. These families are very wealthy parasites from skimming from Iran’s oil & gas businesses and other large industries. MEANING, these fat piggy Mullahs are not just in it for fake Muhammad and Islam. They are in it for the money,

The modest tiers in Iran such as shopkeepers, restaurants and bakeries, food stores are not under such Mullah ownership and control. They have a normal capitalism situation.

While it's not entirely accurate to say that foundations completely control Iran's economy, they do play a significant role, alongside other entities. Here's a breakdown:

Foundations:

Bonyads: These are charitable trusts with significant economic influence, estimated to control 20% of Iran's GDP. They operate in various sectors like manufacturing, trading, and real estate. Some are directly controlled by the Supreme Leader, like Setad and Astan Quds Razavi.
Lack of transparency: Their operations are often opaque, raising concerns about accountability and potential conflicts of interest.

Other players:

Government: The state holds a substantial portion of the economy through state-owned enterprises and banks.
Private sector: Despite restrictions, it exists and contributes to the economy, though facing challenges like access to financing.
Military: The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has also expanded its economic activities in various sectors, raising debates about its influence.

Complexity:

No single entity controls the entire economy. It's a complex picture with different actors vying for influence.
Estimates vary: Some sources like DW put the foundations' share at 80%, which is disputed.

Additional points:

International sanctions have impacted Iran's economy considerably.
There are ongoing debates about economic reforms and transparency.

I hope this clarifies the situation. Remember, the economic landscape in Iran is complex and subject to ongoing discussions.

Copilot

Iran’s economy indeed has some unique features, and one of them is the presence of large religious foundations called bonyads. These bonyads play a significant role in Iran’s economic landscape. Here are some key points:

Bonyads: These charitable trusts control an estimated 20% of Iran’s GDP and are second only to the oil industry in terms of manufacturing, trading, and real estate development within Iran ¹.
Budget Influence: The combined budgets of these bonyads represent more than 30% of central government spending². They wield considerable financial power and influence.
Transparency: Unlike many other sectors of Iran’s economy, the stock market provides a relatively transparent view. The Iran Privatization Organization has divested a significant portion of state-owned assets through the stock exchange. While evaluating the influence of important players like the Revolutionary Guards or the Supreme Leader within the stock exchange provides a conservative estimate, it still sheds light on Iran’s economic dynamics ³.

In summary, while the public sector, state-controlled religious foundations, and the powerful Revolutionary Guard Corps are often named as key players in Iran’s economy, the reality is more nuanced. The quasi-governmental sector, including bonyads, also plays a crucial role in shaping Iran’s economic landscape ³.

The Bonyads did not have to pay taxes, maybe this is still the case?
In addition, the IRGC and similar have many companies abroad that also do not pay taxes. The Iranian “government” has no influence on this.

Iran Update, February 17, 2024

The Houthi movement said that it launched anti-ship ballistic missiles targeting the Pollux, a Panamanian-flagged and registered and Danish-owned vessel, in the Red Sea on February 16 and 17.[18] US Central Command (CENTCOM) said that the Houthis launched at least three anti-ship ballistic missiles at the Pollux. CENTCOM added that the attack did not damage the Pollux or any other ships in the area.[19]

CENTCOM conducted two preemptive strikes targeting one mobile anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) and one surface naval attack drone in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen on February 16 and 17.[20] CENTCOM conducted the strikes after determining that the cruise missile and attack drone presented an “imminent threat” to merchant vessels and US Navy ships in the Red Sea.

full report: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-17-2024

Iran Update, February 18, 2024

Reuters reported on February 18 that Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force commander Esmail Ghaani directed Iranian-backed Iraqi groups to “pause” attacks on US forces during a January 29 meeting in Baghdad.[1] Ghaani met with the leaders of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia groups less than 48 hours after the Iranian-backed drone attack on January 28 that killed three US servicemembers in Jordan. Kataib Hezbollah responded to Iranian directives from Ghaani by announcing that it would “suspend attacks” on January 30.[2] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba did not “initially agree” to Ghaani’s directive.[3] The group said that it would continue attacks targeting US forces on February 2, after Ghaani’s visit.[4] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed three attacks targeting US forces after Ghaani’s visit.[5] It has not claimed any attacks after February 4.[6]

Ghaani’s visit illustrates the degree to which Iran controls its proxy network across the Middle East. Most of Iran's proxies and partners in Iraq immediately ceased attacks following Ghaani’s order. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba initially did not agree but Iranian-backed Iraqi groups have not resumed attacks targeting US forces since February 4.[7] Ghaani and Iran can pressure their partners and proxies to pause or resume attacks as needed, however. Nine Iranian and Iraqi sources told Reuters that Ghaani chose to pause attacks to “avoid a similar escalation” to the 2020 escalation cycle that resulted in the US airstrike that killed former IRGC Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani.[8] Ghaani could resume attacks in pursuit of Iranian objectives—namely, expelling US forces from Iraq—as needed when or if Iran calculates that the risk of “similar escalation” decreases.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-18-2024

Iran Update, February 19, 2024

Russia invited Palestinian factions, including Hamas and PIJ, to meet in Moscow on February 26 for an “inter-Palestinian meeting.”[31] Russian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister and Special Representative for the Middle East Mikhail Bogdanov told Russian media on February 18 that Russia invited Palestinian factions that are based in different countries, including Syria and Lebanon. Bogdanov did not provide any additional details about the purpose of the meeting.[32] The Palestinian Authority (PA) Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh said that the PA will see if Hamas “is ready to reach an understanding.“[33] A senior Hamas delegation last traveled to Moscow in late October 2023 to meet with Russian and Iranian officials.[34] Hamas praised Russia’s stance toward the Israel-Hamas war after the meeting.[35] Russia has framed itself as a possible mediator between Israel and Hamas.[36]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-19-2024

Iran Update, February 20, 2024

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi said on February 19 that Iran is continuing to produce highly enriched uranium at an elevated rate.[66] Grossi told Reuters that Iran is currently producing 60 percent highly enriched uranium (HEU) at a rate of seven kilograms per month. This rate is higher than its three kilogram per month enrichment rate between June and November 2023. Grossi added that he will travel to Tehran on an unspecified date in the coming weeks. Grossi last visited Tehran in March 2023.[67]

Iran has stockpiled at least five nuclear bombs worth of HEU, given its stockpile of 128.3 kilograms of 60 percent HEU as of October 28, 2023.[68] The IAEA defines 25 kilograms of 20 percent or more enriched HEU as a ”significant quantity” for ”which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive cannot be excluded.”[69] Iran has no plausible civilian use for 60 percent HEU but can use it in a compact nuclear explosive or further enrich it to 90 percent weapons-grade uranium.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-20-2024

Iran Update, February 21, 2024

Iranian sources told Reuters on February 21 that Iran provided hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) to Russia in early January.[1] The three unspecified Iranian sources said that Iran provided roughly 400 SRBMs to Russia, including the Fateh-110 and the Zolfaghar. The sources said that Iran has sent at least four SRBM shipments to Russia since Iran and Russia concluded a missile sale agreement in late 2023. One Iranian official said that Iran will continue to ship missiles to Russia because Iran is ”allowed to export weapons to any country” it wishes, given the October 2023 expiration of UN missile restrictions on Iran under UNSC Resolution 2231. UNSC Resolution 2231 suspended nuclear-related UN sanctions and established sunset dates for missile and other arms-related sanctions on Iran. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger said on February 21 that Iran began missile shipments to Russia in early January, following the UN missile restrictions expiration.[2]

Iran's arms sales to Russia are part of Iran's efforts to generate revenue to support its deteriorating economy.[3] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran could seek to acquire cash from Russia in return for supplying Russia with missiles.[4] The Prana Network hacker group published documents on February 4 alleging that Russia is paying Iran roughly $4.5 billion per year to import the Iranian Shahed series drones.[5]

Iran's provision of these missile systems could improve Russia's ability to penetrate Ukrainian air defenses. Kremlin-affiliated milblogger Rybar claimed on February 21 that the acquisition of Iranian missile systems enables Russian forces to hit “remote Ukrainian targets.”[6] The Ukrainian Air Force spokesperson said on February 21 that possible Russian acquisition of the ballistic missiles is a ”serious threat for Ukraine.”[7] This Russo-Iranian military exchange is part of the deepening military and security relationship between the two states that CTP has covered extensively.[8] The expansion of these ties accelerated especially after Iran began providing military support to Russia for its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[9]

CTP-ISW assessed in September 2023 that Iran and Russia would conclude a drone and missile sale agreement after UNSC Resolution 2231’s missile restrictions expired in October 2023.[10] The expiration of UNSC Resolution 2231 in October provided an opportunity for Iran to meet Russian military needs without being violating sanctions or requiring Russia to do so. Iranian Defense Ministry and IRGC officials also showcased these SRBM and close-range ballistic missile (CRBM) variants to Russian officials in August and September 2023 in Moscow and Tehran, respectively.[11] This showcasing illustrates Iran's efforts to conclude a sales agreement in advance of the expiration of UNSC Resolution 2231 in October. [12]

The United States, United Kingdom, and Ukraine have previously warned that Iran would supply ballistic missiles to Russia to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[13] US officials said in November that Iran ”may be” preparing to supply short-range ballistic missiles to Russia, and the US National Security Council spokesperson said in January 2024 that Russia was attempting to acquire missiles from Iran.[14]

The table below shows the specifications for some of Iranian missile systems, including the Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar:

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-21-2024

Iran Update, February 22, 2024

Iran and the Houthis are likely using their attacks in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden to test and refine their approach to striking naval targets. Houthi leader Abdulmalik al Houthi stated on February 22 that the group will “escalate” its operations targeting shipping around the Red Sea.[1] Abdulmalik added that the group would introduce “submarine weapons,” likely referring to unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV), but gave no further details.[2]

CENTCOM reported that the Houthis used a UUV for the first time to threaten shipping around the Red Sea on February 17.[3] The Houthis — enabled directly by Iran — have used combinations of cruise and ballistic missiles as well as aerial, surface, and underwater drones to attack civilian and military vessels around the Red Sea since November 2023. Iranian military advisers are providing targeting intelligence to support the Houthis’ attacks targeting US naval vessels.[4] US naval vessels have regularly intercepted Houthi munitions targeting civilian and military vessels off the coast of Yemen. These Houthi attacks provide Iran and the Houthis opportunities to evaluate the effectiveness of different strike packages to understand how they can evade and overwhelm US defenses more effectively.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-22-2024

Iran Update, February 23, 2024

The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated two Iranian and Iran-linked entities on February 23 for facilitating the transfer of Iranian drones to Russia.[45] OFAC designated the following Iranian and Iran-linked entities:

The Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry for helping to finance and produce Iranian drones at the Alabuga facility in Tatarstan, Russia.
The Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry-affiliated and UAE-based Generation Trading FZE for facilitating the sale of Iranian drone samples, parts, and ground stations that enable the Russian production of Iranian drones at the Alabuga facility.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-23-2024

Iran Update, February 24, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-24-2024

Iran Update, February 25, 2024

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW’s last data cutoff on February 24.[22]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-25-2024

Iran Update, February 26, 2024

The International Atomic Energy Organization (IAEA) disclosed to UN member states on February 26 that Iran has reduced its stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium since late October 2023.[79] The Iranian regime has, according to an IAEA report, diluted some of this stockpile to 20 percent enriched uranium, thereby reducing its stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium by 6.8 kilograms to 121.5 kilograms.[80] The overall Iranian stockpile of enriched uranium has continued to expand since October 2023, however.[81] Iran has also refused the entry of several weapons inspectors into the country and the inspection of undeclared nuclear material, according to the IAEA.[82]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-26-2024

An investigation by Sheba Intelligence reveals that the Iranians have begun planning to establish a free economic zone on the Red Sea coast in the Ras Issa of Al-Hudaydah as part of the benefits they will gain from the war in Yemen.

The investigation quoted commercial sources confirming that Iranian companies have completed engineering plans for the region, including constructing a number of docks to receive goods and oil shipments, constructing buildings and warehouses for goods, and completing six tanks to store Iranian oil shipments.

One Yemeni businessman described the project as “a partnership between the Houthis and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps”.

Another report says: “By being present in this region, Iran can communicate with allied groups and countries such as the Houthis in Yemen or others in East Africa, or Palestinian resistance groups, besides securing and expanding its economic interests and spreading the ideology and thought of the religious revolution.”

https://shebaintelligence.uk/iran-plans-to-establish-economic-zone-with-military-agenda-in-yemens-ras-issa

This only works if there is quasi-peace in the area.

Iran Update, February 27, 2024

The United States and the United Kingdom sanctioned Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force and Houthi members on February 27.[41] The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the United Kingdom designated the following individuals and organizations:

IRGC Quds Force Deputy Commander Mohammad Reza Falahzadeh for generating revenue to fund Houthi operations
Houthi member Ibrahim al Nashiri

A Hong Kong-based shipping company that was responsible for facilitating the transport of Iranian commodities sold in China by the Said Jamal network. Said Jamal is a Houthi and IRGC Quds Force financial facilitator sanctioned by the United States on January 12.[42]
Falahzadeh has played a key role in supporting and financing Houthi, Hamas, and Hezbollah operations.[43] OFAC stated that the IRGC Quds Force and the Houthis sell Iranian commodities to foreign buyers to generate funds to support the Houthis. The US State Department designated the Houthis as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist Group in January 2024.[44] The US State Department designated the entire IRGC–including the Quds Force–as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in April 2019.[45]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-27-2024

Iran Update, February 28, 2024

The Iranian communications and information technology minister announced on February 28 that Russia will launch the Iranian Pars-1 satellite into orbit on February 29.[53] Iranian state media claimed that Russia will use its Soyuz space launch vehicle to launch the Pars-1 into low earth orbit.[54] Russia similarly launched a Kanopus-V satellite—alternatively referred to as the Khayyam in Iran—into orbit in August 2022 on Iran's behalf.[55] The IRGC Aerospace Force Command and Iranian Space Organization separately launched multiple Iranian satellites into low-earth orbit between April 2020 and January 2024.[56] Iran can use satellites capable of collecting imagery to help enable targeting capabilities for attacks abroad.[57] Iranian state media reported in July 2020 that the IRGC used its satellites to collect intelligence on US military positions in the region.[58]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-28-2024

Iran Update, February 29, 2024

The United Kingdom sanctioned three Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force units, two Houthi members, and the IRGC Quds Force deputy commander on February 27.[58] The sanctions targeted individuals and groups that support, enable, or contribute to the Houthis monetarily or militarily. The United Kingdom designated:

Ali Hussein Badr al Din al Houthi (the undersecretary in the Houthi-controlled Interior Ministry and the commander of the security and police forces)
IRGC Quds Force Units 190, 6000, and 340;
Sa’id al-Jamal (An Iran-based Houthi financier whom the United States previously sanctioned in January 2023); and[59]
Mohammad Reza Fallah Zadeh (the IRGC Quds Force deputy commander whom the United States similarly sanctioned on February 27).[60]

Iran and Russia are continuing to deepen security and economic cooperation. Russia launched the Iranian Pars-1 satellite into a low earth orbit using a Soyuz rocket on February 29.[61] Iranian state media reported that the Pars-1 satellite has three cameras and will scan Iran’s topography from an orbit of 500 kilometers.[62] Iranian Communications and Information Technology Minister Issa Zareh Pour claimed on February 29 that the Pars-1 satellite’s launch into orbit marks Iran’s 12th satellite launch in the past 25 months.[63] The Russian launch of this Iranian satellite is part of a larger trend in which Moscow has increasingly supported the Iranian space program. Russia previously launched a Kanopus-V satellite—alternatively referred to as the Khayyam in Iran—into orbit in August 2022 on Iran’s behalf.[64] Iran can use satellites capable of collecting imagery to improve its targeting for attacks abroad.[65] IRGC-affiliated media reported in July 2020 that the IRGC used its satellites to collect intelligence on US military positions in the Middle East.[66]

Iranian Oil Minister Javad Owji separately announced on February 28 that Iranian and Russian officials signed 11 memorandums of understanding during the 17th annual Iran-Russia Joint Commission for Economic Cooperation in Tehran between February 26-28.[67] The agreements cover business, energy, political, and transportation cooperation. Owji stated that Iranian and Russian officials also discussed “peaceful space and nuclear cooperation,” banking and financial cooperation, the Rasht-Astara and Garmsar-Incheh Borun railways, and the Sirik Power Plant during the economic conference.[68]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-29-2024

Iran Update, March 1, 2024

Iran: Iran held separate elections for Parliament and the Assembly of Experts. These elections will likely preserve and possibly even reinforce hardliner influence in the Iranian regime. Voter turnout appeared to hit a record low, likely reflecting the population’s growing disillusionment with the regime. This year’s Assembly of Experts election is uniquely significant, as it could very well oversee the succession of Iran’s next supreme leader.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-1-2024

Since mid-December, about 1,700 ships carrying 145 million tons of goods have been diverted from Suez Canal transit, and volumes are estimated to have fallen 56% year-over-year in February.

https://twitter.com/heimbergecon/status/1763841131119337814