Iranian Regime tv Channel One hacked while it was airing Khamenie speech

various | 10-8-22

[AdmSmith]

Iran Update, July 17, 2025

A US media outlet reported on July 17 that US strikes in Iran on June 21 caused significant damage to only one of the three Iranian nuclear facilities that the United States struck.[1] CTP-ISW has previously assessed that the strikes caused significant damage to all three facilities and will likely set back Iran’s nuclear program.[2] US airstrikes targeted the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, Natanz Enrichment Complex, and Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC).[3] NBC News reported on July 17 that the US strikes set back uranium enrichment at Fordow by up to two years but stated that “nuclear enrichment [at Natanz and the ENTC] could resume in the next several months,” citing former and current US officials familiar with a recent US damage assessment.[4] A US weapons expert stated on July 17 that Iran does not conduct uranium enrichment at the ENTC.[5]

The strikes destroyed key infrastructure at all three facilities. US strikes destroyed the Uranium Metal Conversion Plant at the ENTC, which Iran could have used to transform uranium gas into dense metal in a process called metallization.[6] This process is one of the last steps required to form the explosive core of an atomic bomb. CIA Director John Ratcliffe reportedly said in a closed-door briefing that it would take “years to rebuild” this facility, according to a US official authorized to discuss the briefing.[7] The strikes also struck and sealed tunnel entrances to an underground complex at the ENTC that stores part of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile.[8] Ratcliffe said that the strikes buried the “vast majority” of enriched uranium at the ENTC and Fordow and that it would be “extremely difficult” for Iran to extract the material.[9] CTP-ISW previously reported that Iranian personnel have not made any visible attempts to access the ENTC or Natanz.[10] Senior Israeli officials have repeatedly warned that Israel would “almost certainly” detect any Iranian attempts to recover the material and conduct renewed strikes to prevent Iran from accessing the material.[11] The IAEA previously reported that US and Israeli strikes also rendered most, if not all, of the centrifuges at Natanz and Fordow inoperable.[12] Three sources told NBC News that US officials knew that some facilities at Natanz were “beyond the reach” of GBU-57 bunker buster bombs.[13] The destruction of centrifuges and facilities does not necessarily require bombs to “reach” all infrastructure, however. Grossi previously stated that centrifuges are “delicate” and that even small vibrations can destroy them.[14] The United States used two massive ordnance penetrator (MOP) bunker-buster bombs on Natanz, which would have generated a blast wave far more significant than small vibrations.[15]

Iran is increasing securitization measures in response to concerns about infiltration. Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei called on July 17 for accelerating the resolution of cases against individuals accused of having ties to Israel, calling any delays “unacceptable.”[50] Ejei’s directive follows Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s July 16 call for the judiciary to pursue “recent crimes” with precision and vigilance.[51] Intelligence Minister Esmail Khatib separately stated on July 16 that the judiciary is processing espionage cases and that “some [accused individuals] have already been executed, and the rest will also receive their punishment.”[52] Khatib briefed Iranian lawmakers on counterintelligence operations against “spies” and anti-regime groups both during and before the recent war during a closed parliament session on July 15.[53] The Judiciary spokesperson separately stated on July 12 that the judiciary has filed 50 cases in Tehran Province against individuals accused of collaborating with Israel.[54] Parliament previously introduced a nine-article law on June 29 that labels any intelligence, espionage, or cooperation with Israel, the United States, or other “hostile” actors as “corruption on earth,” which is a crime punishable by death.[55]

Senior Iranian commanders are likely establishing relationships across military branches following the introduction of a new generation of military leadership during the Israel-Iran War. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Mohammad Pak Pour met with Artesh Commander Major General Amir Hatami on July 17, marking the first public meeting between Iran’s new IRGC and Artesh commanders since the war.[56] Pak Pour praised the IRGC’s “high morale” and Iran’s unity during the war.[57] Pak Pour replaced Major General Hossein Salami, while Hatami replaced Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi.[58] Pak Pour and Hatami’s meeting followed a July 14 meeting between Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi and IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Hossein Mousavi.[59] Abdol Rahim Mousavi replaced Major General Mohammad Bagheri, and Hossein Mousavi replaced Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh.[60] These engagements likely reflect efforts to build relationships between top Iranian military commanders after Israeli strikes eliminated key Iranian military leaders.[61]

Assembly of Experts member Mohsen Araki warned on July 17 that any attack on Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei would trigger a full-scale war.[62] Araki declared that the United States and its allies, including the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, would face attacks on their “military bases, economic assets, political forces, and affiliated companies.”[63] Senior Iranian clerics issued a fatwa on June 30 that described US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as “mohareb” (enemies of God) and called for their assassination.[64] Araki was among 400 Qom clerics who signed a statement on July 13 in support of the fatwa.[65]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-17-2025

[AdmSmith]

Iran Update, July 18, 2025

The E3 (the United Kingdom, Germany, and France) urged Iran to deliver “concrete results” or the E3 would trigger the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism, but more time is unlikely to result in changes to Iranian policy.[12] The E3 foreign ministers held a teleconference with Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi on July 17 to urge Iran to resume nuclear negotiations and cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to avoid snapback sanctions.[13] An unspecified French diplomatic source stated the E3 seeks a “verifiable and lasting” deal and reiterated their readiness to reimpose UN sanctions if Iran fails to produce results by the end of August.[14] The E3 would have to initiate the process to impose snapback sanctions by September 3 to complete the 45–65-day process before the measure expires in October 2025.[15] A Wall Street Journal reporter noted that the E3 foreign ministers and European Union Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas also suggested extending the snapback deadline during the call.[16] He added that such an extension would reportedly require agreement from Iran and its UN Security Council allies, Russia and China, to amend the timeline.[17] There is no provision in the JCPOA to extend the snapback clause, however.[18] It is unclear how the UN Security Council could amend the snapback timeline, given that the JCPOA is a political agreement among its participants and not a legally binding UN treaty.[19]

Iran has set a de facto precondition to negotiations that would require the United States to guarantee Iran’s right to enrich before the resumption of any negotiations. Iran has repeatedly reiterated its unwillingness to concede on its right to enrich, though there is an ongoing debate in Iran over resuming negotiations, and this policy could change. Iranian officials have maintained their position on retaining uranium enrichment capabilities despite pressure from the United States and European countries. The delay of snapback sanctions is unlikely to change Iran’s position on nuclear enrichment because a delay does not incentivize Iran to change its position. The Iranian Supreme Leader’s International Affairs Adviser, Ali Akbar Velayati, stated on July 14 that Iran would not oppose negotiations without “preconditions” if the United States guarantees Iran’s right to enrichment.[20] The recognition of this right is itself a precondition, however. US officials repeatedly rejected the demand and insisted on “zero enrichment.”[21] Senior Supreme Leader adviser Ali Larijani separately stated on July 17 that “no talks are underway” and argued that Iran should not rush into negotiations, leaving it to Khamenei to decide when to proceed.[22]

Senior Iranian commanders are discussing air defense modernization as they assess force readiness after the Israel-Iran War. Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi inspected Iran’s air defense headquarters on July 18 to assess postwar readiness.[23] Mousavi highlighted the need for updated air defense systems, creative tactics, and operational agility to counter “future threats.”[24] Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard also presented a report during Mousavi’s visit on recent efforts to strengthen Iran’s air defense capabilities.[25] The emphasis on modernization follows Iran’s ineffective defense against Israeli strikes between June 12 and June 24, using domestically produced systems.[26] Iranian officials may seek to acquire advanced systems from partners like China after domestically produced systems failed.[27]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-18-2025

[AdmSmith]

Iran Update, July 19, 2025

Axios reported on July 19 that senior E3 (the United Kingdom, Germany, and France) and Iranian diplomats are expected to meet in Europe next week to discuss a possible nuclear deal, citing unspecified sources.[22] Iran has not softened its position on its right to enrich uranium on Iranian soil, which makes it unlikely that Iran will accept a nuclear deal that includes a zero uranium enrichment demand. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi told Chinese media on July 19 that Iran is “not convinced yet” to resume nuclear negotiations.[23] Araghchi added that the United States must show a “real intention” to achieve a “win-win solution.”[24] Iranian officials, including a senior adviser to the Supreme Leader, have similarly signaled caution about talks and reiterated that Iran will not accept a zero uranium enrichment demand.[25] The E3 has warned that it may trigger the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran if Iran does not deliver unspecified “concrete results” by the end of August.[26] The E3 would have to initiate the process to impose snapback sanctions by September 3 to complete the process before the mechanism expires in October 2025.[27]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-19-2025

[AdmSmith]

Iran Update, July 20, 2025

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-affiliated Tasnim News Agency confirmed that senior E3 (the United Kingdom, Germany, and France) and Iranian diplomats agreed to discuss Iran’s nuclear program “next week.”[1] Tasnim reported that the parties have agreed on the “principle of talks” but that the timing and location of the talks are not finalized.[2] A German diplomatic source confirmed to Agence France-Presse that the E3 are in contact with Iran to schedule talks for the coming week.[3] Tasnim reported that the talks will take place at the deputy foreign minister level.[4] The E3 has warned that it may trigger the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran if Iran does not deliver unspecified “concrete results” by the end of August.[5] An Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee member said on July 20 that parliament would respond with “severe countermeasures” if the E3 triggers the snapback mechanism.[6] The E3 would have to initiate the process to impose snapback sanctions by September 3 to complete the process before the mechanism expires in October 2025.[7]

A senior Iranian military commander claimed on July 20 that Iran has replaced air defense systems that Israel destroyed during the Israel-Iran War. Iranian Artesh Operations Deputy Rear Admiral Mahmoud Mousavi told Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-affiliated media on July 20 that Israel damaged “some” Iranian air defense systems during the war.[8] Israel destroyed Iranian air defense systems and radars throughout the war to establish air superiority over Iran. Previous Israeli airstrikes on Iran in April and October 2024 rendered Iran’s four Russian-made S-300 air defense systems inoperable.[9] Mousavi claimed that the Iranian armed forces replaced the destroyed systems with existing and new systems.[10] CTP-ISW previously assessed that it is very unlikely that Russia has supplied Iran with new S-300 systems, so Iran has likely replaced damaged air defense systems with domestically produced systems.[11] Iran tested its domestically produced Bavar-373 air defense system in March 2025.[12] Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Ali Reza Sabahi Fard announced in March that Iran would soon unveil a new version of the Bavar-373.[13] Iran has yet to publicly unveil the new version, however. CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran may prioritize developing indigenous air defense systems given that Russia is unlikely to supply Iran with S-300s in the near future.[14] Iran’s domestically produced air defense systems failed to prevent Israel from achieving air superiority during the Israel-Iran War and it is therefore unlikely that the same systems would effectively defend Iran against another conventional conflict with Israel or the United States.

Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Larijani discussed the Iranian nuclear program with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on July 20.[15] Iranian media did not provide details about the meeting, but the Kremlin stated that Larijani presented Iran’s views on the “current escalation” in the Middle East and the Iranian nuclear program. Larijani’s visit to Russia is notable given reports in January 2025 that Larijani had made frequent visits to Moscow to seek Russian assistance with the Iranian nuclear program and air defense capabilities.[16] The visit is also notable given Iran’s reported dissatisfaction with Russian support for Iran during the Israel-Iran War. Iranian media reported on July 15 that Iran will likely maintain ties with Russia but must “rethink parts of the relationship and expand cooperation with other partners,” especially in “sensitive military and strategic areas.”[17] Moscow has offered to mediate between Iran and the United States and has reportedly encouraged Iran to accept a nuclear deal with the United States in which Iran would halt domestic uranium enrichment.[18] Russia reportedly offered to provide Iran with 3.67 enriched uranium to support a civil nuclear program, presumably in return for Iran agreeing to stop domestic uranium enrichment.[19] Russia previously accepted 11,000 kilograms of enriched uranium from Iran in exchange for natural uranium in December 2015 as part of the JCPOA.[20] Neither the United States nor Iran has accepted Russia’s offers regarding

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-20-2025

[AdmSmith]

Iran Update, July 21, 2025

The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry announced on July 21 that senior Iranian officials will meet with E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) officials in Istanbul, Turkey, on July 25 to discuss the Iranian nuclear issue.[1] Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi and Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi will attend the talks. The talks come as the E3 has threatened to trigger the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism to reimpose UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran. The E3 has warned that it may trigger the snapback mechanism if Iran does not resume nuclear negotiations with the United States and make “concrete results” in the negotiations by the end of August.[2] The E3 would have to initiate the snapback mechanism by September 3 to complete the snapback process before the mechanism expires in October 2025.[3] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei emphasized on July 21 that the Iran-E3 talks are separate from nuclear negotiations with the United States and stated that Iran has “no plans” to negotiate with the United States.[4]

Baghaei also announced that Iranian officials will meet with Chinese and Russian officials on July 22 to discuss the possibility of the E3 triggering the JCPOA snapback mechanism.[5] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Russia and China would likely not be able to prevent the reimposition of UNSC sanctions on Iran if the E3 triggers the snapback mechanism.[6] Any JCPOA signatory can initiate the snapback process by referring Iran's non-compliance to the UNSC. The JCPOA gives the UNSC 30 days to pass a resolution to extend sanctions relief for Iran, but UNSC permanent members (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia) can veto such a resolution.[7] China and Russia could therefore try to prevent the reimposition of UNSC sanctions on Iran by proposing a resolution to extend sanctions relief for Iran, but the United States, the United Kingdom, or France could veto such a resolution.

Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh met with Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov in Moscow on July 21, possibly to try to secure Russian military assistance following the Israel-Iran War. Iranian media reported that Nasir Zadeh and Belousov discussed “expanding military cooperation.”[8] Iranian media also reported that Nasir Zadeh attended Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Larijani’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on July 20.[9] Nasir Zadeh heads the Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry, which oversees the Iranian defense-industrial complex and manages Iranian arms sales and purchases.[10] Iran has long sought to acquire Russian Su-35 fighter jets and has pressured Russia to provide it with S-400 air defense systems after Israeli airstrikes in April and October 2024 rendered Iran's four S-300 air defense systems inoperable.[11] Russia has not provided Iran with this equipment and is unlikely to do so in the near future, which underscores the limits of the Russo-Iranian strategic relationship.[12] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran may expand strategic relations with other partners, such as China, due to Russia's limited support for Iran during and after the war.[13]

Senior Iranian officials reiterated their opposition to the planned Zangezor Corridor to senior Armenian officials on July 19. The Zangezor Corridor is a Turkish-Azerbaijani proposed transit route that would connect Azerbaijan proper to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. Iran opposes the proposed Zangezor Corridor because the route would cut off Iranian land access to Russia and Europe via Armenia. Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian emphasized that Iran opposes any “change in the region's geopolitics” in a phone call with Armenian Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan.[28] Grigoryan assured Ahmadian that Armenia has not changed its position “regarding regional transit routes.” Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian separately emphasized Iran's support for “preserving the territorial integrity of all countries” in a phone call with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.[29] The July 19 phone calls come after the United States offered on July 11 to manage the Zangezor Corridor.[30] Iranian media described the Zangezor Corridor on July 16 as a Turkish attempt to extend Turkish influence into Eurasia.[31] Iranian media also argued that the Zangezor Corridor would prevent Iran from being able to militarily support Armenia against Azerbaijan. Iran has become increasingly concerned about the growth of Turkish influence in the South Caucasus in recent years, particularly since the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Iranian officials have expressed concern that Russia's focus on the war in Ukraine has left a power vacuum in the South Caucasus for other regional actors, such as Turkey and Israel, to exploit.[32]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-21-2025

https://www.forbes.com/sites/guneyyildiz/2025/07/18/americas-high-stakes-bet-on-zangezur-how-a-us-led-corridor-could-slash-europes-energy-costs-and-counter-russia/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zangezur_corridor