Posted on 10/08/2022 1:05:38 PM PDT by nuconvert
Iranian Regime national tv Channel One hacked about an hour ago. During a broadcast of Khamenie speech, a red crosshair appeared over his face and chanting of Women. Life. Freedom. There was writing to the side saying "Rise up. Join us". Also 4 photos at the bottom of the screen of young people killed and additional writing: "The blood of our youth is dropping from your paws".
Also, there was a huge banner in the middle of Tehran highway today that read: We are no longer afraid of you. We will fight.
Also, attempted attack on IRI ambassador in Denmark. Her bodyguard was stabbed. Diplomatic Security intervened before the attacker could stab the ambassador.
Iran Update, November 5, 2024
Russia launched the Iranian Kowsar high-resolution sensing satellite and Hodhod communications satellite into orbit using a Russian Soyuz rocket on November 5, which Iran could use to collect imagery on US and Israeli assets and bases in the region.[23] Iranian media claimed that a “private” company—Omid Faza—designed and built the satellites.[24] The head of the Iranian Space Agency, which operates under the Iranian Information and Communications Technology Ministry, stated on November 5 that the agency signed a contract with the Omid Faza Company to buy satellite images.[25] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media previously reported in July 2020 that the IRGC uses satellites to collect intelligence on US military positions in the region, underscoring the importance of satellites to Iran’s military forces.[26]
Omid Faza’s founder, Hossein Shahrabi Farahani, who previously headed US-sanctioned Iran Electronics Industries (IEI) Space Group, created the company in 2018 with several unspecified Amir Kabir University students.[27] The United States sanctioned IEI in 2008 for being “owned or controlled” by the Iranian Defense Ministry.[28] IEI produces electronic warfare equipment, military tactical communication systems, and missile launchers, among other equipment.[29] The launch of the Kowsar satellite into orbit is particularly noteworthy as Iranian officials continue to emphasize that Iran will respond to the recent IDF strikes into Iran.[30]
This launch also highlights how Iran and Russia are continuing to deepen space cooperation.[31] Russia previously launched Iranian satellites into orbit in August 2022 and February 2024.[32]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-5-2024
Recent statements by senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders suggest that the IRGC may conduct a direct attack on Israel from Iranian territory in response to the October 25 Israeli strike targeting Iran. These IRGC commanders have warned in recent days that Iran will conduct a third “True Promise Operation” against Israel. “True Promise Operation” refers to the previous large-scale Iranian drone and missile attacks on Israel in April and October 2024, which Iranian officials refer to as True Promise Operation 1 and True Promise Operation 2, respectively.[10] Senior IRGC commanders, including IRGC Deputy Commander Brigadier General Ali Fadavi and IRGC Second Coordination Deputy Brigadier General Ali Fazli, have recently warned that Iran will “certainly” launch a third “True Promise Operation” against Israel.[11]
Iran may conduct a smaller-scale direct attack on Israel than it did in April and October 2024 in order to preserve its diminishing long-range missile stockpile. Iran used a total of around 300 long-range ballistic missiles in its attacks on Israel earlier this year.[12] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) damaged mixing equipment and facilities used to produce long-range ballistic missiles in its strikes into Iran on October 25, which will likely disrupt Iran's ability to manufacture ballistic missiles.[13] This disruption could cause the Iranian regime to refrain from conducting a large-scale missile attack on Israel since it might currently lack the capability to readily replace the missiles it would use in such an attack. Iran could conduct a joint attack with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias against Israel in order to preserve its long-range missile stockpile, however. Unspecified US and Israeli officials told Axios on November 5 that the IRGC has been transferring drones and ballistic missiles to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias since the Israeli strikes on October 25.[14]
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei described the features a future supreme leader should embody during his first public meeting with the Assembly of Experts on November 7.[15] Khamenei stated that the Assembly should select a leader who embodies the revolution and carries it forward to maintain the revolution's “main goal” of “implementing the religion of Islam in the country and in people‘s lives.”[16] Khamenei notably did not reveal any specific details about his successor. The Assembly of Experts is the regime body constitutionally responsible for monitoring and selecting the supreme leader. The newest Assembly was elected in March 2024 and will serve until 2032.[17] This iteration of the Assembly will likely be the Assembly that chooses the next Supreme Leader following Khamenei’s death.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-7-2024
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is reportedly transferring ballistic missiles and drones and planning a joint attack with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias against Israel, further suggesting Iran will retaliate for Israel's October 25 strikes in Iran from Iraqi territory. Two unspecified Israeli sources told Axios on October 1 that Iraqi militias may soon attack Israel using ballistic missiles and drones.[33] The IRGC has probably shipped some of these missiles and drones in components to Iraqi militias, allowing the groups to assemble the systems themselves possibly with Houthi support, as CTP-ISW suggested on November 5. This collaboration could have also extended into rudimentary drone production.
Iranian media claimed that Iran and Pakistan conducted a joint airstrike attack against Jaish al Adl, a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi militia on November 5.[34] Jaish al Adl acknowledged that two high-ranking commanders and 12 fighters were killed in what it said was a joint Iranian-Pakistani airstrike.[35] The Pakistani officials have not confirmed the joint military action with Iran, however. The IRGC conducted drone and missile strikes in January 2024 on two Jaish al Adl headquarters in Koh Sabz, Baluchistan Province, Pakistan, on January 16 without Pakistan's permission. Pakistan responded by launching combination of drones, rockets, and air-launched standoff munitions targeting Baloch separatists in three locations near Saravan, Iran, on January 17.[36] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi visited Pakistan on November 4 to meet with high-ranking Pakistani officials. Araghchi’s trip likely aimed, in part, to express Iran's concerns regarding border security.[37]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-6-2024
An underage Iranian girl has courageously exposed her karate instructor, who attempted to pressure her into coming to his house, by secretly recording their conversation. In Iran, victims of sexual harassment and assault, especially those who do not wear the mandatory hijab, are frequently blamed and silenced by authorities, making it nearly impossible for them to seek justice.
To challenge this oppressive system, I asked Iranian women to use their cameras to document and expose abusers, transforming their phones into powerful tools of resistance.
The viral hashtag #MyCameraIsMyWeapon captures the spirit of this movement, as women fight back against a regime that seeks to suppress their voices.
https://x.com/AlinejadMasih/status/1854816082768339209
English subtitles
Iran Update, November 8, 2024
Tehran Mayor Alireza Zakani warned that Iran may reconsider its nuclear doctrine in response to US threats.[63] Zakani also suggested that nuclear capabilities enhance Iran’s deterrence. This a part of growing calls from Iranian officials to shift Iran’s nuclear doctrine, specifically Khamenei’s 2003 fatwa banning nuclear weapons.[64] Zakani was the chair of the JCPOA review committee in the Iranian Parliament in 2015, which voiced strong opposition to the JCPOA, arguing that the agreement disregarded Iran’s key red lines and national interests.[65] Zakani criticized the Iranian negotiation team, asserting that they had failed to uphold Iran’s rights, and called for major changes to the deal in October 2015.[66]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-8-2024
A hardline Iranian parliamentarian, Ahmad Naderi, suggested on November 9 that Iran tested an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in Shahroud.[52] Naderi stated that Iran conducting an ICBM test would be “nothing unexpected.”[53] Naderi added that Iran should conduct a nuclear test as soon as possible.[54] This statement is consistent with statements from other Iranian officials in recent months trying to pressure the Supreme Leader to reverse his 2003 fatwa banning nuclear weapons.[55]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-9-2024
Iranian Asset Farhad Shakeri Employed Multiple Associates in the New York City Area to Surveil and Murder a U.S. Citizen of Iranian Origin Who Has Publicly Opposed the Iranian Government.
Shakeri Was Tasked by Iranian Regime with Surveilling and Plotting to Assassinate President-Elect Donald J. Trump
Complaint https://www.justice.gov/opa/media/1376516/dl
Iran Update, November 10, 2024
Israeli Army Radio reported on November 10 that Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer had traveled to Russia in recent days to discuss a ceasefire agreement in Lebanon.[23] The visit reportedly occurred after the IDF strikes into Iran on October 25.[24] Israeli Army Radio reported that Russia is expected to play a crucial role in the implementation of a potential ceasefire agreement by preventing Hezbollah from rearming.[25] Israeli media reported that a Russian delegation previously visited Israel on October 24, according to a source in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office.[26] It is unclear why Russia would prevent Hezbollah from rearming given that Russian forces in Syria have enabled Hezbollah to arm up to this point by allowing Iranian material transfers through Syria to Lebanon.[27]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-10-2024
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Iran Update, November 11, 2024
Iranian politicians are continuing to coordinate politically with the Lebanese government. Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf confirmed Iran’s political support regarding the ceasefire talks in Lebanon in a phone call with his Lebanese counterpart Nabih Berri on November 11.[13] Ghalibaf held separate meetings with Berri and Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati during his visit to Beirut on October 11, where Ghalibaf discussed Iranian efforts to secure a ceasefire that would end Israeli operations in both Lebanon and the Gaza strip.[14] Iranian media reported that Ghalibaf only spoke with Berri on November 11 about a ceasefire in Lebanon.[15] Berri has also previously stated that all relevant parties have fully implemented UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701, which prohibits Lebanese Hezbollah military activity in southern Lebanon. Berri’s assertion ignores the extensive, decades-long Hezbollah efforts to entrench itself militarily in southern Lebanon.[16] CTP-ISW has previously argued that the UN Interim Force in Lebanon has largely failed to undertake the tasks that the United Nations has set for it, which includes preventing Hezbollah’s presence in southern Lebanon.[17]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-11-2024
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 12, 2024
Recent Western and Ukrainian estimates about the size of the Russian force grouping in Kursk Oblast do not represent a significant inflection, as Russian forces have spent several months gathering forces for a future counteroffensive effort to expel Ukrainian forces from Russian territory. Ukrainian officials and Western media recently reported that Russia has concentrated a rough total of 50,000 personnel, including about 8,000 - 10,000 North Korean forces, in Kursk Oblast in preparation for an operation to push Ukrainian forces from Russian territory before late January 2025 and suggested that Russia has not redeployed any of these forces from eastern Ukraine.[19] Ukrainian sources estimated in September and October 2024 that Russian forces had already concentrated between 30,000 and 50,000 personnel in Kursk Oblast, including an estimated 35,000 personnel from Russia’s Northern Grouping of Forces who were operating in Kursk, Bryansk, and Belgorod oblasts and northern Kharkiv Oblast prior to the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast in August 2024.[20] US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin stated on October 31 that 8,000 North Korean soldiers are also currently operating as part of the larger Russian force grouping in Kursk Oblast.[21] A Ukrainian servicemember stated on November 11 that Russian forces are also redeploying additional elements of the 104th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (76th VDV Division) and several battalions of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) from western Zaporizhia Oblast to Kursk Oblast, but ISW has not observed independent indications of these redeployments as of this report.[22] ISW observed reports in mid-October 2024 that elements of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment were operating near Chasiv Yar.[23] Ukraine’s Pivnich (Northern) Operational Command Spokesperson Colonel Vadym Mysnyk reported on November 11 that the Russian military is frequently transferring new reserves to Kursk Oblast due to high personnel and equipment losses.[24] These reserves are likely intended to replace personnel losses and not significantly bolster the existing Russian force grouping in the area.
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
The Russian military reportedly continues to coerce conscripts into signing Russian military service contracts, likely as part of ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts. Russian opposition outlet Mobilization News reported on November 12 that Russian commanders coerced conscripts subordinated to the Russian 80th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division, Central Military District [CMD]) into signing volunteer service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[79]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12-2024
Iran and Russia have taken the first steps to create a banking network that circumvents international sanctions. Iranian Central Bank Governor Mohammad Reza Farzin announced on November 11 that Iran and Russia have implemented a new interbank network to circumvent the SWIFT system, which is based on the US dollar.[15] Iran's Shetab interbank network now works with Russia's Mir system, which means Iranians can now use Iranian bank cards and withdraw money in Russia.[16] The Shetab-Mir network will also enable Iranians to make online purchases in Russia. Iranian state television channel IRINN stated that this plan will be implemented in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Turkey as well.[17] The creation of this network and its emphasis on reducing dependence on the US dollar is part of a broader Iranian effort to mitigate sanctions and bolster the Iranian economy by building relations with regional and international states.
Growing Russo-Iranian tensions in the Caucasus represent fissures in the bilateral relationship, but both states will likely attempt to prevent the Caucasus issue from derailing wider Iranian or Russian policy objectives. The New York Times published an article on growing Russo-Iranian tensions in the Caucasus that included an interview with the Iranian ambassador to Armenia.[18] The ambassador argued that Iran and Russia ”are not allies” and that they have ”some differences” and ”some mutual interests.” This is in part a reference to the disagreements between Russia and Iran over the Zangezur Corridor project, which is a Turkish project that seeks to connect Azerbaijan proper and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic.[19] Such a corridor would sever Iranian land access to Russia and Europe via Armenia at a time when Iran hopes to expand trade with Armenia and Europe.[20] This disagreement is unlikely to derail broader Iranian and Russian efforts to deepen bilateral ties, however. Iran would certainly prioritize sanctions mitigation over secondary policy objectives like the Zangezur Corridor. Iran views sanctions mitigation as a way to enhance regime security by improving its economy.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director Rafael Grossi emphasized the urgency of finding diplomatic solutions to resolve outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear program.[65] Grossi, speaking to reporters on the sidelines of the COP29 summit in Baku, Azerbaijan, said that the international situation is limiting the ability of the IAEA and others to devise diplomatic solutions to influence Iran's relationship with the IAEA. The IAEA has continuously reported that Iran has hindered its ability to monitor the Iranian nuclear program, which has jeopardized trust between the two parties. Grossi’s reference to the international situation is probably a reference to the ongoing Israel-Iran escalation. The ongoing tit-for-tat between Iran and Israel has changed the way that Iranian officials are talking about the development of nuclear weapons, with some Iranian officials speaking increasingly openly about the development of these systems. Grossi will travel to Iran on November 13 to discuss the March 2023 joint statement with senior Iranian government officials.[66] The March 2023 joint statement refers to an Iranian agreement to reinstall IAEA monitoring equipment at its nuclear sites and grant IAEA inspectors access to three previously undeclared nuclear sites.[67]
Iranian Artesh Air Force Commander Brigadier General Hamid Vahedi visited the Chinese International Aviation & Aerospace Exhibition in Zhuhai on November 12.[87] Vahedi evaluated J-10 capabilities, highlighting Iran's interest in advanced military technologies. General Vahedi also met with People's Liberation Army Air Force Commander, General Chang Dingqiu, and discussed potential areas for cooperation.[88] Iran has increasingly focused on modernizing its air force through advanced fighter acquisitions and domestic technology development. Iran likely reached an agreement with Russia in late 2022 to acquire Su-35 fighter jets, potentially as part of a trade involving Iranian military support for Russia's actions in Ukraine.[89] Iranian officials have denied reports suggesting an imminent delivery of Russian Su-35 fighter jets to Iran, however.[90] Egypt also recently signed an agreement with China to acquire Chengdu J-10C fighter jets in August 2024, aiming to replace its aging fleet of American-made F-16s.[91]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-12-2024
Iran Update, November 13, 2024
The damage caused by Israel’s October 25 strike targeting Iran’s ballistic missile production facilities combined with Iran’s decreased missile stockpile makes another Iranian large-scale ballistic missile attack targeting Israel unlikely. Iran could use a smaller number of long-range systems combined with a larger number of shorter-range systems fired from Iraq, however. Iran conducted two major strikes on Israel on April 13 and October 1.[1] Iran used 30 ballistic missiles in the April 13 strike and 180 ballistic missiles on October 1. Israel’s October 25 strikes targeting Iranian ballistic missile production facilities severely damaged Iran’s ability to produce long-range ballistic missiles, according to an Israeli intelligence assessment quoted by a Netanyahu-leaning Israeli outlet.[2] These Israeli assessments are consistent with previous reports that the IDF destroyed mixing equipment used to produce solid fuel for ballistic missiles.[3] The assessments also estimate that Iran still has “several hundred long-range missiles” and that Iran is “unlikely to launch all of the missiles at Israel simultaneously.[4] Iran will likely seek to preserve the remainder of its diminishing ballistic missile stockpile rather than further depleting this stockpile by launching another large-scale missile attack on Israel, assuming the Israeli assessments are accurate.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-13-2024
Regime executed female student leader, Parnian Daliri and is suspected of staging the suicide of Kianoosh Sanjari
Iranian leaders appear concerned about the possibility of the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggering international “snapback” sanctions on Iran. Unspecified diplomats told Reuters that the E3 are drafting a resolution to present at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting in Vienna from November 18 to 22 to “pressure Tehran over its poor cooperation” with the IAEA.[15] The resolution would require the IAEA to produce a “comprehensive report” on Iranian nuclear activities in addition to its regular quarterly ones. The report would likely lay the foundation for the E3 to trigger snapback sanctions because the report would almost certainly confirm—as previous IAEA reports have already—Iranian noncompliance with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[16] The sanctions would target Iran's nuclear and missile program and arms transfers.[17] The most recent IAEA report in August 2024 concluded that Iran continues to develop its nuclear program outside the parameters of the JCPOA.[18] The IAEA report stated that Iran possesses 164.7 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent, marking a 22.6 kilogram increase in the Iranian stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium since May 2024.[19] The report also verified that Iran has installed eight cascades of IR-6 centrifuges at Fordow and 10 out of 18 planned cascades of IR-2m centrifuges at Natanz.[20] Iran also continues to severely limit the ability of the IAEA to conduct various verification and monitoring activities related to the JCPOA.
Iran has continued to expand its nuclear program since the IAEA published its last verification and monitoring report in August 2024. The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) reported on November 14 that high resolution satellite imagery from October 2024 shows new construction at a former Iranian nuclear weapons development site at Golab Dareh.[21] The imagery reveals new trench excavations and cabling that can be used to implement new security measures at the site, including alarms and surveillance cameras. ISIS previously reported renewed activity at another Iranian nuclear site at Sanjarian, citing imagery from September 2024.[22]
Iran's clear and explicit violations of the JCPOA could prompt the E3 to trigger snapback sanctions against Iran. Telegraph reported on November 2 that the United Kingdom is “prepared” to trigger snapback sanctions against Iran due to Iranian noncompliance with the JCPOA.[23] Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Director Mohammad Eslami stated that “any resolution on Iran's nuclear affairs will face Iran's immediate response” during a press conference with IAEA Director General Raphael Grossi, likely referring to the E3 resolution and sanctions.[24] An unspecified senior Iranian official told Reuters that Tehran would send a message to the E3 through Grossi about Tehran’s seriousness to resolve its nuclear standoff, likely to try to convince the E3 not to trigger the snapback mechanism.[25] Senior Iranian officials, including President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, similarly emphasized Iran's willingness to cooperate with the IAEA during separate meetings with Grossi on November 14.[26]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-14-2024
Iran has very likely restarted its nuclear weapons research program in the past year. This assessment is based on publicly reported US and Israeli intelligence about Iranian research activity at the Parchin Military Complex outside Tehran in recent months.[1] Unspecified US and Israeli officials told Axios on November 15 that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) strikes into Iran on October 25 destroyed an active, top-secret nuclear weapons research facility—Taleghan 2—at the Parchin Military Complex.[2] The Iranian regime previously used the Taleghan 2 facility to test explosives that are needed to detonate a nuclear device before the regime suspended its nuclear weapons program in 2003.[3] International inspectors found traces of uranium at the Parchin Military Complex in 2015, indicating that a larger quantity of uranium was there at some point, despite Iranian officials denying that the complex was involved in nuclear activities.[4] Unspecified Israeli officials told Axios that the IDF destroyed “sophisticated equipment” dating back to before 2003 that is “needed to design and test plastic explosives that surround uranium in a nuclear device and are needed to detonate it.”[5] The officials added that due to the Israeli strike on October 25, Iran would have to acquire new equipment if it decided to pursue a nuclear weapon. CTP-ISW does not assess that Iran has decided to build a nuclear weapon at this time.
US and Israeli intelligence began detecting suspicious research activity, including computer modeling, metallurgy, and explosive research, at the Parchin Military Complex earlier in 2024.[6] US and Israeli intelligence services obtained intelligence in March 2024 showing that Iran was running computer models and conducting metallurgical research that could support the development of nuclear weapons.[7] Iran dismissed a warning from the United States in July 2024 about its suspicious research activities.[8] Each one of these activities—computer modeling, metallurgical research, and explosive research—could theoretically have a civilian application. However, when taken together, there is no plausible explanation for these research activities other than that they are meant to support Iran's development of a nuclear arsenal.
Computer modeling could reduce the amount of time it would take Iran to conduct a successful real-world nuclear test if Iran decided to pursue a nuclear weapon. Computer modeling would enable Iran to simulate a nuclear test before conducting a real-life test. Iran—if it decided to do so—could then build multiple nuclear weapons before a real-life test revealed that Iran had achieved weaponization. Building multiple nuclear weapons would allow Iran to test one weapon while still possessing multiple operational weapons to deter adversaries, which is consistent with CTP-ISW’s long-standing assessment that Iran has developed a nuclear program that it intends to use to produce a nuclear arsenal. Iran possessed 164.7 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (uranium enriched up to 60 percent) as of August 2024, which is equivalent to 3.95 significant quantities.[9] The IAEA defines a significant quantity as the “approximate amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded.”[10]
According to Axios, the IDF targeted the Taleghan 2 facility because it is not part of Iran's declared nuclear program and Iran could therefore not acknowledge the significance of the IDF strikes on the site without admitting that it had violated the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.[11] The IDF’s strike also avoided targeting a nuclear facility that the IAEA was actively monitoring by hitting an undeclared site.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi visited the Natanz nuclear plant and the Fordow enrichment site in Iran on November 15.[12] Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Spokesperson Behrouz Kamalvandi and lead Iranian nuclear negotiator Kazem Gharib Abadi accompanied Grossi.[13] The IAEA reported in August 2024 that Iran had installed eight cascades of IR-6 centrifuges at Fordow and 10 out of 18 planned cascades of IR-2m centrifuges at Natanz.[14]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-15-2024
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reportedly called on Lebanese Hezbollah to accept a ceasefire agreement that would require Hezbollah to remain north of the Litani River per UN Security Council Resolution 1701.[1] Two individuals affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) told the New York Times on November 16 that senior Supreme Leader adviser Ali Larijani conveyed this message to Hezbollah during his recent visit to Beirut.[2] The message emphasized that Khamenei supports “ending the war with Israel” and that Iran will help Hezbollah recover from the war.[3] It is in Iran's interest to end the fighting between Israel and Hezbollah to prevent Israel from further weakening Hezbollah.[4] Iran could also calculate that it could help rearm and reconstitute Hezbollah in southern Lebanon after a ceasefire takes effect. Iran has historically transferred weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon via Syria, which means that preventing this rearmament and reconstitution process would require some form of interdiction effort against Iran.[5] This report, assuming it is accurate, highlights the extent to which Iran lacks the capability or willingness to defend the Axis of Resistance against Israel. Iran failed to prevent Israel from defeating or severely degrading Hamas units across the Gaza Strip, and it now similarly appears opposed to helping Hezbollah fight Israel.[6]
A hardline Iranian parliamentarian called for acquiring a nuclear weapon to restore Iranian deterrence with Israel. Ahmad Naderi claimed on November 16 that a nuclear weapon is necessary to “establish balance” in the Middle East.[50] Naderi similarly claimed on November 9 that possessing a nuclear weapon would create “maximum deterrence.”[51] These statements implicitly acknowledge that the Iranian drone and missile attacks on Israel in April and October 2024 failed to restore deterrence with Israel and that additional drone and missile attacks will similarly fail to restore deterrence. Naderi’s statements also come amid numerous indications that Iran has very likely restarted its nuclear weapons research program.[52]
more + maps https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-16-2024
Abolhassan Mahdavi, interim imam of Isfahan and a member of the Assembly of Experts, announced on Friday that the Assembly of Experts has chosen three leaders to succeed Ali Khamenei in order of priority, but the names of these people remain confidential.
It seems that Mojtaba Khamenei, who is the second and most political son of Ali Khamenei, is an option that has a high chance. Mojtaba is the only Khamenei child publicly reported to be preparing for leadership. Since 27 years ago, with the consent of his father, he is involved behind the scenes in directing the affairs of the Nizam. Abbas Palizdar, a close friend of Mojtaba Khamenei, and Mohammad Sarafaraz, the former head of Sed and Sima, have also emphasized this role of Mojtaba. The closure of his non-jurisprudence course and the release of his first official video also indicate plans to transfer power to him.
The next option may be Alireza Arafi, who is a close confidant of Khamenei. He is the second vice-chairman of the Assembly of Experts, a member of the Guardian Council, the Imam of Qom Juma and one of the influential personalities of the seminary. His position in the power structure makes him more likely to be chosen as a successor.
It seems that the third possible option is Hashem Hosseini Bushehri. He is the first vice-president of experts, the head of the community of teachers of Qom seminary and the Imam of Qom. His closeness to Khamenei and holding key positions have increased his chances.
Less likely:
Among other names, Ali Khomeini and Hassan Khomeini (grandsons of Ruhollah Khomeini) are seen, but the chances of these people are very low due to not being in the current structure of the highest levels of the system. Hassan Khomeini, nine years ago, was disqualified in the elections of the Assembly of Experts, and he was practically removed from power and is not even a member of the Assembly of Experts.
Hassan Rouhani’s eligibility to be a member of experts has also been rejected. Sadegh Larijani, the current head of the Expediency Recognition Council, was also prevented from entering the Assembly of Experts in the last election, while his protest resignation from the Guardian Council did not go well with Khamenei.
10OCT024: Marjan Keypour: As the threat of conflict grows, Khamenei’s son is back in the spotlight
The issue of succession in the Islamic Republic of Iran is becoming more urgent as the threat of war grows and threats to the life of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei increase, compounded by the eighty-five-year-old’s declining health. Khamenei and his loyalists seek the assurance of a qualified successor, while his critics point to his inability to prevent or manage domestic and international crises. These conditions are too tumultuous for Khamenei to relinquish the reins easily. Still, the transition will be easier for him if his presumed candidate of choice—and son—fifty-five-year-old Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei is selected, now that the death of President Ebrahim Raisi has removed him from the list of possible contenders.
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/israel-iran-succession-khamenei-mojtaba-video/
Iranian hardline Parliamentarians are increasingly calling for Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon to establish Iranian deterrence with Israel. Hardline Parliamentarian Behnam Saeedi and Parliament's National Security Commission member stated in an interview with Iranian media that any possible change to Iran's defense doctrine will “revise and strengthen” Iranian defense abilities.[93] Saeedi stated that the development of Iranian defense capabilities, including missile, air, and sea capabilities, is “necessary” to establish tools of deterrence.[94] Hardline Parliamentarian representing Tehran Province Mahmoud Nabavian stated that Iran must ”equip itself with all the weapons” its adversaries, including Israel and the United States, possess.[95] This is likely an implicit reference to nuclear weapons. These statements implicitly acknowledge that the Iranian drone and missile attacks on Israel in April and October 2024 failed to restore deterrence with Israel and that additional drone and missile attacks will similarly fail to restore deterrence. These statements also come amid numerous indications that Iran has very likely restarted its nuclear weapons research program.[96]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-17-2024
European states continue to sanction Iranian entities connected to Iranian efforts to supply Russia with arms to support Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The European Union (EU) and United Kingdom (UK) both sanctioned Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) for transporting Iranian drones to Russia on November 18.[78] The EU also sanctioned IRISL’s director Mohammad Reza Khiabani and three Russian shipping firms—MG Flot, VTS Broker, and Arapax—for transporting Iranian weapons, including drone parts to resupply Russian troops in Ukraine.[79] The UK also implemented an asset freeze on Iran Air.[80] Iran Air is Iran's national airline and shipping carrier. US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Iran Air in early September.[81]
Dutch media BNR reported that Dutch-based law firm International Law Firm Taheri (IFLT) established at least six front companies since 2020 to help the Iranian oil industry evade US sanctions.[82] IFLT set up these companies to manage oil tankers with paid intermediaries as directors to obfuscate IFLT’s ownership.[83] The US sanctioned three oil tankers registered at ILFT’s office address in Suriname in October 2024 for their involvement in Iranian oil.[84] ILFT owner Masoud Taheri told BNR that he is just a service provider offering a ”solution” for a client faced with a “legal issue at an international level.” BNR reported that ILFT plays an important role in Iran's “ghost fleet,” a network of illicit shipping facilitators for Iranian oil exports.[85] United Against Nuclear Iran estimated that the six tankers registered through ILFT have collectively exported 160 million barrels of oil from Iran since US sanctions took effect.[86]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-18-2024
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