As with Pearl Harbor, the Midway operation depended on surprise.
Operation K failed to ascertain the location of our carriers. Combined with much heavier than usual American radio traffic and aggressive PBY air patrols, I would place the bulk of the blame w/Yamamoto for not accepting that the all-important element of surprise was not likely.
Of course, the loss of face for retreating before joining battle was not going to happen.
I’ll check out Shattered Sword.
I disagree. Surprise was not necessary at all. Japan had a massive preponderance of power.
1) Yamamoto blundered badly with a vastly overcomplicated plan. He should have massed the fleet at a single eastern point, and moved together, with the carriers.
2) He never should have launched Operation AL. Meaningless, with absolutely no strategic impact, yet it drained two light carriers that would have been crucial from providing CAP while the attack carriers carried out land/sea missions.
3) At the first sign of attack from the air, he could have charged his battleships/cruisers on fast attack at the American fleet. This would have forced significant dilution of the American air attack forces, making them choose to protect their own fleet from heavier sea attack or continue vs carriers. If they did the latter, Yamamoto could have closed and either brought the task forces under his guns or driven them off.
4) It was just as with Pearl Harbor, where a convoluted plan worked.
BTW, I wrote a novel called “Halsey’s Bluff”-—a counterfactual where the Japanese win Midway then all hell breaks loose. I had it fully vetted & endorsed by the Battle of Midway Roundtable vets who read it. I think it’s a pretty good yarn.