Replies

Seth Keshel, [15.08.21 12:14]
(1/4) Many have asked me for my thoughts on the current situation in Afghanistan. Since it figures so critically in my background and analytical qualifications, I will give them here in this space. Be mindful that this will be a long post and may break into multiple sections.

I was assigned to the 4th Combat Aviation Brigade out of Fort Hood, TX, as a second lieutenant fresh out of Military Intelligence Officer Basic Course in 2009. I took up my role as the Assistant S-2 (Intelligence Officer) in one of the brigade’s two Attack battalions (Apaches). The S-2 serves as an advisor to the commander (in this case, a battalion is commanded by a lieutenant colonel). The assistant S-2 is clearly the new guy learning under the more experienced primary S-2, typically a captain or senior first lieutenant.

The brigade was just returning home from a deployment to Iraq when I arrived, but thanks to the troop surge coming in Afghanistan, was quickly spun up for a new deployment under a new brigade commander (one of the greatest leaders I’ve ever known), Col. Dan Williams. Notice of the deployment came in Dec 2009 when the colonel told me “poppy fields in June” at a brigade dining event. I had just been promoted to 1st lieutenant at this time.

By April, our brigade was divided into multiple task forces (with the task forces now holding three types of helicopter – Apache, Chinook, Blackhawk, but not Kiowa). I was shifted to another battalion-sized task force that was going to be missing its S-2 for the first few months of the deployment due to personal reasons. He was a captain, and had experience in the Iraq tour the unit completed in 2009. I was fortunate to have been trained by a brilliant officer, 1LT/CPT Wightman - a great guy with whom I’ve never agreed with politically. He helped me immensely to develop critical S-2 skills.

I had the same analytical skill then as I do now – but without the combat experience and day-to-day know-how that comes with “soldiering.” That is why God made NCOs (non-commissioned officers). For several months, my intelligence section operated with three people, when we were allotted eight on paper. 1LT Keshel, SSG Head, and SGT Millhouse. SSG Head (now retired SFC) was an infantryman by trade who transitioned to MI (Military Intelligence) MOS. As the NCO in charge, his job was mainly to lead our analysts and perform essential administrative functions, but due lacking manpower and the demand of 24 hour operations, he was pressed into a more analytical role than his position would typically entail. One of his duties was getting me straight. He laughs still when we talk about the first rocket that landed near us on Kandahar, the first full day in Afghanistan. He didn’t move from his bunk. I followed the entire drill, including hitting the deck and then going to a bunker. The next time a rocket hit, I didn’t move either. You never forget that level of embarrassment. Over the course of several months, SSG Head got me set up for success, right around the time our captain came in country.

My dad died in September, three months in. I went home for his funeral, and when I got back the captain (CPT Kolano) was back. We are the same age – he graduated college a year ahead of me and therefore was ahead of me in career progression. We had both been 1LTs at the same time, and he made CPT a year before I did, going into this deployment. One drawback of battalion staff sections is that officers often hold the same rank, and become friends, and then have to report one to the other. Of course there is basic professionalism, meaning that no one will undermine the one who outranks them – but it’s not always easy. CPT Kolano and I didn’t really get along personally during our deployment, but fortunately we actually became real friends when we returned and were sent to the Captains Career Course together in Arizona. He is still in, a Major – one of the better intelligence minds I met in the Army – a strategist, workaholic, and fitness nut. We gelled pretty well about halfway through the tour

Seth Keshel, [15.08.21 12:15]
(4/4) and liberty to Afghanistan was a lie. It is the military industrial complex speaking. We have domestic problems here that could have been addressed for the entirety of the Afghan war, without the loss of life, limbs, eyesight, blood, and treasure in a second Vietnam. This is why neo-con warlords like John McCain, Jeff Flake, Dan Crenshaw, Adam Kinzinger, G.W. Bush, and others, must be roundly ridiculed, mocked, despised, and rejected.

The military is a great place for a boy to become a man. I am glad that I served because I have the foundation of resiliency, determination, and realism that I otherwise would never have developed. Veterans are great employees because they can be in the right place, at the right time, and the right uniform. Discipline, personal pride, and fitness (physical and ideally, mental) are hallmarks modern veterans have.

Those veterans will attest to what I’m saying. None of what I wrote is to detract from the bravery of veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan. One of my best friends was a Marine combat engineer (Captain) who has had his life ruined by that stupid war. He is brave, led his men with valor, at the cost of concussing himself permanently and undergoing the emotional trauma that has caused great personal hardship. He reminds me of my Dad – who dealt with his issues from Vietnam in ways that often caused great pain to others, against his own desires.

In summary – though I have wandered – there was never a way to win a war in Afgh if we view “victory” as the locals being able to govern their own country. That was a lie used by the military industrial complex to engage in a war that is two decades long. We were astonished that we were serving there ten years after 9/11. Now that number is twenty years. I was new in my career when I showed up there, with just 2 years of service. If I were still in today, I’d be a Major, a couple years from Lieutenant Colonel, with 13 years of service. No results.

The only way to win it was to destroy everything that breathes and start over. I do not endorse that method because there are many innocents in Afghanistan, and there is no public will to do that, fortunately. That is how things were done in the days of Alexander the Great and Genghis Khan. But since Afghanistan is the size of Texas, bordering 6 nations, there are few strategic targets worth eliminating now. We are eliminating pawns, 19 year olds paid a hundred bucks and given an AK-47 and a couple Chinese rockets to fight for their own country. The knights, rooks, and bishops are hiding out in Pakistan or Iran, funneling money, explosives, and other weaponry into country to maim and kill coalition forces. Our leaders knew this all along but continued. Trump knew this, but knew that if he pulled the plug immediately, he would be blamed for exactly what you see going on right now – the same scenes from “Blackhawk Down” with our equipment and unit regalia being paraded down dusty roads, to our humiliation as a nation. Trump did what he could to empower our Generals to make the kinetic decisions to get as much done as possible, and he dwindled troop levels down enough to pave the way for a withdrawal – but two decades of horrific decision making has its consequences.

I hope this sheds light on the true picture in Afghanistan. It was doomed to fail, and now you see it all coming to fruition.