Yes ZH has some really good stuff no question,they make no bones that the Canadians slept while the chicoms smuggled virus’ that could possibly be weaponized back to Beijing and possibly to Wujan.
heres a clip from another link from your link:
Rise of China’s Biological Warfare Program
During the Korean War (1950–53), the earliest semblance of routinized defence against Biological Warfare in the PLA were the 1952 sanitation/anti-plague units, formed through the involvement of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army in Korea. At the same time, intensive educational campaigns to rid disease-carrying pests were conducted, combined with experience of supposed Biological Warfare casualties treated during the Korean War.
Consequently, in 1954, PLA delegations and students visited the USSR for training in microbiology and infectious diseases. Officially, China declared that its BWs defence programme was initiated in 1958. It was based on a network of anti-plague stationary and mobile facilities (similar to the Soviet one), aiming to cope with plague and further hazardous infectious diseases.
The defensive programme had considerably been evolving during the 1960s, while an offensive Biological Warfare program was initiated in conjunction. By the mid-1970s, a comprehensive, orderly defensive alignment had been already operating within China’s Biological Warfare Program, while an effective offensive BW program was run concurrently.
The latter was formed as an outcome of the influential geostrategic factors mentioned earlier, yet, presumably, was no less a result of an innate Chinese will to possess an arm of high strategic value, in terms of sub-nuclear weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Such motive seems to typically reside in the Chinese national outlook regarding nearly any advanced weaponry.
China acceded to the BWC in 1984, but in a report entitled Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements, the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency contended: ‘China maintained an offensive biological weapons program throughout the 1980s. The program included the development, production, stockpiling or other acquisition or maintenance of biological warfare agents.’
The Pentagon also published a similar paper, entitled ‘Proliferation: Threat and Response’, which claimed that China’s Biological Warfare Program includes manufacturing of infectious microorganisms and toxins. In 1993, US intelligence officials stated that it was highly probable that China had an active and expanding offensive BWs program, following assessment that two civilian-run biological research centers were actually controlled by the Chinese military.
The research centres were known to have engaged previously in production and storage of BW. The American suspicions intensified in 1991 when one of the suspected biological centres was enlarged. Suspicions heightened further after Beijing made, according to a US official, a ‘patently false’ declaration to the United Nations (UN) that it had never made any germ weapons or conducted any work to bolster defences against a biological attack.
The Chinese Foreign Ministry subsequently described all this as groundless, denying that China had a germ weapons programme. In 1995, President Clinton transmitted to the US Congress his statutory annual report, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements. On China, it said:
‘[T]here are strong indications that China probably maintains its offensive BW program.’ In its Chemical and Biological Defense Program Annual Report and the Chemical and Biological Defense Program Performance Plan for 2001, the US Department of Defense was even more specific, contending: ‘China possesses the munitions production capabilities necessary to develop, produce and weaponize biological agents’.
Convening a hearing on China’s proliferation practices in 2003, the US–China Economic and Security Review Commission was informed as follows:
The US believes that despite being a member of the Biological Weapons Convention, China maintains a BW program in violation of its BWC obligations. The United States believes that China’s consistent claims that it has never researched, produced or possessed BW are simply not true, and that China still retains its BW program.
Although China has submitted its voluntary annual BWC confidence-building measure (CBM) data declarations every year, the US Department of State assessed in 2005 that the information submitted therein continued to be ‘inaccurate and misleading’. Further, ‘BWC CBMs since 1991 have called on the States Parties to declare, among other things, their past offensive activities, which China has not done. On the contrary, China insists it never had such a program at all.’
Likewise, in 2007, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) testimony for the US Senate, the Select Committee on Intelligence, entitled ‘Current and Projected National Security Threats’ (in both open and closed sessions), contended that the DIA believes China ‘continues to maintain some elements of an offensive biological weapons program.’
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the DIA and intelligence agencies in other countries most probably continue to carefully follow and monitor China’s Biological Warfare Program. Irrespective of publicly bringing out their findings—if partially—or totally keeping them, Beijing’s BWP entirely persists in all likelihood. It is assumed that it includes an extremely secretive operational, sizable BW arsenal, extremely hidden, which is steadily being upgraded.
China’s Biological Warfare Programme: An Integrative Study with Special Reference to Biological Weapons Capabilities by Dany Shoham published in Journal of Defence Studies.
Given the CEP of our Trident Subs, and the size of the fireball, it might be advisable for a ground burst nuclear strike.
As Gandalf said, "You Tom-fool of a Took! Throw yourself down the well next time and rid us of your stupidity!"