Kalamata to central_va:
"...the South could pay to ship protected manufactured goods down from the North, OR pay tariffs on imports.
The imports, even with the tariffs, were typically cheaper than heavily-protected Northern goods, so the South paid a high percentage of the tariffs." This is Kalamata's version of DiogenesLamp's fantasy about "Northeastern Power Brokers" and "money flows from Europe" -- the alleged "real reasons" the Union went to war.
And as with DiogenesLamp's version, it's nonsense.
Here are the facts (see also my post #1,251):
- In 1860 total US imports were $376 million, about $24 million less than total exports, including gold & silver.
- Of the $376 million total imports, about $353 million arrived in Union state ports, $23 million (6%) arrived in Confederate state ports, of which $17 million (75% of the 6%) arrived in New Orleans.
- So, only 6% of US imports came directly to Confederate state ports and less than 2% to CSA ports other than New Orleans.
- However, the South did "import" $200 million in manufactured products from the North.
Two-thirds of that was cloth products -- wool, cotton & silk -- another 10% was iron, from rail to stoves, and the rest a wide assortment of miscellaneous from hats to soap, tea & musical instruments.
- Notice the two numbers: the South imported about $23 million directly from foreign countries, and "imported" $200 million from the North.
In other words, 90% of what Southerners did not produce themselves they purchased from the North.
- That 90% is the commerce threatened by Confederacy, but notice that Confederates did not intend to destroy that commerce, only to tariff it, expecting that to yield over $20 million in revenues for Montgomery.
Kalamata "It is easy to get side-tracked by assuming the tariffs would affect the Northern consumer equally.
But when you read the newspapers and speeches of that day, both North and South, they are almost unanimous in pointing to the North as the beneficiary of the tariffs, and the South as the victim." The North benefitted by "exporting" $200 million in manufactured products to the South.
All those "exports" included the tariff costs on imported raw materials, for examples:
| Commodity |
1846 Tariff |
1857 Tariff |
Morrill |
| Woolens |
30 |
24 |
37 |
| Brown Sugar |
30 |
24 |
26 |
| Cotton |
25 |
19 |
25 |
| Iron mfg |
30 |
24 |
29 |
| Tobacco |
40 |
30 |
25 |
| Wines |
40 |
30 |
40 |
| Average: |
33 |
25 |
30 |
Of course those tariffs protected not just Northern manufactured items but also Southern exports like cotton, sugar and tobacco.
Kalamata "...followed by a complete overhaul in 1846, which mirrored the additional clause of the future Confederate Constitution by removing item-by-item rates and replacing them with an ad valorem schedule:"
Here our FRiend Kalamata is just babbling nonsense.
In fact the 1846 change from specified charges to ad valorem had nothing to do with the Confederate constitution, but was intended to increase revenues by reducing "mistakes" and by charging higher amounts (a fixed percent) when prices went up.
But the new 1861 Morrill tariff went back to the old way (pre-1846) of fixed amount charges because:
Morrill "...replaced the existing ad valorem tariff schedule with specific duties and drastically increased tariff rates on goods produced by popular "protected" industries, such as iron, textiles, and other manufactured goods.
Economic historian Frank Taussig argued that in many cases, the substitution of specific duties was used to disguise the extent of the rate increases.
Supporters of the specific rates argued that they were necessary, though, because European exporters were routinely providing their American customers with phony invoices showing lower prices for goods than were actually paid.
Specific rates made such subterfuge pointless."
The problem was cheating and by 1860 experience showed the old method actually worked better.
Kalamata quoting Magnus 2017: "While it is difficult to measure the full effect of the revisions given this change of assessment, Morrill 's equivalent rates pushed most items well above the 1846 schedule and, in several instances, to near-parity with the Black Tariff levels of 1842."
Sure, after Democrats' secession, Republicans passed higher rates.
But Southern Democrats defeated Morrill in 1860 and could have again in early 1861, or at least negotiated lower rates on critical items, had they not seceded.
Even then, Morrill rates were not that much higher on biggest import items -- they were roughly 1846 levels.
Kalamata: "So, the division doesn't appear to be about tariffs, per se, but about crony capitalism, a.k.a., corporate welfare, a.k.a. political favoritism.
When we see the word "tariff" dominating the antebellum literature, we tend to scratch our heads and wonder why it was such a big deal.
But the politicians and businessmen of that day understood that the word typically meant political favoritism that helped the North, and hurt the South."
Except that Southern Democrats ruled in Washington, DC, almost continuously from the election of 1800 until secession in 1861.
In all those years Southern Democrats passed seven different tariffs into law:
- Tariff of 1816 (Madison)
- Tariff of 1824 (Monroe)
- Tariff of 1828 "Abomination" (Adams/Jackson)
- Tariff of 1832 (Jackson)
- Tariff of 1833 (Jackson)
- Tariff of 1846 "Walker" (Polk)
- Tariff of 1857 (Buchanan)
In all that time only one tariff was passed by Whigs, in 1842 "the Black Tariff", and that was quickly replaced by
Democrats in 1846.
Bottom line: whatever "corruption" was involved in US tariffs, it was the corruption of Southern Democrats who ruled almost continuously in Washington from 1800 to 1861. 
>>Kalamata to central_va: "...the South could pay to ship protected manufactured goods down from the North, OR pay tariffs on imports. The imports, even with the tariffs, were typically cheaper than heavily-protected Northern goods, so the South paid a high percentage of the tariffs."
>>BroJoeK wrote: "This is Kalamata's version of DiogenesLamp's fantasy about "Northeastern Power Brokers" and "money flows from Europe" -- the alleged "real reasons" the Union went to war. And as with DiogenesLamp's version, it's nonsense. Here are the facts (see also my post #1,251):
As usual, Joey's numbers are deceptive and useless. Read the literature of those days to determine the impact of protective tariffs on the non-protected agriculturalists.
****************
>>Kalamata wrote "...followed by a complete overhaul in 1846, which mirrored the additional clause of the future Confederate Constitution by removing item-by-item rates and replacing them with an ad valorem schedule:"
>>BroJoeK wrote: "Here our FRiend Kalamata is just babbling nonsense. In fact the 1846 change from specified charges to ad valorem had nothing to do with the Confederate constitution, but was intended to increase revenues by reducing "mistakes" and by charging higher amounts (a fixed percent) when prices went up. But the new 1861 Morrill tariff went back to the old way (pre-1846) of fixed amount charges because: Morrill "...replaced the existing ad valorem tariff schedule with specific duties and drastically increased tariff rates on goods produced by popular "protected" industries, such as iron, textiles, and other manufactured goods. conomic historian Frank Taussig argued that in many cases, the substitution of specific duties was used to disguise the extent of the rate increases... "
>>BroJoeK wrote: "The problem was cheating and by 1860 experience showed the old method actually worked better."
At times, it seems Joey is writing for no other reason than the pure "pleasure" of throwing an ad-hominem, or two. He is certainly not interested in the truth. This is Taussig:
"When protectionists make a change of this kind, they almost invariably make the specific duties higher than the ad-valorem, duties for which they are supposed to be an equivalent..." [Taussig, Frank W., "The Tariff History of the United States." G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1892, p.158]
Taussig is paraphrasing the Constitution in the last clause, which requires tariffs to be uniform, across the board. Specific duties can be made uniform, but that was not the goal of the crony-capitalist protectionist. The wanted their stuff, and that of their friends, to be more protected than the stuff of the other guys. The businessmen that relied almost exclusively on exports, like the cotton growers, were left out of the scheme.
****************
>>Kalamata quoting Magnus 2017: "While it is difficult to measure the full effect of the revisions given this change of assessment, Morrill 's equivalent rates pushed most items well above the 1846 schedule and, in several instances, to near-parity with the Black Tariff levels of 1842."
>>BroJoeK wrote: "Sure, after Democrats' secession, Republicans passed higher rates. But Southern Democrats defeated Morrill in 1860 and could have again in early 1861, or at least negotiated lower rates on critical items, had they not seceded. Even then, Morrill rates were not that much higher on biggest import items -- they were roughly 1846 levels."
As usual, Joey's posts are deceptive. First, I was quoting Phillip Magness, and this is the quote in full:
"As president [James Polk, who defeated the Whig protectionist Henry Clay,] delivered on his promise in 1846 when, under the guidance of Treasury Secretary Robert J. Walker, Congress adopted a comprehensive overhaul of the tariff system featuring a moderate downward revision of rates and, importantly, the standardization of tariff categories on a tiered ad valorem schedule.
"This final feature was intended to improve the transparency of the tariff system by consolidating the somewhat convoluted list of tariff items, itself the product of many decades of lobbying and the carving out of highly specialized categories as political favors for specific companies and industries. By converting the tariff from a system that relied primarily on itemized specific duties or individually assigned ad valorem rates to a formal tiered schedule of ad valorem categories in which tariffs were assessed as a percentage of the import 's declared dollar value, Walker further limited the ability of special interests of all stripes to disguise tariff favoritism in units of volume and measurement—different tariff rates assessed by tons of iron, gallons of alcohol, yards of cord and so forth.
"The Walker reforms helped to stabilize many years of fluctuating tariff politics by instituting a moderately free trade Tariff-for-revenue system that lasted, subject to a further uniform reduction of rates in 1857, until the eve of the Civil War…
"Between December 1858 and March 1860, Morrill was inundated with letters from manufacturers and industrialists requesting favorable protective tariff rates against their foreign competitors. Many of these petitions were copied verbatim into the text of the tariff bill. The Morrill schedule also replaced the ad valorem schedule system of Walker with the reintroduction of item-by-item rates. The new schedule utilized an ad hoc mixture of individual ad valorem rates and specific duties, assessed by import units rather than volume, making its administration less transparent. While it is difficult to measure the full effect of the revisions given this change of assessment, Morrill 's equivalent rates pushed most items well above the 1846 schedule and, in several instances, to near-parity with the Black Tariff levels of 1842."
[Magness, Phillip W., "Tariffs and the American Civil War." Essential Civil War Curriculum, 2017, pp.6,8]
As you can see, the Whig ("republican") protective tariff was loaded with "pork," also called "earmarks." Those earmarks were removed under the Polk administration.
The next-to-last highlighted statement reminds me of a federal court case during which the written words of the ACLU were copied verbatim into the opinion of a corrupt federal "judge."
The last highlighted statement contradicts Joey's statement (above,) which reads: "Morrill rates were not that much higher on biggest import items -- they were roughly 1846 levels." I have no idea where Joey got that notion.
****************
Kalamata wrote: "So, the division doesn't appear to be about tariffs, per se, but about crony capitalism, a.k.a., corporate welfare, a.k.a. political favoritism. When we see the word "tariff" dominating the antebellum literature, we tend to scratch our heads and wonder why it was such a big deal. But the politicians and businessmen of that day understood that the word typically meant political favoritism that helped the North, and hurt the South."
>>BroJoeK wrote: "Except that Southern Democrats ruled in Washington, DC, almost continuously from the election of 1800 until secession in 1861."
Not true. The crony-capitalists (in both parties, but mostly Whigs) ruled from 1824 to 1846. James K. Polk put an end to that in 1846:
"The President had reason to be gratified with the passage of this important party measure. It not only dealt a severe blow to Clay's "American System," but it put in operation a tariff policy which Polk had advocated ever since he had been in public life. Much to the disappointment of his critics no industrial calamities resulted from it, and the act was not repealed as Webster had so confidently predicted. Despite the scoffing of Evans, reduction of the tariff rates was followed by an increase in the amount of revenue; it became redundant in 1857 and was still further reduced. While it would he absurd to attribute the prosperity of this decade to the operation of the "tariff of '46," no longer could it be said that an ad valorem revenue tariff would block the wheels of industry."
"The reestablishment of the independent treasury gave additional reason for gratification, and, like the tariff bill, it caused none of the disasters which its opponents had prophesied. With few modifications, the "constitutional treasury" has continued to the present day, and it has done much to extricate national revenue from the field of party politics. With the enactment of these two measures and the settlement of the Oregon question Polk had effected three of the four items of his administrative program. There was no longer need of anxiety for the "glory" of his administration, even though Davis had talked the diplomatic appropriation bill to death."
"Having faithfully complied with the recommendations contained in the President's message, Congress believed, apparently, that the law of compensation entitled it to a free hand in "pork barrel" legislation. Despite the heavy drain on the treasury for military purposes, items were recklessly added to the river and harbor bill until it called for appropriations amounting to nearly a million and a half dollars. Clay himself could scarcely have asked for a more cordial endorsement of his internal improvement policy, and especially from a Congress controlled by Democrats. Polk promptly vetoed this bill, and his message to the House is an able statement of the Jeffersonian doctrine of strict construction. In his opinion, the measure under consideration was both unconstitutional and inexpedient, and parts of it "a disreputable scramble for the public money." ''It is not questioned, said he,"
"that the Federal Government is one of limited powers. Its powers are such, and such only, as are expressly granted in the Constitution or are properly incidental to the expressly granted powers and necessary to their execution."
"After quoting Madison's rule for determining the scope of implied power, Polk maintained that:"
"It is not enough that it may be regarded by Congress as convenient or that its exercise would advance the public weal. It must be necessary and proper to the execution of the principal expressed power to which it is an incident, and without which such principal power can not be carried into effect. The whole frame of the Federal Constitution proves that the Government which it creates was intended to be one of limited and specified powers. A construction of the Constitution so broad as that by which the power in question is defended tends imperceptibly to a consolidation of power in a Government intended by the framers to be thus limited in its authority."
"National appropriations, in his opinion, should be confined to national purposes, and Congress ought to refrain from exercising doubtful powers. He censured in particular the present attempt to include purely local items by a jugglery of words. "To call the mouth of a creek or a shallow inlet on our coast a harbor can not confer the authority to expend the public money in its improvement."
[Eugene Irving McCormac, "James K. Polk: a political biography." Russell & Russell, 1965, pp.678-679]
The cronies resumed their rule under Lincoln.
Mr. Kalamata