Another thing was the American carriers had good fire/damage control and were built with a system to suppress fires. The Japanese carriers, on the other hand, were death traps and they did not have a good system for putting out fires.
Actually, all of the Japanese carriers had reasonable firefighting systems or at least were designed that way. The Achilles heel of Japanese damage control was that they didn’t design their ships *around* damage control like the Americans did and their naval doctrine dictated that damage control was supposed to be handled by a core of highly trained damage control specialists, which turned out to be a problem when the specialists were killed or disabled and the rest of the crew didn’t know what to do. The American practice was to train all crew members in at least the bare rudiments of damage control (”This is a fire hose, this is where you find them, this is how you use it” and “This is a hatch, you keep it closed at all times when you are not transiting it.” if nothing else) and had noticed the surprising survivability of the technically inferior German WW1 fleet units at the battles of Dogger Bank and Jutland, which were attributed to superior damage control and ships designed around it. US naval architects and policy makers took this idea and ran with it to an extent that the Germans couldn’t and didn’t recognize it in WW2. American damage control and damage control oriented design were partially why the destroyers and destroyer escort of Taffy-3 were able to keep floating and fighting for so long with such horrific amounts of damage.
The fact that the Japanese damage control issues weren’t hardware centric was demonstrated by the carrier Shokaku at the Battle of the Coral Sea. Shokaku was hit in and through the deck by three American bombs dropped by dive bombers, equivalent hits to what sank some of the IJN carriers at Midway, but was easily able to put out the fires and sail away. It turns out the captain of the Shokaku had taken a look at what doctrine said he should do to configure his crew for damage control, said f**k that and had his DC specialists start training his entire crew in the rudiments of damage control. Shokaku would be hit hard at the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands (six deck and through deck hits from Hornet’s dive bombers this time) and again sailed away due to the atypical-for-the-IJN DC training.