Posted on 03/09/2018 11:07:28 AM PST by Simon Green
In World War II, the Japanese super-battleships Yamato and Musahi each mounted nine 18.1-inch guns, the largest naval guns ever deployed, but they never sank a single American ship. In a conflict decided by naval aviation, Yamato and Musahi were used mainly as flagships and troop transports. Despite their huge armaments, they were steel dinosaurs from an earlier strategic age.
But how do you sink a steel dinosaur? The answer is: "with difficulty." It took eleven torpedoes and six bombs to sink the Yamato. The Musahi took nineteen torpedoes and seventeen bombs. And at the time they were sunk, both ships were already limping along on patch-up repairs from earlier torpedo strikes. They may have been strategically useless, but the Yamato and Musahi were almost (if not quite) indestructible.
Naval construction requires decades of advance planning, and naval planners are always at risk of fighting the last war. Since the end of World War II, U.S. naval planning has revolved around the aircraft carrier. But world wars are few and far between, and other missions abound. When it comes to countering the rise of China, some of the most frequent missions are freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) requiring no fighting at all.
Over the last several years China has become increasingly aggressive in asserting illegal maritime claims in the South China Sea. In response, the United States regularly conducts FONOPs, sailing destroyers within twelve nautical miles of China's artificial islands to repudiate Beijing's claims to sovereign territorial waters. So far, China has been sensible enough not to challenge any of these operations.
But a destroyer is a fragile fish. In June last year the USS Fitzgerald was put out of action by a collision with a container ship, with the loss of seven liveson the destroyer. Then in August the USS John S. McCain was nearly sunk by an oil tanker. Ten sailors lost their lives. The tanker suffered no injuries. Leaving aside the issue of poor seamanship, these two collisions illustrated a potentially more serious shortcoming of today's naval ships: poor survivability. Navy ships used to threaten oil tankers, not the other way around.
The U.S. Navy certainly needs the firepower provided by its awesome carrier strike groups and its flimsy, but nonetheless formidable, guided missile destroyers. But it also needs ships that can take a punch and keep on sailing. That kind of toughness is likely to become an even more important quality as China develops its precision strike capacities. Soon it may become too dangerous to sail an unarmored ship in the South China Sea.
Stealth is one way to keep from getting hit, and the United States leads the way in the development of stealthy destroyers. But stealth defeats the purpose of a FONOP, which is to be seen. An old-fashioned battleship is a ship to be seenand in a big way. But there's no need for the Navy to build an old-fashioned battleship in the twenty-first century when it can build a new-fashioned battleship instead.
A contemporary battleship would combine advanced armor materials with automated damage control to produce a ship that is virtually unsinkable. Its offensive armaments might be mission-specific, but its key attribute would be survivability. It would be a ship that could be put in harm's way in the reasonable expectation of coming home in one piece.
This "battleship of the future" could solve the challenge posed by China's emerging anti-access / area denial (A2/AD) strategy for excluding the United States from the western Pacific. China is rapidly expanding and improving its networks of onshore, offshore, undersea, and space-based sensors to the extent that it will soon be able to see everything that moves between the Chinese mainland and the first island chain formed by Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, and the Philippines. And improvements in precision weaponry will increasingly mean that China will be able to hit anything it can see.
America's response has been a shifting set of tactical plans successively labeled as AirSea Battle, JAM-GC and Third Offset. What these plans all have in common is the idea that the best defense is a good offense: instead of defending against Chinese A2/AD attacks, they propose that the United States strike first to take out the command-and-control networks that tie China's sensors to its precision munitions. The problem is that this implies the immediate escalation of any A2/AD scenario into a full-scale war.
That's where the battleship of the future comes in: it would give the United States a defensive option for limited conflict. For example, a future battleship could respond to Chinese provocations by disabling Chinese seabed sensors or cutting Chinese undersea cables. It could survive being rammed by enemy shipsa favorite tactic of the Chinese and North Koreans. And if A2/AD did escalate into a shooting war, it could operate in the danger zone while U.S. offensive actions turned the tables.
The U.S. Navy will never again be a dreadnought fleet of big-gun battleships. But it is time to reexamine the role of armor in naval architecture. Even the most forward-leaning offensive operation needs a few tough linesmen who can take a beating and stay in the game. A future battleship would give the Navy and by extension the presidentwarfighting options other than the total annihilation of the enemy. Regular FONOPs already demonstrate the need for such options. The A2/AD threat will likely generate even more dangerous missions that only a durable battleship of the future can safely perform.
Despite what Wikipedia says, North Carolina was heavily damaged by just one torpedo and had to immediately head for Noumea for emergency repairs
The North Carolina class underwater protection was inadequate. The torpedo hit just under the #1 turret and almost caused a magazine explosion.
The turret was knocked out and she spent considerable time under repair.
Other Pearl Harbor battleships other than the Pennsylvania that weren’t as heavily damaged were able to avoid being expended at the Bikini test and remained mothballed well into the 1950’s.
The future is drone boats serving as recon, electronic warfare and missile platforms, with stealth structures and minimal draught.
One of the ships in that photo was the USS Prinz Eugen (war prize given to us by the Brits).
It survived TWO nuke tests, and, then was towed to Kwajalein Atoll. It stayed there for a few months, but, as no one could go on board due to the radiation, it finally deteriorated until it capsized and sank.
It’s still sticking up in the lagoon, and, safe enough to dive on now.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_cruiser_Prinz_Eugen
A heavy cruiser with two triple 8 or 10 inch forward gun turrets and the mid and stern areas packed with various missiles would do the trick rather than go full battleship. You get armor, you get speed, you get long distance hitting power, AA capabilities and you can stand off shore and pound your enemy with shell fire as well.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northrop_Grumman_X-47C
Future would be a stealthy unmanned drone able to provide live intel and long loiter time of when would be best to strike the target without the target knowing it.
The gunboat diplomacy of the battleship is also it’s downfall, everyone knows it’s there so they can take countermeasures and hide or even target the ship.
I’d be overjoyed to see the Wisconsin, New Jersey and, of course, Mighty Mo brought back in to service. I never thought they should have been re-de-commissioned after they were refitted in the 1980s.
Unfortunately, I think the USS Newport News may have been scrapped.
The Iowa class refit had a crew of over 1800, the post war Navy couldn't afford that extravagance. You could crew 4 Ticonderoga's with that.
And the nukes are a lot bigger now ...
For some reason, I can’t copy the image, but the shadow on the right side of the waterspout is a ship, standing on its fantail....
I know, I know. But those battleships are, in my opinion, the most beautiful warships ever constructed. They are just so low, sleek and stream-lined looking that I think the Navy should keep at least one of them around forever.
I am, of course, biased, because when Reagan called the Missouri back in to service, he also called my father back out of retirement to serve on her. I think that was the happiest he ever was in his Navy career.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Arkansas_(BB-33)
Yup, the Arkansas, the oldest US navy combatant in WWII.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Arkansas_(BB-33)
Yup, the Arkansas, the oldest US navy combatant in WWII.
Thanks, I did not know the name of the ship....amazing photo.
Engines? They recalled engine crews of the Sacramento and Camden to man the Iowa's when they were recommissioned.
They used the powerplant from uncommissioned Iowa class Kentucky with lower pressure boilers than other ships.
Pretty much all battleships had inadequate underwater torpedo protection. They were designed to fling 2000 pound project at one another. As for other battleships being mothballed, the point is youre not going to repair a ship that is considered obsolescent. Of course you would keep those that were more modern and in good working order.
Electronics.
You couldve also pointed out that the Bismarck was rippled by a single torpedo hitting the rudder, but of course any warship that loses its ability to turn is going to be in serious trouble.
The Navy revisited the underwater protection of the North Carolina's in the succeeding class the South Dakotas.
The Japanese torpedo didn't just penetrate the hull of the North Carolina, the flash penetrated the forward turret handling room almost causing a magazine explosion.
Akagi, a battlecruiser hull, had it's steering crippled by a 1000lb bomb that didn't even hit the ship, it was a very near miss to the stern at Midway.
USS Long Beach CGN-9If you wanted to serve on a ship that rarely left port in the US, the Long Beach was where to be. We couldnt do much more than 30 knots with a clean hull, so we couldnt keep up with the carriers, so we rarely left port. The reason was that the Long Beach was originally going to be a DLG weighing 12,000 tons. By the time the USN was done expanding it, it weighed 14,000 tons. During sea trials, it was feared that the ship would roll over because it was so top heavy, so 2000 tons of lead was added along the keel to raise the weight to 16,000 tons.
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