[quadrant]

I agree. The Morrill Tariff was of great (and powerful) concern in the South. If memory serves, the tariff was set a 47%, of the value of the imported goods. A tariff of this amount amounts to little more than a total exclusion of goods entering a country.
The Morrill Tariff was extremely popular in the North and the Midwest, for obvious reasons; in fact, it was so popular that Lincoln might readily (and willingly compromise on the issue of slavery itself, as opposed to the expansion of slavery) but could never compromise on the tariff.
Personally, the leaders of the South were extremely foolish to leave the Union, for as Lincoln noted only the federal government could guarantee the existence of slavery. And tariffs can and frequently are revised; and while the Morrill Tariff might be a burden, the South (if it stayed in the Union) had a very powerful hand to play. Essentially, the South acted as did the Central Powers before WWI - it abandoned politics and negotiation for demands and confrontation. And the South came through its own folly to the same ends as did the Central Powers.

[BroJoeK]

quadrant: "The Morrill Tariff was of great (and powerful) concern in the South. If memory serves, the tariff was set a 47%, of the value of the imported goods.
A tariff of this amount amounts to little more than a total exclusion of goods entering a country."

Sorry FRiend, but by now you should begin to grasp how little you really know about these events, and how much of what you think you know is just flat wrong.
A good example is the often ballyhooed Morrill Tariff reason for secession.
So, once again, let's review the facts:

1. In 1860, overall tariffs were nearly as low as they'd ever been -- around 15% average, the same as in 1792 under President Washington.
   
2. That 15% is also the rate the Confederacy established for itself, so it cannot possibly be considered "unreasonable".

3. The highest ever tariff rates -- the so-called Tariff of Abominations of 1828 -- was passed in Congress by supporters of Tennessean Andrew Jackson and South Carolinian John C. Calhoun.
   Those rates averaged 35% and were roughly equivalent to the Smoot-Hawley rates of 1930, widely credited with deepening and lengthening the Great Depression.
   President Jackson later reduced those rates to about 30%.

4. The original Morrill Tariff proposal in Congress, which Southern representatives defeated, would have raised average tariffs from 15% to about 22% overall.
   That 22% was the average of tariffs from 1820 to 1855.

5. Had those Confederate state representatives remained in Congress in early 1861, they may still have defeated Morrill, or at least kept it to 22%.

6. After Confederate state representatives walked out of Congress, and as the Confederacy threatened war, Congress finally passed the Morrill Tariff, in March, 1861, signed by outgoing President Buchanan.
   The new Morrill rates were 26% overall, which was somewhat higher than past averages, and Congress further increased it to 38% in 1865 to help pay for the war.

7. So the Morrill Tariff was not mentioned by name in any Confederate Reasons for Secession document, and though we do sometimes see a generalized complaint about high tariffs, the Confederacy itself set its tariff rates right where they had been in 1860 -- about 15%.
   So tariffs were "politics as usual" and not a sufficient reason to declare secession, Confederacy and war on the United States.

For overall historic tariff rates see here.

For Morrill Tariff history see here.

For Smoot-Hawley Tariff rates see here.

And one final point should be mentioned: the wealthiest of all wealthy Southern planters were sugarcane growers in mainly Louisiana.
They were so wealthy because, beginning in 1789, Congress passed tariffs protecting US producers of sugar from foreign competition, tariffs which, in one form or another, remain in effect today.

Point is: all these complaints about allegedly high tariffs, Morrill especially, are pure smoke-screen intended to obscure the real reason for secession: protecting slavery.