Posted on 04/19/2015 8:40:28 PM PDT by Colofornian
Now that the Philadelphia Eagles have signed a 4th quarterback -- Tim Tebow -- and talk is being bandied about re: Tebow's potential "role player" status...perhaps a review is in order to ponder a potential paradigm shift that the NFL is perhaps beyond the need to acknowledge.
And for that, we need a quick review of another professional sport: Major League Baseball...and specifically the history of pitching:
1901-1968: For the first 68 years of the 20th century, Major League Baseball didn't even track "saves" by relief pitchers. Yankees pitcher Waite Hoyt was retroactively credited with "eight" saves in 1928. But he was primarily a starting pitcher who won 23 games that year -- about all of them as a starter.
1944 snapshot 45% of games started by pitchers wound up as complete games. (Complete Games)
1954 snapshot Still, over 1/3rd of games started by pitchers were completed by them. (Complete Games)
1969: This became the first season where this "saves" were begun to be recorded
1972: Even though teams in the 40s, 50s, and 60s used pitchers exclusively in bullpen roles -- and some even before that -- it wasn't until 1972 when the Reds' Clay Carroll became the first pitcher to make a third of his season's appearances in the beginning of the ninth inning. And that wasn't to be repeated until the A's Rollie Fingers did it in 1982.
Source: Closer (baseball)
1974 snapshot Complete games by starting pitchers actually rose 3.5% over the 1964 season...to 28%. (Complete Games) But this was the "last hurrah" for the complete game -- as it would drop 13 percent (almost half) by 1984.
1976: The "Rolaids Relief Man of the Year" awards weren't given out until based upon the '76 season (Rolaids Relief Man of the Year). The "winners" that year were Rawly Eastwick of the Reds and Bill Campbell of the Twins (Campbell won it again in '77 for the Red Sox).
In other words, "closers" were not a common strategic part of Major League baseball until the 1980s for all teams -- and the 1970s for some teams.
Through 1972: Instead, teams would opt for "complete games" for starting pitchers. Except for seasons 1957, 1960, and 1967, National League starting pitchers complete-game leaders would finish over 20 games per season thru 1972. Juan Marichal (1968), Fergie Jenkins (1971), and Steve Carlton (1972), were still completing 30 games each for those seasons...as was Catfish Hunter in the American League (Yankees, 1975)...with 29 complete games apiece by AL pitchers Jenkins ('74), Gaylord Perry ('72-'73), and Mickey Lolich ('71).
1980-1981 It wasn't until the 1980-81 seasons in the National League -- when the league leaders were only finishing 14 and 11 games, respectively -- and the late 1980s in the American League -- that complete games began its decline toward becoming a mere memory of yesteryear baseball.
Except for Tampa Bay's James Shields (11 in 2011), all of the Major League leaders in complete games since 2000 have been in the single digit-category. Year-by-Year Leaders for Complete Games
1994, 2004, 2014 snapshots Complete games for these years show only 8 percent ('94), 3 percent ('04), and 2.4 percent ('14) of games started were completed by pitchers. (Complete Games)
#1 Just as Major League pitchers no longer have to "go the distance," neither do NFL quarterbacks these days. Just as the bullpen arose to prominence in Major League baseball, an NFL "bullpen" -- where warming up the legs may mean as much or more than "warming up the arm" -- may become the NFL of the future.
#2 And, unlike baseball, it's not simply for (lack of) durability or injury pre-emptive reasons: Red-Zone based strategic reasons abound. For example, since Red Zone defenses don't have as much turf to cover, a case could be made that NFL teams with mobile quarterbacks can indeed place more pressure upon coverage alignments.
And that's where a quarterback like Tim Tebow comes in.
In 2011, the Denver Broncos were 1-3 on their way to their fourth loss when Tebow entered to tighten up a losing effort vs. the Chargers.
Under Tebow, the Broncos won 8 of their next 11 games -- including a wild card divisional overtime win vs. the Steelers ... before losing to the eventual Super Bowl AFC reps in the playoffs. (Half of Broncos four losses in 2011 under Tebow were to the Patriots)
Under Tebow, the Broncos still struggled at times lighting up the scoreboard, especially putting together some long drives. Yet once the Broncos got the ball to the opposition's 30 yard line (or inside of that), Tebow made sure that the Broncos scored 84% of the time. (And 58% of those scores were TDs)
Only seven times in those drives to the 30 or inside failed to result in a score...and four of those were simply missed field goals. Inside the opposition's 35-yard line, the 2011 Broncos under Tebow scored 80 percent of the time -- and 56 percent of these scores were TDs. [Note: These above stats include the two playoff games]
In other words, Tebow was a "closer" type of quarterback. He could "seal the deal" of a long drive or convert an opportunistic turnover occurring deep in the other team's territory.
Tebow as red-zone rusher: On 16 Red-zone carries in 2011, Tebow scored 6 TDs and garnered another 6 first downs. (He also ran for a 2-point PAT). As one internet commentator put it, that's "crazy efficiency."
Since 2008 when the Miami Dolphins introduced the Wildcat formation to the NFL, where a run-oriented replacement quarterback was often used for certain plays, the NFL began moving away from a "complete-game" quarterback dominant scheme. (See List of formations in American football for "Wildcat" formation)
Perhaps for some NFL teams, it may need to move to the next phase: Closer quarterbacks...quarterbacks like Tebow who can get the job done inside the opponent's 30-yard line.
The question is: Will Chip Kelly and the 2015 Eagles be such a new paradigm team?
I think it would be great to have a team experiment with the QB position. The position is so important to the team that it is probably the most critical position in any sport. So much responsibility is given to the quarterback that few players can play it well. And when some team tries to have a running quarterback or something, they get hurt easily. Having a team experiment with distributing the role among several quarterbacks and distribute the responsibilities might be good for the game.
Thanks for posting, interesting concept.
It sounds interesting, but I'm not sure how it would work. I guess if you had a mix of QBs with different strengths (e.g. one that is better at throwing long, one that is better with quick-release short passes, and one that was better scrambling/running and evading the blitz) it would give you options. The problem I see is that having specialty QBs might tip off the defending team what you were going to do. You bring in a guy who can throw long - you're probably going to go long. You bring in a guy who can run with the ball, maybe you're going to run. I guess you could use the move to decoy the defense into thinking you were going to pass - but then run - etc.
I would question the pay and quality angle to this. You’d basically have one four-star quarterback, and three two-star quarterbacks. There are certain clubs where this might work, but you’d have to really think and build intensive strategies over this whole idea. And it wouldn’t surprise if the teams ask to expand the ceiling numbers by two or three more players to make this work.
It’s been attempted enough times in football to know that it is not a winning strategy. Football is a different sport from baseball. The rhythm and timing between QB and receivers and linemen is CRUCIAL. Changing abruptly at the most important moment in a game is simply too big of an obstacle to overcome any difference in QB skills that the backup may have. (Also... If he were THAT much better, he would be the starter.)
So, after the starting quarterback figures out the defenses, figures out their weaknesses, knows when to throw and knows when to hand-off, gets on the same page with all of his receivers as to which routes to run and how to run them based on figuring out the defenses, you’d yank the two starting quaterbacks in the fourth quarter and put in two new quarterbacks who haven’t played a snap yet?
That’s equivalent to playing a chess game, and about 75% through it, substituting the current chess players with two new ones who’ve been waiting in another room.
This concept needs to be looked at in positions besides QB. NFL has a philosophy of putting people in, making them go the distance, and burning them out in 3 years because they just get beat to hell. Football is a sport that just burns through people, the average career is less than 5 years. And they don’t make that much money. We all think of the Deion Sanders that have these outrageous $50 million contracts. Most of them won’t make a million dollars over their career, can’t get a decent job because everybody knows their college degrees are bogus jock-degrees, and they’re so beat up that anything physical is pretty much out.
It’s true, your average football player is nowhere near smart enough to make that adjustment.
Interesting.
Anyhow, this: “1972: Even though teams in the 40s, 50s, and 60s used pitchers exclusively in bullpen roles — and some even before that — it wasn’t until 1972 when the Reds’ Clay Carroll became the first pitcher to make a third of his season’s appearances in the beginning of the ninth inning. And that wasn’t to be repeated until the A’s Rollie Fingers did it in 1982.”
Is wrong. Fingers was on Milwaukee in 82 and with the A’s in 72.
To my mind Fingers’ use by the A’s in the early 70’s was the most influential in starting the evolution to the closer of today.
“once the Broncos got the ball to the opposition’s 30 yard line (or inside of that), Tebow made sure that the Broncos scored 84% of the time.”
What is the average % for teams that get to the opposition 30 yard line?
They have tried this with the Wildcat Offense to some extent. We are even seeing the option come back to the NFL. Tebow would work good in both of these offense packages.
Eagles have five QBs..
I wonder why more pitchers didn't ruin their arms back in the 30s and 40s.
Pitchers sometimes pitched BOTH ends of a double-header.
How come it never occurred to managers to have closers as a rule until the '70s?
I'm guessing that if it ain't broke, don't fix it.
If a guy is still getting the opposing batters out, leave them in.
They might have also reasoned that the complete game guys were "wearing out" the offense, too.
They didn't have as many pinch hitters/double position swaps back then either.
Don't get me started on the DH.
Until the 70s, all pitchers had to bat, too, so you could almost guarantee an easy out.
Back to the O/T, unless a QB gets hurt, he's WAY more valuable taking every snap.
Someone like Peyton Manning makes his bones by figuring out defenses, then picking them apart.
A "relief QB" wouldn't be game ready.
Good Q...don’t yet have stat source for that
You are correct...I was going on faulty memory on that & misposted which team Fingers was on at the time...all else was correct
#1, these are professionals, after all...and knowing when to throw & when to hand-off tends to come both in practice, the exhibition games & all preceding other games.
#2...re: "figuring out the defense" & "figuring out their weaknesses..." well, if you have to be an "in-the-game" QB to do that, then why bother EVER -- at ANY level (college, high school, pros) have either some offensive play coordinator or sideline coach call a play?
You make it sound like nobody on a sideline or in a pressbox seat could possibly "figure out" a defense or its weaknesses?
That's gotta be one of the more pathethic, unthought thru comments to float around.
...gets on the same page with all of his receivers as to which routes to run...
Uh, yeah. Each QB does that pre each play. (It's called a "huddle"). And that "huddle" is based upon extensive practices further fleshed out via those exhibition games & previous games I mentioned above!
Quarterback has become so dull. This would be a great way to charge things up — but I doubt the #1 QBs would take kindly to having their stats diluted by 2nd or even 4th stringers.
(Then perhaps you'd have actual specifics on which teams tried it & what the results were)
Football is a different sport from baseball. The rhythm and timing between QB and receivers and linemen is CRUCIAL.
You said: "Timing...between QB...linemen???" Really?
Listen, whatever "timing between QB...and linemen" that's so "crucial" is going to be of necessity on running plays as well. Which, in turn means that whatever "timing" issues are of necessity between a "QB" and a "lineman" are just as crucial as "timing" between a "RB" and a "lineman." (And we don't see NFL teams hesitant AT ALL about putting in new RB in the red zone, do we?)
The rhythm and timing between QB and receivers...is CRUCIAL. Changing abruptly at the most important moment in a game is simply too big of an obstacle to overcome any difference in QB skills that the backup may have. (Also... If he were THAT much better, he would be the starter.)
LOTS of faulty assumptions there:
Faulty assumption #1:
Let's start with that last comment: "If he were THAT much better, he would be the starter."
I reviewed Tebow's 2011 passing stats from the 31-yard line in: Yeah, he tossed something like 8 TD passes...but he was only 20 of 51. (That's less than 40% accuracy).
You see, Tebow's success deeper in the opponent's turf wasn't usually arm-based. And even on many of those TD throws, his scrambling mobility played a bigger role than "timing patterns" that you seemingly want to reduce the entire passing game to.
Which leads then into Faulty Assumption #2:
Which is, that, the "QB skills" requisite deep in the other team's territory is somehow primarily "QB and receivers." Not only does that less-than-40% completion % negate that focus, but the Bronco run-pass ratio for the same part of the field also cuts down that theory:
I looked over those 13+ games where Tebow ran the 2011 offense: After the Broncos got to the 31 yard line -- or inside of it -- they called:
* 54 RB rushes (& 1 WR around);
* 21 Tebow carries (not sure how many of those were scrambles; the 21 doesn't include 1 sack)
* 51 passes
That means, including the sack as a pass play, that the Broncos only passed the ball 41% of the time deeper in the other team's territory. And I'd say, most teams likely run more than pass in those situations as well.
Which, frankly means that in up to 60% of plays in those scenarios, the "timing" between a WR and a QB means zilch...as in zilcho!
Faulty Assumption #3 -- and a BIG one:
If you what you said was "so" about "timing and rhythm," then no team (or at least MOST teams) would dare put in "new" receivers once they got close to or within the red zone!
I mean, otherwise, per your theory, that would somehow "disrupt" all that accumulated "timing and rhythm" the QB & primary receivers "hooked up" on in the previous (usually) 50 yards!
Tell us, Teacher: What specific NFL team buys into that nonsense?
What? Do you claim that NONE of them or MOST of them wouldn't dare put another receiver in because of this "sacred" notion of "timing & rhythm" earned from their own 20 to the opposition's 30???
Plus, what further makes it faulty can be demonstrated even from the first few full games Tebow played as a Bronco in 2011:
In the first full game, tight end Daniel Fells came in later in the game to replace Virgil Green. Fells only made two catches in the entire game...both on the same drive...both from the 31 yards of the opposition or within...One a 28-yard reception he took to the 3-yard line; and then a 3-yard TD catch.
There was NO "timing and rhythm" Tebow worked up with Fells prior to moving into the opposition's near red zone. If the 2nd or 3rd-team tight end or wide-outs are sidelined a fair amount -- failing to "nail down" all that supposed "timing and rhythm" you talk about -- then you've just made the case for them to remain on the sidelines in red-zone or near red-zone situations. Yet, Fells didn't...and the Broncos were one TD richer for it.
That happened yet again the very next game. Fells only caught one pass...a 5 yarder...and it happened deeper in the other team's territory.
Likewise, in game #10 of that season, Jeremiah Johnson only caught one pass the whole game -- an 8-yarder from Tebow. Again, it occurred deeper in the opposition's territory. There was no "timing and rhythm" work-up foundation.
And these days, tho I haven't taken the time to statistically back it up, I notice MANY MANY games where you have multiple running backs and multiple tight ends and back-up wide outs who wind up getting one or two catches apiece for the ENTIRE game. Your "timing and rhythm" scenario for these teams where it's become a reality is a myth for these types of teams as well.
And, going back to Tebow's less-than-40% completion % in or just beyond the red zone, if all that "timing and rhythm" work-up he & his receivers had "layered up" prior to getting to the opposition's 30-yard line was of such import, it didn't seem to kick in for him the later the drive went.
Tebow was a "closer" despite rookie pass miscues he made...NOT because of all the traditional "QB skillset" you want to assign.
Likewise, some relief pitchers in the Majors (Mike Marshall, Charlie Hough, Hoyt Wilhelm) were successful precisely because of the errant nature of their (knuckleball) pitchers and weaker arms...not because of them.
If you were to impose the modern-day "skill set" template of a "closing pitcher" able to zip fastballs anywhere from 96 to 102 mph, then that would leave a fair number of solid closers in Major League history who proved otherwise.
I'm thinking of short-yardage scenarios, and perhaps even on two-point conversions.
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