Posted on 06/04/2014 7:50:32 PM PDT by Retain Mike
In late December 1941, Navy Secretary Frank Knox and FDR met and selected Chester Nimitz to command the Pacific Fleet, which at that time the public perceived as residing at the bottom of Pearl Harbor. Roosevelt said, “Tell Nimitz to get the hell out to Pearl and stay there until the war is won”. Knox informed Nimitz by saying, “You’re going to take command of the Pacific Fleet, and I think you will be gone a long time”.
On Christmas Day 1941 Admiral Chester Nimitz arrived by Catalina flying boat to take command. When the door opened he was assailed by a poisonous atmosphere from black oil, charred wood, burned paint, and rotting flesh. The boat ride to shore engulfed the party in the panorama of sunken hulls and floating wreckage, punctuated by the bodies of dead sailors still surfacing from the blasted ships.
He spent the first days learning everything he could about his new assignment and confirmed the public’s perception was wrong. The dry-dock, repair shops, and tank farm were intact. The carriers, their escorts, and the submarines stood ready to take the offensive. Admiral Raymond Spruance said of Nimitz, “The one big thing about him was that he was always ready to fight….And he wanted officers who would push the fight to the Japanese”.
Nimitz decided some very good men had taken a terrible beating and were now suffering terrible reminders and apprehensions. When he officially took command December 31, he told the assembled staffs he had complete and unlimited confidence in every one of them. As head of officer personnel in Washington, he knew they had been selected for their competence. But if any wanted to leave, he would individually discuss their futures and do all he could to get them the assignments they wanted.
However, there were a few key staff members he wanted to stay with him. They included Commander Joe Rochefort, Jr. and Lieutenant Commander Edwin T. Layton. These men did not provide warning of the Pearl Harbor attack, but later provided the key intelligence allowing Nimitz to take the calculated risks for the Midway battle.
Midway began with this gracious, determined leader bringing the fight to the enemy at long odds. It finished with the fearful sacrifice of a few brave men on that day. To understand Nimitz’s and the flyers tenuous position consider that gathering every available U.S. Navy ship achieved an order of battle for Midway, where they were outnumbered more than three to one. He was also up against better quality aircraft, such as the Zero compared to the Wildcat and Buffalo.
This abbreviated narrative now excludes the contribution of thousands, whose combined efforts provided the vital margin needed for victory. Preparing Midway for invasion and assembling the task forces at point “Luck” to attack the Japanese required prodigious achievements in logistics, ship repair, and naval intelligence. This narrative also does not describe how making more and/or paying the more bitter price for mistakes contributed heavily to the Japanese defeat.
The Japanese transport group was discovered on June 3, but on June 4, 1942 the curtain rose for the carrier battle. At 5:30AM the PBY patrol by Lieutenant Howard Ady discovered the Japanese task force. Fifteen minutes later Lieutenant William Chase’s PBY patrol reported Japanese planes heading towards Midway. The warnings enabled the 120 aircraft crammed onto Midway to get into the air and Admirals Raymond Spruance and Frank Fletcher to launch carrier attacks. All Midway aircraft made attacks against the carriers except for 25 Marine Brewster Buffalos and Wildcat fighters dedicated to repel the attackers. In the ensuing Japanese attack on Midway at 6:16AM, 14 of the 25 pilots died prompting Captain Philip R. White to say, “It is my belief that any commander that orders pilots out for combat in F2A-3’s should consider them lost before leaving the ground”.
The attacks by land based planes on the Japanese carriers began at 7:48AM. First six TBF Avenger torpedo bombers lead by Lieutenant Langdon K. Fieberling obtained no hits, but five of six aircraft were destroyed including Fieberling’s and only two of 18 men survived. Next Army Captain James Collins lead four Army Air Corps B-26 medium bombers rigged to carry torpedoes in the first ever attempt to attack enemy ships. Two of four planes and their five man crews perished, and no hits were obtained. Lieutenant Colonel Walter C. Sweeney lead 15 long range B-17’s over Nagumo’s position in a level bombing attack from 20,000 feet and obtained no hits on the carriers or escorts. Major Benjamin Norris lead eleven Vindicator dive bombers considered so ancient pilots called them “wind indicators”. They never reached the carriers and unsuccessfully attacked a battleship. Amazingly only two fell to enemy attacks and two more were lost at sea because of low fuel.
Next into the battle came Torpedo 3, Torpedo 6, and Torpedo 8 from the USS Yorktown, USS Enterprise, and USS Hornet respectively. In all Lt. Commander Lance E. Massey, Lt. Commander Gene Lindsey, and Lt. Commander John Waldron lead 41 Devastator torpedo bombers. The squadrons became separated (Waldron deliberately so) from their dive bombers and fighters that were intended to accompany them for coordinated attacks. Now alone these 100 mph torpedo bombers had to evade 300 mph Zero fighters, and withstand concentrated task force anti-aircraft fire before launching at 1,000 yards their 33 knot torpedoes against 30 knot aircraft carriers.
In pressing home their attacks, 35 aircraft with their three man crews were lost, except for Ens. George H. Gay, Jr. who crashed in the midst of the Japanese carriers and was rescued by a PBY the next day. The only fighters about were six from Fighting 3 lead by Lt. Commander “Jimmy” Thach that tangled with a horde of Zero fighters and lost one aircraft. Those from Fighting 6 lead by Lieutenant Jim Gray lost track of the torpedo bombers and kept circling at 20,000 feet to protect the dive bombers they never found. Eventually these fighters returned to the Enterprise in total frustration.
The USS Hornet fighters and dive bombers spent a fruitless morning. Commander Stan Ring lead Bombing 8, Scouting 8, and Fighting 8 exactly as directed and then searched to the south until fuel was critical and each squadron proceeded independently. Lt. Commander Robert R. Johnson leading Bombing 8 was unable to find the Hornet and landed on Midway, but 3 of the 14 aircraft had to ditch on the way for lack of fuel. Lieutenant Stan Ruehlow leading Fighting 8 remained determined to find the Hornet, but all ten aircraft had to ditch, and Ens. Mark Kelly and Ens. George R. Hill were never found. That morning there were 29 empty seats in the Hornet ready room. Fifteen seats belonged to Torpedo 8 pilots slaughtered that morning by the Japanese. The 11 were for Bombing 8 that refueled at Midway and later returned to the Hornet.
The Japanese carrier task force had withstood seven separate attacks over nearly three hours without a single hit. Not counting the B-17’s that stayed at 20,000 feet, Navy and Army flyers pressed home attacks with 62 aircraft. Of those 44 were destroyed, 134 of 183 men were lost, and no hits were obtained.
Next Bombing 3 and Bombing 6 from the USS Yorktown and USS Enterprise respectively found the carriers. They arrived over the carriers while the Zero fighters were still at low altitude finishing off the last American torpedo bombers. The 17 planes of Commander Max Leslie’s Bombing 3 delivered three fatal hits to one carrier, probably the Soryu. For Bombing 6, Lieutenants Wade McClusky and Richard Best lead sections that obtained three hits on the Akagi and at least four hits on the Kaga. The Japanese task forces that had been impervious to harm from 7:48AM to 10:23AM saw three of their heavy carriers turned into burning wreckage in six minutes. However, a price had to be paid. Max Leslie’s planes returned safely, but Bombing 6 lost 8 of 18 two man crews.
There was still one heavy carrier unaccounted for, and at 3:00PM Lieutenant Sam Adams of Scouting 5 radioed Admiral Spruance its location. The Admiral had no fighters or torpedo bombers, but ordered Lieutenant Earl Gallaher aloft at 3:30PM to lead 24 planes from three dive bombers squadrons. A half hour later the Hornet launched 16 dive bombers lead by reserve Lieutenant Edgar Stebbins. These 40 aircraft encountered anti-aircraft fire, lighting attacks from Zeros, and superb evasive ship handling, but there were too many planes and bombs. At least four hits and many near misses transformed the Hiryu into the fourth blazing funeral pyre of the day. All three dive bombing squadrons got hits and two aircraft were lost.
There were attacks before and after June 4 at Midway costing the Japanese Combined Fleet other ships. However, the loss of these four heavy carriers achieved by the incomparable skill, fortitude, and valor of these few men proved fatal to Japanese initiative in the Pacific.
One could easily paraphrase Winston Churchill to say never have so many who fought in the Pacific owed so much to so few. Not counting the B-17’s, about 370 flyers attacked the Japanese in around 180 aircraft of which nearly 90 were lost resulting in about 190 deaths. Walter Lord and Gordon W. Prange considered this an incredible, miraculous victory. For Mitsuo Fuchida and Masatake Okumiya, it was the battle that doomed Japan.
Partial Bibliography:
USNI Blog: http://blog.usni.org/?s=Midway USNI Search: http://www.usni.org/search_google.asp Composition U.S. forces http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq81-5.htm
Action Report: USS Hornet (CV-8) Midway http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ships/logs/CV/cv8-Midway.html
Battle of Midway, Commanding Officer, USS Yorktown, report of 18 June 1942 http://www.patriotfiles.com/index.php?name=Sections&req=viewarticle&artid=1096&page=1
Battle of Midway: 4-7 June 1942, Online Action Reports: Commanding Officer, USS Enterprise, Serial 0133 of 8 June 1942 http://www.history.navy.mil/docs/wwii/mid6.htm MK XIII AERIAL TORPEDO http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=1035 http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WTUS_WWII.htm
Martin B-26 Marauder http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B-26_Marauder
Midway Film by John ford http://video.staged.com/localshops/ww_iirare_film__midway__directed_by_john_ford
Valor: Marauders at Midway http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/1986/April%201986/0486valor.aspx
The Nimitz Graybook http://usnwc.edu/Academics/Library/Naval-Historical-Collection.aspx#items/show/849
Japanese aircraft carrier Hiryū http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_aircraft_carrier_Hiry%C5%AB Japanese aircraft carrier Kaga http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_aircraft_carrier_Kaga Japanese aircraft carrier Sōryū http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_aircraft_carrier_S%C5%8Dry%C5%AB Japanese aircraft carrier Akagi http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_aircraft_carrier_Akagi (Therefore average top speed 30.6 knots)
I was there in April. The reason that it is located in Fredericksburg, 1300 miles from the Pacific, is that it is the home of Chester Nimitz, who left the hotel business to become a sailor.
If you're there at mealtime, head for Wheeler's Restaurant, a couple blocks away on Main Street--or Hauptstrasse, as they call it in Fredericksburg--for some barbecue or German sausage washed down with local Pedernales beer.
Against German and Japanese aircraft, the Brewster Buffalo was junk, but the Finns used it effectively against Soviet aircraft.
There were actually a couple of Finns that became air aces flying Buffalos. I guess that tells you how bad the Soviet planes were. I’m still trying to figure out how the Finns came to be flying Buffalos. We must have sold them to Finland before the war started.
The article overstates our peril. Those numbers of Japanese vessels were spread around in three different groups. The aircraft that “didn’t reach the carriers, but attacked a battleship” must have been going south, because there weren’t any battleships with the carrier fleet. The Buffalos were Marine aircraft based on Midway, not on the carriers, etc.
Parshall and Tulley’s recent book “Shattered Sword” is probably the most accurate account of the battle, and makes it clear that it was a near thing, but not Gordon Prange’s “Miracle”. Essentially, when our TBD’s jumped them before they could find us, the battle was over.
apparently finding each other was a tough thing in those days
After accepting the first eleven F2A-1s -- and discovering how inadequate they were -- the Navy refused the balance of the 50-plane order.
Which was then sold to the Finns...
Sorry...SBD’s.
Lentävä kaljapullo
Yeah, it had to do with there being this big wet area. The signposts kept sinking. Seriously, though, you’re right, both sides had moments where luck was the primary agent.
Da Finns, dey got Sisu.
The extent of my Finnish...
lol
Well... you know... I ought to stop relying on memory.
Re: the author’s description of an attack on a battleship, I remembered that the majority of the battleships were with the main force, approaching Midway from a different direction. Nevertheless, there were two battleships with the carrier striking force, and Marine medium bombers did attack one of them (Haruna) at 5:29 in the morning.
So, I stand corrected.
Shattered Sword is a terrific book.
Haruna and Kirishima were attached to Kido Butai. Haruna was attacked by aircraft six times over the 4th and 5th. No hits.
Kirishima was attacked twice by aircraft and once by submarine. No hits.
The British also used some Buffalos in the defense of Malaysia.
Do post your D-Day piece, and kindly ping me. Thanks.
A good pilot in a mediocre plane is usually superior to a mediocre pilot in a good plane. JMO
My father served on the USS Yorktown CV-5 from Dec 1940 until she was sunk at Midway. As an engineer, he was ordered back aboard her after Capt. Buckmeister (sic) realized she might be saved after her initial abandonment.
He was in #2 engine room when she was fatally wounded by torpedoes from a Japanese submarine. He spent the rest of WWII onboard the USS West Virginia BB-48.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.